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CHAPTER 7 
1918 - 1922 
VERSAILLES & WASHINGTON CONFERENCES 
The close of the First World War found the Royal Navy stronger than 
at any time in its history but the British Government, influenced by the 
need to rebuild the national economy, favoured disposal of as much of the 
{ 
burden of armaments as appeared practical. 'Normalcy' would mean some- 
thing a long way below the levels of 1915 or 1914. The Royal Navy with 
global responsibilities and a tradition of being the front line of the 
nation's defence was aware of the need to preserve a strong fabric of 
defence capabilities. Although Walter Long, 
1 the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, stated in Parliament that, 'the naval policies of all past 
governments, whichever party they have represented, have at least included 
the principle that our Navy should not be inferior in strength to the 
Navy of any other power, and to this principle the present Government 
firmly adheres, '2 this was clearly a less firmly stated commitment than 
earlier claims to a pre-eminent position had been. A result of this policy 
was the danger of either dividing naval forces to cover potential threats 
in Home Waters and the Far East or running the risk of a crisis arising 
in one area while the Fleet was in the other area. 
The defeat of Germany had removed Britain's major naval rival but the 
post-war world revealed the emergence of America and Japan as major naval 
Powers. Both countries had massive naval building programmes under 
1. Long, W. H. (1854-1926); b. 15 July 1854; First Lord of the 
Admiralty, 16 Jan. 1919 - 18 Feb. 1921; Viscount Long of 
Wroxell, 1921; d. 26 Sept. 1926. 
2. Parl. Debs., 5th ser., H. C., Vol. 2b, 17 Mar. 1920, 
Col. 2501. 
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consideration and their : respective political and commercial ambitions 
wseemed bound to challenge Britain! s traditional maritime position. ; Iný. _ 
the, past, 'the British, Government had-}responded to any such-challenge by 
building ship 'for ship. -=Financialý, resouroes now precluded such a course, 
of action and the: -answer was sought in-a-series of Anglo-American-, ra 
meetings; 'eulminating in the Washington Naval Conference of-1921-22, to 
achieve änfiequality based on reduction of naval forces. However, American 
'acceptance of British naval disarmament- proposals became dependent on a 
'replacement of,. th6'Anglo-Japane3eýA, 3. liance by°an agreement more acceptable 
t6-the-United States. The, problems-presented to the -. A! inrtra]. ty of prod- 
ucing. sueh°a, formula,, while providing adequate; naval-protection for 
British'interests--in-. -the Far-East were to be crucial because of-the 
, diminishing strength of the Royal Navy. Itýwas--this growing-belief that- 
any future` naval' threat lay°in-the Far-East, coupled with the decision 
, that military planning-was to be-on. the basis that Britain was not expected 
to be involved, in a major war for ten-years, that was to dominate naval- 
planning during, the, 1920' s. ° 
British submarine policy. was not only subordinated tosuch =actors 
but in addition-the wartime successesýof the-German U-boats-, influenced 
'successive British Governments to press forithe total abolition of the 
submarine., ýGradual recognition-of the impracticality of securing accept- 
ance for this policy led towards other proposals to limit the power of 
. the submarine by means of, size, numbers and use. -Operationally, by 1918, 
. British submarines had proved to be a failure in the defensive role, since 
none of the German naval raids against the East coast of England had been 
intercepted, despite the large number of coastal submarine3allocated for 
, such a 
purpose. However, the overseas patrol submarines had proved their 
capability to operate unsupported in enemy waters where icurface warships 
could not venture. With the advent of peace the submarine appeared to 
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have secured a firm place in-the Royal Navy: - Nevertheless. -there was a 
reluctance to-develop a weapon which in the hands of an enemy was a grave 
threat!, to"Britain'sinaval position and national survival. The submarine; -' 
although it had not disposed of a"modern capital ship, had placed restrie- 
tion& on the, movements ofýsurface. warships-and influenced the decisions 
of. -Fleet, Commanders. to an extent out of all proportion to its-'cost. -The 
needýfor destroyer escorts was an admission that the battleship's trad- 
itional, freedom of-manoeuvre had been severely restricted. The result 
was-that the-immediate post-war years-saw the: decline of the Royal Navy's 
submarine strength to, approaimately one-third of: 'its'wartime size. 
- The factors affecting this reduction were-initially related to the 
surrender of the German submarine fleet and the attempts to secure inter- 
national agreement on the abolition of the-submarine. In order to, achieve 
this the British Government were prepared to' consign the entire British 
submarine force to the breakers' yards. However, --the Admiralty recognised 
that if, the attempts to secure abolition failed then it would be necessary 
to continue submarine development and this would be easier. if, a nucleus 
were retained pending a decision on abolition by the other major naval 
Powers. The surrender of'the German submarine fleet was considered a 
prime necessity in 1918-19 because of the immense strain which had been 
placed on the material and manpower resources of the Royal Navy by the 
unrestricted submarine warfare campaigns. ". Moreover, although it was °- 
accepted that. the U-boats had been checked. it was equally clear that they 
had not been defeated, a point which the First Lord, Sir Eric Geddes5 
accepted in stating that another unrestricted submarine campaign by 
Germany, 'would undoubtedly occasion great loss of life and property to 
5. Geddes, Sir Eric C. (1875-1937); b. 26 Sept. 1875; 
First Lord of the Admiralty, 20 July 1917 - 16 Jan. - 
1919; d. 22 June 1957. 
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the Allied and Associated Powers. '4 In hindsight'it is clear that the 
powers credited to the submarine at that stage of'its development were 
exaggerated but still rested on much firmer ground than the images conjured 
up"prior to 1914 by senior naval figures such as Admiral Fisher. Certainly, 
despite the success of the British-submarine forces, the attitude of the 
Admiralty was that Britain stood to benefit more from the abolition of the 
submarine than from its retention. Opposition was expected from the French 
and Italians who regarded the submarine as a relatively cheap means of 
naval defence. However, the conclusion was that even"if limitation was 
the best solution which could be achieved it would still be 'possible to 
reduce the number of officers and men in this particular service. '5 There 
would then beat least a financial saving and it was this theme, coupled 
to the awareness of the destructive power of the submarine in the hands 
of an enemy, which dominated the attitude of the; British Government and 
Admiralty to the submarine in the , inter-war period. -'Even if A/S devices 
could be developed to a level ensuring dominance over the submarine in 
any future maritime conflict it was accepted that large numbers of destr- 
oyer and, eseort vessels would still be required. Such numbers could not 
be'produoed quickly and this necessitated maintaining a large destroyer 
force in peacetime, far in excess of existing requirements for other pur- 
poses. In a period of financial retrenchment this policy was extremely 
unattractive and lent impetus. to the decision to seek abolition. Moreover, 
in later years the motivation to prepare adequate numbers of A/S vessels 
was to become submerged under political and financial pressure to provide 
only those warships necessary to meet the minimum peacetime requirements. 
4. Geddes to Alllied Naval Council, Nov. 1918, 
Arid 1/8542/290, 'Appendix D. ' 
5. First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir David Beatty, 6 Feb. 1919, 
ADM 1/8549/18,279/f. F. 0010. 
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Meanwhile, post-war re-organisation of the warships and dispositions 
of the Royal Navy led to a majör, reduction in the number of "submarines. 
Early in 1919 the remaining submarine flotillas were allooated; four to 
the newly created Atlantic Fleet, one to the Mediterranean Fleet and one 
to the China Station. 
6 
Throughöut the inter-war period, the policy was 
maintained of stationing a strong submarine force on the'China, Station. 
This gradually evolved into the strategic concept of a holding force, in 
the eventrof conflict with Japan, until the main Fleet could arrive from 
European Raters. Due to the vast area of the Pacific the policy was 
always to allocate the largest patrol submarines available. However, 
these boats were usually inadequate in size ändr`endurance for the roles 
assigned to them. Initially, this was due to the restrictions placed on 
submarine development in the immediate post-war years when the hopes for 
abolition were strong. However, even in later yearä restrictions on 
resources and the effects of disarmament treaties on numbers and. tonnage 
of submarines ensured that a design large enough and sufficiently''speeial- 
ised for the Pacific area alone could not be developed. 
Further restrictions on development' were' created` by the introduction 
of the 'Ten Year Rule', approved by the Cabinet'ori 15 August 1919.7 Under 
this rule it was accepted for planning purposes that the British Empire 
would not be engaged in a major war for at least ten years. In the 
6. Admiralty Operations Committee, 14 July 1919, 
ADM 1/8564/210. 
See also: Beatty, 8 July 1920, ADM 1/8602/54. 
7. S. Roskill, 'The Ten Year Rule - The Historical 
Facts, ' Royal United Services Insitute R. U. S. I. 
Journal, 117 (1972)p 69-71. 
See also: P. Silverman, 'The Ten Year Rule, ' 
R. U. S. I. Journal, 116 (1972), 42-45. 
and also: K. Booth, 'The Ten Year Rule - An 
Unfinished Debate, ' R. U. S. I. Journal, 116 (1971), 58-65. 
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absence-of the First Lord and First Sea Lord the Board of Admiralty laid 
down, 8. on the submarine category, that within the framework of at least 
maintaining an equal number of ships to the United States Navy, 'the 
number of submarines in commission is largely reduced, and the principle 
of placing these vessels in Reserve accepted for the first time, ' and with 
particular reference to the submarine, 'the prospect of ten years peace was 
especially borne in mind. '9 The propounding of this policy Followed the 
British failure to secure international agreement on abolition and the 
acceptance that the submarine would continue in military existence for at 
least the immediate future. 
Evolution of the British Position on Submarine Abolition at Versailles 
only eight months before the Versailles Conference the prospects for 
abolition had appeared good. On the eve of the Armistice lengthy discussions 
had been initiated for planning British tactics at the forthcoming Peace 
Conference. In physical and economic terms, Britain had suffered far more 
damage than all the Allies and Neutrals, from the U-boat campaigns of 
1917-18.. Defeat had appeared sufficiently close at one point to ensure 
the belief that the abolition of the submarine was necessary and that, 
'the condition which would most surely guard our 
naval security in the future would be the surrender 
of the whole of Germany's submarine fleet and an 
international agreement that no power was to build 
that class of vessel in the future. ' Even then the 
question of an international agreement was'qualified. 
'The latter condition, however, is only practical if 
a League of Nations is formed with the power and will 
to enforce such rules. '10 
An additional factor was the smaller cost of producing a submarine rather 
than a capital ship. Undoubtedly, Britain's vast investment in the latter 
8. Board Minute No. 924, June 1919, ADM 167/56. 
9. Naval Staff, Feb. 1919, ADM 1/8549/18, 'Post War Fleet. ' 
10. Naval Staff, 10 Nov. 1918, ADM 116/1.861, 'Discussion of 
Draft Terms of Peace with Germany. ' 
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vessel contiibuted to her perceived vulnerability to the submarine,, even 
if only by reducing the resources available for the extra AIS vessels 
needed. The natural conclusion-was, $that the submarine is essentially 
the-weapon of the weaker naval power and that ... the subject'of univers- 
allyT Forbidding the construction of submarines in the future`:.., would 
undoubtedly be in the interests of Great Britain. '1' 
I- These matters were further discussed at a full Board meeting' on 
14 November, when initial recommendations for the naval aspects of-the 
Peace Treaty were adopted. The demand for the surrender of the German 
submarine fleet was confirmed and there was strong support for, 'a"universal 
interdict on submarine construction if the idea of an all powerful League 
of Nations materialises. ' 
12 
This was a firm 'hedging'of the options on a 
final decision and a realistic acceptance that the chances of Britain., ' 
alone, persuading other nations to agree to prohibition' of submarine' 
construction was unlikely. In particular, the French attitude was expected 
to become intractable. The First Sea Lord Admiral Weiyss15 also sounded 
a note of caution; he was dubious about the League of Nations ever being 
established. Even if auch a body were created it was considered unlikely 
that it would consist of more than the Entente Powers and their Allies. 
Such limited membership would restrict the organisation's powers. Further, 
despite this Britain would, 'almost certainly be in a minority in matters 
11. Ibid. 
12. Admiralty, 14 Nov. 1918, ADM 116/1852, 'Board Meeting 
for Discussion on Peace Settlement, Section 3(o): 
Admiralty Policy in Relation. to the Peace Settlement. ' 
15. Weuyss, Rosslyn Erskine, Baron Wester Wemyas (1864-1935), 
Admiral of the Fleet; b. 12 Apr. 1864; 'First Sea Lord, 
Dec. 1917 -1 Nov. 1919; ret. 1929; d. 24 May 1933. 
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affecting sea-power, #14 and this included the question of submarine abol- 
ition. 
Board feelings on abolition were not unanimous and some favoured. 
proposing not only total abolition but also not accepting any compromise 
suggestions on restricting the operational use. of the submarine. The 
proposal was that policy should be directed towards an agreement that, 
'all nations, including neutrals ... agree not to build submarines or sub- 
mersible for any purpose, commercial or otherwise, ' as, 'this, ' was, 'the 
only way to deal with the matter, no agreement as to use of submarines, ' 
being, 'of the slightest value. ' 
15 Various alternative suggestions were 
put forward for use in the event of failure. These included limitation 
of submarine size, restricting this weapon to defence of coasts and ports 
by reducing the operational radius. However, this idea was considered 
impractical. 16 Nevertheless, this was an argument that was to be resur- 
rected during the disarmament conferences of the inter-war period. 
Although a submarine of 'coastal' tonnage might not have the endurance 
to operate in mid-ocean this was irrelevant to the threat to those British 
trade routes which had their confluence in European Waters. 
The question of whether and how to place legal restrictions on the 
use d submarines in war came under the jurisdiction of the Admiralty 
Reconstruction Committee. Their general conclusion was that, 
'a Submarine could only be a legitimate weapon 
against commerce provided that it conforms to. 
14. Wemyss, 1919, ADM 116/1852, 'Terms of Peace - 
Preparation of the Naval Requirements of Great Britain. ' 
15. Second Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Hubert L. Heath, 1919, 
ADM 116/1852, 'Peace Terms - Conditions to be Aimed at., 
16. D. of P., 1919, ADM 116/1852, 'Notes on Matters Affecting 
Naval Interests Connected with the Peace Settlement, 
Section IV: Future Peace and League of Nations - Prohibition 
of Submarine Construction, ' 35. 
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'the laws of naval warfare, - namely, attempts 
to visit and search merchantmen before capture, 
and in case of capture places in safety all 
persons on board and removes the relevant papers 
before destroying the prize. In the present 
stage of its development it does not eonfbrm to 
these requirements. ' This was precisely the 
reason the Committee wished the restrictions to 
be so framed. 'Every'effort should be made to 
ensure the reiteration of the rule requiring 
visit or summons to surrender before any attack 
is launched against a merchant ship. 'l7 
It is difficult to accept that the Committee were prepared to believe that 
a submarine would sacrifice its major advantage of surprise and that a 
State would adhere to this restrictive ruling if it were facing defeat. 
Moreover, although the Admiralty's official view was taken to be in favour 
of total abolition the Committee, 'considered that it, was eztremely improb- 
able'that other nations would agree-to this. '18 
On Ithe use of mines against submarines, which had been successful when 
they were laid in 'barrier' fields such as the Dover Barrage, the Committee 
adopted a'practical attitude and proposed no change in the existing inter- 
national law. ' This was because it was clearly to Britain's advantage to 
possess a+relatively successful amd'cheap i/S weapon. When it was pointed 
oüt'thät if the submarine were abolished then Britain would lose a major 
reason for retaining the mine, it was quickly emphasised that no agreement 
to abilish the mine was likely as all nations considered it a quick and 
simple weapon to produce. 
19 
The final assessment was that, 'as mines, 
controllerL and uncontrolled, at present constitute one of the principal 
17. Admiralty Reconstruction Committee, 1919, ADM 116/1852, 
Section V, International Lair, 57. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Admiral Heath to'Admiralty Reconstruction Committee, 
14 Dec. 1918, ADM 1/8546/329, 'Question of International 
Law - Mines. ' 
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'means of combatting Submarines, it-is essential that until some equally 
20 
efficient method is devised we should retain their use.! 
On the specific issue of abolition,. Admiral Beatty favoured, a vigorous 
attitude whatever the-apparent difficulties and foreign opposition. 
'The submarine, commercially,. is of no use to 
the nations of the world. It has been demon- 
strated that its use in war tends to outrage 
the laws of civilization and humanity when in 
the hands of a weaker power, and there exists, 
a temptation to attack commeree. It is cons- 
idered that Great Britain should take a definite 
standpoint in the Peace Conference that submarine 
warfare should be abolished and the building of 
submarines by any nation should be definitely 
prohibited by_ International Law and the League 
of Nations. '21 
This view was adhered to by the Board who accepted the reoommendation that, 
'there should be a universal prohibition against building submarines ... 
under the guarantee of an inspecting commission having the right and power 
to enforce the decrees of a League of Nations. ' However, a body of 
22 
opinion on the Board, led by the Third Sea Lord, Admiral de Bartolome, 
favoured rejecting the policy of total prohibition. In a closely reasoned 
memorandum he advanced several arguments in favour of a more realistic ani 
flexible policy. Admiralty policy, he pointed out, had been to emphasise 
the submarine as the weapon of the weaker Power. Therefore, it was natural 
to assume that at the , Peace Conference these smaller naval: Powers would 
oppose any proposal by the British to abolish submarines. : 'By making such 
a proposal we, the stronger power, should merely show our fear of this 
weapon and of its tendency to nullify our huge, and at present, 
20. Ibid. 
21. Beatty, 13 Dec. 1918, ADM 116/2150,5252/H, F. 0051, 
'Proposals as Regards Terms of Peace with Germany. ' 
22. Admiralty Reconstruction Committee, Jan. 1919, 
ADM 116/2150. 
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'predominately'surface fleet. '23 Moreover, it was unrealistic to ignore 
the usefulness of the submarine, especially in the reconnaissance role, 
along With'`the fact 'that, 'we have developed submarines more fully than 
any other nation ... and it would be the height of folly to prevent our- 
selves advancing naval design in the direction most open to improvement', 
whilst other may and probably will do so. ' 
24 
Even it an agreement on 
abolition was achieved it would' still be impossible °to guarantee tobe able 
to detect the building of submarines and, 
'no league of Nations employing hosts of 
inspectors could prevent the design and trial 
of submarines perhaps only with small scale 
models in a tank. When the design is complete' 
and the model tested, construction is a simple 
matter, especially as no form of prohibition 
can destroy the knowledge of submarines which 
the world now possesses ... If therefore, a 
nation were determined to build submarines, 
there would be no difficulty in preparing parts 
for erection at any selected locality. ' The 
overall appeal was for a facing of reality since, 
'submarines have come to stay, and it is our 
business as practical people to accept the fact, 
and to do our best to find a counter to them. 
This we are doing, 'and our efforts appear to 
have been attended with a considerable amount 
of success ... instead of attempting to prohibit it we should endeavour to improve it, especially 
in regard to speed underwater. We have the 
leadership in the design and use of this weapon 
and should not throw it away. i25, 
However, the majority of the Board still considered that there would 
be greater advantages to Britain in abolishing rather than retaining the 
23. 'Admiral Sir Charles Martin de Bartolome, 1919, 
ADM 116/1852, Appendix to 'Admiralty Policy in 
Relation-to the Peace Settlement - Proposed to 
Forbid the Building of Submarines. 1 (Posts of 
Controller and 3rd Sea Lord merged Nov. 1918. ) 
24. Ibid. 
25. ADM 116/1852, Bartolome, 'Admiralty Policy in 
Relation to the Peace Settlement. ' (See Note 25. ) 
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submarine. Therefore, the policy was to be one of no compromise. Moreover, 
the hope was that(the French would withdraw-their objections if they were 
offered. advantagesýon matters affecting land and air forces plus security. 
of frontiers. Howe er, there was an awareness of how f]imsy an agreement 
to-any document-could e under the strain of war. 'In peacetime, armaments 
might be out down and the\construotion oP certain weapons forbidden; but 
war is by its very nature unlimited, and attempts to handicap one weapon 
more than another must break down under the stress-of war. '26 Nevertheless, 
no alteration was, made in the policy that: ' 
'It would'be"most"desirable, in the interests 
of this country if the use of the submarine in 
war was absolutely forbidden, ' and, 'an attempt 
should be made to obtain this. ' However, a 
realistic note was introduced in conclusion: 
'There is likely to be strong opposition to 
this proposal and it is improbable it will 
be adopted. 10 
The French were known to favour retention of the submarine for several 
reasons, including the belief that it was not the weapon itself which was 
treacherous but rather the way in which it was used. 
At the mee g of the Allied Admirals on 1 May 1919, the French 
emphasised their view hat the suppression of the submarine was only 
being sought by the wealthier and more powerful nations, whose main 
reason was protection of their investment in large battlefleets. Much 
of this attitude could be ascribed to French weakness in capital ships. 
Nevertheless, the French Government made it clear that any attempt to 
achieve submarine abolition at Versailles or later conferences would be 
26. Admiralty to Imperial War Cabinet, 1919, ADM 116/1852, 
'Freedom of the Seas: The Use of Submarines and Mines 
in War. ' 
27. Admiralty Reconstruction Committee, Feb. 1919, 
ADM 116/1852. 
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opposed. This opposition was also extended to any moves towards legal 
restrictions or limitation of numbers. 
28 However, the Admiralty did not 
press the issue strongly in the interests of post-war Allied co-operation. 
Nevertheless, the attempt to achieve. abolition had proved useful 
practice for British tactics to be used at future naval disarmament confer- 
ences. The immediate result was the production of a policy which accepted 
the temporary retention of the submarine in the Royal Navy and the newly 
created 'Ten Year Rule' was invoked to justify retaining an even smaller 
number of submarines. The Treaty of Versailles, signed on 28 dune 1919, 
did produce one important result in the submarine category, for the 
Admiralty. Under Article 191 Germany was specifically forbidden to 
possess or acquire submarines. Although the signing of the Peace Treaty 
appeared to have ended the threat posed by the existence of. a'powerful 
German navy, nevertheless, the problem remained of ensuring that the prov- 
isions of the Treaty were not violated. Moreover, if the Germans were to 
resort to naval rebuilding a serious question mark hung over the resolve 
of the Allies to use force to prevent this, especially in, the face of the 
war-weary attitude of their populations. This was generally relevant to 
the question of submarine abolition since the construction and equipping 
of AIS forces would take far longer than gar an equivalent submarine force. 
The logical conclusion would be that it was more practical to attempt to 
curb the existence of the submarine rather than press for total but 
probably temporary abolition. As Admiral Heath had pointed out, once the 
world had knowledge of a weapon no practical person could hope to eradicate 
it. Acceptance of the need to pursue the policy of limitation rather than 
abolition was gradually to be recognised by the British but before this the 
policy of eridaction was to be pursued again, this time at Washington. 
28. Admiralty, May 1919, ADM 116/1852, 'Admiralty Policy 
in Relation to the Peace Settlement, ' 4-5. 
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Meanwhile, Admiral Jellicoe had embarked on a mission to assess the 
naval requirements of the British Empire. 'The uncertainty about future 
naval policy which prevailed in Britain left him with little guidance 
from the Admiralty and obliged him to form his own opinion of the naval 
strength needed for the Empire as a whole and base his recommendations 
on this. ' 
29 Jellicoe assumed that Britain's most obvious enemy would be 
Japan whose geographical position would require the maintenance of a 100% 
superiority in capital ships to ensure a superior force in that area. 
This required Britain to retain a. pre-war level of naval forces. 
'But since Japan's naval expenditure almost 
tripled between 1917 and 1921 and a further 
rapid increase of construction was planned 
for the next six years, Jellicoe's ideal of 
a fleet double the strength of the Japanese 
navy in capital ships was a sheer impossibility RIN 
. in, ' Britain's, 'post-war economic circumstances. '50 
Jelliooe also recommended the need for 56 submarines to be acquired by 
the Dominions, at a time when support for abolition remained strong. He 
considered that some submarines would be necessary for harbour defence, 
despite this policy having proved sterile during 1914-18. Most of the 
submarines would be earmarked for reconnaissance, including detection of 
Japanese southward naval movements. 
'These submarines would work from Hong Kong. 
Four more submarines, also working from Hong 
Kong, should be employed in watching the nor- 
thern portion of the China Sea. Four are 
required in the Torres Straits, and the remaining 
twelve should be employed in watching off naval 
bases in Japan, being based on Hong Kong. It is 
important to keep submarines in Japanese waters,, 
as the moral effect alone of such action would 
be great. 151 
29. A. Temple Patterson (ed. ), The Jellicoe Papers, 
Navy Records Society, (London, 1966-68)s, II9 266. 
30. Temple Patterson, II, 268. 
51. Temple Patterson, II, 352. 
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Decisions on all these dispositions depended on the direction followed by 
future British naval policy. In the First*Lord's opinion the criterion for 
this was not to allow naval capability to fall below the level where it 
was unable to meet the obligations undertaken by the Government. However, 
the solution was complicated by the fact that the economic condition of 
the country precluded the maintenance of naval expenditure at anything 
like'a wartime level. Moreover, the Government did not consider'that the 
inter-national situation justified incurring such costs and were more con- 
cerned as to how much could be saved by immediate economies. The Admiralty 
considered that it was too late for any financial reductions to-affect the 
1920 Navy Estimates but, 'for 1920/21 the case was quite different, and 
we are endeavouring to make a programme which will reduce the Navy to at 
least something like pre-war conditions, and so materially lessen the cost 
to'the country. ' 
2A 
note of caution was sounded on the question of 
reducing the naval forces primarily to fit the post-war economic environ- 
ment. 
'It is easy to fall into the error of allowing 
the urgent need for retrenchment to outweigh the 
really essential services and requirements ... 
But until ... measures are actually in existence, 
until they are subscribed to by all the Great 
Powers, we cannot afford to renounce our naval 
position. 153 
The policy of retrenchment threatened the Submarine Service on two 
levels. These included the reduction of existing numbers and the scarcity 
of resources for new construction. Overshadowing these factors were the 
constant policies designed to'achieve international agreement on abolition 
or limitation of the submarine. Despite the decline in submarine numbers 
32. First Lord, W. H. Long to Cabinet, 1919, ADM 116/1677. 
33. Board of Admiralty to Cabinet, 1919, ADM 116/1677. 
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there was strong public support, ' in'"the early post-war years, for the 
submarine as the major warship of the future. This entailed the removal 
of the capital ship from this position, 'on the grounds that they have 
been rendered obsolete by au rinesand aircraft. ' 
4 
Against this was 
a strong body of naval opinion which continued to regard the capital ship 
as the final arbiter of naval warfare. For several months there was an 
intensive public debate among most of the prominent naval, military and 
political figures not barred from comment by the holding of active comm- 
1ssions or public office. The Conservatives posed some good arguments, 
especially that the gun remained a weapon of greater range and accuracy 
than the torpedo or the bomb. Severe disagreement developed over the 
contention that by building bigger ships and providing underwater bulges 
as well as increasing horizontal armour to withstand bombs, the battleship 
could be made invulnerable to attack by submarines and aircraft. Aircraft 
carriers and their aeroplanes were considered not to be the future major 
naval strike force but rather as essential auxiliaries to the battlefleet. 
The resulting roles included reconnaissance, gunnering spotting and 
torpedo attack against a retreating enemy fleet, although only with the 
limited object of slowing vessels down rather than to achieve a decisive 
result. The Admiralty considered that, 'it has been proved conclusively 
that the unseen pressure of the British Fleet, the main strength of which 
lay in the battleships, contributed in no small measure to the collapse 
of the Central Powers. '55 opinion, in general, tended to adopt a sceptical 
attitude to this claim and many felt to the contrary, that, 
54. Board of Admiralty, 1919, ADM 116/1677, 
'The Retention of the Capital Ship. ' 
55. Ibid. 
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'beeause, a'decisive victory over the High 
Seas Fleet would have shortened the war, 
greater risks should have been taken with 
the Grand Fleet. ' However, 'such a policy 
h never commended itself either to the Admiralty 
or to the C. in C. Grand Fleet. The submarine 
Fand mine threats had a cramping influence on 
Grand Fleet strategy, the former by generally 
restricting the operations of the battle fleet 
to open waters in the northern half of the 
North Sea i., and by forcing the capital ships 
and cruisers to procbed to sea screened by a 
host of destroyers ... There were times when 
some of the big ships were left behind rather 
than take the battlefleet to sea without full 
destroyer protection. +36 
The Admiralty held stronger ground in the assessment that, 'the country 
whose fast capital ships and their complementary Units are not contained 
or held by similar enemy ships can, with these vessels, sweep the enemy 
ships and sea borne trade off the seas. ' 
57 
Nor was there any blindness 
to future materiel developments. 'It goes without saying that the great 
IX 
march of science, and the increasing potentiality of submarine and air- 
craft, will exert a profound effect upon the design of larger vessels of 
war and may even cause their eventual disappearance. ' 
8 
However it was 
not considered that the demise of the capital ship was imminent. Never- 
theless, pressure was so intense that the 1920-21 Navy Estimates included 
the unprecedented move of adding the views of the Naval Staff on this 
issue. Admiralty support for the capital ship was firmly outlined. 
'There has been some criticism of the present types of vessels, especially 
in regard to the capital ship ... The Naval Staff has examined this ques- 
tion with extreme care and as a result we profoundly dissent from these 
56. A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Soa a Flow 
(London, 1961-70)v V, 300-301. 
57. ADM 116/1677, Admiralty to Cabinet. (See Note 35. ) 
58. C. in C. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Sir Charles Madden 
to Admiralty, 10 June 1921, ADM 1/8597/9, 'The Capital 
Ship v Submarine and Aircraft. 
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'views. In our opinion the capital ship remains the unit on which sea- 
power is built up. '59 The natural result of accepting the capital ship 
as the arbiter of naval warfare was the preoccupation of tactical exercises 
with the massed Fleet action. However, despite-the belief'in the capital 
ship there was general agreement that as long as the submarine existed 
there would be a need-for destroyer flotillas to protect the capital ships. 
Meanwhile as a result of the Cabinet's endorsement of the 'Ten Year 
Rule' on 15 August 1919 the Royal Navy was to be allocated not more than 
£60 million under the 1920-21 Navy Estimates. The Admiralty considered 
this an unrealistic amount. Even by pruning the Fleet to the minimum they 
considered necessary for Imperial defence, current costs-oould not be 
reduced below £58 million and this figure included no provision for new 
40 probsäte 
construction. There was the added problem of ap -11i. naval building 
race with the United States which would be financially prohibitive for 
Britain. The former possessed the economic power to outbuild Britain in 
all categories of warships, although there was no threat of war between the 
two nations. Nevertheless, it was considered that if Britain relinquished 
her traditional naval pre-eminence, it would have a profound effect upon 
the nation's international prestige, authority, and commercial advantages. 
Beatty pointed out to the Cabinet that, 
'if an understanding with the United States was 
not possible then it would be necessary definitely 
to lay down that a "One-Power Standard" against 
the strongest naval power is the minimum standard ... 
and that the British building programme in all types 
of vessels must be such that this "One-Power Standard" 
is fully maintained. '41 
39. Long, 17 Mar. 1920, ADM 116/1617, 'Statement to 
Parliament on the Navy Estimates, 1920-21. ' 
40. See Appendix: G(l). 
41. Beatty to Long, 18 July 1920, ADM 1/8602/54, ' 
'Necessity of Avoiding a Supplementary Estimate 
in 1921-22.1 
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The situation was now considered to be at a crucial stage and the utmost 
importance attached to achieving an understanding with the United States. 
'No modification of the United States 1916 Programme has occurred, and to 
carry out the Government policy and maintain a "One-Power Standard", the 
commencement of a building programme in the financial year 1920/21 will 
be essential. ' 
42 
However, a building race in the submarine category was 
considered unlikely since: 
'Important developments in regard to the internal 
combustion engine and other factors may be expected 
during the course of the next year, and prior to 
full consideration of these developments, it would 
be unwise to embark on a programme of Submarine 
replacement and construction. The argument of 
gradual replacement in the case of Capital Ships 
does not apply to Submarines, which are rapidly and 
comparatively cheaply built, and it is an advantage, 
therefore, with Submarines to wait and gain the 
result of laboratory and sea trials now being carried 
out. r43 
Overall, the policy proposed was for: 'An alliance or Entente with the 
United States based on equality in Naval Materiel. ' 
44 However, it was 
necessary not to give the impression that the withdrawal from the 'Two- 
Power Standard' was being forced on the Admiralty by economic pressures 
and alterations in. the international situation. 
'I should propose to say that the Naval Policies of 
all past Governments, whichever party they repres- 
ented, have at least included this principle that 
our Navy should not be inferior in strength to the 
Navy of any other Power, and that the present 
Government adheres to this principle; that we are 
fortunate now in that the only Navy approximating 
in strength to our own is that of the U. S. A., with 
-whom we are associated in such a way that the idea 
42. Beatty to Long, 13 Feb. 1920, ADM 1/8602/54, 
'Naval Estimates and Naval Policy. ' 
43. ADM 1/8602/54, 'Necessity of Avoiding a 
Supplementary Estimate in 1921-22. ' (See Note 41. ) 
44. Beatty, 7 Jan. 1920, ADM 116/1677, 'Naval Policy. ' 
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of competition is repugnant to us all; and.,. 
that we hope and believe that if there is any 
.. emulation between us 
it is likely to be in the 
direction of reducing that ample margin of 
naval strength which we. each alike possess over 
all other navies. i45 
Over the next months discussions were undertaken between the British and 
American Governments with the ultimate aim of working towards a conference 
an naval arms limitation. 
Washington Naval Conference, 1921-22: Preparation of Positions 
The United States Government primarily favoured discussion of a 
building 'holiday' on capital ships, a view accepted by the British Govern- 
meat and Adnniralty, although to a lesser degree. Among 'auxiliary' 
subjects to be discussed, the Admiralty saw the possibility to raise the 
issue of submarine abolition once again. This was tempered by an aware- 
ness of the continued opposition of other naval Powers to such a measure 
and it was accepted that attempts at 'coercion' would prove useless. 
Decision to Press for Abolition - Effects of Failure to Perfect Asdio 
British opposition to retention of the submarine by other Powers was 
partly based on the inability to provide an adequate counter-force. The 
pressure to develop a means of nullifying the submarine. was. intensified 
by dependence on maritime trade and-imports. : The major effort was dir- 
eeted towards development of-A/S devices, principally, Asdic. This system 
had been. developed initially by a committee of Allied scientists during 
1917-18 and the name given to the device was based on the initials of the 
committee's title - the Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee. 
The device worked on the principle of projecting a sound. wave through the 
water. This possessed the property of producing an echo when it struck 
any object in its path. The speed of sound in water being known, a 
45. Long, Jan. 1920, ADM 1/8602/54,6Naval Policy. ' 
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measurement of the time interval which had elapsed between the transmission 
and the echo gave the range of the object. The sound wave being undir- 
ectional and confined to a comparatively small axis, meant that the 
direction of the beam gave the bearing of the object. The method of 
using the device was to sweep the surrounding sea with the sound wave 
beam. The 'cone' of the signal could be swept through 560°, while a 
second cone gave a wider search area and once a submarine was located 
the two narrow 'cones' enabled a more accurate 'fix' to be arrived at. 
However, this was still an ideal in 1921 and the effects of the sea 
condition, changes and water temperature and similar factors combined to 
hamper developments to increase the efficiency of the device. 
Development was also restricted by the difficulty of providing 
adequate numbers of A/S vessels for trials and testing. 
'On every occasion I have impressed upon Captain A, /S 
the desirability of getting a unit at work with the 
Fleet flotillas, but up to the present he cannot hold 
out any immediate hope of being able to undertake this. 
Stress has also been laid on the importance of arriving 
at some form of attacking exercise on a Submarine - 
submerged in which some conclusion can be arrived at 
as to the efficiency or otherwise of the attack. '46 
After nearly five years of development of Asdie this was a. blow to the 
hopes that the: submarine could now be mastered. Moreover, a more ° 
optimistic view was not unanimously held in scientific circles, which 
could explain some of the more extreme. efforts to secure anýagreement on 
abolition at the Washington Conference. No attempt was made to gloss 
over the fact, 
'that the stage of development at-present reached 
with anti-submarine detection devices would. not 
justify any drastic revision in submarine policy. ' 
46. Rear-Admiral (S), D. L. Dent to Admiralty, 
5 Aug. 1921, ADM 1/8609/158.1 
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Further: 'A sufficiently advanced stage of 
development has not yet been reached for fitting 
out an Anti-Submarine unit for work with the 
Fleet, and if such were attempted at the present 
time it is feared that the development would be 
retarded rather than advanced. '47 
This reinforced an earlier report which emphasised that, 
'indifferent weather and poor results go to 
show that at present too much cannot be expected 
of the Asdic gear as now fitted. Rolling defeats 
it, and the uncertain motion in a seaway causes 
so many minor troubles in the present design of 
instruments that reliable results cannot be 
expected in weather worse than "moderate", 
however good the results obtained in fine weather 
may be. '48 
The Admiralty's comment was pessimistic: 'Destruction cannot yet be 
guaranteed until greater accuracy in the final stage of the attack is 
attainable and the weapon of destruction perfected. '49 The overall position 
on, providing a successful counter to the submarine not only appeared weak 
but was not improved by the belief within the Submarine Service that what- 
ever improvements were made in A/S devices, the submarine had a future. 
'When an AIS unit is ready to join the Fleet ... Submarines will automat- 
ioally modify their tactics to meet the new conditions. '50 It was conceded 
that: 'No doubt submarines will be able to modify their tactics in such 
a way as to render them less vulnerable to detection and attack. '51 Never- 
theless, the Admiralty preferred to support both the belief that the next 
five years would see the complete development of A, sdio and also moves to 
47. D. S. R. to A. C. N. S., Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, 
Tune 1921, ADM 1/8609/158. 
48. Captain AIS to AM. miralty, 9 July 1921, ADM 1/8609/-158, 
'A/S Flotilla - State and Proceedings. ' 
49. D. of T. D., 26 July 1921, ADM 1/8609/158, 'Comments 
on Report of Captain A/S. ' 
50. ADM 1/8609,158, Dent to Admiralty. (See Note 46. ) 
51. D. S. R., 8 Sept. 1921, ADM 1/8609/158, 'Comments on 
R. A. (S)'s Memorandum of 5 Aug. ' 
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achieve abolition. Even if the latter, policy was successful it was 
intended that development of Asdio"would-eontinue so as to provide a 
safeguard if foreign submarine fleets were rebuilt. However, -the continued 
existence and improvement of A/S devices necessitated the provision of 
expensive and, specialised vessels as-well as crews in peacetime. Such a 
force could not be built up quiekly-in the event of war. -Moreover, if 
abolition. was not achieved, other,, nations were expected to concentrate on 
improving -the capabilities of;,, the + submarine. - :, M 
Washington- Naval, Conference: oll Nov. -1921-- 6 Feb. -1922, 
The strong British delegation was lead by the Lord President of the 
Council, A.,. J... Balfour and the Naval. Mission initially included-the, -. First 
Sea: Lord, Admiral Beatty, and the First Lord A.. H. Lee. 
52 
At, the opening 
Plenary Session, it-was the United"States. delegation which took the 
initiative. by., presenting, proposals on capital ship limitation and also on 
quantitative limitation: of submarine tonnage. In the latter category, 
the British-Empire and, the United, States were to be a3lowed-90,000 tons 
each, Japan, 54,000 tons;. _and Prance : and. Italy proportionately lower 
totals. These proposals were received unenthusiastically by the British 
delegation and they made. their position clear on the submarine question. 
Admiral Beatty. not only pressed for a greater reduction in submarine ton- 
nage but also emphasised that, 'he would welcome total abolition of 
submarines provided that all nations agreed. '53 .. This condition was 
already opposed by many of the amaUer naval Powers, who were not repres- 
enteil at the Conference, as well as by France. Shortly after the opening 
52. Lee, Arthur Hamilton, Viscount Lee of, Fareham (1868-1947); 
b. 8 Nov. 1868; First Lord of the Admiralty, 18 Feb 1921 - 
51 Oct. 1922; d., 21 July 1947. 
55. A. J. Balfour to Marquis Curzon of Kedleston (Foreign 
Secretary), 14 Nov. 1921, Documents on British Foreign 
Policy (London, 1966), 1 ser., XIV, 472-75. 
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Session Beatty and Lee returned to England, leaving naval matter4 at the 
Conference in the hands of, Rear-Admiral Chatfield.: In the absence of 
both, First Lord and First Sea Lord. at the Washington, Conference,, there 
wasta feeling at the Admiralty , that the Royal. Navy was vulnerable to 
pressures within Whitehall directed towards further reduction of all 
three Services. Beatty wrote to his wife on 2 February 1922: 'The 
question of economy is driving. everybody mad, and I believe will leave us 
in more trouble than all the spendthrift governments we have, ever seen ... 
If it continues we shall have no Navy at all, Washington Conference, or, , 
54- 
not. ' 
"" The British considered the submarine to be primari]tiy an anti-commerce 
weapon; 
55 
and qualitative limitation, of submarines was not considered to_ 
be very important in relation to this role. Despite this the question of 
qualitative limitation was intended as a cardinal issue, in any British . 
proposals on submarine restriction if abolition should fail. The contra- 
diction in policy which resulted was highlighted by the reaction in London 
to a speech at the Conference on 15 November., 
'I do not know upon whose advice Mr. Balfour 
gave expression this morning to the position 
that it might be possible to abolish large 
submarines as opposed to small vessels of that 
nature. In many respects it is most regrettable 
that he should have done so. Firstly, this view 
implied that a limitation in the, size of any 
particular class of vessel is feasible and is 
thus opposed to the general policy already 
approved by the British Government. Secondly, 
it is entirely a fallacy to suppose that it was 
the large submarines which did all the damage to 
British trade in the late war. '56 
54. W. S.. Chalmers, Life and Letters of David Beatty 
(London, 1951). (Quoted in B. B. Schofield, British 
Sea Power (London, 1967), 95. ) 
55. See Appendix: G(2). 
56. D. of P. to Beatty, 19 Nov. 1921, ALL 11/5447, 
'Washington Conference 1921-22: Miscellaneous 
Papers, Note 4, Naval Section. ' 
- 210 - 
The, Germans had done most of their commerce destruction with U-boats of 
500 tons and Mittel U-boats of 800 tons, while their U-cruisers had proved 
of little use. British naval opinion was agreed, however, that there 
should be no qualitative tonnage agreement above the 350 tons figure if 
only because larger submarines were considered to be better equipped to 
comply with any 'visit and search' regulations that were agreed to by the 
Conference. Admiralty planning was also at fault in believing that any 
nation'on the outbreak of war would be short of experienced submarine 
crews. 'During the 1950's Admiral Doenitz was to prove that it was possible 
to build up a reserve cadre of officers and men within a small peace-time 
fleet. 
-=''The question of limitation of capital ship tonnage was also influenced 
by'the existence or otherwise of the submarine. United States proposals 
set'the"capital ship displacement at 52,500 tons per vessel. However, the 
Admiralty considered that the continued existence of the submarine entailed 
a larger tonnage-since: 'A restriction in the size of capital ships limits 
the'underwater protection of those ships and so adds to the strength of the 
submarine., * 
P7 
The United States delegation's original policy had been to 
achieve reductions in all categories of warships. However, it was grad- 
ually accepted that the' overall' success of the Washington Conference would 
be threatened if some agreement was not reached principally in the subma- 
rine category. Therefore, the Americans proposed an increase in their 
submarine tonnage and that of Britain and Japan, in the hopes of persuading 
the French to accept a lower tonnage than they were claiming. Accorded 
minority status, France was known to favour large increases in her submarine 
forces. However, the British had come to Washington seeking the abolition 
of the submarine and therefore regarded the United States proposal as likely 
57. Admiralty, Dec. 1921, ADM 116/2150. 
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to open the 'floodgates', it being, Ia strange proposal to lay before a 
Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armament and one which if persisted 
in, will sanction, and even foster a new competition in the building and 
use of war vessels which are far more open to"objection than any surface 
capital ships. '58 The increase to be allowed over existing submarine forces 
was 7,689 tons for the United States, 9,524 tons for Britain, and 25,226 
tons for Japan. 
59 
Italy was to be allowed to build up to one third of 
the British tonnage (an extra 11,744 tons) and-the. French were allowed 
50,000 tons, irrespective of their tonnage demands, which in fact exceeded 
this figure. 
The British delegation realised that the possibility of an agreement 
on abolition was being eroded, not only by the expected French opposition 
and tonnage demands but, also by. such statements'as. that by the United States 
Navy's General Board that the submarine was, 'an effective and legitimate 
weapon of warfare, ' although, 'unlimited submarine warfare should be out- 
lawed. '60 This was damaging because the United States had been considered 
Britain's only certain ally din abolition. Nevertheless, the Admiralty had 
been fully committed to continuing with the approved policy despite the 
evidence that the Conference was moving against an abolition agreement. 
The American proposals were counter-attacked and British policy defined 
as being directed by humanitarian motives rather than fear of the submarine 
as a military weapon. On these grounds, the use of submarines against 
merchant shipping could not be tolerated. Moreover, although the British 
hoped that the submarine would be mastered by future A/S forces, the cost 
58. Lee to Committee on Limitation of Armaments 
(Washington Conference), 22 Dec. 1921, ADM 116/2150. 
59. See ippendiz: G(3). 
60. S. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars 
(London, 1968 , 1, S28. 
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of the latter was considered prohibitive in peacetime. Therefore, once 
again the delegates were reminded that the aims of the Conference included 
reducing national expenditure on armaments, 'as far as is compatible with 
national safety, ' 
61 
a factor on which the politicians and their military 
advisers tended to be divided. One factor the British were agreed on was 
that the submarine remained a serious menace to the sea routes of the 
Empire. Therefore, it was made clear that failing any agreement on abol- 
ition, Britain would be unable to reduce her destroyer tonnage below the 
existing level. This threat disguised the fact that the-economic situation 
largely precluded any increases to this tonnage. Nevertheless, unless the 
United States delegation modified their proposals then the British found 
it impossible, 
'to agree to any of the clauses of the U. S. 
proposals dealing with the smaller types of war 
vessels. No guarantee given in time of peace 
that submarine craft will not be put to an 
improper use in time of war can be accepted. 
It will therefore be seen that any unwilling- 
ness to accept the abolition of submarines on 
the part of other Powers will defeat the chance 
of an agreement being reached on a considerable 
portion of the U. S. proposals. '62 
However, the Americans were aware of the economic importance to the British 
of achieving agreement on naval arms limitation. The additional refusal 
of the French and Italians to accept their allocated submarine tonnage as 
adequate meant a deadlock over auxiliary warships. The only result could 
be that the British threat would fail for lack of credibility. During the 
early sessions however, this conclusion was not absolutely certain and the 
British delegation continued to be energetic in their attempts to achieve 
61. Balfour to 2nd. Plenary Session, Jan. 1922, A] 116/2150. 
62. Curzon to Balfour, 15 Nov. 1921, D. B . F. P., 1 sere., XIV, 475-76. 
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an agreement on abolition. Despite this, many decisions on the submarine 
continued to be made on the basis that it would continue in existence. 
For this reason, the American proposal for a capital ship building 'holiday' 
for ten years was received with minced feelings by the British because of 
fears that battleship development would become stereotyped, 
'while submarine development in numbers, ' Would, 
'still be considerable and in design unlimited ... 
The three leading Naval Powers, ' (Britain, United 
States, and Japan), 'may therefore easily find 
their whole naval position undermined by the swift 
development by Powers like France or Russia of 
large flotillas of far more powerful submarines. '6 
Even a proposal by Admiral Beatty for a slow replacement programme of 
battleships was not considered to solve this problem. One suggestion was 
that a solution might lie in an 'arrangement' with the Americans on capital 
ships in return for support on the submarine issue. 
'We therefore think that acceptance of the American 
proposal in regard to capital ships should carry with 
it the most rigorous restriction of submarine constr- 
uction, if not indeed their complete abolition. The 
interests of the three leading Naval Powers who are 
to be signatories are clearly identical in this request. 
They ought to bring the utmost pressure upon minor Naval 
Powers not possessing battlefleets to conform, and they 
ought to adopt a common policy in regard to the non- 
signatory Powers. Such a line of argument would tend 
to throw Great Britain and the United States, more 
closely together, and we feel it should be thoroughly 
explored, ' for, 'if the submarine can be banned absol- 
utely or restricted to the narrowest limits, very great 
advantages will be repped by the leading Naval Powers. '64 
After consultation, the Government agreed to the recommendation of the 
C. I. D., that the main proposal on the limitation of capital ship numbers 
should be accepted in conjunction with a ten year building 'holiday'. The 
C. I. D. were aware of the possible detrimental effect of such a 'holiday' 
and therefore, 
63. Ibid. 
64. D. B. F. P., 1 aer. XIV, 475-76. (See Note 62. ) 
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it was agreed... that it would be to the advantage 
of Great Britain if submarines were totally abol- 
ished. In this connection it is important to 
remember that the battleships of the signatory 
Powers now in existence are not provided with - 
protection against submarine attack as the vessels 
in the new construction programmes would have been. 
The battleships of signatory Powers would thus be 
placed at an increasing disadvantage during the i 
next ten years, vis-a-vis submarines ... It, there- 
fore, becomes a matter of common-interest to the, 
signatory Powers to minimise the activities of 
-submarines, if not to secure their--total abolition. 
It is important that such limitations as the 
signatory Powers-themselves agree to assume should- 
be pressed upon the non-signatory Powers. 165 
Pressed they could be but to force acceptance was another matter and as 
the other signatory Powers themselves were known not to favour severe 
restriction or abolition of the submarine, this was an impossible target 
to achieve. 
Meanwhile, the latest news from the British Embassy in Paris was 
equally gloomy. 
'It is ... on the subject of the naval disarmament 
proposals as-they-are likely to affect France, that 
most disapproving comment has been made ... France 
has a large coast-line and lines of communication 
with her overseas Colonies to defend ... For this 
ý=reason she must possess numerous light cruisers, - 
and above all, submarines. i66 
French press and public opinion also appeared firm in the belief that 
submarines, 
'were invented by France for defensive purposes, 
and it was always her intention to. build, a large 
fleet of them. Ninety thousand tons, ' was cons- 
idered by the". French to be, 'a very modest figure, 
insufficient to France's needs. But this is the 
.. 
total allowed to'England. France must expect to 
have a yet smaller figure allotted to her. '67 
65. Curzon to Sir A. Geddes (H. M. Ambassador to Washington 
and a member of the British Delegation), 16 Nov. 1921, 
D. B. F. P., 1 ser., XIV, 476-77. 
66. Lord Hard. inge (Paris)to Curzon, 20 Nov. 1921, 
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British submarine proposals were considered to be aimed purely at France, 
allied to attempts to regain-dominance in the"Mediterranean. Finally, in 
so far as the British policy involved attacking the possession by the" 
smaller Powers, the French saw themselves as the champion of-these nations. 
As if to emphasise this point, the Naval Committee of the French Senate 
now tripled proposed submarine construction to 36, spread over the next 
three years. However, it was known that no money had yet been provided 
in the Budget for the first twelve of these submarines, announced-in the 
1921 French Navy Estimates. The action'of the Senate Committee was there- 
fore taken as indicating that the French Government wished to have somer_ 
thing to bargain with in case the question of land armaments arose at the 
Conference. 
The continuing strength and inflexibility of French policy at 
Washington led to a further re-appraisal of British tactics. No advantage 
could be seen in distinguishing between ocean and coastal submarines due 
to-the proximity of France to the focal point of British trade routes. 
Differences of opinion now existed between the British delegation and 
London, with the former declaring faith in the belief that the submarine 
could be mastered and the latter stating that: 'If France has a large 
submarine force in a future war Great Britain might be cut-off for all 
practical purposes from sea borne supplies. '68 The situation on abolition 
was such that the C. I. D. were not above suggesting to the British deleg- 
ation that they adopt an uncompromising attitude on the issue of French 
land armaments and then offer to compromise in exchange for France's 
support for abolition. The suggestion was rightly deelined. since such a 
move would have merely confirmed French theories on British tactics at 
68. Curzon to Balfour, 23 Nov. 1921, D. B. F. P., 
1 ser., XIV, 499-500. 
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Washington. Balfour also emphasised that although efforts would continue 
to be made to achieve agreement on abolition, France and Italy were certain 
to combine against this policy. However, despite this accurate assessment 
of the practicality of the situation, efforts were to continue to dissuade 
the French of the necessity for retaining submarines. France's acceptance 
of a small battlefleet was also considered necessary. If neither of these 
proposals succeeded then the chances of British acceptance of the United 
States' proposals on auxiliary vessels was adjudged to be very slim. 
69 
A 
concession was to be made on the battleship tonnage to be allowed to France 
but only, 'in return for the virtual abolition of the submarines or at 
least the prevention of new building of submarines of any kind. '70 Never- 
theless, it had to be conceded that the chances of success were negligible- 
and that, 'we must consider that the French will probably continue to 
assert their claim to a 60% battlefleet and to the full United States 
allotment of submarines. '71 Lloyd George endorsed the recommendation that 
no further offers of concessions should be made on the other categories. 
However, the latest intelligence from Paris made it clear that the French 
were fully alive to the strategic advantage of their positions on using 
submarines against Britain. Further, they apparently did not contemplate 
signing any agreement inhibiting submarines from attacking merchant ships. 
Balfour considered that the policy discussions at the Conference 
were approaching a crucial stage. The Technical Sub-Committee was expected 
to complete its deliberations on naval questions at any moment, when they 
69. Balfour to 2nd Plenary Session, 21 Nov. 1921, 
ADM 116/2150. 
70. Curzon to Balfour, 27 Nov. 1921, D. B. F. P., 1 ser., 
XtV, 514. 
71. Ibid. 
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would be presented to the main Conference. The United States was now 
considered to have a better, understanding of the British position on the 
submarine but, nevertheless, the best that would be expected was lukewarm 
support on quantitative tonnage limitation. British tactics on abolition 
were therefore altered to include the offer of scrapping their entire r-. " 
submarine force in return for similar action by the other major naval 
Powers. In the probable event that this offer failed, then the policy 
was to accept no restriction of numbers of A/S vessels or on the arming 
of merchant ships. 
Meanwhile., in London, the-debate continued on the wisdom of restr- 
icting submarine policy at the Conference to the issue of abolition. The 
Naval Staff advocated an alteration to concentrate on limitation agreements 
since, 'the question of abolition would appear to be of greater academic 
interest rather than of practical concern. '72 The suggested alternative 
was, 'to endeavourto get the individual displacement of submarines reduced 
to the lowest possible'. -compatable with the defensive. '7 Once again the 
French and Italians proved a major obstacle, since they were known to want 
to use the bulk of their submarine tonnage for-oversea boats. Nevertheless, 
these proposals represented a change of attitude away from total preocc- 
upation with abolition, and from the position held earlier in the Confer- 
ence,, of accepting no policy which implied that a limitation in the size 
of any particular. class of submarine was feasible. However, the question 
of a proposal for small submarines to be allowed to France and Italy had 
72. D. of T. D., 2 Dec. 1921, ADM 1/8616/213, 'Comments 
on Memorandum Submitted by Naval Staff (29 Nov. 1921) 
on "Abolition of Submarines - Remarks re and Proposals 
for Limitation of Submarine of all Powers". ' 
73. Naval Staff, 5 Dec. 1921, ADM 116/3447, 'Possible Attitude 
of French and Italians Towards Abolition of Submarines., 
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been considered and rejected, due'to the proximity of those countries to 
British trade routes. 
74 
On the -question of American support, the Foreign 
Office now tended to the view that this' was unlikely, due to public opinion 
within the United States. The Foreign Office also concluded that the 
French would stubbornly resist any offer, even of an alliance, in return 
for renunciation of the submarine since they had made clear that the reten- 
tion of such vessels was vital to their national defence. Feelings in the 
Foreign Office were that the advent of submarines and aircraft tended to 
remove natural frontiers such as the English Channel and reduce Britain to 
the same position as that of a continental Power. 
75 
.f 
The Admiralty was aware of the weakness of the overall British position 
and their assessment of situation was that, 
'we did not come over here as a wealthy country, 
nor with a Government behind us prepared to back 
our Naval aspirations. We were, and have been for 
the last two years in a position of great anxiety, 
and there appeared no probability that this anxiety 
would be lessened in the future. As long as America 
and Japan continue to build against each other, Great 
Britain's position will be financially hopeless ... 
we have already accepted as a nation, equality with 
the United States, and this in itself cannot be 
reconciled with our requirements in the world. We 
did not accept it from a strategical standpoint, it 
was forced upon us by the financial standpoint. '76 
On the specific issue of the submarine there was considered to be little 
chance of achieving any agreement favouring abolition, despite the possible 
effects of the First Lord's speech at the forthcoming Public Session. 
74. Foreign Office to Admiralty,, 22 Nov. 1921, ADM 116/2149, 
'Notes on the Limitation of Submarines. ' 
75. Sir William Tyrell (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs) to Admiralty, 25 Nov. 1921, ADM 1/8609/158, 
'Views on Report of Captain $/S. ' (See Note 48. ) 
76. Chatfield to D. C. N. S., Vice-Admiral Keyes, 29 Nov. 1921, 
Keyes MSS, 7/12,1-2. 
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Therefore, Rear-, Admiral Chatfield concluded that the most realistic 
approach was to, 
'try to obtain as great a reduction in numbers 
and size of submarines as possible without agreeing 
to restrict ourselves in any way in the numbers and 
types of craft we may build to meet the menace. The 
United States has agreed with us that if we have to 
settle a submarine ration, the three great Naval Powers 
should informally decide among themselves the ration 
for all Powers. I think the United States will help 
us in keeping the ration as low as possible and France 
will have to give way or be in opposition to us all. 
Personally, I do not greatly fear submarines and am 
convinced that the progress of research and science 
either on the line we are going, or on other lines will, 
in the course of time, render them obsolete. f77 
Chatfield could have had little ground for confidence at that stage, and 
his emphasis on the promise of future developments was to that extent a 
placebo. On the attitude of the French, events were to prove him totally 
wrong. There was also the view that any threat stemming from French and 
Italian possession of the submarine was exaggerated, although the reasons 
advanced to support this theory appeared dubious, emphasising as they did 
that French and Italian submarines were too inefficiently handled to carry 
out a commerce war. 
78 
Clearly, effect rather than accuracy appears to have 
been the motive behind this report. 
The Admiralty now accepted that it was likely the British delegation 
would have to settle for an agreement on limitation rather than abolition. 
The Naval Staff considered that a qualitative limit of 1,200 tons would be 
a suitable figure. This limit meant that few existing submarines would 
have to be scrapped and therefore it was hoped that the other major Powers 
would be more amenable to qualitative limitation than they had been to 
abolition. 'Whatever the outcome, however, it was accepted that in the 
77. Ibid. 
78. Keyes MSS, 7/1.2. (See Note 76. ) 
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event of retention of the submarine it was extremely important not to 
throw away what advantages were held in the development of the existing 
British force. This was estimated to hold a lead of approximately five 
years, following the removal 'of the Germans from submarine possession or 
development. In addition, various views were now advanced by different 
groups to support retention of the British submarine. Despite their pre- 
Conference opposition even the Naval Staff were prepared to advance a 
proposal. ' This, despite the evidence of the First World War was that. 
'The submarine is indispensable to us at advanced and poorly protected 
bases. '79 The Naval Staff also favoured the continuing use of the subma- 
rine in the reconnaissance role, where it had'been very successful between 
1914-18. Others led by the D. of G. D., argued that in any future maritime 
conflict it would be possible for an enemy to build up a submarine force" 
much more rapidly than Britain could develop and construct A/S forces. 
Therefore submarines in the Royal Navy in peacetime would be useful in 
providing training for a permanent AIS force which the retention ' of the 
submarine by other Powers would make necessary. Failure to provide and 
adequately train such a force meant that, 'this country with its far 
distant Dominions and long and vitally important Trade Routes would be 
at a very serious disadvantage. ' 
80 
However, the economic disadvantages 
which had brought the British to-Washington precluded official support 
for'the retention of the submarine purely on the grounds of AIS training 
or protection of overseas bases. However, the same economic and political 
restrictions affected the provision of adequate numbers of major surface 
79. Naval Staff, 4 Dec. 1921, ADM 116/2149, P. D. 01664/21, 
'Notes on the Abolition of Submarines. ' 
80. D. of G. D., 6 Dec. 1921, ADM 1/8616/215, 'Views on 
Naval Staff Memorandum of 4 Dec. 1921.1 
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units and ensured that the question of port defence, especially in the 
Far East, remained at least a factor affecting naval policy on the subma- 
rine throughout the inter-war period. Opposition to retention for AIS 
training tended to stem mainly from the consequent need for lavish expend- 
iture on AIS forces and it gradually became official policy to link 
submarine and A/S forces together in disarmament negotiations. Logically, 
it was considered that the fewer the submarines allowed to foreign Powers 
the greater would be the advantage to Britain in terms of a reduced need 
for A/S forces. 
Meanwhile, the Naval Staff urged that. the advantages to Britain of 
abolishing the submarine now depended to a certain extent on the, theatre 
of operations.. In European waters, abolition was considered. an advantage, 
while in the, Far East submarines were regarded as useful for local defence 
and to fight holding actions until. the arrival of the main Fleet. In late 
December 1921 Vice-Admiral Keyes came out strongly in favour of limited 
retention. ! I, have never considered that total abolition-is a practical 
proposition and-am strongly of the opinion that a limited retention is 
really in our best interests. ' 
81 
There was also the apparently insoluble 
problem in any submarine agreement, of not only persuading the non- 
signatory Powers to sign but, also ensuring that they did not renege. 
Therefore, the reason for the continued pursuance of the abolition policy 
as Washington became largely one of tactics, with the object of gaining 
concessions in other categories. Instructions to the British delegation 
were that: 
'We are not binding you in any way about the 
construction of cruisers and small craft of 
every kind. That is a different and far more 
81. Keyes to Chatfield, 10 Dec. 1921, Keyes MSS, 7j12, 
'Abolition of the Submarine. ' 
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'complicated side` of the question and although - 
we would pay a great deal for the complete 
abolition of the submarine, -yet if this cannot 
be attained we are sure British interests will 
not be injured by complete freedom of construc- 
tion. The purely naval interests of Great 
Britain Rill be well secured by a ten year absolute 
naval holiday in capital ship construction plus 
perfect freedom in the construction of smaller 
craft. Alternatively, they would be well secured 
by the said naval holiday in capital ships pluk 
the abolition of submarines and a Limited constr- 
uction of smaller craft which took proper account 
of our need in this respect. This second alterna- 
tive however is more complicated and doubtful than 
the first, and an agreement would probably be far 
more difficult to arrive at. i82'' 
On the 19 December the British delegation forwarded a, request°to the 
Americans for a public Session of the Conference, in order to make, a final 
plea for abolition. 
85 
The'United'States Secretary of State made it clear 
to Balfour that while he'agreed with the British view; ' his naval advisers 
and the Advisory Committee, which wielded strong influence, did not. More- 
over, within the Conference, all the Powers, except the United States, had 
already declared their opposition'to abolition and, in a public session 
would be supported by a majority of the interested smaller nations. 
Finally, it was suggested that if the British were agreeable to present 
their views in a private Session then there was ,a good chance of revised 
proposals from the United States. These would be aimed at ,a flat rate 
limit of 40,000 tons for each of the major Powers and a resolution against 
the misuse of submarines. 'Despite reservations-about the value of such 
resolutions, Balfour agreed to put the suggestion of a private Session to 
the British delegation. 
84 
There it was decided to agree with the American 
82. Curzon to Balfour, 9 Dec. 1921, ýD. B. F. P., 1 ser., XIV, 545. 
85. British Empire Delegation, 19 Dee. 1921, ADM 116/34479 
'14th Meeting. ' 
84. Balfour to Curzon, 19 Dec. 1921, D. B. F. P., 1 ser., XIV, 567-68. 
See also: British Empire Delegation, 20 Dec. 1921, 
ADM 116/3447, '15th Meeting. ' 
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request and `put the case before 'the Committee on'Limitation of Armaments-85 
The attitude of the American press was that with opposition from four 
Powers, Britain would'not achieve abolition. Certainly, the British 
Government was-in receipt of reports from Paris that French political 
opinion remained. determined, to ensure no curtailment of submarine constr- 
uction. 
86 
t. ý. - 
On°the 22 December,, Lee began his'speech by admitting that on the-' 
proposal fork abolition, the British delegation found itself unsympathetie 
to the-United States-, delegation'a latest proposals. 'Attempts to disprove 
that the submarine was a necessary weapon for-the-weaker Power led himýto 
attempt reasons'why itýwas inadequate for coastal', defence. ' On the evidence 
of the First World War, Lee-. was making = a', correct' statement, although 'for 
the wrong reasons, and despitethe, views of"the'Naval'Staff. 
87 
Many of'the 
differences between-established facts' and `statements in this-speech were 
the result-'of the need-to tailor it '- to fit the"proposal "for''äbolition. 
Thus, despite-the recent-reports on the existing-limitations-of Asdio., - the 
attitude adopted was thatrin'"future-wars the submarine would have little 
chance of success;. 'against properly''equippedfleets of , evenindividual 
modern warships-' . True or not; the fatal fact was that as-a result of 
88 
Washington-and later naval arms limitation treaties, the bulk of the 
Royal Navy was to, consist of-modified First World War designs which could 
not be construed as properly equipped or modern: Meanwhile, claims that` 
ý, ark 
85. Balfour to Curzon, 22`Deo. '192l D. B. F. P., 1 ser., XIV, 569. 
86. D. N. I., 21 Dec. 1921, ADM 116/2150. 
87. Naval Staff, June 1921, ADM 1/8948, 'The Naval Situation 
in the Event of War Between Japan and the United States. t 
88. 'e]ß+ä 116/2150, Lee to Committee on Limitation of Armaments. 
(See Note 58. ) 
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the U-boat I had proved ineffective against the British Fleet ignored 
both its effect on naval tactics, with large numbers of destroyers needed 
to screen the Fleet at sea, and the success of the submarine against mer- 
chant shipping. However, whatever arguments were advanced it was accepted 
that Franch remained the main stumbling block to an abolition agreement. 
Attempts were therefore made to undercut the French position, including 
the desperate offer'to scrap'the entire British submarine- force, if-the 
other Powers did likewise:, -="-Although failing abolition,, the. logical step 
was to seek some form'ofýlimitation of tonnage and/or use, for the purposes 
of this'speech it was maintained` that no alternatives to abolition would 
be acceptable'to the British. The speech was obsolete before it was 
given, with Conference opinion already inform opposition to abolition. 
This weakn ss was reflected. "in the'tone of desperation which permeated 
the entire presentation and culminated in the proposed reaction-to any 
refusal of the smaller, Powers `to abandon the submarine. 'If, however, 
the Great Naval Powers-having a self-denying ordinance, should find them- 
selves'. exposed to hostile action by smaller States practising methods of 
piracy, they would find means -... 'of : bringing Nemesis upon the-trans- 
gressor., 
89 
This was an`impressive piece-of'rhetoric{but more hypo- 
thetioal than practical As the record of international co-operation and 
the League of Nationa'Was. -to prove. 
""'The practical' effects of Lord Leef9. speech were also negligible, as 
the American Press pointed'out. 
"We could have wished that it had been aV 
representative of the United States and not 
the First Lord of the British Admiralty who 
presented the case. Great Britain has more 
lines of communication by sea than any other 
89. ADM 116/2150, Lee to Committee on Limitation of 
Armaments. (See Note 58. ) 
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'Powers and would. therefore benefit more than' 
any other if the submarine were outlawed or 
closely limited. in number and tonnage. Coming 
from Lord Lee the argument for reduction has 
an. air of special pleading which militates 
against its acceptance. ' Nevertheless, the 
conclusion was that it would, 'be found far 
easier to prevent the forging of these weapons, 
either at the present, Conference or later, than 
to place reitrictions on the uses to which they 
may be put after they have been made. 190 
Following Lee's speech, Sir Maurice Hankey wrote to the Prime Minister that, 
'we shall be beaten in regard to the abolition of submarines ... After that, 
I am not. clear, at the moment of writing that we know exactly what we are 
making for, except that if submarines are retained., we must insist on a 
free hand in anti-submarine aotivities. '91 Within a few days the situation 
had further deteriorated when the French refused to accept a quantitative 
tonnage limit below 90,000 tons... In effect this was a claim for parity 
with the figures proposed, by, the United States for itself and Britain., A 
strong feeling existed among. the British delegates that the acquisition 
of such a large submarine force by France could only be directed against 
Britain, since they could see no other logical reason to justify the 
tonnage. demanded. The proximity of, British trade routes to France, 
especially. those leading through the Mediterranean, provided the most 
sensitive reason for the British opposition to expansion of French subma- 
rine forces, even if the latter's purpose was claimed to be defensive. 
Attempts were made to brand the French as supporters offunrestricted 
submarine warfare and reference was made to statements by Admiral de Bon 
and articles by Capitaine de Fregate Castex, in which the latter had 
90. 'New York World', 24 Dec. 1921, ADM 116/3447. 
91. Hankey to Lloyd George,, 22 Dec. 1921, D. B. F. P., 
1 ser., XIV, 569-75. 
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appeared to justify the unrestricted use of submarines. 
92 
The question 
was settled by the French repudiating both'the article and the interpret- 
ation by Lord Lee. 
Following the failure over ' abolition the British delegation was 'not 
wholly committed to achieving agreement on submarine tonnage limitation. 
The French request for 90,000 tons was considered totally unsatisfactory 
but United States proposals for a maximum of 60,000 tons'with France, ' 
Japan, and Italy being restricted to their existing tonnage (51,390: 
311452: 21,000), were more acceptable. However, all prospects of such an 
agreement were destroyed by the'French reiteration of their'refusal to 
accept less-than 90,000 tons. 
t 
Root Resolutions 
Despite the original British view that rules governing the conduct 
of submarine warfare were unenforceable in 'war, the Conference now turned 
to consideration of such proposals. The Admiralty view was that, 'it 
should be made quite clear to the United States Government that the 
British Delegation are not empowered to discuss rules of methods of 
warfare at sea. '93 This was reaffirmed following the news that the 
United States had decided to submit suggestions for rules on the conduct 
of 'submarine warfare. The British were also concerned about the other 
Powers seizing this issue as an excuse to curtail the practice of sear- 
ching neutral merchant shipping on the high-seas during wartime. However, 
because of the probability of becoming isolated from the position held by 
92. 'Synthase de la Guerre Sous-Marine, ' La Revue Maritime, 
Jan. 1920,162-63. (Quoted in ADM 11675-"- 
95. Admiralty to C. I. D., Deo. 1921, ADM 116/1852, 
Paper no. 277B. 
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the other major Powers, the recommendation was that initially the-British 
delegation should propose that 'submarines should be guided by the existing 
rules for "visit and search" already approved by International Law for war- 
ships"generally and that, ' submarines, '... should signify their willing- 
ness to adhere to such rules'as long as they are observed by the ' '' 
adversary. '94 If accepted, this meant that all but'the largest submarines 
would be precluded from attacking merchant ships, since they could not 
carry prize crews or accommodate prisoners. Stress was also laid on the 
fact that no other regulations were to be accepted for the conduct of 
war at sea; any agreement for restricting submarine warfare was not cons-' 
idered to provide adequate safeguards'for the British Empire, nor was any 
such agreement to be'considered as restricting the prosecution of AIS 
measures by Britain. 
The need to accept a policy on restriction of submarine operations 
was considered to be, 'a plain and logical outcome of'... failure to 
secure the abolition of submarines at the present Conference. '95 Never- 
theless, it was now realised that the failure of the abolition' policy 
meant that some form of legal restrictions would. have to be agreed upon 
and this made it necessary to secure the best possible terms for Britain. 
consisted of three resolutions Initial proposals, by Mr. Elihu Root, 
96 
which became known as the 'Root Resolutions'. For obvious reasons, the 
British favoured such clauses as: 'A merchant vessel must not be attacked 
unless it'refuses to submit to visit and search after warning. '97 This 
94. Naval Staff, 27 Dec. 1921, ADM 116/2149, 'Rules for 
Submarine Warfare Against Merchant Shipping. ' 
95. Ibid. 
96. Root, Elihu, United States Secretary of State, 1905-09; 
member of the U. S. Delegation at Washington Conference, 
1921-22. 
97. See Appendix: H(1). 
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restriction, if obeyed by a submarine commander, removed the element of 
surprise inherent in underwater attack by forcing the submarine to operate 
on the surface. In addition, the British were adamant that they would 
favour defensive arming of merchant shipping since this enhanced the 
chances of survival against the submarine which was more vulnerable on the 
surface. However, the arguments proved inconclusive over whether use of 
defensive armament made a ship's civilian crew into servicemen. Another 
useful clause for the British concerned the fate of passengers and crew. 
Under the Resolutions the merchant vessel could not be sunk until civilians 
had been transferred to a place of safety. In this case, the ship's boats 
were not acceptable as conforming to such a requirement. Clearly, with- 
out surface support the submarine could not accommodate prisoners. 
There was no disguising that the Root Resolutions contained weak- 
nesses, nevertheless, the Admiralty hoped that a belligerent Power would 
adhere to such an agreement, at least in the initial stages of a war, in 
order to increase or retain neutral support. Moreover, in the event of a 
violation, some of the major Powers might be prepared to enforce the 
Resolutions, if these were to their advantage. However, this was a slim 
possibility, not one to be relied on. Specific Admiralty doubts on the 
wording of the Resolutions were concentrated in two areas. These concerned 
Resolution IV, termed the 'Piracy Resolution', and the traditional policy 
of blockade. Balfour emphasised the strength of feelings, in a telegram 
to the Prime Minister. 98 Originally, Resolution IV had affected only 
submarine officers, but, as a result of amendments by the Italians, 
criminal responsibility for violating the rules was extended to include 
the officers and crew of surface warships as well as submarines. British 
98. Balfour to Lloyd George, 13 Jan. 1922, D. B. F. P., 
1 ser., XIV, 598-601. 
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reaction was unfavourable. 
'Great Britain is compelled to, keep submarines 
and a resolution of this nature will imperil our 
submarine personnel. Officers will not remain in 
a service where they ... in consequence of some 
slight error of judgement involving the destruc- 
tion of a merchant ship ... may be called before 
a foreign court and condemned offhand as pirates. '99 
In addition, Resolution IV was not considered a real deterrent. Much of 
the unease felt by the British delegation stemmed from the faot that the 
term piracy had previously only been accepted as describing the actions 
of forces acting without legal authority. 
00 On these grounds, Resolution 
IV could be interpreted as meaning that only five Powers were competent 
to frame international law. This was clearly impractical even allowing 
that such law only existed under the voluntary acceptance by sovereign 
states of any or all of its provisions. Confirmation of this belief that 
interpretation of international law was essentially subjective was supplied 
by the view that: 'Generally it may be observed that in all the resolu- 
tions except the fourth one we have merely restated in emphatic and 
authorative terms what Great Britain has always regarded as part of 
existing international law. 1101 Nevertheless, if Britain adhered to the 
existing draft of Resolution IV as recommended, 102 then by existing law 
it would only apply to the Signatory Powers and they in turn would have 
to ratify any agreement on the Resolutions before they became effective. 
Failure to achieve ratification precluded persuading any non-signatory 
Powers to adhere to the Resolutions. 
99. Chatfield (Washington Delegation) to Admiralty, 
3 Jan. 1922, ADM 1162149. 
100. British Empire Delegation, Jan. 1922, ADM 1/8622/54, 
51st Meeting. 
101. D. B. F. P., 1 ser., XIV, 598-601. (See Note 98. ) 
102. British Empire Delegation, Feb. 1922, ADM 116/3447, 
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The other area of concern to the British involved the policy of 
blockade. Traditionally, blockade had been one of the most valuable 
weapons of British sea power and attempts to blunt this weapon had always 
been firmly resisted. However, the First World War had seen an alteration 
in the system of blockade, occasioned by the advent of new technology. 
The old policy of close blockade had been Abandoned in favour of a distant 
blockade. The failure to achieve abolition of the submarine meant that 
the question of blockade had to be re-studied, not only in relation to 
these boats preventing a blockade but also in their use to enforce a 
blockade. The majority view, at Washington, was that the submarine could 
not be used in any form of blockade; a decision finally accepted by the 
British. All Conference Powers finally agreed to recommend the four Root 
Resolutions, renamed the Root Treaty, to their respective Governments for 
ratification. This was the only agreement on submarines reached at the 
Conference and even this was nullified, when later the French Senate 
refused to ratify the document. The repercussions of the Washington 
Treaty on the Limitation of Armaments, signed on 6 February 1922, on 
British submarine policy were still unresolved several months later. The 
majority of problems sprang from the Root Treaty. Clarification was 
sought on whether submarine personnel accused of being quasi-pirates could, 
'only be tried in a country where legislation has been passed defining the 
violation of these laws of war as equivalent to piracy. '105 The legal 
ruling was that, 
'enemies can never commit acts of piracy on each 
other, their depradations being deemed mere acts 
of hostility. ' Moreover: 'The taking, ' of a 
ship, 'to be piracy must be without authority from 
103. Admiralty Legal Staff, 25 Feb. 1922, ADM 1/8622/54, 
'Washington Conference: Root Resolutions Regarding 
the Use of Submarines - Legal Questions Involved by r 
the Piracy Resolution. ' 
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'any prince or state, for a nation never can 
be deemed pirates. ' However: 'Subject to 
the above, though the act can be done by a 
foreigner, and outside British territory 
e. g. on the high seas, a British Court can 
try a pirate. '104 
Despite this ruling; as late as 1926 the Admiralty considered it necessary 
to state that, 'if in a naval war we were forced to sink merchant ships as 
a reprisal we might have to suspend or abrogate this provision in our Act 
(i. e. Washington Treaties). '105 This also ignored refusals to ratify the 
agreement which meant it was already null and void under international law. 
During July 1922 a detailed report on the Washington Conference was 
presented to the First Lord. This drew attention to an apparent inconsis- 
tency in British naval policy, stemming from. a recommendation to the 
Dominions by the Admiralty that submarines should be included in their 
naval forces. In hindsight this appeared difficult to reconcile with 
official British policy at Washington, 'where a policy total abolition 
was advocated. '106 This inconsistency stemmed from the fact that there 
were advantages as well as disadvantages in the use of submarines. Although 
an agreement on abolition would have been preferred, the Admiralty had no 
delusions about the value of submarines 'based on war experience confirmed 
in Fleet exercises which had since been carried out. ' The Root Resolutions, 
'although admirable in intention cannot be relied upon when formulating war 
plans for the defence of commerce. ' 
107 
Taken together these points 
resulted in the Admiralty considering that no inconsistency of policy existed 
and this led to the recommendation being placed before the 1925 Imperial 
Conference. 
104. Ibid. 
105. Admiralty, 1926, ADM 1/8700. 
106. Naval Staff, July 1922, ADM 116/5165, 'Root Resolutions 
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if the Washington agreements were allied to the 'Ten Year Rule' then 
the naval defence of the Empire was likely to be in a perilous position 
unless additional provisions were made for defence requirements. The 
Admiralty considered that despite the economic situation of the nation, 
efforts should be made to build up military strength rather than rely on 
the paper promises of other nations. One effect of the reliance on Treaty 
provisions as a means of national security was seen in the decision to 
replace the Anglo-Japanese naval alliance with a Four Power Pact. Thus: 
'The strategic situation in the Western Pacific has changed for the worse 
...; now, until the arrival of the main fleet two classes of vessels will 
108 
be of the utmost value in the Pacific. ' One of these was the submarine 
but in 1922 no new British submarine had been laid down for four years and 
the total submarine strength in the Royal Navy had declined to less than 
50 boats. 
,, ze 
Although the Washington Conference achieved agreement on limitation of 
battleship tonnage it failed in a similar respect with submarines and 
military aircraft, both of which were potentially more important weapons 
than battleships. Obviously this is clearer today than in 1922 when the 
battleship continued to be considered as the mainstay of any navy. The 
success of the British submarine during 1914-18 appeared to have secured 
ti 
its place in the Royal Navy. In less than twenty years this vessel had 
been developed from a coastal boat with limited endurance to designs 
capable of an endurance of several thousand miles in all seas and weathers. 
Nevertheless, in common with all other categories of naval vessels the 
submarine force was rapidly reduced in numbers. Moreover, to many people, 
108. ADM 116/5165., Naval Staff, 'Root Resolutions. ' 
(see Note 106. ) 
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in a negative way, the abolition of the submarine appeared to provide 
greater advantages for Britain than retention. Besides the hostility and 
fear which stemmed from the experience which the Royal Navy had gone 
through in 1917 at the hands of the Germans, the Submarine Service had 
also to contend with the attitude which saw the submarine as a threat to 
the battleship; this attitude was enhanced by the difference in the cost 
of the two weapons. Undoubtedly, in this sense, Britain's investment in 
battleships contributed to her perceived vulnerability to the submarine. 
Although the Admiralty reaffirmed the Navy's faith in the battleship it 
was not ablivious to the advances of technology; but it still believed 
that the demise of the battleship was not imminent. Therefore, the prep- 
aration of naval policy for the Washington Conference did not relate to 
submarine construction in the same way as it affected capital ship 
programmes. 
In the immediate post-war period only the continued possession of 
the submarine by the other major Powers and the need to retain continuity 
of knowledge prevented the total eclipse of the British submarine force. 
Development was therefore limited by the Admiralty to the minimum level 
considered necessary to meet these requirements. Thus, although proposals 
on submarine abolition had been vigorously pressed at Washington, they 
were not as important either domestically or internationally as the capital 
ship proposals. As far as capital ships were concerned the French were 
resentful over what they considered to be relegation to second rank status. 
The Japanese were also bitter, not only on the question of the ratio 
allocated to them but also over the severing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 
Although the Four-Power Pact left Japan in a potentially powerful position 
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in the Pacifio, the more militant elemen's in Japan regarded the overall 
Washington Conference as a diplomatic defeat. These were resentments 
which threatened to bear fruit in differing ways in the future. In 
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Britain, naval opinion brought up on a tradition of a 'two-power' standard 
was not unnaturally unenthusiastic over the results of the Conference. 
The reluctance to accept a voluntary sharing of global naval power was 
understandable as Britain had a far greater need of a navy than any of 
the other major Powers. Nevertheless, the realities of economic weakness 
could not be avoided and even the most passionate 'two-power, supporter 
had to accept the realisation that results of a naval race were now economic 
ruin for Britain. For the Submarine Service the period following the 
Washington Conference was one of struggle, marked by the Government's 
determination to continue pressing for abolition of the submarine, allied 
to financial stringency and a restriction on resources for development and 
construction. 
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I, nVAT TLO at 
1925 - 1927 
DOMESTIC SUBMARINE POLICY AND THE 
1927 TRIPARTITE NAVAL CONFERENCE AT GENEVA 
The failure of the Washington Naval Conference to produce an agree- 
ment on abolition marked the end of the first phase of British post-war 
submarine policy, and resulted in a reassessment of the Royal Navy's 
submarine requirements. An Admiralty conference was scheduled for early 
May 1922 so as to assess the possible submarine models that might be 
required. 
I 
In the general financial climate of the time there could be 
no possibility of producing improvements to all the types of submarine 
with which the Royal Navy had ended the War. As the Anglo-Japanese Alli- 
ance was not to be renewed in 1922 a requirement arose principally for a 
new overseas patrol submarine, with increased endurance and habitability, 
for deployment in the Far East. The Naval Staff considered submarines 
essential to defend ports and bases in that area in the event of war, 
until the main Fleet could arrive. These factors led to the Conference 
concluding, 'that it was of primary importance to develop a submarine for 
distant patrol work. '2 This requirement resulted in the '0' class design 
and preparatory work began as soon as the conference finished. 
5 Some 
1. D. of P., Apr. 1922, ADM 138/676,5.0470/22, National 
Maritime Museum (N. M. M. ), 'Agenda for 2 May Conference 
on Future Submarine Requirements. ' 
2. A. C. N. S., May 1922, ADM. 138/676, N. M. M., 'Report of 
2 May Conference. ' (Delegates: R. A. S, Rep. of C. in C. 
Atlantic Fleet, D. of P., D. of G. D., D. of T. D., D. N. C., 
D. N. E. (S), H. of T. S., Rep. of D. of S. D. ) 
3. D. N. C. to E. in C., 5 May 1922, ADM 138/676, N. M. M., 
'New Submarine Design of Oversea Patrol Type. ' 
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disagreement existed whether certain submarine models other than the 
patrol type should continue in development but it was recognised that 
financial factors especially made further development on other submarines 
impractical. 
4 
Whatever the wishes of the various Heads of Departments, 
the situation was such that: 'In the immediate future, when economy will 
effectually limit our submarine construction programme, we should concen- 
trate on the oversea patrol type. '5 
Meanwhile, the 1922 Estimates indicated that the number of submarines 
to be maintained in commission and Reserve would drop from 85 to 58. To 
bolster numbers the six submarines on the China Station were to be retained 
but classified officially as being kept in Reserve. 
6 
In view of the later 
recommendation put to the 1923 Imperial Conference that the minimum number 
of submarines required for Imperial defence was 78 (comprised of sixteen 
flotillas plus two boats in Reserve) 58 was clearly an inadequate number. 
7 
However, the force level was largely dictated by economic factors, with 
the decline in numbers continuing to an estimated 55 boats by 1926. The 
Washington Treaty laid down a twelve year life for submarines and this 
meant that unless there was a radical change of attitude towards construc- 
tion, it would be necessary by the early 1930's to build a further 45 
submarines to meet the defined minimum requirements. 
8 
4. C. in C. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Sir Charles E. Madden 
to Admiralty, 4 July 1922, ADM 158/676,855/A. H. 0010, 
5.0.980/22, N. M. M. 
5. D. C. N. S., Vice-Admiral Keyes, 30 May 1922, ADM 138/676, 
N. M. M., 'Admiralty Conference of 2 May 1922. ' 
6. First Lord, Arthur Hamilton (Baron Lee), 1922, ADM 3-16/5706s 
'Navy Estimates for 1922.1 (Cmd. 1603. ) 
7. Admiralty, 1925, ADM 116/2511, 'Resolutions of Imperial 
Conference. ' 
8. See Appendix: H(2). 
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, -.,; Therefore, during the summer of 1923, the Admiralty proposed. to the 
Treasury,. a programme to rectify the deficiency. Calculations indicated a 
minimum annual construction rate of seven patrol submarines from 1925-26. 
The reply, was a requestwfor. further reductions in the Navy Estimates not 
only.. to relieve economicpreasure on the Government but,. also as a denial 
that: 
>'A Conservativet-Government ... always wastes-the taxpayers' substance in armaments and neglects 
: -, -, his social development. We can of course rejoin, that we are bound to ask the nation to provide 
what is necessary for the defence -of the Empire; 
but we must be careful to see in that case that 
only what is necessary is provided. 19 
The essential argument concerned what each side considered to be 'necessary'. 
The Government was pledged to 'a, policy of economy andlof debt reduction. '10 
Military opinion held that there was a possibility of Japan proving hostile 
in the. future but Baldwin was equally firm. in the belief that, Japan was, 
'markedly friendly. '12 However, as a result of the Four-Power Pact signed 
at Washington, the only Power in a position to restrain Japan was the 
British., Empire since the United States was prevented from constructing 
any naval, bases, nearer to Japan than Pearl Harbour. If it proved necessary 
to send a Fleet to the Far; -East, even under ideal conditions the time ; 
needed would be four to six weeks., Therefore, existing naval forces in 
the area such as cruisers and submarines would have the task of, delaying 
any Japanese naval movements for this period. In order to strengthen 
naval defences in the Far East without increasing the Navy Estimates the 
9. Prime Minister, -Stanley Baldwin, to First Lord, Leopold Amery, 
17 Aug. 1923, ADM 1163387. 
10. Ibid. 
U. C. I. D., 19 June 1923, ADM 116/2247, Paper 195C, 'Empire 
Naval Policy and Co-operation: 83rd Meeting of the Standing 
Sub-Committee on Defence. ' 
12. ADM 116/3387, Baldwin to Amery. (See Note 9. ) 
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recommendation was that Australia should be persuaded to order six over- 
seas patrol submarines. 
15 
The '0' class were proposed as being the most 
suitable and eventually the Australians agreed to purchase two. 
Admiralty fears over possible Japanese hostility were increased by 
reports circulated during June and July 1923 that the Japanese appeared 
to be interested in acquiring cruiser submarines. This was viewed as a 
possible additional threat to convoys to Singapore or Hong Kong. It is 
difficult to understand, why these Japanese submarines should have been 
considered as a danger to the Eastern convoy assembly ports as they would 
have been operating thousands of miles from their own bases without surface 
support and it had already been stated, at Washington, that surface support 
was necessary for long-range submarine operations. One possible answer is 
that such a pessimistic attitude was a reflection of the need to force 
additional resources from a reluctant Government; but it was also a 
reflection of British doctrine. Even in the late 1930's it was maintained 
that British submarines could only operate a continuous patrol in Japanese 
waters if they were based on Hong Kong rather than Singapore. These 
analyses also shed an interesting light on British naval thinking as to 
the use of Asdic with the convoy system. 'It has been under consideration 
to provide Asdic protection only with a few hundred miles of points of 
assembly for the long distance ocean convoys. It will now be necessary ... 
to provide whole voyage A, sdic protection and the number of protecting 
vessels required will be largely increased. '14 
15. ADM 116/2247, C. I. D., 'Empire Naval Policy. ' 
(see Note 11. ) 
14. D. N. I., 25 June 1925 -9 Aug. 1925, ADM 1/8636/40, 
'Japanese Activities in Germany with Regard to 
Obtaining Plans of the Cruiser Submarines. ' 
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Meanwhile, despite the Government's belief that there was no 
perceptible threat to justify immediate increases in the Navy Estimates, 
they were-anxious to find a means of reducing the severe unemployment 
which existed in Britain. 'There had, of course, been unemployment before 
1914, but it had fluctuated heavily, falling to'three or four per cent in 
good years, and rising to ten per cent and over in years of depression. 
. The novel 
feature of post-war unemployment was that it continued at a 
permanently high level. '15 Abnormal unemployment levels were-concentrated 
in certain areas of the country and in the ailing traditional heavy indus- 
tries, especially shipbuilding. The result was successful pressure for 
orders to be placed with shipyards: specifically an immediate £25.3. million 
programme to be spread over five years. 
16 
The plan included the laying 
down of three patrol-submarines in the initial stage of the programme. 
Sanction for these and other orders had been given by the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, prior to the granting of parliamentary approval. This was 
contrary to normal practice and underlined the Government's view of 'the 
urgency of the domestic-situation. 
The Ten Year Construction` Programme 
By 1924 the implication of the Washington Naval Treaty had been 
largely absorbed. As a -result the Admiralty, fettered by Government 
economic-policy and the 'Ten Year Rule' mounted a major offensive to 
secure assurances about the size and cost of-the Royal Navy up to 1935. 
The form chosen was the presentation= of a ten year construction programme. 
The Washington Conference had imposed a ten year building 'holiday' on 
capital ships and the Admiralty therefore concentrated on the other 
15. R. Skidelsky, Politioians and the Slump (London, 1970), 15. 
16. Board of Admiralty, 21 Nov. 1923, ADM 1/8702151, 'Special 
Programme of New Construction. ' 
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categories of warship. Despite the change of Government in January 1924 
pressure was maintained, leading to consideration of the proposed programme 
by the Cabinet in March. In the submarine category, assessment of required 
numbers was not to be based on the total of submarines possessed by other 
nations but rather on the potential threat posed by the strongest possible 
opponent in European waters (France) and in the Far East (Japan). These 
selected 'threats' were neither immediate nor, at the political level, 
inevitable. The two fleets did however represent paradigms of what might 
have to be faced in military terms, if the uncertain international climate 
worsened, as even the Foreign Office conceded it might. The original 
programme included a final force total of 60 patrol, twelve cruiser, and 
eight fleet submarines. 
The requirements for the latter model stemmed from the fact that this 
was still a period in which naval thinking accepted the battlefleet as the 
decisive instrument of naval power. In the scenario of the ideal Fleet 
action the fleet submarine would manoeuvre, on the surface, around the 
scouting screen of the enemy Fleet and launch a submerged attack once in 
position. This was expected to disorganise the enemy and allow the British 
Fleet to gain a decisive result. Therefore, the torpedo was to remain the 
main armament with the gun being considered of little importance. However, 
it is surprising that, after a decade of development but no battle exper- 
iences the fleet submarine was still considered to be a complement to 
Fleet operations. 'There is at present very little experience ... to show 
how much value should be attached to Submarines in a Fleet Action, but it 
is considered that if these vessels have a high surface speed (about 26 
knots) they should be able to get into positions from which they can 
submerge and attack. ' 
17 
The Admiralty continued to be troubled throughout 
17. Tactical Division, March 1924, ADM 1/8672/230, 
T. S. 5911, 'Fleet Submarines. ' 
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this period by the costly difficulties of producing sufficiently powerful 
diesel engines to attain this objective. It was a difficult technical 
problem in itself, but the small number of submarines envisaged for the 
role made it, by e. ny standards, a costly investment. Moreover, the function 
of the fleet submarine was essentially confined to Fleet operations and 
even in this role'ttie only alternatives were torpedoing disabled warships 
and Fleet reconnaissance. The latter role was better suited to surface 
cruisers and, in areas where the submarine was useful in reconnaissance, 
the patrol model was preferred because of size and cost. In addition, the 
limits of technology marked'out an uncertain future for both the fleet and 
cruiser submarines, with the result that the Admiralty laid the greater 
stress on the need for patrol submarines. 
18 
It is hard to avoid the con- 
clusion that these types of 'heavy' submarines were retained for intra- 
service reasons rather than for any general strategic function. The 
incidence of Fleet actions was not at all high, but it would be a great 
thing for the Submarine Service if their vessels could be made fit 'to be 
in the line' - even if it meant that some awkward compromises had to be 
made over other functions, and other types of submarine. 
Meanwhile, despite wanting the multiple objectives of improved patrol 
models, greater numbers of operational boats and increased experimentation, 
the Admiralty still considered it necessary to maintain a sense of practical 
proportion on the question of numbers if a successful conclusion were to be 
achieved. In order to improve the probability of acceptance of their 
proposals the Admiralty attempted to present the submarine as a necessary 
naval weapon with a purely military role such as reconnaissance or anti- 
warship. This was clearly a difficult task so soon after Washington, and 
18. Plans Division, Apr. 1924, ADM 1/8072/250, P. D. 02004/24, 
'Ten Year Construction Programme - Part III: Submarines, 
3 and 8. ' 
See also: Appendix: G(4). 
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it was considered necessary to state that the British submarine was not to 
be viewed as primarily a commerce raider. 'No mention is made of the des- 
truction of enemy trade as the primary function of British submarines as, 
apart from the limitations imposed by the Root Resolutions, it is only in 
exceptional cases that this function cannot be more effectively carried 
out by surface vessels. '19 There seems little doubt that the documents 
forwarded to the Cabinet were intended not only to be used in support of 
an enhanced construction programme but also as a case for the retention 
and strengthening of the submarine forces within the Royal Navy. 
The Admiralty emphasised two factors. Development of the Asdic device, 
in Britain, was considered to be far ahead of anything possessed by any 
other Power. Therefore, while enemy submarine forces would be faced with 
gradually more efficient AIS forces, the British submarine was expected to 
remain relatively immune to detection. This was considered to be extremely 
important in roles such as reconnaissance. 'The development of submarine 
detecting devices will have a limited effect on the usefulness of 
submarines. '20 However, the Admiralty case was. weakened by the admission 
that the 'limited effect' would be achieved by simply withdrawing the 
submarine outside the range of coastal AIS vessels. In military terms 
this was clearly an unsatisfactory policy, given the high priority 
accorded to information gathering. Those of a cynical nature might have 
been tempted to view the Admiralty's solution, of expanding the number of 
submarines on reconnaissance duties to cover the same area, as merely an 
excuse to justify their case for increased numbers. 
19. Ibid. 
20. ADM 1/8072/230, 'Ten Year Construction Programme. ' 
(See Note 18. ) 
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The Admiralty's attitude to the reconnaissance role also appeared 
confused. The suggested use of surface or semi-surface support (cruiser 
submarines) for submarine reconnaissance forces appears to destroy the 
advantage of 'invisibility' conferred by submergence. Moreover, this was 
a very expensive way of providing support and could only result in drawing 
enemy surface forces to the area. Nevertheless, the chance of tempting 
enemy units on to major British surface forces was the policy which was 
advocated to justify a persistence with submarine reconnaissance patrols 
in areas of intense A, /S activity. It could also be seen as an excuse for 
justifying the construction of the cruiser submarine. But if support for 
submarine forces were to be provided to destroy major enemy surface units 
then surface cruisers would have been a more realistic proposal; and if 
the scenario was ever actually considered for practical use, the growing 
effectiveness of maritime air power was to nullify any possibility long 
before the opportunity arose to use it. However, such schemes were symptom- 
atic of the thought and energy applied to the task of retaining and devel- 
oping the submarine within the Royal Navy when wartime experiences, 
government policy and finance all were weighted against this category of 
vessel. 
Submarines in service with the Royal Navy in 1924 were all of war- 
time construction and this factor was calculated to reduce their effective 
operational life to ten years. Advances in design, construction and 
maintenance were expected to increase the service life of new submarines 
to fifteen years under peacetime conditions. The recommended proposal 
was that, 
'for the first year under consideration, 1925-26, 
eight oversee Patrol type should be laid down; 
and that in each subsequent year the question 
should be decided whether one or two of the eight 
should be cruiser submarines, aiming at a total 
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'of twelve of the Cruiser type in each 
period of ten years: or whether a group 
of four Fleet submarines and four of the 
oversee Patrol type should be constructed. '21 
It was still hoped that construction of cruiser submarines could begin in 
1926-27 and the first of the new fleet submarines in 1927-28. 
The Admiralty had hoped for an immediate Government deoision but this 
was not to be. Despite continuous pressure there was no progress until 
early in 1925. Opposition to any increase in expenditure at all was led 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill. 
22 
Expenditure on 
all three Services was to drop steadily throughout the 1920's and: 'If 
Churchill had had his way completely, the drop would have been even more 
sharp. ' 
25 Churchill favoured no new construction in 1925-26 with the 
exception of submarines, mainly because they required only relatively 
small expenditure. This attitude, allied to the belief that there was a 
negligible threat from Japan, was bitterly fought by the Admiralty, and 
led to the setting up of the Naval Programme Committee chaired by Lord 
Birkenhead. 
94 
The Committee asked the Admiralty to submit a modified construction 
programme, which was handed over in June 1925.25 The decision to agree 
to this request resulted partly from the Admiralty's awareness of the 
necessity for an alteration of ground, because of prevailing domestic 
21. First Lord of the Admiralty, W. C. Bridgeman to Naval 
Programme Committee of the Cabinet, 18 June 1925, 
ADM 1165441, 'Modified. Naval Construction Programme. ' 
22. R. Rhodes James, Churchill -A Study in Failure, 1900-39 
(London, 1975), 214. 
23. R. Rhodes James, 215. 
24. Naval Programme Committee'of the Cabinet, 18 Feb. 1925, 
ADM 1163441, 'Composition"and Terms of Reference: Part 
III of Admiralty Memorandum on Ten Year Construction 
Programme - Submarines. ' 
25. R. Rhodes James, op. cit., 215. 
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politioal"and economic factors, and to prevent the total rejection of 
the Ten Year Programme. Although the appointment of the Committee was in 
some'ways a victory for the'Navy - their proposals were not rejected out 
of-hand, it was clear that they would have to provide a convincing brief 
to maintain this partial success against the Chancellor's preferred policies. 
However, it was made clear that in the event of rejection of the modified 
proposals the entire'Board of Admiralty were prepared to resign. 
26 
The 
Government seemed determined, for economic reasons, to downgrade the danger 
of the naval situation-outside Europe, even to the extent of reversing the 
decision reached by the naval planners in August 1924 and confirmed by the 
Board-in September 1924 that, $no reason 'exists for changing the basis on 
which naval preparations are being made i. e. War in the Far East. This is 
probably the most difficult war we may be called upon to engage in and, for 
this reason, it is"considered desirable to pursue our preparations in that 
direction. '27 By June 1925 this had become: 'the Admiralty are to be 
guided in their preparation by the view of the Cabinet that aggressive 
action against the'British Empire on the part of Japan within the next ten 
28 
years is not seriously to be apprehended. ' The Admiralty were to be 
compensated for this disruption to existing plans by being allowed an 
extended period of time for completing war preparations, from 1929 to 1935, 
but there seems'to'have been no realisation of the time that would be 
necessary to rectify any deficiencies if a threat were to arise in the Far 
East after the suggested time period elapsed. 
26. R. Rhodes James, op. cit., 214. 
27. D. of P., 25 Aug. 1924.. --ADM 1/8664/135. 
28. Naval Programme of the Cabinet, 1 July 1925, 
ADM 116/5441,8th Meeting, 'Modified Naval 
Construction Programme. ' 
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Admiralty proposals for, modifications in the submarine category 
extended at this stage only to, models rather than numbers. Future annual 
construction was requested to be at a"level of eight patrol submarines, 
except for. 1928-29 : when only seven were to be ordered "plus one fleet boat. 
29 
Further requests. for, reductions in the overall construction programme to 
reduce the annual cost of all naval construction. to approximately 
£l$ million. led to a out of two patrol models per year. Despite vigorous 
leadership from the First Lord, it was clear that the Admiralty represent- 
atives would have a hard fight to, secure acceptance of even the modified 
proposals. Churchill was strongly opposed to the total numbers requested 
by the Admiralty for the Ten Year Programme. The Chancellor was determined 
to reduce spending on defence and, had already secured an extension to the 
life of the 'Ten Year Rule'. Now he made no effort to disguise his scept- 
icism, on the need for the proposed number of submarines. Keyes, in order 
to counter this attack, painstakingly. pointed out that the total required 
was based on contingency war plans in the event of conflict with either 
France or Japan. There was some scepticism expressed at the figure of 
80 submarines being. achieved coincidently for confrontations with both 
France and. Japan. However, Keyes's explanations were apparently accepted. 
Strenuous questioning then took place on the need for the various 
submarine models requested by the Admiralty. On the cruiser submarine the 
Admiralty indicated that one of the proposals for any future naval disarm- 
ament conference should concern qualitative tonnage limitation. If 
successful, it was hoped that this policy would prevent the general constr- 
uction of such large submarines. Naval opinion now tended to consider 
them as a potentially serious threat to Britain's maritime trade. Disen- 
chantment with the cruiser submarine also stemmed from the calculation that 
29. See Appendix: G(5). 
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in order to concentrate on building patrol submarines it would be imposs- 
ible to match any potential enemy in constructing the cruiser model. More 
importantly, the proposal for qualitative limitation marked an alteration 
away from a total demand for abolition in terms of international naval 
disarmament. The attitude towards the fleet submarine however remained 
unchanged and still depended on the production of a sufficiently powerful 
diesel engine. 
The Committee was fascinated with the proposed use of submarines in 
any conflict with Japan and the immense distances involved. However, whether 
any future war was in the Par East or Europe, the probably British subma- 
rine force was likely to be based largely on the patrol submarine, with 
construction being concentrated entirely on the '0' class. However, this 
design would be fourteen years old by the time the Ten Year Programme was 
completed in 1937, and to remain with the one design was to ignore the 
question and value of development. Nevertheless, although there was no 
evidence that the Admiralty favoured allocating only minimal resources to 
submarine development, less funds were being channelled into this category 
of research and development than any other. In addition, submarine develop- 
ment had been so neglected that the facilities for construction had almost 
disappeared; a point emphasised by Admiral Fuller. 
50 
'The submarine building is a very specialised 
construction, and if we ; Io not keep to a sort 
of programme from the point of view of constr- 
uction work, we will not have the people to 
construct them when we want them ... there is 
only one firm that has kept going since the war, 
and they have been able to do so because they 
30. Fuller, Sir Cyril Thomas Moulden (1874-1942), Admiral; 
b. 22 May 1874; D. of P., Jan 1918 (Peace Conference, 
1919); Rear-Admiral, June 1921; A. C. N. S., 1 Dec. 1922 - 
15 May 1923; Third Sea Lord and Controller, 15 May 1923 - 
50 Apr. 1925; Vice-Admiral, July 1926; C. in Co North 
American and West Indies, Apr. 1928; Admiral, May 1930; 
Second Sea Lord, 26 May 1930 - 31 Aug. 1952; ret. 1935; 
d. 1 Feb. 1942. 
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'were building a submarine engine to put into 
a ship for trial. The other firms have prac- 
tically dropped the whole thing. Some of them 
say they can start again but it will take a 
long time. They could get going in a year 
1031 
On this point, even Churchill was prepared to concede that some submarine 
construction was necessary. 
On requirements to fulfil contingency plans against France, the 
Admiralty held that submarines would be needed mainly for reconnaissance 
off the French ports. This reasoning, accepted by the Committee, was based 
on the belief that French submarines would prevent surface ships fulfilling 
this role. However, the question of the number of boats required to counter 
the French revolved around whether the British submarines would be used 
entirely on reconnaissance, in which case 80 boats was considered too high 
a requirement, or also on blockade duties. Therefore, before approval 
could be given to a total of 80, the Admiralty was required to furnish 
supporting evidence based on the War Plans. Meanwhile, the discussion 
touched on the efficiency of Asdic. Keyes was quick to counter Churchill's 
arguments by pointing out that detection was only the easier half of the 
problem since the submarine still had to be destroyed. On the proposed 
total, Churchill was at pains to emphasise that he was not against a con- 
tinuance of submarine construction but he considered a figure of 80 boats 
as excessive. A far more practical programme would be to build only 
three to four submarines annually for five years and then see how the 
international situation affected development. Although a sound idea it 
was not necessarily advanced for the right reasons, which should have 
been based not only on cost but also on the need to incorporate new design 
and construction developments into the Ten Year Programme. An alternative 
31. Fuller to Naval Programme Committee of the Cabinet, 
23 Mar. 1925, ADM 116/5441, '5th Meeting. ' 
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suggestion was made that if a deficiency in submarine numbers arose an 
emergency programme should be resorted to. However, this would have been 
based solely upon existing designs and allowed no inclusion of development 
work. 
In reaching a conclusion on the size of the long-term construction 
programme, the Cabinet, through its Committee, had before it additional 
information concerning Britain's shipbuilding capacity in the event of 
war. 
52 If the possibility of war with either Japan or France in 1929 were 
accepted for planning purposes, then it was accepted that there would be a 
need to lay. down an extensive construction programme including provision 
for 45 submarines. However, this was well beyond Britain's shipbuilding 
capacity. Within the 1955 framework, as the Admiralty had intended it to' 
be read, the Ten Year Programme could still'go ahead but in the submarine 
category sixteen boats would be needed annually, and 32 slipways perman- 
ently occupied by new construction, to replace war losses calculated as 
being twice the annual peace-time level. The problem was that the maximum 
submarine construction programme possible on the outbreak of war was 
assessed at only 52 boats. 
Nevertheless, the Government decided to"postpone any new submarine 
construction for one year and from 1926-27 to authorise only six patrol 
models annually plus one fleet submarine in 1929-50.35 The initial effect 
of removal of the six submarines, plus a-depot ship and a repair vessel, 
was to save only £754,657 out of a total cost for 1925-26 of £8,928,827. 
The 1925-26 programme was to be confined to, 'the completion of "L. 26" 
32. Plans Division, 8 May 1925, ADM 116/3747, 
'Shipbuilding Policy in War. ' 
33. Bridgeman, 27 July 1925, ADM 116/3441, 'Statement 
on the 1925-26 Naval Estimates - Supplementary 
Programme. ' (Cmd. 2476. ) 
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land "L. 27", and further advancement of "0.1", 154 This decision did not 
please the Admiralty. 
'With reference to the Cabinet decision post- 
poning for one year the proposals of the 
Admiralty for the construction of submarines, 
the Sea Lords desire to place on record the 
situation in regarduto this type of vessel ... 
The British Empire, 4 in 1929 be inferior to the 
-, -U. S. A., Japan and France 
in total numbers of 
Submarines and, in vessels of post-war design, 
will have only four as against the 57 possessed, 
by the U. S. A., 61 by Japan, 67 by France and 
20 by Italy. i55 
The five year lead'held by Britain in 1919 would no longer exist and with 
the possibility of another international naval disarmament. conference in 
the near future, the outlook for the submarine in the Royal'Navy looked 
very gloomy. Although the struggle over the Ten Year Programme had resulted 
in a commitment to continue submarine construction there were to be no 
increased resources for development. This position existed largely because 
the Government, despite Admiral Beatty's warning,: remained not only averse 
to development and expansion but also continued to seek international 
agreement on abolition. However, experience as evidenced by: 'The 
proceedings of the Washington Conference clearly demonstrated that any 
proposal for the total abolition of submarines would not have the slightest 
chance of acceptance. '36 Proposals on tonnage limitation were indicated 
as probably being more acceptable and the possibility of agreement on 
qualitative limitation was certainly welcomed. The Admiralty disapproved 
of continued "pressure towards achieving abolition largely because it was 
34. Bridgeman, July 1925, ADM 116/3706, 'Statement on the 
1925 Navy Estimates. ' (Cmd. 2366. ) 
35. First Sea Lord, 'Admiral Sir David Beatty, 23 July 1925, 
ADM 3.16/5587s 'Statement on New Construction Programme. ' 
36. D. of P., 13 Feb. 1925, ADM 1/8683/151, 'Naval 
Disarmament - Views 1925.1 
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realised that, 'the chances of abolishing submarine warfare are not greet, 
as all the smaller powers consider that the submarine is their main Naval 
weapon of defence. ' 
57 
Greater faith was placed in achieving sufficient 
reductions to allow financial savings in the provision of peace-time A/S 
forces. This had emerged as a strong point of the British case at 
Washington and now continued to hold a pre-eminent position in the disarm- 
ament conference proposals. Money saved in this sector was considered 
invaluable as a means of reinforcing the strength of major surface units. 
Although the 1925 Naval Disarmament Conference proved still born, 
pressure on the Admiralty for further economies, increased in. severity. 
However, as the Government, had confirmed definite construction programmes 
up to 1931, the Admiralty could be forgiven for thinking that the constr- 
uction issue had been settled. Nevertheless, following upon the report of 
the Cabinet Naval Programme Committee, it was decided to set up the Colwyn 
Committee, to re-evaluate the strength of shipbuilding in the event of war. 
The Birkenhead Committee had calculated the minimum number of slipways 
necessary for 1929 to meet the required total of warships to be laid down 
in the first year of war. The inability to meet this shipbuilding capacity 
necessitated a postponement of the theoretical date of war to 1935. It 
was hoped that normal construction would then have reduced the number of 
warships required on the outbreak of war. The Admiralty, having already 
fought a long struggle to obtain some form of future construction prog- 
ramme, were in no mood to enter a fresh conflict over another ten year 
programme. 
'We do not know and cannot, forecast what the 
strength of fleets in 1955 will be. Even in 
the case of the British Fleet we only know what 
the strength will be in 1932. Further it is 
37. Admiralty to. Committee of Imperial Defence, 9 Oct. 1925, 
. DM 1/8683/131, 'Views of Board on Naval Disarmament. ' 
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'suggested that it is very undesirable to ' 
re-open the question of British Shipbuilding 
policy with Lord Colwyn's Committee as that 
would necessitate going over the whole of the 
arguments ... which were put before Lord 
Birkenhead's Committee ... Their Lordships 
assume that it is not the desire of Lord Colwyn 
(even if it were within his province) that the 
Admiralty should re-open the arguments in favour 
of their original proposals for new construction, 
which were put before and considered by Lord 
Birkenhead's Committee. As the Committee are 
aware, the Government have quite recently decided 
on a certain scale of ship construction for five 
years after full consideration of the recommend-' 
ations of this Committee and it is presumed that 
this decision is not in question. 1-35 
There the situation'was allowed to rest for the moment, although the 
Admiralty took"the opportunity to re-emphasise the fact that existing plans 
allowed for only 28 new submarines by 1929, compared with 53 in the United 
States Navy and"71 in the Japanese Navy. 
This was calculated as'leaving a deficiency, under the Washington 
Naval Treaty, of 35 under-age submarines by 1 April 1932. Therefore, the 
Cabinet's total for a replacement programme was considered to fall. 
'far short of the appropriate quota of the full 
ten years' programme originally asked for by the 
Admiralty. Unless, therefore, the consequent 
deficiency is made up by a greatly increased 
programme in the years immediately following the 
now approved programme the strength of the Fleet 
in 1935 will be far below a real one-power stand- 
ard as this term is conceived by the other 
principal Naval Powers. 139 
Moreover, the Fleet was expected to be limited'in efficiency, since in 
conforming to the Gover'nment's policy the Admiralty were having to resort 
to extreme measures to achieve reductions. Further, this contraction of 
numbers and strength could only be achieved: 'By the acceptance of risks 
58. D. of P. to Colwyn Committee, 27 Oct. 1925, 
ADM 1/8692/253. 
59. D. of P. to Colwyn Committee, 26 Oct. 1925, 
ADM 1/8692/255. 
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'which would in normal circumstances be guarded against as an essential 
feature of naval policy, and by making changes which in several instances 
are in the nature of experiments and may not ultimately prove practicable. ' 
40 
Although there was acceptance of the-political ruling on the question of 
war up to 1935, scepticism existed on the wisdom of such a decision. 'As 
regards material the Admiralty policy is to provide equipment only for 
vessels that will be in the Fleet at the end of the ten year period, during 
which the Cabinet have stated it is unlikely any war will occur,. and to 
spread this accumulation evenly over the ten years. ' 
41 
Thus, if the 
Cabinet's ruling was accurate there would be little need for a Navy for 
at least ten years and therefore expenditure could be reduced by curtailing 
construction and replenishment. for this period. - Admiralty planning accepted 
that by 1931 the Atlantic Fleet would, 'have become relatively unimportant 
as compared with the Mediterranean, '42 and reflected the reorientation of 
the Royal Navy to face the potential naval threat in the Far East. Concen- 
tration of British naval forces in the Mediterranean served two purposes 
necessitated by the inability to maintain a large-battlefleet both in Home 
Waters and the Far East. Primarily, the security of the sea route through 
to the Sueß Canal was ensured if it proved. neoessary-to move the main Fleet 
and troop convoys to the Far East. Moreover, in the event of any deter- 
ioration of the situation in European waters it would be possible for the 
Mediterranean Fleet to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet. However, it was 
clearly not possible to reinforce both areas simultaneously. 
40. Ibid.. 
41. ADM 1/8692/255, D. of P. to Colwyn Committee. 
(See Note 59. ) 
42. Head of Mining, 13 July 1926, ADM 1/8701/143. 
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British submarine forces were also affected by the proposed reorgan- 
isation and the calculation was that by 1930 one third of the available 
boats would be assigned to the China Station (twelve '0' and nine 'L'). 
(kiginally six '0' class had been earmarked for the Mediterranean but these 
were replaced by 'K. 26' and five 'L' class, 
43 
and in 1929 units of the 'P' 
class were also earmarked for the Far East. 
44 
At home the problem of 
submarine numbers was most evident in meeting training requirements. The 
shortage of strength had already led to the decision to merge the Devonport 
and Atlantic Fleet flotillas. The Atlantic Fleet wanted them not only for 
patrol and reconnaissance work but also to simulate roles of the fleet 
submarine. Devonport's claim was based on the need for as many training 
submarines as possible in a situation where shortage of hulls was so 
desperate that at Portsmouth submarines were having to be brought out of 
reserve to augment the training squadrons. 
Meanwhile, the question of further reductions in submarine strength 
was also affected by moves towards a new naval disarmament conference. 
However, until agreement was reached in either abolition or limitation, 
the Admiralty had to wrestle with the problem of inadequate numbers. The 
latest proposals had been proclaimed as helping, 'to reduce materially the 
cost and maintenance of submarines. ' 
45 
The indication was that the Admiralty 
now based any long-term judgements on submarine policy more upon economic 
factors rather than any political solutions likely to result from disarm- 
ament conferences, or upon any military judgements. This led to a revision 
43. Admiralty to C. in C. Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Sir 
Roger J. B. Keyes, 10 Feb. 1926, ADM 1/8715/185, 'Future 
Disposition of Submarine Flotillas. ' 
44. Admiralty, 1929, ADM 116/3706, 'Naval Estimates. ' 
45. Head of Mining, 28 Mar. 1927, ADM 1/8715/185. 
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in acceptable numbers: a total of 66 ' instead. of, 7l, -submarines would-be 
required from 1933 onwards. Estimates of the service life of. existing 
submarines-were extended to twelve years, for wartime construction, ' and 
fifteen-: years for peace-time construction. Future submarine building 
programmes were confirmed at a maximum annual-rate of, six boats between 
1929 and 1932, while the inclusion of a-fleet model infthe 1929 programme: 
was rejected in favour of a slower design (21 knots) known as a 'fast 
patrol' submarine. However, anew design for a small patrol submarine 
('S' class) was added to the same programme in order to replace the over-,:, 
age 'H' class., Despite this, it was proposed that fromi1930 onwards only 
four submarines should be constructed annually: although it was disguised 
as a minimum programme, numbers would not increase since the scrapping 
schedules was-set-at four boats per annum from 1933. The guiding criteria 
had to ensure that: 'The new scheme will involve less, expenditure than 
the old. ' 
46 
However, these criteria were denounced as mere' supposition 
as it was pointed, out that: 
v. 'The question of the number of Submarines tobe 
maintained in the ultimate war Fleet will be one 
--of the points at issue at the forthcoming Naval 
Conference at Geneva. Similarly there is no doubt 
that the life of each type of ship will be consid- 
ered and, it is to be fixed. On the results of 
the Conference, therefore, will depend the distri-, ' 
butions, construction and replacement of Submarines 
after the year 1952, ' but, 'for the whole period 
under review in the distribution, ' 1927-52, 'put 
forward by Director of Plans it will be necessary 
to replace our old submarine construction, irres- 
pective of any agreement which can be envisaged as 
resulting from the Naval Disarmament Conference. 147 
46. Ibid. 
;, 
47. D. C. N. S., Vice-Admiral. Sir Frederick L. Field, 
5 Apr. 1927, ADM 1/8715/185. 
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Tripartite Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 - Preliminary Discussions 
Efforts to achieve a new agreement on naval limitation had been encour- 
aged by the success of the Locarno Pact which had heralded further Allied 
withdrawals from Germany and her admittance to the League of Nations. The 
resulting international situation was now judged suitable for further moves 
on disarmament and plans were outlined setting up a Preparatory " Cömmission 
for a disarmament conference to be held at Geneva during 1927. The United 
States Government was anxious to extend such a conference to include naval 
disarmament and during February 1927 discussions were held between American 
and British representatives. The United States proposal was for, to 
further conference, confined to the Washington Powers, for the extension 
of the principles of the Washington Convention to classes of vessels 'other 
than those affected by that Convention. 
' 
The First Lord had already indicated a favourable view towards a 
naval conference, 
49 
and'the Americans considered that their policy con- 
formed with British wishes on this subject. 
50 
However, the British held 
that because of the failure to secure acceptance of the Washington Treaty 
by the smaller Powers, it might be dangerous to proceed to further naval 
reductions. There was the strong possibility that the only reciprocal 
reductions would come from the Washington Treaty Powers. Internationally, 
the United States Goverrnment had, 'little to gain from the success of a 
general disarmament, ' but, 'much to gain from a naval conference, whatever 
the measure of its success. '51 Further, with elections due in the 
48. Foreign Office, 11 Feb. 1927, Documents on British 
Foreign Policy, (London, 1970), la ser., III9 566. 
49. Bridgeman, June - Aug. 1927, Cmä.. 2964, 'Speeches at 
the Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference. ' 
50. Foreign Office, 10 Feb. 1927, D. B. F. P., la ser., III, 565. 
51. Foreign Office, 12 Feb. 1927, D. B. F. P., la ser., III, 568-71. 
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United States: 
'The Republicans' electioneering cupboard 
is bare, and the President must shortly 
reach a decision in the matter of cruiser 
construction. To build or not to build is 
becoming the burning question of the hour, 
and will have an important effect on the 
party's prospects. '52 
The Admiralty remained hostile to any reduction in surface cruisers below 
existing or projected numbers, since this was seen as imperilling the safety 
of Imperial sea communications. The cruiser issue was expected to be the 
major question at the naval conference but the Admiralty would not accept 
a reduction in numbers coupled with the extension of the 5: 5: 3 battleship 
ratio to the cruiser category, even if there were prospects of limitation 
agreements on the submarine category as a result. Divorced from any agree- 
ment on cruiser ratios, 'they would welcome some limitation of submarines. ' 
55 
However, it was accepted that: 
'The Americans, who are weak in cruisers, would 
bring the utmost pressure to bear on us in that 
category, for, if we persisted in our refusal to 
reduce, irrespective of ratio, the conference 
, 
would surely collapse. After Bruisers, the con- 
ference is no doubt aimed at submarines. The 
French attitude towards that class is well known. 
They have consistently refused to entertain any 
kind of limitation ... They would, of course, be 
in a strong position to maintain that attitude in 
the absence of agreement on cruisers. In the event, 
on the other hand, of agreement in that class, they 
would be hard put to it to resist the pressure of 
the other conference Powers and of Public opinion 
at large which, in the matter of submarines, has 
further hardened since the days of Washington. '54 
The last two points appear to have been optimistic, especially the reference 
to the power of public opinion, which had proved inconclusive at the 1922 
52. Ibid. 
53. D. of P., 9 Mar. 1927, ADM 1/8715/185, 'Memo on Board. 
Minute No. 2285 of 27 Jan. 1927.1 
54. Ibid. 
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Washington Conference. However, what could not be denied was the truth 
of the statement that, 'the present chance is as good a one as we may get 
for many a day of securing a limitation of submarines, ' and, 'that is, of 
course, if the French could be induced to enter a separate naval confer- 
ence at all. '55 
Geneva Naval Conference 1927 - Submarine Policy 
British, policy for Geneva was defined as being, Ito obtain by common 
consent the total abolition of the Submarine or, in default, a strict limit- 
ation in the tonnage allowed to nations. ' 
56 
In attempting to achieve this, 
recognition was given to the necessity of securing the acceptance, by the 
other naval Powers, of the belief that Britain no longer regarded the subma- 
rine as a military threat. However, this was a reversal of the attitude 
which presented the submarine-as being capable of doing, 'great harm to an 
opposing Power, irrespective of that opposing Power's naval strength. '57 
Therefore, a reason was necessary to explain this change and the chosen 
solution was to present the latest Asdic developments as the complete anti- 
dote to the submarine. However, this still left two problems: the 
efficiency of Asdio and the question of the need to maintain a degree of 
secrecy about it. British research suggested that the. complete A/S solution 
had still not been developed but a device such-as Asdic, 'in combination 
with depth charge attack, renders the detection and subsequent hunting of 
a Submarine a comparatively easy operation while rendering the chances of 
a successful attack by Submarines correspondingly more remote. 158 
55. D. B. F. P., la ser., III, 568-71. (See Note 51. ) 
56. D. of P., 3 Mar. 1927, ADM 1/8715/194, -'Limitation 
of Armaments - Submarines. ' 
57. Ibid. 
58. ADM 1/8715/194, 'Limitation of Armaments. ' 
(See Note 56. ) 
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However, the belief in detection as #a comparatively easy operation' must 
be questioned when the poor results achieved by the A/S training squadrons 
were attributed to the fact that 'our own submarines have become skilful in 
"avoiding" tactics. '59 The official view of the efficiency of Asdic was 
also questioned, especially by submariners. 
'Asdic was never the infallible weapon we 
cracked it up to be ... In various set-piece 
exercises, we dived and asdic-fitted ships 
hunted us. To facilitate their training and 
strengthen their confidence our movements were 
generally restricted; seldom were we allowed 
to evade. When evasion was allowed, we generally 
succeeded ... On other occasions, in Fleet exer- 
cises, we submarines carried out many dummy attacks 
on battleship steaming at 18 knots, zig-zagging, with 
anti-submarine destroyer screens. Our movements 
were, of course, unrestricted, but even then 
everyone above the surface knew that a succession 
of submarines would be attacking between certain 
times in a particular area. But still, an average 
submarine stood an odds-on chance of getting in 
close enough to fire torpedoes undetected. 160 
opinions were divided between the merits of 'leaking' information on 
Asdic, even in the interests of achieving abolition. It was considered 
that a 'leakage' followed by vague Parliamentary questions and answers, 
would mean that, 'the atmosphere in June next in regard to Submarines will 
be more favourable to British Policy. '61 This was concurred in mainly 
because, 'once an apparatus is largely fitted at sea, it cannot be kept 
seeret. 162 Additionally, 
'other nations are convinced that the British 
desire for the total abolition of submarines 
59. D. S. D., A. E. Kennedy-Purvis, 8 Mar. 1927, 
ADM 1/8715/194. 
60. J. Broome, Convoy is to Scatter, (London, 1972), 79-80. 
61. ADM 1/8715/194, 'Limitation of Armaments. ' 
(See Note 56. ) 
62. ADM 1/8715/194, D. S. D. (See Note 59. ) 
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'is based not on humanitarian grounds, but 
on the undoubted fact that Great Britain has 
more to fear from submarines than has any 
other Power. If the veil Of secrecy regarding 
Asdios be partially lifted at the present moment, 
foreign Powers are almost certain to assume that 
it is being lifted solely for the purpose of 
helping Great Britain in the presentation of 
her case against submarines. ib5 
Major 'opposition to abolition was again, -expected. to come from the French; 
therefore: "To expect (France) to agree to the scrapping of all these new 
submarines, -on which she has expended-so much ' money' since the War ... and 
by means of which she has attained naval superiority over her potential 
enemy, Italy, 'seems Utopia. ' 
64 
France was known to have conducted Asdio 
experiments and Japan and Italy were expeoted to follow"suit. " Therefore, 
the probability was that Britain would lose rather than gain by an disol- 
osures about"As is development; and although work on Asdic could continue, 
even in the unlikely event that abolition was achieved, it would soon prove 
impossible to continue the study of A/S'techniques without the use of 
submarines as targets. If a major Power resumed submarine building then 
British AIS forces would be at a disadvantage. These facts led to the 
conclusion that, 'we should guard the secrets of our attainments in anti- 
submarine warfare ... so that we may maintain the lead we possess over 
other Navies at the present time. '65 
Meanwhile, the Government had reaffirmed Britain's intention to 
participate in the proposed naval conference, although now both France 
and Italy were averse to the idea, 
66 
and final invitations were issued for 
65. D. N. I., 21 Mar. 1927, ADM 1/8715/194. 
64. Ibid. 
65. ADM 1/8715/194, D. N. I. (See Note 65. ) 
66. Sir W. Tyrrell (Foreign Office) to Sir E. Howard 
(Washington), 8 Mar. 1927, D. B. F. P., la ser., III, 581. 
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a three Power conference following favourable indications from the Japan- 
ese. The absence of France from the Geneva Conference led to a revision 
of Admiralty policy which restricted objectives in the submarine category 
to tonnage limitation since any possible agreement on abolition would be 
worthless. Ideally, submarine totals would not be discussed at all since: 
'So long as the Submarine is dealt with as a distinctive type of vessel 
it appears impossible to formulate any basis on which to allocate numbers 
and an empirical allocation would appear to be the only practical 
solution. '67 Each nation had different operational reasons for arriving 
at the total tonnage it required. As a means of achieving limitation by 
the other major naval Powers, it was proposed that Britain should insist 
on the submarine not being treated as a distinctive type of vessel but 
merely a special version of surface warships. Thus, 
'the British "M" class are Capital Ships by 
virtue of their 12 inch gun armament; "%. 1" 
is a Cruiser, while the "0" class are torpedo- 
carrying vessels. If this general proposition 
can be accepted the solution would appear to 
lie in permitting submersible vessels to be 
built mit of and only out of the number of 
warships allocated to the Powers of the 
distinctive types ... Thus, if a nation should 
desire to build a submersible vessel carrying 
a 12 inch gun, she would have to sacrifice her 
right to build a surface Capital Ship. '68 
This was undoubtedly ingenious but an illogical scheme and was unlikely to 
be considered as a practical proposition. 
Final British Proposals - Submarines 
Although publicly committed to press for abolition, the Admiralty 
decided at an early stage to base British submarine proposals on tonnage 
limitation so as, 'to see limitations imposed on the numbers, size and 
67. D. of P., 10 Mar. 1927, ADM 116/3371. 
68. ibid. 
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'armament of submarines. ' 
69 
The British argument on qualitative limit- 
ation reaffirmed a belief that: 'If ... the submarine is a necessity for 
defence, the larger type of vessel is not essential for this purpose. ' 
70 
proposals were that within the overall tonnage allocation there ahould be 
two types of submarine: Class A (1,600 - 2,000 tons: 5 inch gun) and. 
Class B (under 600 tons: 5 inch gun) with the age limit of both set at 
fifteen years. These types represented standard British naval thinking 
on their own requirements and also on restricting the operating efficiency 
of the submarine in an anti-commerce role. These proposals were regarded 
as the nearest alternative to total abolition and an improvement on the 
policy of having an overall tonnage limit alone, which allowed a country 
to build submarines of any size, provided that they did not exceed the 
overall quota. Subject to equivalent reductions by the other participating 
powers, Britain was prepared to accept a limit of 60 submarines. Further, 
if the United States and Japan were to lay claim to a higher number then 
the intention was to adopt an equivalent position on numbers of surface 
cruisers. 
Tripartite Naval Conference - Geneva 1927 
The Conference opened on 20 June attended by delegations from the 
United States, the British Empire, and Japan. France and Italy had 
refused to participate but the former sent an 'informer' and the latter 
an 'observer'. 
71 
Although capital ship and cruiser ratios were the major 
69. Plans Division, 6 May 1927, ADtd 1/8715/188, 'Proposals 
of 1927 Naval Disarmament Conference. ' 
See also: Naval Staff, ADM 1/8715/188, P. D. 02852/27. 
See also: C. I. D. Paper No. 808B, 14 April 1927. 
70. Ibid. 
71. 'The Naval Conference, ' R. U. S. I. Journal, LXXII (1927), 633. 
See also: S. R. Graham (Rome to Sir A. Chamberlain (Foreign 
Secretary), 3 liar. 1927, D. B. F. P., la ser., III, 578. 
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considerations of the Conference, the British delegation 
72 
were prime 
advocates of-discussions on the submarine category. The United States 
proposed that total submarine tonnage be based on the existing Washington 
ratios for capital ships of 5: 5: 3 for themselves, Britain, and Japan respec- 
tively. Age limit was to be set at thirteen years. The Japanese favoured 
a virtual cessation of naval building and coupled this with a demand for a 
higher ratio in all categories for themselves. 
73 
Neither of these Powers 
favoured qualitative limitation. The British regarded such proposals as, 
'perpetuating competitive building. ' 
74 The Americans were not specific on 
quantitative submarine limitation and figures as varied as 60,000 to 
90,000 tons were mentioned. However, by 24 June a sufficient degree of 
agreement had been reached to allow the submarine category to be discussed 
by the Technical Committee. The Japanese now accepted the concept of two 
classes of submarine, if only as a basis for discussion, while the British 
wanted a total tonnage for each class75 and considered maximum and minimum 
displacements as a way to, 'cut out the chance of any Power building a 
large number of medium size submarines of, say, 1,000 tons, which possib- 
ility would otherwise have existed under a total tonnage system. '76 
Despite this, the Americans, upon being informed of the British requirements 
for only fifteen small and 45 large submarines, had agreed to the proposals 
provided they were given equality. There was, as the D. C. N. S. pointed out, 
72. First Lord of the Admiralty, Y. C. Bridgeman; Chancellor of 
the Duchy, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood.; D. C. N. S., Vice-Admiral 
Sir Frederick L. Field. 
73. British Empire Delegation, 21 June 1927, ADM 116/2609, 
'2nd Meeting. ' 
74. Mr. London (Geneva) to Chamberlains 21 June 1927, 
D. B. F. P., la ser., III, 608-09. 
75. Bridgeman to Baldwin, 27 June 1927, D. B. F. P., la ser., III, 625. 
76. British Empire Delegation, 24 June 1927, ADM 116/2609, 
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no objection to this and'such a concession might be useful since, 
'it must be remembered we had come to this 
Conference suggesting that each country should 
state what they required in various classes of 
ships and that they should each state their 
case justifying these requirements. When we 
come to state that our requirements in cruisers 
would be approximately 500,000 tons, the Americans, ' 
if they still demanded equality, would have to 
justify an increase in their demands from the 
300,000 of their proposals to 500,000. M 
This was a crucial aspect of the Conference since the British were not 
treating the question of agreement on submarine policy as an isolated case 
but one which might be useful in modifying American demands on other categ- 
ories. Indications were given that they would adopt a more flexible 
attitude over submarine tonnage if the Americans adopted a similar position 
on cruisers. However, this presumed a general consensus among the three 
powers to achieve some form of successful conclusion to the Conference. 
Moreover, United States policy, as Viscount Chelwood pointed out, was based 
on ensuring that the results of the Conference should be two fold: to keep 
the Japanese allowance as low as possible and to achieve naval equality 
with Britain. Further discussions on the submarine category were delayed 
while the Japanese delegation awaited instructions from Tokyo on whether 
or not to exclude the small submarine category. 
78 
Despite a negative 
decision on Class B the submarine discussions continued, albeit slowly, 
with both the Americans and the Japanese, in the British view, proving 
difficult. 'The Japanese were adamant in insisting on 2,000 tons for 
the bigger type submarines. The Americans, however, were prepared to come 
down to something nearer our own figure. ' 
79 
However, even this possibility 
77, Ibid. 
78. British Empire Delegation, 29 June 1927, ADM 116/2609, 
'4th Meeting. ' 
79. British Empire Delegation, 1 July 1927, ADM 116/2609, 
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brought no real satisfaction; Admiral Field found the Americans very trying 
to deal with. 'He thought he had got them to agree to something and at the 
next meeting he found that they simply reverted to their own original 
proposal. '80 The American attitude seemed to be one of playing for time 
and on 1 July they repeated the same tactics on submarines, 'in regard to 
which a considerable measure of agreement had previously been reached. '81 
The British considered 1,600 tons as an adequate upper limit for ocean- 
going submarines, with the operating radius on this tonnage estimated 
at 10,000 miles. 'The Americans had agreed to a limit of 1,700 tons and, ' 
Admiral Field, '... thought that pressure should be put on the Japanese to 
do the same. ' 
82 
The Japanese might give way on qualitative tonnage of the 
small submarine, 'and so facilitate discussions of the submarine class as 
a whole. ' 
83 
In the absence of agreement by the other two Powers, the 
British contemplated insisting on nothing less than the 5: 5: 3 ratio, in 
line with the original United States proposal, and increasing tonnage 
requirements from 60,000 to 116,000 tons. 
84 
On the evidence of known British views on submarine abolition or 
limitation, this proposal cannot have been intended as a serious threat 
but rather as a negotiating ploy. Certainly, on the basis of past oppos- 
ition to French demands for 90,000 tons, it would have been a remarkable 
80. ! bid. 
81. ADM 116/2609, British Empire Delegation. 
(See Note 79. ) 
82. ADM 116/2609, British Empire Delegation, 
(See Note 78. ) 
83. D. B. F. P., la ser., III9 623. (See Note 75. ) 
84. Mr. London (Geneva) to Chamberlain, 1927, 
D. B. F. P., la ser., III, 686-87. 
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volte-face. Nevertheless, the British delegation went as far as placing 
on record that the intention to'-raise the proposed tonnage was, 'largely 
due to'the fact that neither the United States nor the Japanese represent- 
atives'would agree ` to' submarines b eing'divided into two types 'and. there is 
therefore no guarantee that the total tonnage finally agreed upon will not 
be used entirely for constructing submarines of large offensive power., 
85 
Unrealistic as this move may'have been, it had been largely dictated by 
two reasons; to attempt an alteration of the United States views on cruiser 
numbers and also because of an appreciation of the AIS effort required, in 
numbers and cost, to contain submarines capable of an endurance of several 
thousand miles. The plans to redeploy the Royal Navy towards the Far East 
dictated the need for development of long-range submarines and complicated 
the delegation's problems. However, the United States delegation did not 
deviate from their original demand for parity with Britain on submarine 
tonnage and they retained the proposal for a quantitative total of 90,000 
tons. Meanwhile, some progress was made with the Japanese who were now 
prepared to accept a minimum limit of 70,000 tons. The British considered 
that the Japanese were not competing against them but rather were attempting 
to safeguard themselves against the United States. 
86 
Further discussions 
resulted in the Japanese agreeing to transfer 10,000 tons of their subma- 
rine claim to surface categories without any increase in their overall 
tonnage of 325,000 tons. In response, the British were prepared to reduce 
their total quota by 50,000 tons to 500,000 tons. 
87 
However, hopes of 
-85. British Empire Delegation, 7 July 1927, ADM 116/2609, 
'6th Meeting. ' 
86. Ibid. 
87. Mr. London (Geneva) to Chamberlain, 17 July 1927, 
D. B. F. P., la ser., III0 690. 
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finalising these agreements were crippled by the fact that the submarine 
category was not the central issue controlling the success or failure of the 
Conference. -1 
The major difficulty concerned surface cruisers and in particular the 
British proposal, supported by Japan, for a limit only on the number of 
10,000 tons vessels. The United States favoured this type, which were 
considered suitable for fleet operations, -and therefore disagreed with the 
British proposals. Their preference was for agreement based on a 'global' 
tonnage covering all types of cruisers since, 
'the United States government would never 
agree to limitation in one class of cruiser 
and not in another and that if the British 
delegates returned to Geneva with proposals 
for limitation of 10,000 ton cruisers and 
freedom of action with regard to smaller 
cruisers the conference was doomed to failure. 188 
The British favoured the 6,000 tons cruiser since it was considered inval- 
uable for defence of sea communications against surface raiders. Prospects 
for a successful outcome to the Conference remained gloomy. 
Despite this, the British delegation went ahead with modified propos- 
als on cruiser*, destroyers and submarines89 while the negotiations on 
capital ships and aircraft-carriers were abandoned as unlikely to achieve 
results. On submarines, agreement was reached over maximum gun calibre, 
(5 inches); a qualitative limit of 1,800 tons; a definition of standard 
tonnage; and a statement that no submarines were to be exempt from any 
overall tonnage agreement, such as the Japanese proposals for submarines 
under 700 tons. However, no successful outcome could be reached on the 
other British proposals nor on the 90,000 tons quantitative limit proposed 
88. Mr. Chilton (Washington) to Chamberlain, 28 July 1927, 
D. B. F. P., la ser., III, 702. 
89. Mr. London (Geneva) to Chamberlain, 28 July 1927, 
B. D. F. P., la ser., III, 703. 
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by the United States. Rejection of the British views on cruisers meant 
that the Government had to resign itself to the failure of the Geneva 
Conference, with the exception of a few minor agreements, and both they 
and the United States Government became. locked. in a purely propoganä. a 
battle to assign blame for the failure. British policy, 
'vis-a-vis, -of press and public opinion in the 
event of a breakdown of the naval conference 
is to-express the great disappointment of His 
Majesty's Government that they had been unable 
to achieve reduction in expenditure on naval 
armaments which they so ardently desire and which 
their own proposals entailed, owing to rigid 
adherence of the United States to proposals which 
place Great Britain in a permanent position of 
naval inferiority. 190 
On 3 August, instruction were issued to alter the final passage to read: 
'Whilst giving Great Britain and the United States an equal tonnage of 
cruisers would leave us without a sufficient number of them to protect our 
sea communications. ' 
91 
Much of the blame for failure was attributed to 
the Americans because of, 
'their insistence on building a large number of 
cruisers with eight inch guns entailing a great 
increase in armament and cost instead of the 
reduction in both which we were seeking. Anyone 
who regards the situation dispassionately and 
impartially will agree that it would be imposs- 
ible for His Majesty's Government to agree by 
treaty to fall below the one Power Standard. ' 92 
Amidst the inter-governmental duels the final Plenary Session of the 
Conference was scheduled for 4 August. The United-States favoured merely 
a formal closing ceremony but did not press the issue. 
93 
The First Lord, 
90. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard (Manchester, Mass. ), 
50 July 1927, D. B. F. P., la ser., III, 710. 
91. Ibid, Footnote No. 5, F. O. Telegram No. 362. 
92. D. B. F. P., la ser., III, 710. (See Note 90. ) 
93. Howard to Chamberlain, 3 Aug. 1927, D. B. F. P., 
la ser., III, 724. 
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aware of political capital, pressed for explanatory speeches and took 
this opportunity to voice criticism of the American attitude. 
The British considered that there were several reasons for the failure 
of the Conference, including differing strategic viewpoints, the existence 
of the 'Big-Navy' pressure group and its effects on the American Congress 
and delegates.. 'I came to the conclusion very early in the grooeedings. that 
with the American. Delegation dominated as it was by 'Big Navy' Admirals 
94 
there was no chance of any satisfactory agreement. ' In addition, much 
of the British motivition for agreeing to participate in a naval disarmament 
conference had stemmed from hope of repeating the Washington Conference,. 
which had been regarded. generally as a successful venture. However, as. 
Chamberlain pointed out:. -'As to the Naval Conference, this is all now past 
history. '95 The Geneva Conference proved inconclusive on submarines partly 
due to the premature curtailment brought about by disagreements on surface 
cruisers; many of the proposals affecting the submarine category were still 
at the negotiating stage when the delegations dispersed. 
The period between the Washington and Geneva naval conferences had 
been one of, mixed fortunes for the, Admiralty. The need to replace wartime 
construction and the problems posed by the growth of Japanese naval power 
were two of the initial problems. The Admiralty recognised the existence 
of financial restrictions which precluded Government sanction for the full 
constructional requirement. However, following the implementation of the 
Washington agreements the Admiralty rightly considered that-the Ten Year 
programme did not utilise all the constructional resources available. 
94. Howard to Chamberlain, 1 Sept. 1927, 
D. B. F. P., la ser., III, 738. 
95. Chamberlain to Sir J. Tilley (Tokyo), 24 Aug. 1927, 
D. B. F. P., la ser., III, 734-36. 
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Financial factors were allowed to UAM&j dominate Government policy and 
in the face of a continuing decline in shipbuilding and other defence 
industries the Government relied on political calculations to satisfy 
military requirements. Thus, contingency plans to counter possible war in 
the Far East were altered in time scale from 1929 to 1935, irrespective of 
whether the Japanese or any other Power would be so considerate as not to 
launch an attack earlier. 
The failure to achieve abolition of the submarine at Washington had 
ensured the retention of this vessel in the Royal Navy. However, the 
attitude remained one of tolerance rather than enthusiasm, despite the fact 
that the decline in surface warship numbers resulted in the submarine being 
recognised as having an essential role in the initial 'holding' stages of 
a Far Eastern war. Gradually, throughout the period, the combination of 
political and military requirements with financial factors ensured the 
prominence of the patrol submarine over the more specialist models; brought 
about by the need for maximum utilisation of diminishing numbers. Although 
a plan for submarine construction was agreed to as part of the Ten Year 
programme, restriction of the power of foreign submarine forces, even if 
British submarine requirements suffered, remained the goal of the Govern- 
ment and to a lesser extent the Admiralty. To both, however, a reduction 
in foreign submarine numbers still meant a possible lessening of the need 
for AIS escort forces in peacetime, although their reasons differed. The 
Government considered the logical conclusion to be a reduction in defence 
expenditure, while the Admiralty saw any diminution of $/S forces releasing 
resources to other categories. Neither side was prepared to accept the 
more difficult decision to maintain both submarine and A/S forces. In 
part this reflected the Government's reluctance to accept the failure of 
any of the naval disarmament policies. The Admiralty, in turn, preferred 
to continue pressing for strengthening of the major surface warship 
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categories rather than make adequate provision for its auxiliary forces. 
Moreover, in the absence of the French, any submarine agreement was of 
limited value to the British. 
Failure of the Geneva Conference meant that the next three years were 
to be crucial: Admiralty policy on submarines clearly had to choose 
between extensive development, for which there seemed no likelihood of 
adequate resources, or for retention of existing projected 'force levels. 
An understanding with the French to reduce their submarine fleet was also 
considered necessary in the hope that the other major Powers would not 
follow suit but rather continue to favour tonnage limitation. The Govern- 
ment also favoured reducing the British submarine force in the vain hope 
that such a gesture would have a reciprocal effect on foreign powers. 
Clearly for the Royal Navy generally and the Submarine Service specifically, 
the late 1920's and early 1930's promised a renewal of the struggle for 
survival of the British submarine. Although not on the level reminiscent 
of the pre Washington period the struggle still centred on the need to 
retain sufficient numbers to meet operational requirements. 
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CHAPTER 9 
1928 - 1931 
-ANGLO-FRENCH DISCUSSIONS AND 
1930' LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 
The failure to achieve major agreements at Geneva had little direot 
effect on existing British plans for submarine development and construction. 
Decisions on specific models were influenced more by reviews of general 
naval policy. Thus, in the late 1920's, reviews of the various contin- 
genoy war plans concluded that war in the Far East was the most likely 
scenario, 
l 
and that certain of the resources allocated to submarine develop- 
went should be moved from the fleet submarine to the patrol model. The 
increased emphasis on the development of the patrol model coincided, in the 
period between the 1927 Geneva and 1930 London Naval Conferences, with 
gdmiralty concern over the replacement of ageing First World War submarines.. 
as; well as the possible effects of international quantitative tonnage 
agreements. 
Intensive studies resulted in total requirements being reduced from 
80 to 72 boats with the emphasis on the patrol model. However, with these 
boats expected to have a Service life of only twelve years, which was a 
rationalisation stemming from the decisions of the Birkenhead Committee, 
six new submarines needed to be laid down annually. The submarine prov- 
isions of the Ten Year Programme had already been delayed two years and 
now financial restrictions precluded such an annual construction rate. 
proposals for a Service life of fifteen years had been suggested at 
1. D. of P. (W. A. Egerton), Oct. 1925, ADM 116/3629, 
'Sketch Estimates 1926 (Vote A): Scheme of Hostilities 
on which Mobilization Requirements are to be Based. ' 
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Geneva but the United States and Japan had preferred thirteen years. 
Nevertheless, -. the question of age limits was not considered likely to, 
'affect the problem. for another ten or twelve years, when the replacement 
of the "0" class submarines comes to be considered. '2 There was. also a 
possibility that production of submarines with increased endurance capab- 
ilities would enable a reduction in numbers but this was not considered 
very likely. In fact, the decline in the numbers of boats ordered was 
expected to nullify the-advantages imparted by increased capabilities. 
Admiralty policy now aimed, tat building up to and maintaining approx- 
imately, 60 -, -"0"-class and twelve - Small submarines whose design, ' had., 
'not yet been settled. '5 Moreover, failing, any agreement on tonnage limit- 
ation the expection was that by Apri1,1931, the Japanese would have 72 
submarines under twelve years old and the United States a force of 80 
submarines of. all ages although this. total was expected to decrease in the 
absence of a new construction programme. 
4 
British construction policy was 
dictated by the Government's decision of July 1925 which laid down the 
building programme up to 1930.5 This programme had been generally adhered 
to until the abortive Geneva Conference and the resulting political situ- 
ation led the Cabinet to set up the Naval Programme Committee. Its brief 
was to enquire into and seek ways of re-adjusting future construction prog- 
rammes within the framework of the already announced general policy. 
Naval planners now regarded war in the Far East as'probably the most 
difficult war we may be called upon to engage in. ' Therefore, 'the 
2. Plans Division, 29 Aug. 1927, ADM 1/873-1/142, 
'Shipbuilding Programme 1927: Submarine Position, 
of British Empire in Relation to the U. S. A. and Japan. ' 
3. Ibid. 
4. See Appendix: G(6). 
5. See Appendix: G(7). 
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'decision of the Cabinet to accept the assurance of the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs that aggressive action on the part of Japan 
before "1935 is not a contingency'to be setiously apprehended, '6 tended to 
hamper the Admiralty's -plans'to prepare a Far East-orientated naval 
policy. 'In addition, -the continued existence of the 'Ten Year Rule' 
continued to stifle the speed at which this policy could progress. ` 
An idditionäl problem'was posed by the need to replace some of the 
ageing capital ships. Any'improvements to the British submarine' force were 
considered possible only in'theperiod prior to new capital ship construe- 
tion. One proposal was'to increase the annual submarine building'rite to 
eight boats from 1928-307 but the Government, still searching for inter- 
national agreements on disarmament, vetoed"any such increase. The same 
political policies also precluded any immediate capital ship replacement 
and the Admiralty emphasised that acceptance of Government policy was not 
to be considered as an'endorsement. 
'It is ... evident that, owing to no building 
having taken place during the years immediately 
after the War, even if this minimum programme 
is carried out, there will be periods when the 
numbers of these vessels will fall considerably 
below our bare requirements, except in so far as 
numbers can. be kept up by retaining "over-age" 
ships if they prove to be efficient enough to 
warrant retention when the time arrives. The 
risks resulting from this temporary reduction 
of strength must however be accepted so long 
as the chance of an important naval war is remote. 'S 
Although the prevailing doctrine on the threat of naval war identified the 
Far East as the most likely area this did not totally preclude consideration 
6. . ADI 116/3629, '1926 Sketch Estimates. ' (See Note 1. ) 
7. A. C. N. S., 2 Sept. 1927, ADM 116/2606, 'Proposals 
on Building Programme. ' 
8. D. C. N. S., Admiral jl. 'ield to First Sea Lord, Admiral Madden, 
4 Cot. 1927, ADM 116/2606. 
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of involvement in a European conflict. Thus, Navy Estimates down to 1930 
were formulated on the basis that they would, 'meet the "war in the Far 
East" requirements governed by the Ten-Year decision, and also the require- 
ments of "an_extra-European war". '9 However, if a disproportionate percen- 
tage of available resources were allocated to a long-term programme of 
capital ship replacement, then clearly insufficient numbers of other war- 
ships would be produced, and result in an inability to meet even a one- 
power standard in the general way that the Naval Staff thought right. It 
was not only the comparative strengths in one or two categories that'were 
important, but the general capacity of the Navy to wage war successfully. 
The question of balance between categories was considered unavoidable as 
the period of the building 'holiday' was drawing to a close. Unless this 
was extended there appeared to be no alternative but to give precedence to 
capital ship construction. Annual demands by the Government for reductions 
in the Navy Estimates meant that, 
'some reduction in the construction of these 
vessels, ' cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, 
'will be most strongly pressed on the Admiralty 
during the years in which the replacement of 
Capital Ships is necessary. It is therefore 
most important to increase the numbers during 
the few years remaining before the construc- 
tion of Capital Ships commences. '-0 
In November 1927, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill, 
pressed for and received Board agreement to cancel two of the three cruisers 
authorised under the 1927 programme. The Admiralty's reluctant acceptance 
of this move was largely dictated by the fact that existing expenditure 
exceeded the Navy Estimates and the only other recourse would have been to 
9. D. of P., 16 Oct. 1927, ADM 116/3629, 
11928-Sketch Estimates. ' 
10. ADM 116/2606, Field to Madden. (See Note 8. ) 
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request a supplementary estimate. Churchill then proposed further 
reductions in the 1928 cruiser programme and the curtailment or reduction 
of other naval priorities. The Board opposed this constant whittling away 
of the ten year programme of 1925.12 But the final estimate agreed was 
only just over £1 million more than the total requested by the Chancel- 
lor. 
15 The surviving two cruisers of the 1928 programme were later cancelled 
by the incoming Labour Government. Meanwhile, although the Conservative 
Government would also have preferred international agreement on capital 
ship limitation, it accepted that the only area in which a possibility 
of immediate success appeared to exist was in a European agreement on the 
limitation of submarines. 
Admiralty policy still officially proclaimed submarine abolition as 
their long-term aim but practical realities indicated that tonnage limit- 
ation was the best that could be achieved. 
14 
The need to pursue a policy 
of submarine limitation was attributed to the submarine threat to the 
battlefleet and there was only one reference in the Naval Staff apprec- 
iation to a threat to maritime trade. This concerned the potential danger 
o£ other nations building cruiser submarines. The uneasy balance between 
abolition and limitation made it difficult, however, either on the one 
hand to put so much emphasis on abolition that the Government might be 
tempted to accept other naval sacrifices to get an international 'package 
deal' agreed or, on the other, to put British submarine capabilities very 
high on any Admiralty list of priorities. 
U. Board minute No. 2391,3 Nov. 1927, ADM 167/75. 
12. Churchill to Bridgeman, 16 Jan. 1928, Ma 1/8765. 
13. See Appendix: C. 
14. Plans Division, 10 Nov. 1927, ADM 116/3371, 
'Submarines and Disarmament. ' 
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Anglo-French Naval Conversations - 1928: Disarmament 
Conference - Preparatory Commission 
The major obstacle to any agreement on submarine limitation continued 
to be France, to whom the submarine remained an attractive method of level- 
ling out naval strengths against both Britain and Italy. The policy of the 
French Government. since Washington had suggested no willingness to reduce 
their total submarine tonnage requirements. Therefore, they were thought 
unlikely to prove amenable to any proposals for a reduction in quantitative 
or qualitative tonnage. However, if the French could be persuaded to an 
agreement then the concurrence of the United States and Japan was considered 
likely. During March 1928, a Preparatory Commission had been established 
at Geneva to prepare the ground for a future naval disarmament conference. 
The Commission's-early proceedings brought to light the major stumbling 
block to any-Anglo-French agreement. This concerned the British draft 
proposals on naval limitation, which centred on close classification and 
limitation of numbers within each category. French proposals were for 
limitation only on the basis of total tonnage. The United States and 
Japan tended to favour the British proposals with the former holding that, 
total tonnage contained the germs of eventual competition and would nöt 
lessen international suspicion, uneasiness and mistrust. ' 
15 
The Italians 
sided with the French since the total tonnage proposals allowed them to 
maintain a low overall tonnage. but still construct sufficient warships in 
the categories they preferred. Negotiations resulted in the British 
agreeing to tonnage limitation within categories while the French agreed 
to divide total tonnage into four groups, including submarines over 600 
tons, as the basis for discussion. 
15. Mr. Gibson (U. S. Ambassador to Belgium), Mar. 1928, 
ADM 116/5521, '10th Meeting of the 3rd Session of the 
Preparatory Commission. ' 
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The next stage of British policy was to press for a specific agree- 
ment on cruisers and submarines. In considering new proposals, the 
possibility of a-future naval disarmament conference had always to be 
kept in mind. -The expectation-on both categories was that, 
the final disarmament conference will fix a 
ma im tonnage applicable to all Powers which 
'no Power will be allowed to exceed during the 
period covered by the Convention. Within this 
maximum limit each Power will indicate at the 
final conference for each of these categories 
the tonnage they propose to reach and which 
they undertake not to exceed during the period 
: covered by the Convention. '16 
This made it important for Britain to obtain prior agreement with France on 
quantitative submarine tonnage in order to prevent a repetition of the 
failures at Washington and Geneva. ''A full naval disarmament conference 
was accepted as still being far in the future but specific timing depended 
on an agreement, Ion the system of classification and the' elimination of a 
class of cruisers carrying 6 inch guns and below. ' 
17 
Ratios were not 
considered necessary for submarines since: 'Submarines are not' set off 
against submarines. ' 
18 
Therefore, the suggestion was for British submarine 
proposals to be-concentrated on a maximum tonnage approximating to the 
known claims of the other Powers. Although France and Italy were to be 
left to propose a total, the British target was a 1iiait of 75,000 tons 
approximating, tto the status-quo of the United States, Japan and France 
and the figure on which agreement seemed possible at the Coolidge Geneva 
19 
conference. ' The estimation was that 'in addition to covering- ' all 
_,... 
16. Franco-British Disarmament Proposals, Mar. 1928, 
ARA 116/3371. 
17. Ibid. 
18. ADM 116/3371, 'Franco-British Disarmament Proposals. ' 
(See Note 16. ) 
19. ADM 116/3371, 'Franco-British Disarmament Proposals. ' 
(See Note 16. ) 
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'reasonable requirements' the figure of 75,000 tons was only likely to be 
exceeded, within the next five years, by the claims of France and Japan. 
British submarine requirements, based on this time scale and proposed. 
tonnage had been the subject of extensive studies early in 1928. The 
overall requirements proposed by the Admiralty included operations, 'in 
the Baltic and Black Sea in the event of a war with Russia, and in the Far 
East in the event of a war with Japan. ' 
20 
Modifications were made to the 
proposed system of Far East patrols, principally in their duration. This 
reflected the increased endurance hoped for from the post-war designs. The 
opportunity was also taken to assess future design requirements for patrol 
submarines. The recommendation in the case of Baltic operations was that 
the boats used, 'should be of the small type"owing to the restricted and 
comparatively shallow waters in which they will have to operate. " 
21 
Far 
East operational requirements provided a far more complex problem. The 
need *as for increased endurance and habitability and the resultant decision 
produced two different designs. The smaller design, required for operations 
in the shallow restricted waters of Northern Europe and the Mediterranean, 
had already been agreed to in the form of the 'S' class. However, develop- 
ment of the larger submarine ('T' class), for general patrol duties and 
specific replacement of the 101, 'P', and 'R' classes in the 1930's, was 
to prove a much longer and more complex process, interrupted by the 1950 
London Naval Conference. 
During the summer and autumn of 1928 the issue of arms limitation 
remained in the forefront of British naval thinking, as the Anglo-French 
negotiations appeared to be approaching agreement. However, two problems 
20. D. of P., 50 May 1928, ADM 116/2606. 
21. Ibid. 
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prevented these discussions from being considered as a purely naval or 
European issue as had been intended. Not only did any Anglo-French agree- 
ment involve limitation of land armaments but also both parties had to be 
careful not to appear to be excluding any of the other 'disarmament' Powers 
from consultation on any arms limitation proposal. The United States, 
while publicly supporting British attempts to achieve abolition of the 
submarine, had never adopted the belief that the submarine constituted a 
mortal threat to any nation's survival. Therefore, the Americans had been 
content to accept equivalent tonnage figures to Britain, although inferior 
to those claimed by France and Japan. 
22 
Nevertheless, any agreement 
between Britain and France on the submarine category made it necessary to 
demonstrate that none of these measures presented a threat to the overall 
naval position of the United States. Failure to do so carried the possibility 
of arousing an attitude in American political and naval circles which 
might lead to difficulties over other categories, such as cruisers, at a 
future naval disarmament conference. 
On submarine abolition the British now admitted that: 'The trend of 
naval discussions at Washington in 1922 and subsequently has ... indic- 
ated that neither on total abolition nor on total tonnage limitation is 
agreement likely to be reached-'23 Therefore, policy was to be directed 
towards a compromise with, in this instance, limitation being confined 
only to the larger submarines. However, freedom from tonnage restrictions 
was to exist only below 600 tons, which hopefully would prove an insuff- 
icient displacement for sustained operations outside coastal waters. 
This proposal had to be qualified by acceptance that: 'Against Great 
Britain however all submarines large or small built by European powers can 
22. See Appendix: G(8). 
23. Admiralty, 1928, ADM 1163371, 'The Anglo-French 
Naval Limitation Proposals. ' 
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'be used offensively. '24 Nevertheless, this attitude was included 
primarily for the United States's benefit since, despite French agreement 
to the proposal to limit all submarines over 600 tons, the United States 
Government had expressed a view that it saw no difference in offensive 
power between the two classes of submarine. Any appearance of concession 
was destroyed by'the British reply that, 'the number of torpedoes carried 
in the smaller submarine is less, whilst the radius of operation is 
considerably curtailed. Their attacking power is limited and not to be 
compared with that of the larger submarine. ' 
25 
Efforts to achieve a radical 
reduction in overall submarine tonnage were increased by the Admiralty 
during August in the hope that reduction in total British requirements would 
result in the French following suit. 
'As regards the total maximum tonnage for large 
submarines, ;. t is to our advantage to keep the 
submarine tonnage as low as possible. At Geneva 
we put forward 90,000 tons as a maximum for 
submarine tonnage of all descriptions with a 
proviso that not more than two-thirds of this 
total should be in large submarines. This would 
have allowed of 60,000 tons of large submarines, 
and I would propose that Admiral Kelly, ' (senior 
British naval representative at Geneva), 'should 
have this figure in mind. r26 
Hopes of success on this question were destroyed, as in 1927, by differences 
of opinion with the United States. In this instance, due to premature 
disclosure of impending Anglo-drench agreement on several disarmament 
proposals, the Americans protested that the British were endeavouring to 
manoeuvre them into a position of inferiority or isolation. The result was 
a termination of negotiations and a strong denial by the British Government 
24. Madden to Bridgeman, 17 Aug. 1928, Aft 3.16/3371. 
25. Admiralty, 1928, ADM 116/3571, 'Anglo-French Discussions - 
Final British Proposals on Submarine Limitation. ' 
26. ADM 116/3571, Madden to Bridgman. (See Note 24. ) 
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of any secret clauses or political understandings. 
Meanwhile, although the Admiralty had extended contingency construe- 
tion and war plans up to 1935, pressure was applied by the Treasury for a 
reassessment of the Navy's needs on ammunition, stores, and fuel oil up 
to 1938. The implication was that immediate economies should be possible 
in the Navy Estimates, especially on the specified items. 
27 A further blow 
which struck directly at submarine construction had been occasioned by the 
advent of the Labour Government in June 1929, which led to a review of the 
1928 programme. This resulted in the cancellation of two submarines and 
one submarine depot ship, reducing the submarine programme to four boats. 
These reductions elicited a strong protest from the Sea Lords, allied to a 
request for the restoration of the original submarine quota. 
'Our submarine requirements have been formulated 
at 72, viz. six submarines a year, with an age 
limit of twelve years. Of these, 60 were to have 
been of the "0" type and twelve of the fast fleet 
type of submarine. Since these proposals were 
considered a demand has arisen for a faster type 
than the "0" type between it and the fast fleet 
type, and for a smaller submarine - to be known 
as the "S" type - which could be built in place 
of a number of the "0" type. 128 
The view was that the proposed reductions had been sanctioned by the 
Government, 'in order to effect a measure of immediate economy and to 
assist the conversations with the U. S. A., particularly in regard to the 
cruiser question. '29 In both assumptions the Admiralty was correct but 
having made the analysis the Sea Lords did nothing about it; their response 
was inactivity rather than the spirited resistance of previous years. 
27. Churchill to Bridgeman, 31 July 1928, ADM 3.16/5388. 
28. Madden to D. C. N. S., Vice-Admiral Sir William W. Fisher, 
2 Oct. 1929, ADM 116/2606, P. D. 03391/39, 'Naval 
Construction Programme. ' 
29. D. of P. to Fighting Services Committee, 10 Oct. 1929, 
ADM 116/2606, 'Memo on Proposed 1929 Construction Programme. ' 
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Confirmation of the suspicions over cruisers was not long in being supplied. 
During October, Ramsay MacDonald and President Hoover came to, a tentative 
agreement whereby-a'basis of 50 cruisers of 530,000 tons was established. 
50 
Invitations were-then extended to Japan, France, and Italy to attend a 
naval disarmament conference in London during January 1930.51 meanwhile, 
the 1929 *programme -had been suspended in October pending investigations 
by the Fighting Services Committee and the Admiralty had to place before 
the Committee, 'the naval construction' requirements for the 1929 programme, 
taking into consideration the measure of agreement -which has been reached 
with the U. S. A., and the possible effects, if general agreement is reached 
at the five power conference in January next. '32 
Abolition v Limitation of the Submarine - Policy for the 
London Naval Conference 
One of the 'possible effects' was the question of either submarine 
limitation or abolition. In evidence to the Fighting Services Committee 
the Admiralty reaffirmed support for reduction of submarine construction 
only, 'to the minimum rendered possible by agreement with other powers. '33 
Although no mention was made of abolition it had been stated officially 
that: 'The British Empire and the U. S. A. agree in their desire to abolish 
the submarine as an instrument of war. '34 In practice this was largely a 
diplomatic gesture as the United States did not consider the submarine to 
30. General Dawes(United. States Presidential Representative) 
to Ramsay MacDonald, 29 Aug. 1929, Documents on British 
Foreign Policy, (London, 1946), 2 ser., I, 57-58. 
31. Arthur Henderson (Foreign Secretary) to Ambassadors of 
France, Italy, and Japan, 7 Oct. 1929, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., I'i", 
103-105, 'Invitations to the London Naval Conference. ' 
32. ADM 116/2606, '1929 Construction Programme. ' (See Note 29. ) 
33. ADM 116/2606, '1929 Construction Programme. ' (See Note 29. ) 
54. ADM 116/3388, Churchill to Bridgeman. (See Note 27. ) 
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be the naval threat that the British held it to be. Moreover, support 
for British abolition proposals was contingent on agreement by other nations. 
Under these circumstances it was a useful negotiating weapon for the 
United States with the British over cruiser numbers. Although the main 
emphasis of British policy on submarines was now directed towards agreement 
on quantitative tonnage limitation, proposals for abolition were retained; 
but in place of a reaffirmation of the supposed inhumanity of the submarine, 
the intention was to emphasise that this weapon was irrelevant and obsolete 
as a result of advances in 1A/S devices and techniques. Thus, 
"'when public reference is made to the question, ' 
of abolition, 'it is desirable to lay emphasis, 
not on the threat of the submarine, but rather 
on the advance in anti-submarine methods since 
the war, showing how in the late war the subma- 
rine was only a serious menace during the time 
that our methods of anti-submarine attack were 
still not fully developed. '55 
gsaio and Convo 
During the period since Washington, British naval thinking on the 
submarine threat had undergone several alterations and the submarine limit- 
ation proposals reflected some of these. Disagreement on the effectiveness 
of convoy extended to the highest levels of the Admiralty. Events of 1917- 
1S had proved that the U-boat posed a major threat to Britain's wartime 
survival. Yet, the A, /S lessons were soon forgotten, as was the effective- 
ness of the convoy system if properly prepared and implemented. Quite why 
this should be is uncertain; perhaps it had something to do with the slow 
production of the Official Histories of the period, or perhaps with a 
recollection of the political pressure to which the Admiralty had been 
exposed over the decision to introduce convoys. Certainly no major staff 
55. D. of P. to Madden and Fisher, 12 July 1929, 
AD", M 116/2686, P. D. 03394/29. 
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study of the U-boat campaigns had been done. In 1928, the A. C. N. S. (Admiral 
Dudley Pound) and the D. C. N. S. (Admiral W. W. Fisher) were both opposed to 
convoy as a defensive technique. 
36 
Advances had been made in Asdic and other A/S equipment since 1918 
but whether that progress had been sufficient to guarantee a successful 
defence against the submarine was still far from certain. Nevertheless, 
many officers asserted their confidence in the ability of Asdic to defeat 
any future U-boat threat, and therefore remove the need for convoy. 
However, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Madden, continued to support the 
decision to implement convoy against submarine as well as surface attack. 
57 
Despite this the bulk of naval opinion preserved an anti-convoy viewpoint. 
An additional persistent problem was the shortfall between the number of 
A/S escorts needed to allow efficient use of the Asdic device and the limited 
resources the Government was prepared to make available for new construction. 
In many instances, Asdic-equipped vessels could only 'sweep' effici- 
ently at a maximum speed of ten knots and only under the best weather 
conditions. This was clearly inadequate since submarines could use their 
higher surface speed to alter their position in relation to the convoy 
escorts before submerging to attack. Exercises against fast troop convoys, 
rather than the slow merchant convoys which would predominate in war, 
produced disappointing results for the A/S forces. 
'The operations of the A/S vessels from an asdio 
point of view do not appear to be entirely satis- 
factory in that on the two occasions when contact 
was gained with the submarine as a result of a 
search scheme, both A/S vessels, shortly after the 
commencement of the "hunt", lost contact which was 
never regained. All ships report that asdio 
36. Board Minutes of 14 & 21 Apr. 1928, ADM 1/8765/513. 
57. Board Minute of 8 May 1928, MI 1/8765/315. 
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'operating efficiency was considerably impaired 
due to the weather conditions. '38 
Nevertheless, the Admiralty remained reasonably satisfied with the ability 
of the escorts to keep the submarine underwater during daylight hours, 
which could cause it to fall behind the vessels it was shadowing due to 
its poor underwater speed. Little or no consideration was given however 
to the use of radio to enable groups of submarines to remain in contact and 
facilitate concentration for attack on the convoy, overwhelming the escort 
forces by weight of numbers. This omission is understandable, however, 
given the Admiralty's preoccupation with the warship as the main target 
for British submarines and with the essentially defensive'mode of thinking 
that was inherent in the dependence upon anti-submarine policy. Similarly 
the only attention given to the use of British submarines in a surface role 
was in the shadowing or reconnaissance of enemy warships and fast troop 
transports, where the low underwater speed of the submarine required it to 
operate on the surface. Exercises raised doubts about the use of subma- 
rines for surface shadowing. 
This form of reconnaissance had been one of the most firmly advocated 
duties during the 1920's for British submarine forces. Support was given 
not only by successive Rear-Admiral (S) 's but by many other zenior naval 
officers and possibly reflected a preoccupation with attempts to use the 
submarine as a substitute surface warship. Evidence by operational 
commanders tended to differ. 
'The poor qualities of the submarine as a 
surface reconnaissance craft was clearly 
shown ... by the number of times destroyers 
sighted submarines on the surface. It is 
not perhaps generally realised to what extent 
38. Tactical Division, Dec. 1929, ADM 186/145,1, 
C. B. 1769/29(1), 'Exercises and Operations 1929: 
Exercise O. C. - 1/2 May 1929; Remarks of Captain (D), 
2nd Destroyer Flotilla. ' 
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'submarines are handicapped by their low 
height of eye, by the vibration inseparable 
from, the Diesel engine, and by the difficulty 
in keeping an adequate lookout over the whole 
horizon with the restricted space and personnel 
available on the bridge. '39 - 
The practical value of even troop-convoy exercises was diluted by the fact 
that: 'The convoy enjoyed a measure of protection which would not usually 
be available except for expeditionary forces, and it was possible to provide 
for most requirements, particularly as no provision had to be made vis-a- 
vis surface forces. ' 
40 
Further, the practice of crediting participating 
warships with artificial speeds was capable of producing erroneous conol- 
usions, particularly in respect of operational and projected submarines. 
Complaints that submarine were being excessively hampered in these exercises 
by safety restrictions resulted in only small concessions; surface warships 
were allowed to zig-zag but they were still forbidden to alter course to 
evade attack or avoid torpedoes and AIS vessels were still not permitted 
to carry out 'hunts' for submarines. Despite this the purpose of these 
exercises was stated to be, 'to exercise all forces in their functions of 
41 
war. ' 
British Proposals on Submarine Tonnage Limitation at 
1930 London Naval Conference 
An agreement for a quantitative limit on submarines of 90,000 tons 
had seemed possible to the Admiralty at the 1927 Geneva Conference and this 
total was favoured as an initial proposal for the London Naval Conference. 
However, the ultimate aim remained a much lower figure. The greater the 
39. Ibid, Remarks of Captain (S), 1st Submarine Flotilla. 
40. Tactical Division, Nov. 1930, ADDS 186/147, C. B. 1769/30(1), 
81, 'Exercises and Operations 1930: Exercise A. U. No. 6- 
28/30 liar. 1930, Atlantic Fleet. ' 
41. Tactical Division, June 1931, ADM 186/147, C. B. 1769/30(2), 
86, 'Exercises and Operations 1930: Submarine Exercise 
No. 10, Exercise A. U., 27-29 Oct. 1930. ' 
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reduction in foreign submarine tonnage the less would be the need, under 
the Admiralty's calculations, for large and expensive A/S forces. 
42 
An 
additional proposal favoured the application of the Washington ratios to 
the submarine category. However, modification of the ratios to suit Japan, 
France and Italy would be accepted if necessary so as to obtain agreement. 
France and Japan were expected to claim totals of 80,000 and 90,000 tons 
respectively, while Italy although seeking parity with France43 would 
agree to abolition in the unlikely event that the other Powers also agreed. 
44 
Even if abolition was accepted, the Japanese were expected to be, 'more 
insistent ... than ever for a full 70% of 8-inch cruiser tonnage of the 
strongest Power, thus rendering yet more difficult the settlement of our 
cruiser difficulty with the United States and Japan. '45 Certainly, the 
importance of the cruiser category to the success of the Conference had been 
evident in the strength of the differences between Britain and the United 
States and was shown by the need for a tentative agreement before proceeding 
to the full Conference. The necessity of reaching similar agreements with 
the other major Powers led to the acceptance, 'that it will eventually be, 
necessary for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom ... to agree 
to the retention of the submarine. ' 
46 
However, in the best tradition of 
diplomatic negotiations, this decision was not to be made known until 
France and Japan agreed, 'to adopt a reasonable attitude in regard to some 
42. Henderson to R. H. Campbell (Paris), =26 Nov. 1929, 
D. B. F. P., 2 ser., I, 150. 
43. Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Henderson, 11 Nov. 1929, 
D. B. F. P., 2 ser., I, 134. 
44. Graham to Henderson, 11 Dec. 1929, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., I, 163. 
45. Cabinet to Admiralty, Dec. 1929, ADM 116/55720 'London 
Naval Conference 1930 - Proposals to be Submitted by 
H. M. Government, ' 13 and 50. 
46. Ibid.. 
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'of the other difficulties which will confront the Conference, '47 princi- 
pally over new cruisers and capital ship replacement. 
48 
Domestic and Political Effects on Preparations for the 
London Naval Conference 
Clearly the decisions at the London Naval Conference would be deter- 
mined by'more overly political considerations than at Geneva in 1927 or 
Washington in 1922. The Government were seemingly determined to ignore 
the recommendations of their naval advisers in the preliminary negotiations 
with the invited Powers. Ramsay MacDonald in conversation with the French 
Ambassador during November 1929 had said, on submarine abolition, that: 
, Unless an international agreement on the subject could be concluded ... 
it would be useless to pursue the point. '49 This was contrary to Admiralty 
advice not to disclose the demise of the abolition policy as long as it 
remained a useful negotiating measure, especially with the French and 
Japanese. Further, on 9 December, MacDonald informed the Japanese Ambas- 
sador that, 'whilst His Majesty's Government felt that it would be advis- 
able to stop the use of this arm, ' (submarines) 'at the same time they knew 
that certain other Powers could not agree with them-' 
50 
In essence, the 
Government were admitting defeat on the question of submarine abolition 
before the start of the Conference. Moreover, they were envisaging a hard 
struggle to achieve what they considered a satisfactory limitation of 
submarine tonnage. Certainly, in the Admiralty's opinion, another negot- 
iating advantage was being conceded since the Government could no longer 
47. ADM 3.16/5572j, 1950 London Naval Conference. (See Note 45. ) 
48. Foreign Office, Sept. 1929, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., I, 85, 
'Draft Note of Invitation to the Naval Conference. ' 
49. Henderson to Campbell, 26 Nov. 1929, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., I, 150. 
50. Henderson to Sir J. Tilley (Tokyo), 11 Dec. 1929, 
D. B . F. P., 2 ser., 1; 162. 
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appear to be relinquishing a position in order to achieve better terms on 
other categories such as cruisers. 
The Government continued to be motivitated by a need for economy, 
especially in defence spending, as was evident in the attitude towards the 
Navy Estimates under review by the Fighting Services Committee. The 1929 
as well as the 1930 programmes were examined, 
'with a view to seeing whether the desire of 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer for a reduc- 
tion of £5,000,000 on the 1929 Navy Estimates 
could be fulfilled, and if so how. ' Submarines 
were considered, 'capable of being affected 
by any decisions of the Conference, ' and there- 
fore: 'The Treasury, ' were, 'not without hope 
that the Conference may pave the way for an all- 
round reduction of armaments on a greater scale 
than the Admiralty anticipate and they consider 
that it would be wrong to authorise any further 
building until the results of the Conference are 
known. In particular, any decision taken now in 
regard to Submarines appear to the Treasury to 
be inconsistent with the policy of abolition of 
that class which, it is understood, H. M. Govern- 
ment intend to put forward at the Conference. '51 
Clearly no one had informed the Treasury that the Prime Minister no longer 
considered submarine abolition to be a feasible policy. Reluctantly, the 
. admiralty agreed., 'on grounds of policy, ' to the Committee's proposal to 
suspend submarine construction until the results of the London Naval 
Conference were known, 
52 
even'though the existing force numbered only 55 
with ten more boats building. 
55 
In addition, the submarine category was 
placed last on the building order of priority. The 1929 submarine prog- 
ramme was reduced to three boats which were then suspended until the 
Conference concluded. Only if the submarine was retained would a 
51. Admiralty and Treasury to Fighting Services Committee, 
13 Dec. 1929, ADPM 1/8739/40, 'Report on the 1930 
Naval Estimates. ' 
52. See Appendix: G(9). 
55. Murray to Board, 7 Jan. 1930, ADM 1/8739/40. 
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Supplementary Vote then be passed to restore the orders for the suspended 
boats. Finally, to complete a black picture for the Admiralty, the Com- 
mittee recommended that two submarines of the 1928 programme should be 
cancelled. 
Submarine Proposals at the London Naval Conference 
Contradictions on British submarine proposals continued to exist up 
to the opening of the London Naval Conference on 17 January 1930. On 
9 January the Cabinet Committee on the London Naval Conference reported 
that despite the fact that. the United States and Italy might agree to 
submarine abolition, clearly in view of the known opposition of France and 
Japan, 'an agreement to abolish submarines was improbable. '54 However, on 
1.4 January the Cabinet announced that: 'The Government has declared its 
intention to move for the total abolition of the Submarine, ' while con- 
firming the 9 January decision that: 
'In view of the opposition of France and Japan, 
there is little chance of our success in this, 
however. We shall, therefore, have to fall back 
upon reductions and shall have to use all the 
pressure we can to bring Submarine strengths 
down,... We should propose a maximum tonnage for 
Submarines, not to exceed 1,500 tons, and also a 
maximum gross tonnage which must include both 
the largest and the smallest Submarines built. 
There must be no unregulated Submarines as was 
proposed in the Anglo-French Agreement. '55 
The result was that not until the 16 January was the Admiralty able to set 
out the final proposals for the Conference. 
56 
The failure to achieve agreement on quantitative submarine tonnage 
limitation at the 1927 Geneva Conference had been blamed on the refusal 
54. Cabinet Committee, 9 Jan. 1930, ADM 116/2747, 
'5th Meeting. ' 
55. Cabinet, 14 Jan. 1930, AL! t 116/2747,1 (30). 
56. Madden, 17 Jan. 1930, ADM 116/2746, 'Basis of 
British Naval Strategy. ' 
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of the United States and Japan to accept sub-division of their tonnage 
quotas into large and small submarines. 
57 The Admiralty deemed this 
division necessary since, 'the Submarine possesses most powerful offensive 
attributes, ' and: 'In these circumstances, it is held that our submarine 
strength depends upon the relative strength of other Powers. '58 However, 
if 'the naval strength of the Conference Powers were to be based on the 
Washington ratios then the Naval Staff recommended that any figure of 
submarine tonnage which was practical should be agreed to. Needless to 
say, a 'practical' limit would be expected to approximate to the total 
proposed by Britain. As a further incentive the proposals were to include 
the offer of variations in the Washington ratios in the interests of 
reaching an agreement. However, the basic question remaining unanswered 
was whether there was a difference between the politidans and their naval 
advisers as to what total constituted a 'practical' tonnage. Only the 
proceedings of the Conference could provide a definite answer. 
1930 London Naval Conference: 17 January - 22 April 1930 
During the initial stages of the Conference the British made clear 
their intention, failing abolition, to attempt to divide"the submarine 
question into two sections. 
'If an agreement upon this, ' (abolition), 'is 
impossible the Government will put forward 
proposals limiting submarines rigidly to defence 
requirements in number and size. Its position 
during the negotiations on this arm will be to 
obtain the lowest possible limits. It will also 
propose to revive the agreement signed at 
Washington on the 6th February 1922, but not 
fully ratified by the signatory Powers, to 
57. See Appendix: H(5). 
58. Ail( 116/2746, 'Basis of British Naval Strategy. ' 
(See Note 56. ) 
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'regulate the attack of merchant ships by 
submarines in accordance with the rules and 
practice set forth in the treaty. '59 
Not unexpectedly it rapidly transpired that abolition had no chance of 
success. Once again a major part of the British case had been that the 
submarine was not a coast-defence weapon and could only be used for 
offensive purposes. Little credence was placed on British claims that 
they were not seeking abolition because of the nation's dependence on 
merchant shipping in wartime. The Delegations also remained unmoved by 
statements pointing out that the other Allied. Powers had lost over 
2,000,000 tons of merchant shipping and that Britain'was only attempting 
to save the other Powers unnecessary expenditure since submarines,. 
'are expensive in maintenance; they have the 
most complicated machinery and a very high 
proportion of skilled personnel is required 
to man them. They are very expensive to 
build. They require extensive provision in 
the way of shore establishments and depot 
ships to maintain them. i60 
The financial argument proved weak because it could, With only minor 
alterations, be applied to any category of warship. A much more con- 
vincing argument was to be found in the claims of, 'large savings in the 
provisions of destroyers and anti-submarine units, '61 stemming from a 
successful abolition agreement. Although the United States officially 
supported the British, American interest lay more with achieving agreement 
on restricting submarine operations against merchant shipping. 
59. Cabinet, 7 Feb. 1930, ADM 116/2748, 'Documents on 
the L. N. C. - Position at the London Naval Conference, 
1930, of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. ' 
60. First Lord A. U. Alexander, 11 Feb. 1930, AD2II 116/2748, 
'4th Plenary Session, ' 187-91. 
61. Ibid. 
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However, the French remained firmly opposed to abolition and made 
it clear that support for an agreement on legal restrictions would only 
be given if the submarine, 'as far as both rights and duties are conc- 
erned, '62 was treated in a similar manner to the surface warship. The 
French then proposed that: 'A committee should be appointed to prepare 
an agreement open for signature to all naval powers, forbidding submarines 
to act towards merchant ships otherwise than in strict conformity with 
the rules, either present or future, to be observed by surface warships., 
65 
The Italians vacillated and declared themselves in favour of both abolition 
of the submarine and legal restrictions upon submarine operations, with 
the final choice depending upon the decision of the other pourers. As 
had been expected, the Japanese supported the French proposal, maintaining 
that: 'The submarine has its proper legitimate uses, ' while agreeing to 
the need for a 'formula to terminate the abuse of submarines. ' 
64- 
The 
United States responded with the proposal: 
'that a committee should be appointed to study 
and report to the Conference as to the poss- 
ibility of agreement on the following questions: - 
I. The abolition of the submarine; II. Regulation 
of the use of the submarine - through subjecting it 
to the rules of war governing the use of surface 
craft; III. Regulation of the unit size of submarines. '65 
62. M. Leygues (French Delegation), 11 Feb. 1930, ADM 116/2748, 
'4th Plenary Session, ' 193-98. 
63. Ibid. 
64. Admiral Takarabe (Japanese Delegation), 11 Feb. 1930, 
ADM 116/2748, '4th Plenary Session, ' 200-2. 
65. United States Delegation, 11 Feb. 1930, ADM 116/2748, 
'4th Plenary Session. ' 
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On the 12 February all these resolutions were referred by the First 
Committee 
66 to the Committee of Experts. 
67 
Legal Restrictions on-the Use of Submarines 
Initial discussions moved slowly and on 3 March the British presented 
their proposals on legal restrictions, attempting to present themselves 
as an honest broker between the French and the Americans, despite their 
position being closer to that of the latter. Following the Washington 
Conference a series of articles on legal restrictions known as the Root 
Resolutions had been presented to the Conference Powers as a treaty for 
ratification. 
68 
However, he French had consistently refused to ratify 
and were expected o hol4)to this policy. There was a slim possibility 
that if only Articles I and II of the Root Treaty were retained and 
Articles III and IV omitted the French might agree to ratify. However, 
it was equally clear that if these Articles were abandoned then the 
United States Senate would not ratify the revised Treaty. Any uncertainty 
which may have existed over this point was dispelled by the United States 
insistence on Articles I- IV being retäined intact. The British 
supported this, especially Article IV, concluding that if this clause 
was adhered to, 
'it practically ruled out the use of submarines. 
It was certain that a submarine could not be 
operated against merchant craft in the same way 
as surface vessels and should a Nation possessing 
large numbers of submarines operate them against 
66. British delegates on the First Committee were 
Mr. R. L. Craigie (Chairman), A. M. Cadogan, Captain 
R. M. Bellairs, Captain E. L. S. King, Lieut. -Colonel 
A. G. B. Browne, Mr. Alex Flint. 
67. The Committee of Naval Experts was made up of naval 
representatives from each of the Delegations. See 
ADM 116/2748, 'Documents on the L. N. C., ' 426, for a 
complete list of these representatives. 
68. See Appendix: H(l). 
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'Great Britain :.. it would be impossible-for 
her to abide by the rules laid down for surface 
craft. t 69 , 
There was no doubt, however, that there would not even be a 'paper' treaty 
unless all five Powers ratified any agreement no matter how many non- 
Conference nations accepted it. Therefore, the British decided, I 
'to adopt a preliminary attitude in deciding 
in favour of upholding ... ratification of 
the Root Treaty, but on ... finding that 
acceptance of such a proposal was impossible, 
to make an attempt to secure agreement on a 
new draft Treaty which would go as far as it 
was possible to meet the wishes of both the 
U. S. A. and France. '70 
In turn, the Committee of Experts recommended the return of the legal 
restriction question to the First Committee, if the attempts to reach 
agreement on submarine abolition failed. 
Submarine Abolition 
Meanwhile, the thorny problem of abolition had also been handed to 
the First Committee, where progress was immediately blocked by the French. 
In an attempt to solve this situation the problem was passed on the 
12 February to the Committee of Experts who, 'unanimously agreed that this 
was a question with which they were unable to deal with owing to its 
essentially political character. '71 In addition, 
'the view was expressed, by more than one 
delegation, that the discussions which had 
taken place at the Fourth Plenary Session, 
also at the Fourth Meeting of the First 
Committee, clearly indicated that it was not 
desired that the Committee of Experts should 
attempt to examine this resolution in any way. '72 
69. Alexander, 3 Mar. 1930, ADIA 116/2747v '8th Meeting 
of British Commonwealth Delegation. ' 
70. Committee of Experts, 4 Mar. 1930, ADT( 116/22460 
L. N. C. (E) 15, 'Legal Aspects of Submarines. ' 
71. Ibid. 
72. Committee of Experts, 11 Mar. 1930, ADM 3-16/2748, 
'3rd Report, ' 418. 
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This resulted in the abolition question being referred back to the 
First Committee for further discussion. However, when the matter was 
raised'at the Seventh Meeting the national Delegations refused to alter 
their positions and it proved impossible to reach any agreement. The 
final pronouncement was that, 'no agreement has been reached which would 
render possible the abolition of the submarine*'? 
3 
Legal Restrictions on Submarines - Stage II 
In an attempt to clear the impasse created by French and American 
disagreement over the Root Treaty, the British suggested that a possible 
compromise would be to agree on a Declaration rather than a Treaty. The 
former would be restricted to a statement of what was recognised as inter- 
national law. Although the Americans were prepared to respond by adopting 
a more flexible attitude on retention of all four Articles of the Root 
Treaty, there was disagreement among the British Delegation on this point. 
The First Lord's view was that, 'Article IV was an important one as it, in 
fact, made it impossible for submarines to operate against merchant ships 
altogether, ' but Admiral Madden emphasised that: 'The Admiralty, however, 
desired that the submarine should be capable of exercising its right to 
inspect merchant vessels for information. ' 
74 
Moreover, a contradiction 
existed between Articles II and. IV since, 
'Article II implied that the submarine had the 
right to deal with merchant vessels providing 
the rules governing surface craft were observed 
and then Article IV summarily denied this right 
by saying that the submarine could not operate 
against merchant ships because it could not comply 
with the rules applicable to surface warships. '75 
75. First Committee, 12 Apr. 1930, ADM 116/2748, 
'3rd Report, ' 413. 
74. British Commonwealth Delegation, 13 liar. 1930, ADM 1162747, 
L. N. C. (E) 16, '9th Meeting. ' 
75. Ibid. 
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Finally, the British decided to accept omission of Articles III and IV 
and confirmation of the suggested Declaration was put forward on the 
4th March. The latter was largely a concession to the French since subma- 
rines were no longer prohibited from attacking merchant vessels as in 
Article III of the Root Treaty. However, in practical terms the Declar- 
ation was so worded as to make such an attack impossible if the rules were 
obeyed. The removal of Article IV was not regretted by the British since 
the Admiralty had never been happy with the piracy reference and its 
consequences. The First Committee supported the recommendation that a 
Declaration on the legal aspects of submarine warfare should be accepted 
as established rules of international law and subsequently the Declaration 
was entered in the London Naval Treaty. 
76 
qualitative Submarine Tonnage Limitation 
British policy for agreement on qualitative limitation appeared more 
likely of fulfilment than abolition, although it was accepted that any 
agreement would only affect future construction. The United States proposed 
1,800 tons as a maximum limit and the figure was accepted by Britain but 
rejected by France and Japan. The latter suggested a 2,000 tons limit 
which the French supported provided they were allowed to possess a limited 
number of submarines displacing up to 5,000 tons each. The French claim 
therefore raised again the concept of two classes of submarines. Although 
the British had proposed two classes at the 1927-Geneva Conference the 
figures then had been much lower. The negative reaction of both Britain 
and the United States prevented any further progress on the French proposal 
and all the Conference Powers, with the exception of France, agreed to 
accept 2,000 tons as the upper qualitative limit. Despite this, the French 
continued to seek a guarantee allowing a small number of submarines over 
76. See Appendix: H(4). (Part IV, Article 22. ) 
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2,000 tons before also adhering to the agreement. 
77 Finally, a compromise 
was agreed on the basis that, 'the maximum unit displacement of submarines 
be fixed at a figure of 2,000 tons, ' but, 'each of the Powers represented 
at the present Conference may be permitted to maintain not more than three 
submarines of a maximum unit displacement of 2,800 tons., 
78 However, the 
boats allowed in the larger category were to be included in each Power s 
overall submarine tonnage quota. Agreement was also reach on a maximum 
gun calibre of 5.1 inches (130 mm. ), except in the case of the larger 
submarines which could carry a 6.1 inches (155 mm. ) gun. To secure French 
acceptance, an exception was made to allow the retention of an 8 inch gun 
already fitted on one of their submarines. Overall, these agreements had 
to be considered a partial victory for the British in so far as they 
amounted to a restriction of the other Powers' submarine forces. 
Auantitative Submarine Tonnage Limitation 
The British were less successful on quantitative limitation. Initial 
proposals had been based on a total of 78,000 tons but the French had merely 
rejected this figure and countered with a claim for 100,000 tons. The 
British reply can hardly have been intended to be acceptable, being fixed 
at the low level of 40,000 tons. 
79 
Italian claims were also viewed with 
disapproval since they were considered to threaten British attempts to 
restrict future submarine construction. Finally, the Japanese added to the 
difficulties by regarding the submarine category as a useful negotiating 
weapon for hopefully extracting concessions on cruisers and other items 
from the British and Americans. This particular situation was galling for 
77. Committee of Experts, 11 Mar. 1930, ADM 116/2748, 
'3rd Report, ' 419-25. 
78. First Committee, 12 Apr. 1930, ADM 116/27489 
'3rd Report - Part III, ' 414-16. 
79. British Delegation, 12 Mar. 1930, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., I, 
242-48, 'Meeting of the Representatives of the U. K., 
U. S., and French Delegations. ' 
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the British: they had intended to adopt an identical attitude to the 
Japanese to ensure agreement on reductions in the submarine category, but 
not at the expense of increases in the tonnage of other categories. Not 
unnaturally, they rejected the Japanese claims as too high 
80 
and on cruisers 
refused to alter their position that Japan should be allowed only twelve 
of the 8 inch gun cruisers to Britain's fifteen. Initiatives by Britain 
and the United States finally resulted in the Japanese agreeing not to 
exceed 52,729 tons in the submarine category by 31 December 1936.81 The 
British considered an agreement with Japan necessary so as to forestall 
French moves, 'to enlist the Japanese Government as an ally against the 
United States and Great Britain, particularly on the question of submarines. '82 
Thus, they were quietly satisfied because: 'We have succeeded in getting 
Japan down in Submarine tonnage from 78,000 to 53,000 roughly ... whilst' 
our present figure of Submarines built is 45,500 so that the general 
arrangement is advantageous to us. '83 However, France and Italy refused 
to sign the agreement and negotiations continued between them on the 
question of parity. 
Finally, the Treaty, signed on 22 April 1930, tidied up the question 
of the definition of a standard displacement for submarines left over from 
the 1927 Geneva Conference. 
80. Henderson to Tilley, 15 Mar. 1930, D. B. F. P., 
2 ser., I, 249-51. 
81. See Appendix: H(4). (Part II, Article 6. ) 
82. D. B., 2 ser., Is 249-51. (See Note 80. ) 
83. D. C. N. S., Vice Admiral W. W. Fisher to Lord Jellicoe, 
1930, Fisher MSS, F. H. R. /11, F. H. R. /MS67/010, 
National Maritime Museum (N. M. M. ). 
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Franco-Italian Discussions 1930-31: Submarine Issues, 
Following the Conference the British Government were concerned to 
secure French and Italian acceptance of the Treaty. The British had indic- 
ated unofficially during the Conference that as a last resort they were 
prepared to agree to allow'the'French a 65,000 tons submarine force. 
However, this had been on condition that an assurance was given, 'that 
the French would not regard this as a final figure but as a stage towards 
84 
an eventual parity figure of 52,700 tons. ' Excessive French demands were 
seen as providing an incentive to the other naval powers to increase their 
submarine forces. Moreover, although the danger of war with France was 
viewed more as a contingency than a reality it had to be recognised that 
a majority of British trade routes converged within convenient operating 
distance for even the smallest of French submarines. In the case of the 
Japanese submarine force the threat was considered less critical because 
of the vast distances involved in the Far East. 
Therefore, the British considered it extremely important to persuade 
the French and the Italians to accede to the London Treaty and this meant 
involvement in the naval discussions between the two nations, who had been 
persuaded to meet at Geneva in November 1930. The Italians quickly stated 
that they, 'could not accept a lower submarine tonnage than 52,700 tons. #85 
This proposal was not unexpected since allied to parity with the French 
this gave them an extra 8,000 tons. However, the British attitude was that: 
'As regards submarines ... there seemed little 
hope of ... being able to reduce the French 
below 77,500 tons because their present figure 
for submarines built, building and authorised 
84. Henderson to Lord Tyrrell (Paris), 4 Nov. 1930, 
D. B. F. P., 2 ser., I, 422-24. 
85. Mr. R. L. Craigie (Foreign Office), 1 Jan. 1931, 
D. B. F. P., 2 ser., Is 428-43. 
- 302 - 
'was nearly 98,000 tons; and the French could 
not by 1936 reach a figure lower than 77,500 
without either scrapping under-age submarines 
or else abandoning the construction of subma- 
rines which had been authorised by Parliament 
and on which a large amount of work had already 
been done. On the other hand, the British 
Government were quite unable to accept such a 
high submarine figure for France with the 
British treaty figure standing at 150,000 tons 
for destroyers. This constituted one of the 
most serious Anglo-French difficulties. '86 
The Japanese were also unhappy at the prospect of any post-Conference 
agreement giving the French a higher total than 52,700 tons since this 
would mean that France had achieved her object merely by holding out a 
little longer. Logically this could not be denied and therefore the 
British produced elaborate reasons for initially offering the French a 
higher tonnage, although they hoped to restrict the final figure to approx- 
imately the London Treaty quota. 
Discussions in Paris failed to alter the French position and the 
final British proposals allowed them 77,548 tons and the Italians 52,700 
tons. This proved insufficient for the French who now wanted a total of 
85,137 tons. British reaction to this was to threaten an increase in 
destroyer tonnage under Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty, 
87 
while 
the French defended their tonnage claim as being due to the fact that, 
'at the time the Treaty was signed, France already 
had an authorised programme which would have auto- 
matically brought her figure up to 78,500 tons of 
under-age submarines in 1936 and that she had in 
addition been given the right under Article 7 of 
the Treaty of London to construct two cruiser 
submarines with a total tonnage of 5,600, making 
85,000 tons in all. '88 
86. Ibid. 
LoA! 0;, J NAVAL T4GAtr, tTto 
87. )ti '(Part III, Article 21. ) 
88. Tyrrell to Henderson, 20 Feb. 1931, D. B. F. P., 
2 ser., i, 453-55. 
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Thus, they considered there was no justification for Britain resorting to 
Article 21, to which the British countered that they have never agreed to 
78,500 tons and even their offer of 65,000 tons had been unofficial. More- 
over, the hope had been that France would agree to abandon the 11,000 tons 
scheduled under her 1930 programme as well as the two projected cruiser 
submarines. In the British view, failure to do this invalidated previous 
calculations on AIS forces and destroyer tonnage. Both sides remained 
unmoved by each others' arguments and in view of the reports from Paris, 
the Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson and the First Lord A. V. Alexander 
decided to make a personal effort to break the deadlock. Following their 
arrival on 23 February they were engaged in twenty; four hours of intensive 
discussions resulting in a provisional agreement by the French to undertake 
no further submarine construction, 'other than for completion of the 1930 
programme and for replacement of tonnage becoming over-age after December 
31,1931. '89 
The French considered this agreement as a victory, in the sense that 
Britain had apparently approved the French claim for 81,989 tons in return 
for the dubious benefit that France would raise no objection to quantit- 
ative tonnage being re-introduced at the proposed League of Nations 
Disarmament Conference, scheduled for 1932. Unofficially, the British 
still considered that French submarine tonnage was too high, especially 
in relation to British destroyer tonnage of 150,000 tons, and they were 
concerned about the effects of the agreement on the other Powers' sixbma- 
rine fleets. Therefore, in the event of fai. ltire to reach, 'a more 
satisfactory equilibrium between French submarine tonnage and British 
89. Tyrrell to Sir R. Vansittart, 24 Feb. 1931, 
D. B. F. P., 2 ser., Is 458-60. 
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'destroyer tonnage His Majesty's Government will retain their right to 
make such an increase as they judge necessary in British destroyers 
figure of 150,000 tons. ' 
90 
The crucial question for the Admiralty was 
whether, in view of the-Government's past record on disarmament, allied to 
continuing economic problems; such an increase would be of more than token 
size. The United States appeared dubious about the proposed French ton- 
nage, especially in relation to ratification of the London Treaty by the 
Senate: expansion of destroyer forces under Article 21 was only permissible 
in reply to action by non-signatory Powers. Therefore, the-United States 
preferred the Franco-Italian naval discussions to result in a separate 
agreement rather than in acceptance of the London Treaty. 
91 
The Japanese 
were more amenable but still dissatisfied. 
92 
Meanwhile, the Italians 
agreed to accept, submarine parity with Britain, the United. States and Japan 
and not to include any submarines in their 1931 programme, nor to lay down 
93 
any new submarine tonnage until 1933. Although a 'Bases of Agreement' 
was signed by France and Italy on 11 march 1931, French dissatisfaction 
resulted in the breakdown of the Agreement by September. This failure 
destroyed all current hopes of securing French and Italian adherence to 
the London Naval Treaty and although both were still bound by the provis- 
ions of the Washington Treaty, France remained unfettered by any agreement 
on the use of submarines either in the form of the Root-Treaty or Part 
IV of the London Naval Treaty. 
9a. Ibid. 
91. Sir R. Lindsay (Washington) to Henderson, 26 Feb. 1931, 
D. B. F. P., 2 ser., I, 460 and 466-67. 
92. Mr. Snow (Tokyo) to Henderson, 27 Feb. 1931, 
D. B. F. P., 2 ser., I, 461. 
93. See Appendix: H(5). 
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Results of the London Naval Conference 
The British had. three major proposals on submarines prior to the 
Conference. Officially, abolition had been one of these policies but 
expecting failure, the main emphasis centred on attempts to achieve, ton- 
nage limitation agreements, supported by legal restrictions on the use of 
submarines in war. Failure to ensure French and Italian accession to the 
London Treaty meant that all three proposals had ended in partial or 
total failure. Abolition, as expected, had never appeared as a possible 
agreement, while only on qualitative limitation and legal restrictions had 
anything resembling success been achieved, through agreements with the 
United States and Japan. However, the proposals accepted on legal restr- 
ictions were considered by the Admiralty to be only a reaffirmation of the 
existing position. 
'Root Treaty Articles I- IV never came into 
force since the French refused to ratify. 
Article XXII of the London Naval Treaty cannot 
be described as replacing or superceding the 
above mentioned articles of the Washington Treaty 
of February 6,1922, since the latter never became 
effective. Its provisions are expressly described 
as representing established rules of international 
law. '94 
Zdoreover, the failure to secure French acceptance of the Conference agree- 
ment on quantitative limitation opened up the possibility of an increase 
in foreign submarine fleets, as the other major Powers reacted to the 
undesirability of allowing themselves to be fettered by Treaty to a fixed 
tonnage while the French remained free to build at will. All in all, the 
Conference relieved the Admiralty of the dilemmas about how to shape 
British submarine policy that had existed before the Conference met. 
94. Admiralty, 20 May 1930, ADM 1/8741/88, 'Reply to 
House of Commons Question. ' 
- 306 
Effect of the London Naval Conference on 
British Submarine Construction 
The Admiralty's initial concern was with the 1929 and 1930 submarine 
programmes which had been suspended pending the results of the conference. 
The Cabinet had cancelled three of the six submarines of the 1929 prog- 
ramme on the recommendations of the Fighting Services Committee and a 
Supplementary Estimate was necessary to restore the remainder of the 
programme. 
95 
In addition, continuation of the existing scrapping schedules 
up to 31 December 1936 meant that there would be a net reduction in numbers 
of 23 submarines during the period. Even if the pre-Conference proposal 
for a force of only 40 boats was retained it required an annual rate of 
construction of just three submarines, although 3,700 tons per annum would 
be available under the Treaty. 
96 Clearly the proposed annual programmes 
were inadequate, producing a shortfall of 600 tons per annum. The revised 
1929 programme of one 'G' class (1,800 tons) and two 'S' class (650 tons 
each) provided evidence of the failure to take up even the limited tonnage 
allowed by the Conference. The Admiralty appeared satisfied to accept 
only three boats per year, 
97 largely because financial provision for the 
whole of the construction programme was considered uncertain and the known 
attitude of the Treasury militated against a higher figure in what were 
considered 'exceptional circumstances. '98 The Cabinet were also in the 
process of 'carefully' reviewing the situation resulting from the provisions 
of part III of the London Naval Treaty, dependent upon its ratification by 
95. Alexander to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Philip Snowden, 28 Apr. 1950, ADM 116/3389. 
96. D. of P., 24 Apr. and 8 May 1930, ADM 1/9728. 
97. Alexander to Fighting Services Committee, 9 May 1930, 
ADIA 116/2606, 'Naval Construction Programme, 1930. ' 
98. Snowden to Alexander, 12 May 1930, ADM 116/3589. 
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all the Conference Powers. 'As a result they do not consider that in the 
present international situation it is desirable at this moment to formulate 
general proposals covering the whole period of the Treaty or, in fact, to 
go beyond the present financial year. ' 
99 
Apart from anything else the 
Government were then concerned to reach agreement with France and Italy 
on submarine tonnage and until something was achieved on that front the 
decision was that construction programmes could not be clarified for the 
period covered by the London Naval Treaty. 
The 1929 and 1930 programmes were to be allowed to go ahead but the 
cancellation of three boats from the 1929 programme was confirmed. 
100 
roreover, submarine construction under the 1930 programme was announced 
as only three boats and so ensured that submarine strength was at a danger- 
ously low level. Although the Government still stubbornly favoured 
pursuing a policy of abolition the Admiralty emphasised that: 'Whilst 
other powers retain the submarine weapon it must be retained by us. 1101 
This resulted in the Admiralty's assessment of future submarine require- 
ments being based on a comparison with the declared construction programmes 
of the other major Powers. 
102 
The problems of possibly having to increase 
destroyer tonnage to counter French submarine construction were also bound 
to cause uncertainty over what proportion of resources would be available 
for the submarine category. The shortfall between requirements and the 
number of patrol submarines in service was therefore accentuated by the 
99. Admiralty, June 1930, ADM 116/3389, 'Naval 
Construction Programme, 1930.1 
100. Admiralty, 21 May 1930, ADM 1/8739/40, 'Supplementary 
Estimate for the 1929 Programme. ' 
101. Admiralty, June 1930, ADM 116/2606, P. D. 03584/30, 
'Naval Construction Programme, 1930. ' 
102. Alexander to Fighting Services Committee, 8 Dec. 1930, 
ADM 116/2606, P. D. 03687/30, 'Naval Construction 
Programme, 1930.1 
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reduction of the projected construction programmes-up to 1936. Prior to 
the London Naval Conference the Admiralty had estimates submarine require- 
ments at 72, boats but the Treaty quota meant that this total was no longer 
feasible. There were 53 submarines in service (45,534 tons) and nineteen 
building (26,1.10 tons), matching the original requirement of 72 boats. 
However, 17,000 tons had to be disposed of to comply with the Treaty. 
105 
Estimates were that-at least four submarines per annum would be needed to 
maintain an under-age force up to the Treaty tonnage. In fact it was not 
until 1936, following the negative results of the 1935 London Naval Confer- 
ence, that the annual submarine construction rate rose above three. 
. he 
late 1920's had been marked by a constant reduction in proposed 
submarine-numbers and following the London Naval Conference they were 
reduced even further. The foroe total was now to be as low as 40 submarines 
by 1936, which was half the total proposed in1924-25 (when assumed annual 
wartime losses alone were assessed at sixteen boats). The 0 and destroyer 
force was in an equally difficult position with a total of only 150,000 
tons. Problems would also arise if any need emerged suddenly to increase 
numbers-since with the-continuing decline in orders difficulties arose, 
'with the Specialist , Armament Firms as to 
maintenance of plant, in particular as regards 
, Armour, Shell, Guns and Gun Mountings. Some 
of these questions cannot be settled without 
involving financial issues and the extent of 
these necessarily depends upon the productive 
capacity required to be maintained to meet 
Admiralty requirements. +104 
103. Rear-Admiral (S), Dunbar-Nasmith to Admiralty, 
28 Aug. 1930, Submarine Archives H. M. S. 'Dolphin', 
927/5.96, 'Scrapping of Submarines in Accordance 
with the London Naval Treaty. ' 
104. Admiralty, 9 May 1930, ADM 116/3747, P. D. 03567/30, 
'Shipbuilding Policy in War. ' 
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It was clearly going to be increasingly difficult both to keep current 
strengths up and provide for future building capacity. Additionally, 
the persistently high strength of foreign submarine fleets also ensured 
that the. need to keep abreast of the latest submarine technology was a 
constant preoccupation. 
Nevertheless, throughout the 1920's and well into the next, decade, 
the effect of Treasury pressure caused annually a reduction in the resources 
allocated to the Royal Navy. This affected not only warship construction 
and development but also maintenance of bases and the level of essential 
stocks of fuel oil and munitions. The results of this cut back meant that 
those categories of vessels considered less vital to naval policies were 
most vulnerable under this policy. Throughout this period, the cruiser 
(for defence of. trade routes and communications) and destroyers (for fleet 
and. convoy escort) were considered of prime importance 
(a building 'holiday' 
being declared on capital ships). 
7 
Under the leadership of Admiral Beatty the Admiralty had waged a 
strong rearguard action throughout the early and middle twenties against 
the financial and political pressures of successive Governments to reduce 
defence expenditure. Despite a tremendous effort they were, largely 
unsuccessful. Beatty'. s retirement led to a void and the need for a 
period of resettlement while his successors coped with his absence. From 
1920-1928, Beatty's presence as First Sea Lord had ensured continuity in 
the direction of the Naval Staff and naval policies. In addition to his 
war-reputation, Beatty was well-connected, influential and personable, 
with the result that if he had been driven to resign the Government would 
have been faced with serious political problems. The natural result was 
that no one could easily take Beatty's place, or command similar prestige 
and effect, more especially since he had been the last of the major wartime 
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'heroes' still in office. His retirement strengthened the Government's 
position in its relations with the Admiralty and diminished the Admiralty's 
influence during the period. Moreover, immediately after Beatty's retire- 
ment there was a reluctance by the Admiralty to overturn what he had done, 
if only because he had held office for so long; to admit to new policies, 
however necessary, was extremely difficult, not least within the Service. 
However, before these problbma could be solved the Admiralty was forced to 
'shelve' them due to preoccupation with the 1930 London Naval Conference. 
only after its conclusion was it possible for the Navy, to concentrate on 
rectifying its shape and size to meet the international situation. Beatty's 
successor, Madden, proved unable to match his predecessor in terms of 
personality. In mitigation it must be stressed that this would have been 
a difficult if not impossible task for anyone else at that time. Moreover, 
Madden had to take office at an extremely difficult time, while the Geneva 
Conference was still in session. Added to this was increasing Government 
pressure as the economic crisis deepened for further cuts in naval expend- 
iture. Beatty had intended that Keyes should succeed Madden but the 
advent of the Labour Government in 1929 frustrated this proposal. The 
opinion of the politicians was that Keyes would be unsuitable to deal 
with the political requirements of the First Sea Lord's post. moreover, 
doubts existed about Keyes's intellectual capacity for the job. One war- 
time colleague commented: 'Keyes is a fine fellow but is not blessed with 
much brains. '105 Moreover, with the 1930 London Conference due the follow- 
ing year, the Labour Government were averse to appointing someone who 
would probably be intractable over the degree of disarmament the Govern- 
ment hoped to achieve. The result was the choice of Admiral Field, a man 
105. Jellicoe to Admiral Sir Frederick Hamilton, 
9 Nov. 1915, Hamilton MSS, N. M. M. 
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not only in doubtful health but also described as one of the most colour- 
less First Sea Lords of the period.. 
106 One of his first major acts was 
to approve the Government's plan to reduce the cruiser force from 70 to 
50 as part of their proposals for the London Conference. 
Although the failure to achieve international agreements had little 
effect on existing technical plans for submarine construction, the agreed 
qualitative limit of 2,000 tons clearly precluded development of large 
specialist submarines. However, the Admiralty was concerned about the 
possible effects of quantitative tonnage agreements. These threatened to 
reduce the revised plan for a force of 72 submarines, already shown to be 
inadequate, to only 40 boats. Since an estimate of 70 submarines had been 
made to counter any aggression in only the Far East the new total was 
clearly unrealistic. moreover, the shortfall existed not only in theory 
but also in practice, as the existing force level was only 53, allied to 
a planned annual construction programme of no more than six submarines. 
on these figures the maximum force would never exceed 55 under-age submar- 
ines. But the indecision about which total was feasible provided a clear 
example of the malaise and uncertainty which gripped the Admiralty in the 
struggle Stith the politicians during this period. 
Hore than at any other time since 1918 the submarine appeared to be 
expendable, considered a vital weapon only by the Submarine Service itself. 
Clearly, what would have been needed was a determination by both the 
Admiralty and'Government to maintain submarine strength at a more real- 
istio level but there was no consensus about the submarine in the Navy as 
a whole and the submarine had a low priority. On the other hand it could 
be argued that the survival of the submarine in the Royal Navy was now 
106. S. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, 
968 , 1,48. (London, 196-SIT. 
- 
- 312 - 
assured. The failure of successive abolition policies had resulted in the 
acceptance of limitation agreements as a more practicable contribution to 
the Government's dimraament policies, which now extended to all categories. 
Thus, although abolition had been proposed at the 1930 Conference, the main 
effort was restricted to tonnage limitation. Further evidence of the 
survival of the submarine was provided by the fact that destroyer and 
escort vessel tonnage quotas were now linked to quantitative limitation 
in the submarine category. This reflected alterations in British naval 
thinking, principally on the ability of A, /S forces equipped with Asdic to 
counter the submarine threat. This question was to dominate British 
submarine policy in the period after the 1930 London Naval Conference. 
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CHAPTER 10 
1931 - 1934 
DOMESTIC SUBMARINE AND A IS POLICY. 
Despite a decade in which several naval disarmament and limitation 
agreements had been signed., British attempts to obtain international 
support for the abolition or rigorous limitationr of the submarine had 
been frustrated, principally by the French. The years from 1931 to 1939 
were to see acceptance of the futility of these policies and a gradual 
reassessment of British naval requirements. Impetus was provided by the 
knowledge that the United States, Japan, France, and Italy were all 
increasing their naval armaments. Moreover, evidence existed that, 'some 
of the smaller nations are either commencing or projecting the building of 
submarine flotillas which may constitute a much increased threat to ... 
naval security. '1 The problem was compounded by the fact that Britain 
had accepted a level of naval armaments insufficient to maintain and 
protect wartime sea communications even on a modestly computed basis. 
Existing naval disarmament agreements were due to expire in December 1936 
and the Admiralty held that unless there were considerable reductions in 
the French and Italian naval programmes, allied to further disarmament 
measures at the next Conference, a considerable increase in British naval 
strength was necessary. No more reductions could be recommended beyond a 
decrease in the displacement and gun calibre of capital ships and only if 
this was part of an international agreement. Nevertheless, British 
proposals for the 1932 League of Nations Disarmament Conference at Geneva 
were based on accepting that, 'the Washington and London Naval Treaties 
1. First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Frederick L. Field to Three 
Party Committee, 1931, ADM 116/2826, D. C. (P. ) 6, 
'Appreciation of the General Naval Situation in 193101, 
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'are the only practical steps-which have been taken to limit armaments, ' 
and, 'nothing should be done which would in any, way compromise these 
Treaties-'2 However, the Government! economic problems made it unlikely 
that 'anything' would be, done., especially, as disarmament agreements were 
considered valuable in relieving the burden of defence expenditure. , 
The low level of British naval strength emphasised the vulnerability. 
of the nation which had to import large quantities of foodstuffs and raw 
materials. In Europe, France possessed the ability to be a potential 
threat through attacks on trade as, 
'she has concentrated largely upon the 
submarine arm. The experience of the late 
war showed that the submarine is a weapon 
admirably adapted for attack upon the Empire's 
trade. The presence, therefore, of a powerful. 
submarine fleet at our door merits serious 
consideration. 0 
The geographical position of France was considered to facilitate attacks 
upon British trade routes, not only in the English Channel and the North 
Sea but also in the Mediterranean. Italy, however, was not thought a 
serious menace to British shipping, although well situated to be so in the 
Mediterranean, largely because she was herself vulnerable to maritime 
pressure. Germany also was not considered to constitute a major threat 
but the future appeared less comfortable as enforcement of the disarmament 
clauses-of the Versailles Treaty became more difficult. German particip- 
ation in the League of Nations Disarmament Conference was bound logically 
to lead to demands for equal treatment and parity in naval armaments 
with France. 
Domestic Submarine Development 
Meanwhile, the Admiralty had to oversee the reduction of the submarine 
2. Ibid. 
3. ADM 116/2826, Field to Three Party Committee. (See Note 1. ), 
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force to a level complying with the London Naval Treaty. This was neces- 
sary as part of preparations for the League of Nations Conference since 
Britain had to be seen upholding existing arms limitation agreements. 
4 
With a submarine building programme limited to three boats per year the 
problem was not one of overall numbers but of priority between types. This 
led to some extremely complicated schemes on how to use available tonnage. 
'In order to build as fully as possible up 
to our treaty allowance, we could lay down 
three "G" class (1,800 tons each) in each 
of the years 1932 and 1933. It is necessary, 
however, to proceed with the early develop- 
ment of the, ' minelayer, 'class, of which a 
new design is now being investigated. It is 
therefore proposed to include in the 1932 
programme - two "G" class, one "U" class. 15 
All proposals were dependent on finance and in the Government's view this, 
meant reducing expenditure. 
'The new programme for 1952 as now provisi- 
onally proposed is estimated to cost approx- 
imately £10,500,000, ' all categories, '... 
In present circumstances, such a figure seems 
to be out of the question to ask for. I have 
therefore re-examined the programme and offer 
the following suggestions for reducing expend- 
iture. ' In the submarine category, 'Substitute 
one "S" type for one 'G" type submarine. Prog- 
ramme will then become one "G", one Minelayer, 
one "S". Saving approximately £300,000. i6 
Clearly, in this situation it was difficult to get support for additional 
submarine construction even on the basis of operational requirements. 
In preparation for the Conference, the Cabinet authorised the 
4. Committee of Imperial Defence (C: I. D. ), 1 May 1931, 
ADM 116/3204, 'Memorandum on Disarmament Conference - 
Reduction and Limitation of Armaments: Return of Naval 
Vessels Possessed by United Kingdom and British Empire. ' 
5. D. of P., Aug. 1931, ADM 116/2606, '1932 Naval 
Construction Programme. ' 
6. Third Sea Lord, Vice-Admiral Sir Roger R. C. Backhouse-to 
D. of P., 12 Oct. 1931, ADAM 116/2606, P. D. 03921/31, 
'1932 Construction Programme. ' 
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establishment, on 6 October 1931, of an Inter-Departmental Committee? to 
act as a sub-committee of the C. I. D. Among its first tasks was consideration 
of a Naval Staff memorandum on the navies of the major and minor Powers in 
relation to disarmament negotiations. A new problem was expected to arise 
as this was to be a general Conference and not a select grouping of major 
powers. The smaller naval nations, handicapped by limited financial 
resources, were expected to concentrate any new development on smaller war- 
ships, especially submarines. Therefore: 'It seems probablg that the 
question of the limitation figure for submarines will prove one of the 
most difficult points on which to get agreement. 'a Among other proposals 
it was suggested that submarine tonnage could be kept down by the abandon- 
ment of projected rather than existing construction programmes or scrapping 
over-age boats. This would have given the best return for Britiin by 
limiting small submarine fleets for several years ahead and forcing 
increased dependence on over-age tonnage. Despite the fact that these 
proposals were, 'very likely to prove unacceptable ... it was considered 
that they should be pressed, ' because: 'The Admiralty cannot view the 
development of such submarine forces with equanimity, and it is considered 
that a strong stand be taken against such development., 
9 
A strong stand 
was certainly possible but in the face of the known views of the other 
powers was an empty gesture. 
France was expected to continue opposition to submarine abolition or 
limitation and presented a two-fold problem for Britain. The French had 
to be persuaded to accept reductions in overall tonnage, which seemed 
7. Naval representatives were: Vice-Admiral Dreyer (D. C. N. S. ), 
Vice-Admiral Pound, and Captain T. S. V. Phillips. 
8. Field to Reduction and Limitation of Armaments Policy 
Committee, 6 July 1931, ADM 3-16/2611. 
9. Ibid. 
- 517 - 
impossible, and simultaneously the Admiralty had to consider the effect of 
and. the measures necessary to counter such a force. 
'The Submarine ... hampers enormously every 
operation in any area in which it may be 
found - ships have to zig-zag, heavy or 
valuable ships have to be screened, high 
speed has to be maintained - all of which 
reduce endurance. Further, a vast mine- 
sweeping and anti-submarine organisation has 
to be set up, and generally the mere possibility 
of the presence of submarines renders necessary 
the expenditure of immense additional effort in 
order to obtain even a reasonable degree of 
immunity from casualty. '10 
Despite a decade and a half of development the use of Asdic was coming to 
be seen not as a complete answer to the submarine but merely a means of 
blunting the weapon. Even this could only be achieved at prohibitive cost 
in A, /S vessels and specialist crews. The French were talking of a submarine 
force of 125,000 tons and the Admiralty found it difficult to reconcile such 
a large tonnage solely with defence of North African troop convoys. Nor 
were they placated by French announcements that their submarines were requ- 
ired for coast defence. 
'Furthermore, British war experience by no 
means proves that the submarine is a part- 
icularly suitable type of vessel for coast 
defence purposes. ' The logical conclusion 
was, 'that French insistence on such a large 
submarine tonnage is due to an intention to 
use these submarines in a future war as an 
offensive weapon against surface vessels of 
the enemy Navy and Merchant Marine. 111 
The possibility of French attacks on British Merchant shipping could not 
be entirely ignored if only because of the size of the French submarine 
fleet. However, in terms of naval planning such a threat was considered 
mainly in relation to contingency war plans. The problem of extravagant 
10. ADM 116/2826, Field to Three Party Committee, 6-7. 
(See Note 1. ) 
11. Naval Staff, 29 June 1931, ADE( 116/2611, 'The 
Submarine Menace, ' 13. 
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French submarine construction and its effect on encouraging other naval 
Powers created financial pressures on Britain to increase her A/S forces. 
Overall, as a European Power with a moderately sized Fleet, France had to 
be included by naval planners as a possible major threat. Principal 
reasons, in addition to the large submarine force, included outlets to 
the Atlantic and the Mediterranean as well as a surface fleet to support 
the submarine force. In general terms, France posed more of a naval threat 
than Italy and represented in the Admiralty's opinion the type of threat 
in the 1920's and early 1930's that a re-armed Germany posed in the middle 
and late thirties. To that extent it represented a prudent 'norm' against 
which to provide. Moreover, the naval staff could not afford to lightly 
dismiss not only France as a threat but also the U. S. A. and Italy. There 
had been no continuation of wartime co-operation after 1920 and no 
specific treaty provisions existed to allay fears. The notion of perman- 
ent international co-operation played no part in the inter-war environment, 
even allowing for the fitful existence of the League of Nations. In some 
respects, the totally different concerns and preoccupations of the 
European States after the Second World war, that stand in such sharp 
relief, represent something of a determination not to be put bn such 
tenterhooks again. 
Admiralty Position on Convoys 
In searching for a means of countering the submarine threat to 
commerce the Admiralty recognised that not only had the U-boat campaigns 
of 1917-18 come close to success but also that, 'the adoption of convoys 
was a very important factor in the defeat of her, ' (Germany), 'unrestric- 
ted attack on trade. '12 The advantages of the convoy system were 
realised but the Admiralty remained unconvinced that this alone provided 
12. Tbid, 15. 
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a reasonable safeguard against the submarine and continued to favour a 
system of independent sailings. One reason,. was the time needed on the 
outbreak of war to increase the number of A, /S vessels and crews. To 
attempt to maintain a large enough force in peacetime was considered 
ruinously prohibitive, as was equipping merchant shipping with defensive 
armament. In addition, until the late 1930's the main naval assumption 
was that Japan, not Germany would be Britain's main enemy in a future war. 
Therefore, the problems centred on moving fast troop convoys to the Par 
East and not slow merchant convoys across the Atlantic. However, extensive 
plans could be worked out to ensure that the actual collection and routing 
of convoys would commence with the outbreak of a European war, if unres- 
tricted submarine warfare necessitated them. Nevertheless, these were 
major reasons for attempting to abolish or limit the submarine, especially 
since as a regular warship it possessed the advantage of readiness for war. 
This argument, however, depended on accepting that the submarine was not 
only a cheaper vessel to construct and maintain than an escort vessel but 
also that a Navy possessing submarines as a major strike force would not 
have the need to maintain AIS forces. Britain remained vulnerable because 
her large merchant fleet left her no alternative but to provide protection 
against both surface-raider and submarine. 
However, in 1931 Asdic had still not been sufficiently developed to 
be used under all sea conditions and the conclusion was that.. 
'good results can only be obtained from this 
apparatus in moderate sea weather conditions 
at moderate speeds and with very well-trained 
personnel, whose efficiency deteriorates some- 
what rapidly after periods of watch-keeping, 
which is a most exacting duty. ' The assessment 
of the strength of such forces in the Royal 
Navy led to the conclusion that: 'The number 
of vessels fitted with efficient submarine 
detecting apparatus which would be available 
at first to escort individual convoys is likely 
to be so limited as to provide very little 
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'protection from torpedo attack to a convoy 
covering a large area, and only a chance of 
successful reprisal, which is often a long 
and difficult operation. '15 
Various exercises had been carried out as a means of improving the A/S 
escorts dispositions in the defence of convoys. The most advantageous 
positions were concluded to be ahead, abeam, and on the quarter or astern 
of the convoy and from these, escorts could: 'Carry out a prompt counter- 
attack on any submarine attacking the convoy, ' and; 'Detect an attacking 
submarine prior to her firing torpedoes at the convoy. ' 
14 
Optimum defen- 
sive positions for A/S escorts could alleviate slightly the problem caused 
by shortage of numbers but the only efficient remedy lay in the provision 
of adequate numbers of such escorts. However, this was partly a political 
problem since such a solution would have required a large increase in the 
Navy Estimates, at a time when all categories, especially capital ships, 
required replacement as well as expansion. In addition, a large amount 
of specialist manpower would have been needed and the domestic political 
climate was still considered unsuitable for rearmament measures, despite 
the relief construction orders would have created for unemployment in 
many depressed areas. The Admiralty's arguments for more A/S escorts were 
not helped by the fact that, as in the late 1920's, the exercises from 
which these conclusions were drawn were still extremely artificial. The 
'convoys' travelled at 15 knots, compared to the 7 knots of an average 
merchant convoy, which would have allowed underwater attack with submar- 
ines capable of 8-9 knots for limited periods submerged. On the. surface, 
submarines were fast enough to overhaul merchant convoys and repeat a 
13. ADM 116/2611, 'The Submarine Menace, ' 16. (See Note 11. ) 
14. Tactical Division, July 1932, ADM 186/491, 'Progress in 
Torpedo, Mining and Anti-Submarine Warfare 1931 
(P. T. M. A. S. ), ' 33. 
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submerged attack. Moreover, 'convoy' exercises were infrequent and 
concentrated on providing practice for the Asdic equipment. The shortage 
of destroyers was a major reason for this infrequency. In addition merchant 
ship owners were probably reluctant to withdraw their vessels from profit- 
able trade to take part in exercises, and exercises continued to be based 
on the scenario of a fast troop convoy escorted by ample numbers of sur- 
face and AIS escorts. No awareness was shown of the possibilities of night 
attacks by submarines on the surface where the Asdic echoes could not 
detect them. Although a large number of U-boat attacks in 1917-18 had 
been made under these circumstances, the outbreak of war in September 1939 
found the Royal Navy unprepared for and initially vulnerable to such 
tactics. Part of the reason stemmed, from a ban on submarine night operations, 
which had been imposed for safety reasons, and was not relaxed until 
1936-37 and then only in the Mediterranean. 
15 
Nevertheless, since Dudley 
pound was then C. in C. in that area (and later First Sea Lord early in 
the war), the Navy in 194Qtshould have been aware of the ineffectiveness 
of Asdio against submarines on the surface. No such clear warning existed 
on the use of 'wolf-packs', especially as the effectiveness of this tactic 
was increased by the unforeseen event of the U-boats acquiring the use of 
bases on the French Atlantic coast. Moreover, the Royal Navy appeared to 
show greater enthusiasm for the traditional 'hunting-group' system of AIS 
operations than for the methods of the screening force, 
16 despite the 
evidence of the First World War that it was easier to detect submarines 
by protecting a convoy than by scouring thousands of square miles of ocean. 
Asdic possessed such a limited range that a submarine could be easily 
15. A. J. Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran, (London, 1974), 
46. 
16. ADM 116/2611, Field to Reduction and Limitation of 
Armaments Committee. (See Note 8. ) 
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missed. except in close proximity, i. e. when attacking merchant ships in 
convoy. Much of the enthusiasm for the 'hunting-group' method lay with 
the Navy's traditional belief in the offensive. The Second World War 
proved again that the 'hunting-group' could provide-a useful adjunct to 
the convoy system but this view assumed a surplus and not a shortage of 
A/S vessels. The result was a diversion of valuable A/S escorts away from 
convoys to undertake futile 'offensive' patrols by 'hunting-groups'. 
Convoy escort duties were regarded by many officers as dull änd monotonous 
measures and command of a fleet destroyer was considered a greater prize. 
The logical result was that the majority of the best commanders were 
assigned to the fleet rather than convoy escorts. There were also the 
threats from surface raiders and aircraft to be considered. Convoy exer- 
cises more often concentrated on these threats than on that posed by the 
submarine. Air attack was considered more relevant where convoy routes 
passed close to hostile territory. The view on the use of aircraft to 
supplement the A/S forces was that: 
During the Great War Allied aircraft only 
effected the destruction of seven out of a 
total of 188 enemy submarines destroyed. 
Subsequent fleet experience points to the 
fact that the potentialities of aircraft in 
this respect have not materially altered, but 
they have extended their capabilities for recon- 
naissance, and this should help to increase the 
chances of attack on the submarines by vessels 
fitted with Asdios. rl7 
However, in 1959, no suitable aircraft were available, largely because the 
responsibilities of naval aircraft did not include the protection of mari- 
time shipping. The absence of long-range aircraft and escort carriers had 
grave consequences during the early years of the war. The situation was 
largely the result of the limited interest and priority given to convoy 
17, ADIA 116/2611, 'The Submarine Menace, ' 16. (See Note 11. ) 
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during the inter-war period. 
The problem of surface-raiders was a traditional one for the Royal 
Navy, although it had not affected the initiation of the merchant convoy 
system in 1917; the German surface-raiding forces had long since disappeared. 
The emphasis on the surface-raider threat had increaäed *ith the laying 
down by Germany of the first of the 'pocket battleships'. The ideal role 
for these vessels was-clearly against merchant shipping. The only British 
warships combining the necessary speed and superior gunpower to defeat 
such opponents in a single ship action were the ageing battle-cruisers. 
A combination of convoy, Asdio, and submarine limitation agreements would 
hopefully counter the underwater threat but the belief remained that the 
only measure which could ensure safety from submarine attack was abolition. 
Meanwhile, in terms of numbers, the situation was'serious in both categories 
of escort-vessel - the destroyer versus the submarine and the cruiser 
versus the surface-raider. In 1918, Britain had possessed 116 cruisers- 
and 433 destroyers, while the projected figures for 1936 were 50 and 120 
respectively. The message presented to those charged with British naval 
policy was that existing and proposed force levels were too low to provide 
even the minimum level of naval protection in a future war. Abolition of 
the submarine would have provided a solution but: 'It appears likely 
that the best we can hope to achieve at the 1932 Disarmament Conference 
is to get a reduction of submarine tonnage for various Powers, and it is 
very important that the French total submarine tonnage should at any rate 
be reduced to equality with our own. '18 However, there was no likelihood 
of success over persuading the French to accept reductions in their 
submarine force or agree to Part IV of the London Naval Treaty which they 
18. ADM 116/2611, 'The Submarine Menace, ' 18. (See Note 11. ) 
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had already refused to ratify, and which the Admiralty now wished to see 
incorporated as an integral part of the Disarmament Convention. 
Geneva Disarmament Conference - 1932-33 
The League of Nations World Disarmament Conference opened in February 
1932 with the Admiralty continuing to advocate submarine abolition publicly, 
despite being aware that there was little hope of France or Japan agreeing. 
opposition from the smaller Powers was based on their consideration of the 
submarine as a valuable weapon. for coast-defence. The British rejected 
this reason but had to admit that it was impossible to prove that the 
presence of submarines did not hamper and complicate enemy naval move- 
ments. Meanwhile, in order to strengthen the case for a major reduction 
in qualitative tonnage, studies were made, 'to investigate whether a 
submarine tonnage could be found. below which the vessels would be quite 
suitable for the coastal operations ... but too small for extended oper- 
ations against trade overseas. r19 However, investigation of both British 
and German wartime records showed that submarines of approximately 600 tons 
had operated efficiently in the North Atlantic, while boats of 300 tons 
had proved suitable in the Mediterranean. Therefore, a, 'figure of 250 
tons standard displacement (340 tons submerged) provided the only possible 
dividing line between vessels suitable for the two types of operations. '20 
Evidence from previous disarmament negotiations, however, showed clearly 
that the other Powers favoured a qualitative limit of 2,000 tons maximum 
and 600 tons minimum, rather than a standard 250 tons. Meetings of the 
Conference Naval Commission soon confirmed this and although a number of 
nations favoured qualitative tonnage restriction they were not prepared to 
consider a lower limit than 600 tons. 
21 
19. Admiralty, 1933, ADN 116/2827, 'Papers on the League of 
Nations Disarmament Conference, 1932-33. ' 
20. Ibid. 
21. Vice-Admiral Pound, 25 May 1932, ADM 116/3617, D. C. /044. 
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The nature of the Conference, concerned with areas of disarmament 
other than naval items, tended to complicate the possibility of agreement 
on relatively small points such as qualitative submarine tonnage. Thus 
attempts to reach a common upper tonnage limit for submarines were delayed 
pending wider discussion on defining 'offensive' and 'defensive' weapons 
of war. These negotiations revealed, 'a mass of opposing views, each 
nation seeking to prove that the weapons they favoured were defensive 
whilst those they did not possess were offensive. '22 It could be added 
that nations were also opposed to any weapons they did not consider vital 
to their requirements but that were felt to be a danger when possessed by 
other Powers. British naval policy remained centred on the need for 
surface command of the sea. Failure to achieve or maintain it meant 
defeat. Traditional naval supremacy was achieved by the defeat of the 
enemy fleet. However: 
'The submarine is the only vessel which can 
operate without support and in the face of 
general surface command being held by its 
enemy ... The submarine is consequently able 
to disturb our general command of the sea in 
a manner that no other type of vessel can do. 
To us, on the other hand, the submarine is of 
no value for controlling the distant areas 
generally, because: - (a) We can control enemy 
trade in these areas more simply and cheaply by 
the use of surface ships. (b) It is unsuitable 
for defending trade. t25 
Nevertheless, the submarine was useful to Britain in, to few areas in any 
particular war where our surface vessels are unlikely to have control, as 
in the Baltic in 1914-18 owing to Germany's possession of the Kiel Canal. '24 
22. 'Naval Disarmament' (An account of the Geneva Conference), 
Feb. - June 1932, ADM 116/5617,1-2. 
23. British Commonwealth Delegation, 18 Feb. 1932, ADM 116/3617, 
'The Role of the Submarine in Defence, ' 2-3. 
24. Ibid. 
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The British were anxious to avoid becoming involved in the general argument 
on differentiation between 'offensive' and 'defensive' weapons, being, 
'convinced that ... any attempt to regulate 
disarmament on the assumption that distinct- 
ion can be drawn between offensive and defen- 
sive weapons must prove not only abortive but 
the precursor of unfruitful argument and 
international ill-feeling. '25 
Therefore the case for submarine limitation was to concentrade purely on 
securing as low a qualitative tonnage as possible irrespective of whether 
this weapon was considered offensive or defensive. Pressure from the 
other Powers meant that a figure less than 600 tons (standard) could not 
be considered. If such a limit could be regarded as the maximum size then 
there were advantages for Britain but this was to ignore the disadvantages 
to British submarine operations. Overseas patrols using boats with this 
tonnage limit were still considered feasible but only if bases were avail- 
able. Such facilities were available in the European area and this 
concept had provided the basis for the design philosophy of the new 'St 
class patrol submarines. However, this type were precluded from most 
Far East operations by their limited endurance. Nevertheless, in the 
hopes öf reducing expenditure in the AIS sector the British view remained 
that: 
'If we cannot get abolition of the submarine, 
we should support the limitation of the type 
to such a size that they are really of use for 
defensive purposes only (if such a size can be 
found) ... using the argument that we must stick 
to the tonnage which really draws the line between 
offensive and defensive submarines. '26 
Nevertheless, even if such a limit were accepted, then efforts would be 
made to reduce quantitative tonnage in order to prevent an increase in 
25. D. of P., 8 Mar. 1932, ADM 116/5617. 
26.. Pound., 22 Feb. 1932, ADM 116/3617p D. C. /S. 010, 
'Submarines - Reduction in Size, ' Enclosure No. 1. 
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numbers. But, no matter how far nations were prepared to reduce their 
submarine tonnage there was no way of preventing the return of larger 
submarines in wartime. However, the hope was that this sort of measure 
would allow enough time for the Royal Navy-to expand its AIS forces. 
The Admiralty preferred the 250 tons limit but realised that this 
was unlikely, to be achieved.. 'You are not to initiate proposals to effect 
a reduction in the size of submarines, but may support any such proposal. '27 
Moreover, in - all - moves, made by the British delegation they were to ensure 
that the provisions of the Washington and London Naval Treaties were not 
affected. This was inýline with Admiralty policy to extend the London 
Naval Treaty, to include France and Italy. 
28 
Hughes Proposal 
The Conference had made no progress on submarine limitation when on 
22 June the United States proposed that the maximum qualitative tonnage 
should be reduced to 1,200 tons and that no nation should possess more than 
35,000 tons in the submarine category. The opposition presented by France 
and Italy was hopefully to be overcome by calculating their tonnage as if 
they had signed the London Naval Treaty on the basis of the abortive 
Franco-Italian Agreement of 1 March 1931. British reaction to these 
proposals was that: 
'Relating the British proposal in regard to 
size with the United States proposal in regard 
to numbers would produce a total tonnage in the 
Submarine category of 10,000 tons, or 25,000 
tons below the United States proposal. The U. S. A. 
proposal, however, goes some way towards securing 
a substantial reduction in numbers of Submarines, 
27. Admiralty to Pound, 2 Apr. 1932, ADM 116/3617, 
M. 0460/32,1. 
28. Plans Division, 23 June 1932, ADS 116/2827. 
- 328 - 
and. though not as far-reaching as the 
British proposal, it cannot be altogether 
objected to. t29 
There was little choice in this decision since none of the other Powers 
were prepared to consider the low qualitative limit of 250 tons. However, 
additional proposals were forwarded by the British, tailored to fit their 
own requirements. These included a prohibition on submarine construction 
and a reduction of one-third in destroyer tonnage. 
50 
Although officially 
continuing to favour abolition, the British were prepared to accept the 
American proposal that there be a maximum limit of 40 submarines per 
nation. None of the other Powers, however, favoured the proposed qualit- 
ative limit and the French continued to refuse to reduce their total tonnage. 
The United States were still prepared to make appropriate statements in 
support of the British abolition proposals but in practical terms the 
major effort was expended on achieving a reduction in the quantitative 
tonnage limit. 
'As regards submarines, Admiral Hepburn 
re-iterated their desire for total abolition. 
If they were to be retained, however, they 
would want something larger than 250 tons. 
His idea seemed to be that a limit should be 
put on numbers and total tonnage. Individual 
tonnage might be left free since, as the 
Italians pointed out, it would be an advantage, ' 
to Britain, 'if a nation elected to put all 
its tonnage into a few large submarines. 131 
The withdrawal of the German delegation on 16 September effectively 
stopped -further progress on naval questions. 
29. Sir John Simon (Foreign secretary) to British Embassy 
(Geneva), 22 June 1932, ADM 116/2827, 'Hughes Proposals. ' 
30. ADM 116/3617s 'Naval Disarmament. ' (See Note 22. ) 
31. Admiralty, 15 Nov. 1932, ADM 116/2827, 'Documents on the 
League of Nations Disarmament Conference, 1932-33: Results 
of Private Conversations Between Representatives of Powers 
as to British Disarmament Proposals of 21 Oct. 1932. ' 
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The Admiralty's concern about the German claim for equality was 
largely related to German re-acquisition of the submarine, although the 
question of capital ships and heavy cruisers was not ignored. The problem 
was how to exercise some control over German naval rearmament while accep- 
ting that such a policy was inevitable if Germany was granted equality of 
political status. The recommendation was that Germany be brought into an 
international agreement which would allow the Germans the right to build 
large surface warships and free them from the prohibition on submarine 
construction. In reality Germany would be only qualitatively, ton the 
same basis as other Powers and she would not be able to build up a force 
of submarines of any size because a condition of the agreement was to be 
that she should accept little or no increase on the Versailles quantitative 
figures for the present. '32 It involved the gamble that Germany would 
continue to adhere to such an agreement. Recognising that the inevitable 
increase in pressure from the Germans for release from the disarmament 
clauses of the Versailles Treaty might lead to unilateral action, the best 
solution was considered to be to persuade the Germans to an agreement with 
limitations on tonnage rather than risk no agreement at all. On the 
question of submarines, the Admiralty accepted the proposal to lift the 
total prohibition subject to the condition that: 'It should also be part 
of any agreement that Germany accepted the limitations of Standard Category 
system, which would not permit transfer from surface craft to submarine 
33 
tonnage. ' The decision to officially approve Germany's re-acquisition 
of submarines may appear to have been a strange decision to make at a 
time when it was being stated that the convoy system, even supported by 
32. D. of P., June 1932, ADM 1162827, P. D. 0410632. 
5a. First Lord, Viscount Monsell to Cabinet, 29 June 1932, 
AD; M 116/2827, 'Note on Disarmament. 
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A, /S escort forces was no guarantee of safety against the submarine. 
34 
However, the Admiralty concluded that there was a need for an overall 
naval agreement including Germany. The alternative was the possible 
collapse of the Washington and London Naval Treaties, under'the pressure 
of a naval building race. Such a development would have spelt the failure 
of a decade of continuous activity on disarmament by successive British 
Governments. The nation was not prepared for that consequence nor poss- 
essed the capability to undertake major construction programmes except 
over a lengthy period. In addition, the Navy could not rapidly absorb 
the numbers of resultant vessels. The best that could be hoped for was 
that continued development of Asdic would increase the degree of safety 
of convoys despite a continuing shortfall in the available number of 
escort vessels. Nevertheless, any failure to agree on definite naval 
limitation proposals at the 1932 Conference would mean that no immediate 
agreement, which also included the other Conference Powers, was possible 
with Germany. Not until 1935 was it to prove possible for Britain to 
conclude a bilateral Anglo-German Naval Agreement, including provision 
for the construction of submarines. 
Overall British policy at Geneva was to do nothing which would affect 
the existing naval disarmament treaties. 
55 
moreover, American policy 
sought to strengthen the status-quo by gaining the adherence of the French 
and. Italians to the London Naval Treaty. 
56 
The result was that the 
Geneva Conference settled, in the later months of 1932, into a forum for 
cementing the provisions of the London Naval Treaty in preparation for 
the projected 1935 Naval Conference rather than for creating any new 
34. ADM 116/2611, 'The Submarine Menace. ' (See Note 11. ) 
35. Mansell, 24 Mar. 1932, ADM 116/3617, 'Meeting of 16 March. ' 
36. ADM 116/3617, 'Naval Disarmament, ' 10. (See Note 22. ) 
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agreements. British attention turned to the United States proposals 
since if successful these were seen as providing the chance to obtain 
reductions in French submarine tonnage. However, the British considered 
the existing proposal to reduce the French to 70,000 tons as inadequate 
in relation to the London Naval Treaty. Although in 1951 they had agreed. 
to accept the French figure of 81,000 tons plus, this had been on the 
understanding that the total would be revised downwards at the Geneva 
Conference. Despite the negative achievements on this issue and the 
general desire by France for increased naval armaments the Admiralty still 
considered the existing policy justified. If agreement could not be 
reached then early consideration of the British position on Article 21 
of the London Naval Treaty was required. This Article allowed an increase 
in tonnage, 'in one or more categories if the requirements of national 
security are materially affected by the new construction of any power not 
a party to the limitations of the Treaty. '57 The 'Escalator Clause' had 
originally been framed to counter any French refusal to reduce her subma- 
rine tonnage to the 52,700 tons of the London Naval Treaty. The United 
States was concerned to include France in the Treaty, even with a higher 
submarine allowance of 70,000 tons, in order to avoid the perceived 
dangers of tonnage escalation in other categories. Article 21 applied 
only to the. actions of non-signatory Powers and French assession to the 
Treaty would remove the escalation danger. The advantage to Britain of 
any French agreement was largely economic in allowing the Government to 
avoid having to find resources for an increased destroyer tonnage. 
By December 1932, the French were aiming for a figure of 96,000 tons, 
in addition to submarines authorised under the London Naval Treaty already 
37. ADM 116/3617, 'Naval Disarmament', 14-16. (See Note 22. ) 
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being laid down and which could no longer be regarded as new construction. 
Despite Britain's 'officials rejection of American proposals to allow 
France 70,000 tons, the Admiralty considered that the French would accept 
less than 76,000 tons. However, even this total could only be achieved 
if there was no further construction and all over-age boats were scrapped. 
Such an agreement was expected to result in Japan claiming an increase in 
her submarine tonnage, perhaps to the level of the French force, and as a 
response to any escalation of British destroyer tonnage. The'net result 
would have been to, destroy the status-quo. As a compromise solution, 
pending the possibility of an agreement with the French before the end of 
the Conference, the British proposed that they slow down their over-age 
scrapping programme for destroyers since the 150,000 tons total did not 
have to be achieved until December 1936. Existing destroyer tonnage was 
181,000 tons, of which 124,000 tons was over-age. Thus an increase could 
easily be created without adding to existing construction programmes and 
invoking Article 21. 
New proposals by Britain in March 1935 involved submarine tonnage 
totals being tied in with an attempt to gain a compromise acceptance of 
the London Naval Treaty by France and Italy, 
58 
Under this system Treaty 
powers were to remain subject to the Washington and London Naval Treaties. 
but France and Italy would only have to ratify those parts of the London 
Treaty which they had already signed. However, this meant there could be 
no further submarine construction by these countries until the Treaty 
expired in December 1938. The hope was that the next naval conference 
would then ensure a further period of naval limitation. Any prospect of 
success was eliminated when on 12 June Britain further amended the tonnage 
38. British Commonwealth Delegation, 16 Mar. 1933, 
ADM 116/3291p 'Draft Convention Submitted by 
United Singdom Delegation. ' 
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proposals so that: 'Until December 31,1936, France and Italy will arrange 
their present submarine building and scrapping programmes, so that on the 
said date, their completed tonnage will not be greater than 52,700 tons. ' 
59 
Thereafter, no progress was made with the French, despite the Italians 
agreeing to accept the submarine total laid down in the London Naval Treaty. 
This was conditional on the unlikely event of the French accepting the 
Italian naval tonnage demands. The Conference continued until 1934 but 
with no success. The international political situation had also deterior- 
ated and the proppeets for a successful naval conference in 1935 appeared 
to be threatened. 
Domestic Submarine Construction 
New naval construction was dependent on the decisions reached at 
Geneva. The quantity of over-age vessels to be scrapped under the London 
Naval Treaty had by 1933 turned into an annual problem. This was largely 
the result of juggling resources prior to each Navy Estimate. Further 
complications were added by the shortage of trained crews caused by the 
continued rundown of the submarine force. The situation by March 1932 
was so grave that: 'In order to provide the personnel for "Swordfish" 
and "Sturgeon", the first of the "S" class, it will be necessary to place 
certain submarines in Reserve. ' 
40 
This made it necessary to take a 
similar number of boats and place them in the Material Reserve, for 
scrapping. This would then be in excess of the planned scrapping prog- 
ramme under which the total submarine tonnage, including new construction, 
would comply with the London Treaty quota by December 1936. The 
39. British Commonwealth Delegation, 12 June 1933, 
ADM 116/3266, 'Article 27 of Revised Draft Convention. ' 
40. Rear-Admiral (S), C. J. C. Little to Admiralty, 14 rear. 1932, 
Submarine Archives, H. M. S. 'Dolphin', 96/A. S., M. 0270/32. 
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tentative scrapping programme for 1932-33 was fixed at seven submarines 
but even this was expected to lead to a shortfall in total tonnage since 
only six new boats were authorised. 
41 
Therefore, no disposals total was 
set until progress with the 1931 construction programme was clear. 
Originally this programme had been designed so that total tonnage would 
not exceed 52,700 tons. However, the latest figures showed that by 1945, 
twenty boats out of a total force of 51 would be over-age. An additional 
problem was that the submarine, because of its specialist nature, was 
recognised as only being safe for a strictly defined length of service 
life. Any extension of this 'life' meant the possibility of increased 
hazards. The Admiralty's attitude towards the submarine could not be 
divorced from consideration of the requirements for overall British naval 
policy, which the deteriorating international situation was only gradually 
to alter when it became clear that tonnage limitation agreements were under 
threat of breaking down. Evidence showed that even the United States had 
constructed more submarines than Britain since 1918 and the the other 
major naval Powers had constructed twice as many or more. The note.. of 
warning was clear. 
Me reduction of our total of submarines to 
39 in 1936 is a disturbing factor: We ende& 
the last war with 140 submarines and in 1928 
a total of 79 submarines was considered the 
war requirement (P. D. 03027/28). The reason 
for the acceptance of a submarine tonnage of 
52,700 at the London Conference is appreciated, 
but is it the fact that our war requirement for 
submarines has materially altered. 142 
British support of American proposals, in 1932, for a maximum national 
force of 40 submarines, indicated that political factors dictated war 
41. Plans Division, 17 Feb. 1932, ADM 1162949, 
'Tentative Scrapping Programme. ' 
42. Ibid.. 
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requirements and that these were now considered to have materially altered. 
The evidence of political ascendancy and military decline, in the relation- 
ship between Government and Admiralty, during the late twenties and early 
thirties, was confirmed in the decision to maintain adherence to the 
London Treaty quota in the submarine category despite all the evidence of 
increases in foreign submarine strength and the need fora larger British 
force. 
With no political and economic support for the old policy of building 
ship for ship, maximum utilisation had to be made of existing resources in 
planning for new construction. Moreover, whatever the political policy on 
this issue the existing defence requirements continued to provide a major 
influence in dictating the direction of development within each warship 
category. In the case of the submarine the question of a further limit- 
ation of resources, for whatever reason, was not a new situation and the 
response had been a concentration of development on one type, the patrol 
model. 
45 On the subject of British requirements for this vessel it was 
accepted that a larger design than the new IS' class was needed, espec- 
ially in the Far East. 
44 
'The size of submarine required for distant 
reconnaissance in our case is complicated by 
the climatic conditions in the Par East. 
'Whereas a submarine of 600 to 800 tons (our 
"E" and "L" classes) could carry out this 
function admirably in European waters, it 
has been found that the necessary degree of 
habitability involving inter alia, cooling 
plant for crew spaces and for the battery 
requires a tonnage of 1,475 tons as in our 
"0", "P" and "R" classes. t 45 
45. See Appendix: G(10). 
44. See Appendix: G(11). 
45. Little to Admiralty, 11 liar. 1932, ADM 116/5617, 
M. o460/52, 'Proposals for Limitation of Submarine 
Size to 250 tons. ' 
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The First Sea Lord, Admiral Field emphasised however that additions 
to existing programmes were precluded, largely because of the (abnormal 
financial situations. ' 
46 
Certainly, Admiralty acquiescence in this situ- 
ation implied no short-term improvement in British submarine strength. In 
July 1928 the requirement had been for 72 submarines but by 1933 this total 
had almost halved. Compliance with the London Treaty could be held respon- 
sible for much of the decline in the size of the force. In addition 
successive Governments could be fairly blamed for pursuing a political 
policy of tight financial stringency but this ignored the Admiralty's part 
in accepting such a policy of tonnage reduction. Admiral Chatfield con- 
firmed this in 1937 when, in a memorandum to the C. I. D., he stated that: 
tIt is necessary for the first time for, many years to consider our subma- 
rine requirements on a strategical basis. The submarine strength required 
by a country is almost entirely independent of the submarine strength of 
other countries. ' 
47 
Meanwhile, requirements for submarine types had 
changed but to a certain extent these had cancelled out each other's 
effect. Increases in the size of new submarines caused a , rise in their 
cost and, in the atmosphere created by shortage of hulls and financial 
restriction, the emphasis was diverted even more to meeting the overall 
tonnage quota with smaller submarines. However, it was necessary to go 
one stage further to make the new force total of 40 submarines appear 
satisfactory even on paper. This necessitated an optimistic and hypo- 
thetical view being taken of the potential wartime strain that the British 
submarine force was likely to undergo. The result was the acceptance of 
46. Field to Little, 1932, ADM 167/87, C. P. 444/32, 
'Programme of New Construction for 1933. ' 
47. Admiralty to Defence Plans Sub-Committee C. I. D., 
29 Apr. 1937, Cab. 27648, D. P. (P) 3, 'A New 
Standard of Naval Strength, ' 16. 
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the assumption that, for planning purposes, war would occur only in one 
area (Europe or the Far East) at any one time. Even then, in the worst 
situation, the projected force level could only be considered as barely 
sufficient, 
' which also ignored the 1925 memorandum on 'Shipbuilding 
policy in Wax'. This document had calculated an annual replacement figure 
in wartime of sixteen submarines and an'initial total force of So. 
49 
Within the ramifications of this tortuous policy, development continued 
slowly towards producing a design for the new medium size patrol submarine 
(IT' class). A prime directive was to keep the tonnage of this design as 
low as possible (1,100 tons instead of 1,400 tons) in order to now allow 
a total force of-49 submarines. 
50 
However, any increase in armament meant 
a larger boat. Submariners favoured greater offensive power while there 
were others who held that: 'The ability to attack, undetected, is cons- 
idered to be of such importance that even a reduction of offensive power 
is considered reasonable if this would result in still further reductions 
in size. '51 Despite these differences, it was accepted that the unsatis- 
factory performance of the 'G' class in the patrol role emphasised the 
need to produce a new medium patrol submarine design as quickly as possible, 
and to include the first boat in the 1935 Estimates. 
The increasing concentration on production of the patrol model 
reinforced the need to gather as much material as possible on the use and 
efficiency of this type of submarine in a future war. The conclusion was 
to confirm the main roles as consisting of operations in enemy waters 
48. Plans Divison, Dec. 1933, ADM 19728, P. D. 0441133, 
'Submarine Building Policy. ' 
49. Plans Division, 8 May 1925, ADM 116/5747, P. D. 02229, 
'Shipbuilding Policy in War. ' 
50. See Appendix: G(12). 
51. D. of T. D., 10 Jan. 1934, ADM 1/9728, P. D. 0443.1/55, 
'Future Submarine Building Policy. ' (Endorsed by D. O. D., 
16 Jan. 1934. ) 
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(reconnaissance and minelaying) and anti-warship patrols52 but not anti- 
commerce patrols as such targets were expected to be rare and accounted 
for by the cruiser force early in any conflict. The Admiralty was also 
concerned to adhere to existing international submarine limitation agree- 
ments such as the Root Resolutions and Part IV of the London Naval Treaty. 
However, continuing increases in AIS weapons and tactics were expected to 
be found in foreign navies. An exception to this belief existed over 
A, sdic, since it was considered that the peacetime improvements had given 
Britain a good lead. Developments of this device, for use in submarines, 
were expected to give British submarine forces a valuable aid against 
foreign A/S forces. Nevertheless, the expectation was that British subma- 
rines would have to attack warship targets from longer range than had been 
the practice during the First World War, in order to reduce contact with 
the escort forces to a minimum. The range of Asdio had so increased that 
submarines were instructed to assume that within 4,000 yards of the target 
they were to adopt anti A, /S screen penetration tactics. 
53 
Thus with 
torpedo ranges being officially quoted as. a maximum of 5,000 yards54 the 
problem lay in the divergences which could creep into a torpedo's course 
as it neared the end of its run. The result was an increase in the bow 
torpedo salvo from six to eight tubes in order to ensure a hit. 
55 However, 
52. Rear-Admiral (S), N. F. Lawrence to Admiralty, 
21 Feb. 1934, ADM 1/9728. 
53. Tactical Division, 1933, ADM 186/499, 'Instructions 
for Submarine Operations, ' Para. 129. 
54. Tactical Division, 1933, ADM 186/498, C. B. 1904, 
'Theoretical Investigation: The Use of the Torpedo 
in Action. ' 
55. Tactical Division, 1933 and 1934, ADM 186/154 & 155, 
'Exercises and Operations. ' 
See also: Rear-Admiral (S), 1934, ADM 116/5872, 'Summer 
Cruise Exercise Reports. ' 
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acceptance of this alteration led to a resurrection of the question of 
whether qualitative displacement was to be determined by operational 
requirements or Treaty regulations. Acceptance of tonnage limitation 
meant that ways had to be found of augmenting the operational submarine 
forces in wartime, if losses should prove high. Clearly it was, 
'unlikely that the'Commander-in-Chief would 
be satisfied to keep submarines of (say) the 
"Thames" class tied to his fleet month after 
month waiting for a contact with the enemy 
fleet which may never take place. He will 
almost certainly use these larger vessels to 
supplement the smaller ones on patrol, for 
which work owing to their great size they are 
not so suitable ... instead of building more 
"Thames" class it would be preferable to use 
the tonnage in a larger number of smaller 
submarines. '56 
It could be argued that the 'Thames' class would prove useful in the 
immense distances of the Pacific but even in that area their usefulness 
was hampered (if used on reconnaissance) by the shallow waters around 
Japan and in the vicinity of Singapore for defence of the base. There- 
fore, to comply with the London Treaty quota and also satisfy the 
requirement for a replacement for the ageing 'H' class in the training 
role, a new small submarine design ('U' class) was proposed and accepted. 
Equipped with a minimum torpedo armament these boats were. also to be able 
to undertake limited war-patrols and thereby partly alleviate any wartime 
shortage in this type of submarine. 
Low Level of Naval Strength 
The submarine force had constantly suffered a reduction in strength 
throughout the previous decade. However, many of the causes and results 
also applied to other warship categories. Each year the Sketch Estimates 
had been reduced by the Treasury as a 'temporary' measure until 'next years. 
56. ADM 1/9728, Lawrence to Admiralty. (See Note 52. ) 
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The result was that the Navy considered that it was gradually losing the 
capability to fulfil the policy expounded by the British Government. 
The British Empire based its econ6mic and military strength on secure 
maritime communications and even during the years of financial retrench- 
ment the principle had always been affirmed by successive British Govern- 
ments and Imperial Conferences. However, -throughout this same period, 
four major factors had been allowed to dominate the naval requirements 
of the nation: Financial stringency and the 'Ten Year Rule' had done much 
to reduce the availability of new resources and as a result the Royal Navy 
had had to rely largely on. utilisation of accumulated war reserves and 
serviceable stocks. Thus, Estimates during this period gave a false 
picture of the Royal Navy's true requirements. The problem was further 
complicated by the need, as each category of stock neared exhaustion for 
provision not only of new stock, but also additional material to replenish 
the reserves. This contributed to increased political resistance to these 
requests. The question of new construction had also been affected by the 
results of the international naval conferences which had gradually placed 
increasing restrictions on the different categories of warships. Political 
policy had also dictated further reductions above Treaty requirements as 
an 'earnest of good will', prior to these conferences -a gesture which 
other nations had not reciprocated. 
Deterioration in the international situation, particularly in the 
Far East, as well as increasing political tension in Europe, dictated that 
a halt be made in the decline of the fighting ability of all three Services. 
To this extent the C. I. D. had recommended to the Government that the 
assumption governing the estimates for the defence Services, that from any 
given date there would be no major war for ten years, should be cancelled.. 
The Treasury now retreated from its previous firm support for the 'Rule', 
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excusing the previous policy with the statement that it had not been, 
'an essay in prophecy, but a working hypothesis 
intended to relieve the Chiefs of Staff from 
the responsibility of preparing against contin- 
gencies which the Government believe to be either 
remote or beyond the financial capacity of the 
country to provide against. ' However, 'in 
present circumstances we are-no, more in a position 
financially and economically to engage in a major 
war in the Far East than we are militarily. ' In 
the face of the enormous economic difficulties 
faced by the nation a, 'period of recuperation, 
diminished taxes, increased trade and employment 
was needed before the military situation could 
be reetified. i57 
The Chiefs of Staff argued in return that: 'The whole of our terri- 
tory in the Par East ... as well as our vast trade and shipping lies open 
to attack. '58 The result was the decision by the Cabinet on 23 March 1932 
to cancel the Ten Year Rule with the proviso that, 'this must not be taken 
to justify an expanding expenditure by the Defence Services without regard 
to the very serious financial and economic situation which still obtains. '59 
Increases in defence expenditure were allowed but these merely restored 
the 1931 level and clearly the total of naval strength, including subma- 
rines, was to remain inadequate for several years to come. The Treasury 
was to continue to impose financial restrictions on the Services, aided by 
public opinion which still saw rearmament as more likely to hasten than 
avert war. 
Thus, the removal of the official justification for not increasing 
the resources in the annual Estimate still did not solve the problem that 
57. Treasury to Cabinet, 11 Mar. 1932, CAB 2/5, C. I. D. 
Papers 1087 B, 'Comments on Chiefs of Staff 1932 
Review. ' 
58. Chiefs of Staff to C. I. D., 22 Feb. 1932, CAB 53/22, 
COS 295, 'Annual Review of Imperial Defence Policy. ' 
59. Cabinet to C. I. D., 22 Mar. 1932, CAB 1932,255 Meeting 
of C. I. D., 'Conclusion, ' 2. 
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whereas the Navy Estimates for 1914 (excluding the non-effective vote) 
were £48,541,000, the 1932 Estimates (converted to 1914 values) represented 
a figure of £26,508,500. Although the Royal Navy was not faced by the 
German High Seas Fleet of 1914, the American and Japanese Fleets had 
increased by 37, and 55% respectively since 1914, while the Royal Navy 
had declined by 51%. Clearly there was a need for new construction, 
eepeoially if, as the Admiralty concluded, 'the Disarmament Conference ... 
will, at the most, only achieve limited results and, further, that any 
future Conferences held-... will not, to any remarkable extent, ameliorate 
the situation. r60 
The emergency in new ship construction was still not considered to 
apply to the submarine category and production was maintained at three 
boats per year. The major effort was to be expended on capital ships and 
cruisers. However, the assessment that the submarine menace to the Empire 
was a serious one was reiterated and plans were proposed to build up a 
reserve of A/S material. Failure to achieve this previously was blamed 
on the 'Ten Year Rule' and it was still accepted that a completely satis- 
factory reserve was impossible to achieve in peacetime. Nevertheless, it 
was considered that the experimental stage had passed and with the stand- 
ardisation of Asdic equipment it was necessary to build at least a nucleus 
of reserve strength, to consist initially of seventeen coastal and ten 
ocean-convoy AIS vessels. However, the scarcity of Government resources 
for construction and the reduced national shipbuilding capacity, resulting 
from the stagnation in new construction over the previous decade, meant 
that no more than nine coastal and eight ocean A/S vessels were expected 
60. Field, 14 Nov. 1932, ADM 167/87, 'Review of the 
Present Condition of the Navy and. General Remarks 
on Future Policy. ' 
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to be completed by 1942. Moreover, the entire programme was scheduled 
to take fifteen years to complete. 
Official opinion remained that AIS vessels could not be expected to 
provide complete AIS protection for ocean convoys since, towing to the 
very large numbers that would be needed, the role of these vessels is 
rather to detect and counter-attack a submarine sighted or reported in the 
vicinity of a convoy or after it has actually attacked the convoy. '61 The 
problem of insufficient A/S escorts led to-plans that merchant convoys 
should not exceed between sixteen and twenty vessels. However, even then 
calculations allowed for only two escorts per convoy instead of the four 
originally intended. Estimates were now for a total force of 102 ocean 
and 417 coastal A/S vessels (109 Europe; 508 Far East), the latter consis- 
ting largely of trawlers. However, only 30 old destroyers and fifteen 
sloops could be spared to be earmarked for ocean convoy work and even by 
19571t was expected that no more than seventeen would be equipped with 
A, sd. io. Coastal AIS vessels were deemed necessary, 'to escort convoys 
through coastal waters and in the approaches to defended ports, ' and, 'to 
carry out offensive operations against submarines operating off ... 
coasts., 
62 Little or no attention appears to have been given to the 
possibility of air attack on coastal convoys, although the Admiralty 
considered the aeroplane to be a greater threat than the submarine to 
ocean-convoys. Possibly the answer to this question lies with ä belief 
in land based British aircraft to nullify any threat. The only 
61. Naval Staff, 1932, ADM 167/87, T. D. 135/32, 
'Formation of an Anti-Submarine Flotilla and 
Asdic Reserve. Part 1: Anti-Submarine Vessels 
Required. in War. ' 
62. Ibid. 
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alleviating factor for the Admiralty, in this instance, lay in the 
assumption, (that unrestricted submarine warfare will not be carried out 
for some time after war breaks out. ' 
63 
Although developments in Asdic had continued to show improvement, 
locating the submarine was only half the problem. The probably weakness 
of protection for convoys, due to insufficient number of A/S escort 
vessels, was not acknowledge& in the preparation for exercises involving 
attacks on convoys. The Admiralty continued to consider the surface-raider 
to be the main-threat to convoys and, although recognising the advantages 
of the convoy system in countering the submarine threat, remained con- 
vinced that this 'alone did not provide a 'complete safeguard. However, 
the hope was that'a, combination of convoy, Asdic and tonnage limitation 
agreements would counter any submarine menace. But any proposal to 
increase the size of the A/S forces in peacetime was still considered 
financially prohibitive by the Government. Acceptance of the inability 
of the Admiralty to alter the Governments decision resulted in many 
senior officers subconsciously accepting an exaggerated belief in the 
ability of Asdic to provide a complete answer to any submarine threat 
within limited A, /S resources. Undoubtedly, advances had been made in 
Asdic and other AIS equipment, as well as in tactics, but whether that 
progress had been sufficient to guarantee a successful defence against 
the submarine was still far from certain. In many instances, Asdic 
equipped vessels could still only operate efficiently at a maximum speed 
of 10 knots when undertaking an Asdic sweep and only under the best 
weather conditions. However the lack of thought given, even during the 
1930's, to the possibility of night attack by submarines on the surface 
63. ADM 1/9728, 'Submarine Building Policy. ' (See Note 48. ) 
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is more understandable given the Admiralty's continuing preoccupation with 
the warship as the main target for British submarines. Use of British 
submarines in a surface role still centred on the shadowing or reconnais- 
sance of enemy warships and transports. This had been one of the most 
firmly advocated roles during the 1920's for the British submarine force 
and probably reflected a preoccupation with attempts to use the submarine 
as a substitute surface warship. 
In naval policy, political factors now appeared to dictate war 
requirements in the relationship between Government and Admiralty. Existing 
and projected naval force levels were insufficient to provide even the 
minimum level of maritime protection in a future war. The Admiralty, 
however, remained initially reluctant to press for realistic strength 
levels for a variety of reasons. The vacuum created by Admiral Beatty's 
retirement and then preoccupation with the 1930 London Conference were 
major factors; as was the overall question of naval morale, evidenced in 
the Invergordon Mutiny. This in turn was a symptom of the financial 
forces affecting the nation. Government pressure in support of its 
disarmament and economic policies, with the latter reinforced by a world 
trading recession, remained strong. However, the deterioration of the 
international situation, allied to the results of the 1930 London Confer- 
ence, increased concern within the Admiralty finally leading up to the 
promulgation of the 'New Standard of Naval Strength'. Even this repres- 
ented only what the Admiralty considered to be the minimum level of naval 
forces needed coupled to the nation's existing shipbuilding capacity. 
The system between elected Government and the Services also had to be 
taken into consideration and many of the Admiralty's proposals, especially 
on the need to build up and re-equip armaments and shipbuilding 
firms, 
were anathema to a Government which like its predecessors held that the 
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only possible economic policy was one of deflation, and a doctrinal require- 
ment to avoid deficit budgeting. 
In the post-London Conference period, the Admiralty calculated in the 
submarine category that 19,000 tons had to be laid down by 1933 to reach 
the quota limit with a force of under-age boats. However, well into the 
1930'x, the effect of Treasury pressure caused an annual reduction in the 
resources allocated to the Royal Navy. Those categories of vessels consid- 
ered less vital to naval policies were most vulnerable under this policy 
and the submarine was one of these. This was confirmed by the refusal to 
react to increases in foreign submarine fleets. Financial consideration 
and greater restriction of resources, rather than pure consideration of 
operational roles and requirements, dictated that the line of British 
submarine development concentrated on the patrol model. Admiralty accept- 
ance of Government policy on finance and thereby resources ensured however 
that no short term improvements in submarine numbers could be expected.. 
The decline in the number of hulls therefore continued and was officially 
accepted in the 1932 Geneva Conference proposals for a quantitative total 
of 40 submarines. Fortunately, the determination of the other major powers 
to increase their naval forces was gradually to strengthen the Admiralty 
case on the need-'for a 'New Standard of Naval Strength., 
The Royal Navy continued to be regarded as essential for the security 
of the Empire and in the Admiralty's view this necessitated a capital fleet 
of sufficient strength to deter Japanese aggression. However, since the 
main fleet could not cover both European and Par Eastern waters there 
would clearly be a period before relief in the event of conflict in the 
Far East. The shortage of surface warships in that area ensured that the 
existing submarine forces would be called on to play a major role. In 
recognition of the growing danger permission was given by the Cabinet in 
June 1932 for work to recommence on the Singapore Base. There still 
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remained the problem, however, as to whether there would be a British 
Fleet available to go there. The entire Singapore strategy was dependent 
on such a force being available and this assumed no major naval threat in 
Europe. Although this assumption was plausible in the 1920's it became 
less so during the early 1930's. The requirement was seen as one of 
maintaining a favourable balance in European waters and this led the 
Admiralty to seek a naval agreement with Germany, one condition of which 
was the official acceptance of German reacquisition of submarines. Clearly, 
the immediate future was to be crucial, with the added prospect of the 
scheduled 1935 Naval Conference, and for the Submarine Service, as for the 
Navy as a whole, the next months would indicate either further decline or 
a renewal of strength. 
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CHAPTER li 
1934 - 1935 
ANGLQ-GERPL4N NAVAL AGR M, 11= AND 
PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1935 LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 
London Naval Conference 1935-36: Preparations. - 
General Naval position 
The international political situation continued to deteriorate so 
much that the British Government were prompted to undertake an early 
initiative on calling another naval disarmament conference, despite the 
Admiralty's objections that prior clarification was needed of British 
naval policy. On 15 November 1933 the Cabinet had approved the C. I. D. 's 
list of priority areas for Imperial Defence. These included defence of 
Far Eastern possessions, European commitments and defence of India. Six 
months later the position in Europe was rivalling the Far East as a 
priority because of the, 'increasing evidence of Germany's intention to 
1 
re-arm, with or without the consent of other Powers. # Equally the 
position in the Far East now gave great cause for concern and, 'pending 
an improvement in our relations' with Japan, 'we cannot overlook the 
danger created by our total inability to defend our interests in the Par 
East ... At the moment we are almost defenceless in the Far East. '2 The 
miralty preferred to hold the Government's determination to participate 
in the 1932 League of Nations Disarmament Conference as the major reason 
for allowing the continued deterioration in British naval strength despite 
the warning from the early 1930's of the growing militarism of Japanese 
1. Naval Staff, Apr. 1934, ADM 1/8802, 'Requirements for 
the 1935 Naval Conference. ' (Admiralty Paper No. 1. ) 
2. Ibid. 
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and German foreign policy. This solution is too simple and ignores the 
responsibility of the Board of Admiralty to convince the Government of 
the need for adequate naval defence and their failure to achieve this. 
The weakness in British defence capabilities were not confined to the 
Navy and the reasons lay in the policies of economy, disarmament and 
retrenchment followed since the close of the First World War. These 
factors were still considered by the Government to preclude the realis- 
ation of what the Admiralty considered to be a correct level of naval 
defence. This was defined as providing naval forces in the Far East 
capable of resisting any Japanese encroachment and thereby protecting 
British possessions, while at the same time retaining sufficient strength 
in European waters to deter the strongest continental naval Power. Even 
if such a standard had been accepted and finance made available, the 
reduced national shipbuilding capacity and the time needed for actual 
design and construction work, precluded any significant additions to the 
Fleet in the immediate future. Therefore the Admiralty accepted in the 
short-term the Government's policy of attempting to prevent an increase 
and preferably to achieve a reduction in the naval forces of the other 
major Powers. 
There was however a new firmness in the position of the Admiralty; 
but the need to obtain, substantial agreements in a second London Naval 
Conference had now to be considered the immediate practical need. Clearly 
if these were not achieved and the international situation continued to 
deteriorate then the major need would be to reiterate the arguments and 
persuade the Government, as a major priority, of the need for massive 
rearmament. The question then would be whether sufficient time remained 
to repair the neglect of a decade and a half. 
In the submarine category the general policy was to propose a further 
reduction in national submarine tonnage to 40,000 tons, in the hope that 
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the other major naval Powers could be persuaded to accept parity. However, 
the known opposition of the French and Japanese ensured that such a move 
was doomed to failure from the outset. Abolition was no longer seen as a 
feasible policy, nor was the aim of a qualitative limit of 250 tons. The 
dropping of the abolition policy was defended as allowing the use of, 'the 
tactical and strategic advantages of submarines ... to balance to some 
extent, the dangers to ... trade and sea communications consequent on their 
retention. '3 In addition, the Admiralty decided that it was no longer in 
Britain's interests to support a lowering of the qualitative limit below 
2,000 tons. If an agreed quantitative tonnage limit could be strictly 
enforced then, 'the fewer submarines built by foreign Powers on a total 
tonnage the better. Numbers of small submarines are a greater danger than 
few larger submarines. ' 
4 
The crucial questions remained whether any agree- 
anent could be reached and if it could be enforced. For the British the 
proposed limit of 40,000 tons meant that the 'G' class programme would have 
to be curtailed at three hulls in order to maintain the required number of 
submarines within the tonnage quota. It was also an opportunity to 
terminate what had been an extremely, 'see-saw policy in regard to the 
Fleet submarine since the conclusion of the war. '5 However, in the face 
of the known views of the French and Japanese any reduction of overall 
submarine tonnage below the 52,700 tons of the London Treaty was extremely 
unlikely. Evidence tended to suggest that France would not agree to an 
overall tonnage figure below 70,000 tons and Japan was expected to insist 
3, ADM 1/8802, 'Requirements for the 1935 Naval 
Conference. ' (See Note 1. ) 
4. ADM 1/8802, 'Requirements for the 1935 Naval 
Conference. ' (See Note 1. ) 
5. Little to Third. Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral Sir Charles M. 
Forbes, 27 Feb. 1934, ADIJ 1/9373, M. F. 0.2506/34. 
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on at least a similar figure. 
6 
Any agreement on these lines would then 
lead to the United States demanding parity with Japan, and Italy parity 
with France. The resulting increase in world submarine tonnage would 
obviously be to Britain's disadvantage. Britain certainly had a require- 
ment for 70,000 tons but the abvious disadvantage lay in encouraging the 
other major Powers to claim similar and larger quotas. Despite the 
improved performance of Asdic the consequence of German re-acquisition 
of the submarine could not be ignored. This raised again the thorny ques- 
tion of the provision of VS escort vessels in sufficient numbers. The 
Admiralty considered that: 
tIf, as seems certain, submarine tonnage 
cannot be ... reduced, fuller measures of 
protection against submarine: attack must be 
prepared. The existence of large submarine 
forces of any foreign Power capable of 
expansion in war, with its potential threat 
to our trade, cannot be ignored ... Great 
additions to our destroyer and anti-submarine 
forces might be required to deal with this menace. '7 
However, there was a shortfall in providing convoy escorts and this 
weakness was considered to make the grouping of merchant ships in convoys 
a danger rather than a security. The Admiralty's view now was that the 
shortage was a result of excessive arms limitation policies by successive 
Governments. In applying this argument to cruisers, where the strength 
of the force had been allowed to fall to 50, the Admiralty were on stronger 
ground than over destroyers and other AIS escorts. Nevertheless, in both 
cases requirements had been pared back to inadequate levels by a lack of 
determined resistance by the Admiralty. Throughout this period the 
Admiralty had given tacit approval to the debilitating policies of 
6. Naval Ministerial Committee of the Cabinet, 28 May 1934, 
ADM 116/3573, P. D. 04526/34,3rd Meeting. 
7. First Sea Lord, Admiral Chatfield, Apr. 1934, ADL 116/2999, 
'Preparation for the 1935 Naval Conference. ' 
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disarmament by restricting opposition to'the level of internal statements 
of disapproval. Thus in 1930 agreement was given to a surface cruiser 
force of only 50 vessels, a total which had been rejected in 1927 and 
which had led to the threat of'resignation by the Board of Admiralty. 
However, in mitigation it must be emphasised that in 1927 in the person 
of Admiral Beatty the Navy possessed someone whose resignation from office 
would have commanded public attention and led to domestic questioning of 
Government policy. In 1930 the Board believed and accepted that resignation 
would not have affected public and Parliamentary acceptance of Government 
disarmament policy. In'general terms this lack of prestige and the 1929 
financial recession contributed to acceptance of Government policies; and 
this submission was reinforced by the nation's apparent tacit support for 
these policies. However, when by the period after 1933 the international 
situation began seriously to deteriorate and the Admiralty felt it could 
be sure of some political and public support for its demands for re-armament, 
then not only were Government policies objected to but counter proposals 
also put forward with a degree of confidence. 
Irrespective of military or political requirements, therefore, there 
was a limit to the measures which could be taken quickly to rectify any 
shortage of mat6riel. Thus, while it was calculated that Britain possessed 
a military requirement for a submarine force of 70,000 tons, the political, 
economic and construction factors dictated that proposals for a national 
tonnage quota of only 40,000 tons be retained for the 1935 Conference. 
However, there was little enthusiasm for a policy of parity, at this 
figure, for all the major Powers, as this was considered 'likely to 
produce complication in practice. 'a Nevertheless, some effort was 
8. Foreign office to Admiralty, 1934, ADM 1/8802. 
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considered necessary, to seek agreements curtailing the expansion of 
foreign submarine fleets. Whatever the outcome it was clear that in the 
post-Conference period an extensive reappraisal of both submarine and A/S 
requirements, for naval defence of the Empire, would be required. During 
1934 the Admiralty had calculated that a minimum of 200,000 tons of 
destroyers and other A/S escort vessels would be required on the outbreak 
of war. It was correctly realised that the size of the AIS force was not 
primarily decided by the potential numbers of enemy submarines but rather 
on the number and size of convoys to be protected. Nevertheless, the 
proposed overall tonnage provided for only approximately 100 vessels which 
would be required for both fleet protection and convoy escort. Calculations 
indicated that this would result in a force of only, 'two A/S vessels to 
each convoy. In September, 1918, on a basis of five A, /S vessels to each 
convoy we were thus employing some 300 vessels., 
9 
Clearly, even with the 
improvements made to Asdic equipment and AIS weapons since 1918, this was 
a weak level of protection which could be overwhelmed if several submarines 
were to attack together. 
Meanwhile, as part of the preparations for the 1935 Naval Conference, 
definite submarine tonnage limitation proposals had been submitted by the 
major naval Powers. The United States had no firm views on quantitative 
tonnage but they were happy to continue with the existing qualitative limit 
of 2,000 tons. Although the French were also agreeable to such a limit, 
the problem of agreement on a quantitative tonnage was not to prove so 
simple. France was prepared to reduce her submarine force to 80,000 tons 
but only if the other submarine fleets were stabilised at their existing 
levels. A further offer to, 'contemplate further reductions below this 
level by scrapping submarines as they become over-age and only building 
9. ADM 1/8802, tRequirements for the 1935 Naval 
Conference. ' (See Note 1. ) 
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'sufficient new ones occasionally to keep the dockyards efficient in this 
type of construction, ' 
10 
. was dependent on tonnage compensation in other 
categories, noteably capital ships. This was unlikely to prove acceptable 
to the British who could afford no further deterioration in the naval ratio 
vis-a-vis the other major Powers. 
The Italians accepted the London Treaty figure of 52,700 tons and 
proposed a qualitative limit of 1,400 tons. However, the French were not 
prepared to accept a low quantitative figure, while the Japanese regarded 
the submarine category as capable of being merged with the 6 inch gun 
cruisers and the destroyers, over which there was to be no tonnage limit. 
Failing agreement on this, they were prepared to settle for a single 
category for submarines but with a quantitative limit of 120,000 tons. 
11 
The British reply, simple and clear, was that such a figure was unacceptable. 
Moreover, the Admiralty concluded that: 
'It now seems more than probably, that we shall 
fail to induce the Japanese to recede from their 
main demand i. e., the right to equality, the 
right which if it were granted to Japan, would 
also have to be granted to the European Signa- 
tories of the VIashington Treaty and which would 
inevitably be extended to Russia and Germany. '12 
if their demands were not granted the Japanese threatened to denounce the 
Washington Treaty and proceed to build submarines without restriction. 
The Naval Staff considered that the possession of such a force would have 
little effect on the European Powers and this contrasted oddly with earlier 
10. Foreign Office, 3 Oct. 1934, Documents on British Foreign 
Policy, (London, 1973), 2 ser., XIII, 48, 'Results of 
Preliminary Conversations Relating to Preparations for the 
1935 Naval Conference Held with the United States, Japanese, 
French and Italian representatives. ' 
11. Foreign Office to Cabinet, 27 Oct. 1934, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., 
XIII, 73, 'Report on the Preliminary Naval Discussions with 
Japanese Representatives. ' N. C. M. (32) 22. 
12. Chatfield, 30 Oct. 1934, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 77-78, 
N. C. M. (35) 23. 
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opinions denouncing a parity figure of 70,000 tons. The reasoning now 
seemed to be that the Far East was a different theatre of operations, so 
that although in Europe the-Admiralty seemed mesmerised by the proximity 
of France to British trade routes, in the Pacific safety was seen to lie 
in the remoteness of Japan from the main British trade routes. A Japanese 
submarine force as a threat to merchant shipping, 'would be a serious 
inconvenience but in view of modern methods of dealing with submarine ... 
they would not be more than that. ' 
13 
This also seems at odds with earlier 
Admiralty assessments, particularly on the shortage of A, /S escorts and 
Asdic equipment for an Eastern war. It also indicates an illusory belief 
in the efficiency of Asdic. During December 1934 the Admiralty was 
partially successful in persuading the Japanese to modify their submarine 
demands to below 100,000 tons. 
14 How far below this figure the reduction 
would be made was not clear but indications were that it was far above the 
French claim for 80,000 tons. There is some evidence that the Admiralty 
was considering a parity figure meeting French requirements in the hope 
of ensuring the success of British proposals in other categories which 
would result in a new long-term naval arms limitation treaty. Together 
with the Japanese proposals this idea was greeted with some astonishment. 
'The Japanese submarine proposition seems utterly fantastic. How comes 
it that ... The Admiralty can even contemplate 80,000 tons. '15 Meanwhile, 
the desire to believe in the efficiency of 4/S methods appeared to 
Government observers to have spread widely within senior naval circles. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Little, 6 Dec. 1934, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 148, 'Record 
of a Conversation with Vice-Admiral Yamamoto. # (N. C. (J) 
7th Meeting. ) 
15. Sir R. Vansittart, Dec. 1934, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 
149, 'Footnote No. 3 to Document No. 881. (See Note 14. ) 
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'Admiralty I believe consider submarines less of a danger than formerly., 
at any rate as regards battlefleets, owing to the development of protect- 
ive measures in recent years. 016 
Further meetings with the Japanese did not result in any reduotion of 
submarine tonnage demands. The Admiralty concluded that: 'His Majesty's 
Government could not possibly consider figures such as those that had 
been indicated by Admiral Yamamoto. ' 
17 Stalemate then ensued while the 
Japanese representatives returned to Japan for further instructions. 
Meanwhile, the size of the existing Japanese submarine force was exerc- 
ising an influence on British construction plans. Even in the remote 
event that the initial British proposal of 40,000 tons had been accepted 
it would still have taken a long time to bring Japan down to this figure 
because of the large amount of relatively new tonnage she possessed. 
Recognition that the Japanese would never reduce to 40,000 tons clearly 
emphasised that it was, 'undesirable for us to omit provision for replacing 
our over-age vessels, if we are to maintain our position vis-a-vis foreign 
powers during the period of reduction. It is therefore necessary to 
include some submarines in the 1935 Programme. ' 
18 
However, Admiral Chat- 
field had., accurately, explained that it was erroneous to base British 
submarine requirements on the strength of foreign submarine fleets. There- 
fore, it would have made more sense to counter such an increase (and its 
implicit threat to merchant shipping) by including more JIS escorts in the 
construction programmes. 
16. Ibid., Lord Stanhope (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs). 
17. Chatfield, 28 Dec. 1934, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 157, 
'Record of a Meeting between United Kingdom Representatives 
and Admiral Yamamoto. ' (N. C. (J) 10th Meeting. ) 
18. Chatfield, 12 Oct. 1934, ADM 167/91p 11935 Naval 
Construction Programme. ' 
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Use of British Submarine Forces in the Far East 
On 30 December 1934 the Japanese Government officially denounced the 
Washington Naval Treaty and brought into prominence an earlier Admiralty 
memorandum which had been intended, 'to draw attention to the important 
role which submarines will be called upon to play in "holding the fort" in 
the Far East ... and the inadequacy of the existing provisions in that 
respect. '19 The recommendation then had been that the submarine strength 
on the China Station should be increased from fifteen to 21 boats. The 
withdrawal of the Japanese from any naval arms limitation agreement, allied 
to a deteriorating political situation in the Far East, indicated an 
immediate need for increases in the submarine force in the Pacific. The 
role of these boats was defined as: 'The security of the Singapore Base 
and its facilities, ' 
20 
until relief arrived with the main Fleet. Submarines 
were to be employed in Japanese waters as advance warning of any invasion 
fleet destined for Singapore. However, evidence suggested that: 'The 
number of submarines available ... would not suffice for keeping an efficient 
watch on all the possible points of departure. '21 Nevertheless, the 
Government were not prepared to jeopardise their efforts to achieve 
agreement on reduction of quantitative submarine tonnage by increasing 
British requiremiinta. Therefore any increase in the number of boats on 
the China Station was unlikely in the immediate future. Existing subma- 
rine strength was so low that in the event of war, doubt existed as to 
whether boats could be spared from Home Waters. Provision of such reinforce- 
ments depended on reaching agreement with France and. Italy at the 1935 
Conference. 
19. D. of P., 12 Feb. 1934, MA 1163862, M. O. 0570/35, 
'Disposition of Naval Forces in Phase 1- War in the Far East. ' 
20. D. of P., 1934, ADT. i 116/38620 'Eastern War - Appreciation 
of the Situation of the Eastern Forces During the Period 
before Relief. ' 
21. Ibid. 
- 358 - 
On operational roles, the value of submarines in reconnaissance 
patrols off Japan was calculated as small, despite the fact that this 
contradicted one of the requirements influencing the design of the new 
medium patrol submarines. 
22 
In addition, the presence of British subma- 
nines off Singapore, rather than having to operate in Japanese waters, was 
considered sufficient to persuade the Japanese to invest expensively in 
, A/S 
forces. The proposal was that: 
'The principal value of submarines in connection 
with the security of Singapore during the period 
before relief is considered to lie in the fact 
that, by virtue of their ability to operate 
unsupported against superior forces, they, alone 
among naval forces, are capable of offering direct 
opposition to a Japanese attack in force at any 
time. It is further considered that the most 
efficient way of using them in this role would be 
by concentrating them in the vicinity of Singapore. i23 
This was a reiteration of the roles proposed during the early and middle 
twenties when memories of the ineffectiveness of submarines in the coast 
and port defence role were even clearer. The report appeared as more of 
a means of justifying the fact that the number of submarines in the Far 
East was so limited rather than as an accurate assessment of operational 
requirements. Although during the Second World War the United States 
submarine force was to sink 63% of Japanese merchant tonnage, the range 
of British submarines in 1934 indicated that for a sustained anti-commerce 
campaign they would have to operate from Hong Kong. This disposition was 
precluded as the base was considered vulnerable to any Japanese advance. 
Moreover, under the Four-Power Agreement signed at Washington in 1922 the 
military installations at Hong Kong could not be improved in order to 
reduce the vulnerability of the base. 
22. D. N. C. to Board, 30 July 1935, ADM 167/92) 'Sketch 
Design for '2" Class Patrol Submarine. ' 
23. ADM 116/3862, 'Eastern War'. (See Note 20. ) 
- 359 - 
Anglo-German Naval Agreement - Background and. Initial Moves 
The Admiralty, however, was now more concerned to turn its attention 
to solving the problem of German naval rearmament before becoming embroiled 
in the complexities of a full naval conference. The validity or otherwise 
of Far Eastern submarine policy was relegated to one side pending the 
solution of these other issues. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, 
Germany was forbidden to build submarines but information reaching Britain 
indicated that plans were underway to increase the size of the German 
naval forces, as part of an overall policy of rearmament, and that subma- 
rines would be included. During June 1934 the Admiralty concluded that if 
Germany were to be included in any future naval arms limitation agreement, 
as a means of curbing her rearmament, then: 
'Under equality of treatment, Germany could not 
be denied submarines if they are retained by other 
Powers, and it has been the Admiralty policy for 
some years that she should be permitted a small 
tonnage in this category. It is proposed that she 
should have 5,000 tons-, 24 
However, this was to be dependent on German agreement to a naval arms 
limitation treaty and not as a separate pact. In December 1934, an 
Admiralty assessment of German submarine construction capability concluded 
that Germany could build four boats annually after 1935 rising to possibly 
six per year by 1940. Total German submarine forces were not expected 
to 
exceed twelve boats by 1939 and 30 
by 1942.25 This was at a time when 
gidmiral Doenitz estimated future German requirements as being, 'at least 
300 operational U-boats in order successfully to wage war against shipping. ' 
26 
24. Plans Division, 29 June 1934, A D9 'Limitation 
of German Naval Armaments. ' 
25. D. of P., 5 Dec. -1934, ADM 116/357$, 'Minutes of 63rd 
Meeting of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee.! (Endorsed 
by D. N. I. - 17 Dee. 1934. ) 
26. K. Doenitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days, (London, 1959), 33. 
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preparations were already underway to manufacture prefabricated parts for 
250 tons coastal submarines at various shipyards to await the decision to 
begin construction. The only question was whether this decision would be 
the subject of an international agreement or a unilateral declaration by 
Germany. According to Doenitz, Hitler's object at this time was to attempt 
to persuade Britain to disassociate herself from the opposition he expected 
from the other Powers to Germany's renunciation of the military clauses of 
the Versailles Treaty. By concluding a naval agreement with Britain: 'He 
hoped thus to put an end also to British political hostility in the future, 
for a limitation of naval armament thus voluntarily accepted would be 
clear proof that Germany had no intention of attacking Britain. ' 
27 
Hitler's hopes could only have been raised when the British failed during 
1934 in attempts to form a united policy with France and Italy on German 
naval rearmament. In the Admiralty's view the question was not whether 
Germany should be allowed to rearm but rather, 'what size of German Navy, 
quantitative and qualitative they were prepared to let the Germans attain 
in order to secure a general settlement. '28 However, any agreement had to 
be connected to existing or proposed naval treaties. An understanding with 
France and Italy would have been an added advantage. Therefore, Admiralty 
proposals were to allow Germany at most to, 'have a navy equal to that of 
the strongest power in the Baltic, ' 
29 including 5,000 tons of submarines. 
During February 1935 agreement was reached that any settlement with 
Germany on armaments should replace the provisions of Part V of the 
Treaty of Versailles. 
27. Doenitz, op. cit., 99 
28. D. of P., 16 Jan. 1935, ADM 116/3373, 'German Naval 
Armament. ' 
29. Ibid. 
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British hopes were that Germany could be included in the forthcoming 
Naval Conference and to this end a meeting was arranged with the Germans 
for an informal exchange of views. In accepting this invit&tion the 
German Government clarified their request for a total tonnage equal to 
3ple. of the Royal Navy. Initial British reaction was that, 'such a figure, 
if persisted in would render qualitative limitation definitely impossible 
so far as the European Powers are concerned. ' 
50 
The hope was that after 
further discussions the Germans might 'prove more reasonable'. However, 
clearly if these talks and the parallel conversations with the French and. 
Italians failed then the 1935 Naval Conference would have to be postponed, 
rather than risk as abortive meeting. This step was, 'clearly undesirable 
except as a last resort, since its psychological effect must necessarily 
be b ach, ' further, 'it would leave the door open to uncontrolled rearmament 
by Germany and to, competitive building between France and Italy. '31 These 
major fears by both the Government and Admiralty made an agreement of even 
55ö of British naval tonnage, attractive. An added incentive was provided 
by Hitler's announcements during March of Germany's resumption of full 
sovereign rights and the implementation of compulsory national service for 
the Ax-my and. of the 'official' existence of the German Air Force. These 
were flagrant breaches of the Versailles Treaty, which the other major 
powers had made no physical moves to-, oppose. British requests for infor- 
mation on proposed submarine construction led to the German admission 
that 
orders had been given for only twelve boats of 250 tons each. 
32 
Although 
30. Foreign Office & Admiralty, 30 Mar. 1935, D. B. F. P., 
2 ser., XIII, 181-87, 'Questions of Naval Limitation. ' 
31. Ibid. 
32. Sir E. Phipps (Berlin) to Sir J. Simon (Foreign Secretary), 
25 Apr. 1935, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 198. 
See also: Documents Nos. 150,165,188,271. 
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the subject of much comment in the British press and Parliament, the 
incident wAs not regarded as serious although it did engender an air of 
mistrust. However, the issue whether or not Germany already had any 
submarine sections ready for assembly was considered less important than 
the need to reach an international agreement on naval arms limitation. 
Hitler finally denounced Part V of the Treaty of Versailles on 
12 May 1935 and further announced that the German Navy would be restricted 
to 55% of the Royal Navy's tonnage and 15% below the French total. On 
submarines, he proclaimed German support for abolition, provided all the 
other naval Powers supported such a policy, knowing that this was unlikely. 
The repudiation of the Versailles Treaty did not result in a belligerent 
reaction from the British Government but rather in the naval sector, in an 
extension of its disarmament policies. The Admiralty made a thorough 
re-assessment of the probable effects if Germany was allowed to construct 
up to 35% of British naval tonnage. 
33 The conclusion remained unchanged 
from the earlier appreciation by the Naval Staff of British requirements 
for the 1935 Naval Conferencen and the views expressed in the Chiefs of 
Staff's Annual Review for 1935. These held that it was essential to be 
able to provide sufficient naval strength in the Far East to prevent 
Japanese aggression while ensuring adequate strength in European waters to 
deter the strongest naval Power. A Two-Power Standard was precluded and 
this was presented as meaning that the Admiralty could not guarantee the 
security of sea communications. Moreover the despatch of a sufficiently 
strong fleet to the Par East would clearly leave Britain in an inferior 
naval position in Europe. If the Government would or could not supply 
33. Plans Division, 27 May 1935, ADU 116/3373, 'Notes on 
German Naval Strength: Strategic Implications of the 
55% Ratio. ' 
34. Naval Staff, Apr. 1934, ADM 1/8802, Admiralty Paper No. 1, 
'Requirements for the 1935 Naval Conference. ' 
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the resources to rectify these materiel weaknesses it had to accept that 
Britain could not, tsimultaneously fight Japan and the strongest European 
naval power. ' 
35 
The Chiefs of Staff provided endorsement for this cone- 
lusion. 
'The existing margin is only sufficient on 
the supposition that France will not be our 
enemy in Europe and that we are not without 
allies. ' Further: 'That we should be called 
upon to fight Germany and. Japan simultaneously 
without allies is a state of affairs to the 
prevention of which our diplomacy would naturally 
be directed. '36 
The proposal was that France should be maintained as a friend and ally 
which would allow the main Fleet to be sent to the Far East if needed. 
The minimum level of strength the Admiralty proposed to accept in Home 
waters, if a Fleet was sent to the Far East, comprised a surface force 
equal to that proposed for Germany. This tended to emphasise the feeling 
that an agreement should be reached with the Germans even on a 35%, limit. 
The alternative was unrestricted German naval rearmament and the 
added strain this would impose on Imperial defence. Overall, Britain had 
to, 'in the next three or four years, be able to provide naval security in 
an alliance with France against Germany, while at the same time defending 
ourselves against Japanese aggression. ' 
7 
Existing Japanese and German 
naval tonnage was 64% and 3.1% of the British total respectively. Even 
alloying Germany a strength of 35% was considered to leave a sufficient 
margin to meet the requirements of both European and Far East naval defence, 
with the proviso that Japanese naval strength remained at the 1935 level. 
35. ADM 116/3373, 'Notes of German Naval Strength. ' 
(See Note 33. ) 
36. ADM 3.16/3373., 'Notes on German Naval Strength. ' 
(See Note 33. ) 
37. ADM 116/5373, 'Notes on German Naval Strength. ' 
(See Note 33. ) 
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This was unlikely since Japan favoured equality with Britain and the 
United States. No doubt the Admiralty had hopes of a reduction in the 
Japanese proposals but this does not clarify the recommendation that, 'an 
ultimate 35f ratio for Germany is strategically acceptable, provided we 
maintain our present ratio vis-a-vis Japan. '38 This was especially true 
when existing evidence indicated that the ratio could only be maintained 
by increased British naval construction, -which the Government was loath to 
accept. 
ýi lo-German Naval Agreement - Negotiations and Signing 
On 2 June 1935 the German delegation, headed by the Foreign Minister 
Ribbentrop, arrived in London for the first meeting with British naval 
representatives. The Germans were,, quick to press for, 'a clear and 
formal recognition of the decision taken by the German Government laying 
down a relationship between the British and German fleets in the proportion 
of 100% to 35%. '39 This was given as the basis of political and naval 
advice, in which the latter held that:, 
'The statements of Herr Hitler, as amplified 
by the German representatives in the current 
conversations, make it clear that there is no 
prospect whatever of Germany coming to an 
agreement on any question including the 
extremely important one of qualitative limit- 
ation, except on the thirty five per cent basis. ' 40 
Whether this achievement was another case of successful political bluff by 
Hitler or not was rendered less important by Admiralty thinking on the 
need for such an agreement. 'Since our strategical requirements must take 
38. ADM 1163373, 'Notes on German Naval Strength. ' 
(See Note 33. ) 
39. British Representatives, 5 June 1935, D. B. F. P., 
2 ser., XIII, 364, 'Anglo-German Naval Discussions. ' 
(N. C. M. (35) 50. ) 
40. Naval Staff, 5 June 1935, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 369, 
'Memorandum on the German Proposal for a 35ö Naval Ratio. ' 
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'account of both Germany and Japan it is evidently to our advantage that 
the naval forces of each or either of them should (a) Be Limited (b) Be 
limited at as low a figure as it is possible to secure. '41 This solved 
the immediate necessity of seeking additional construction resources from 
a reluctant Government. Statements by the German delegation that their 
Government would, if no agreement was forthcoming, build past the 55% level 
irrespective of the views of France and the other major Powers, appeared 
to reinforce the belief that this was the only opportunity to place a 
restriction on renewed German naval building. A generally favourable 
attitude was also forthcoming from both Government and Admiralty because 
the Germans, unlike the Japanese, were asking for only 55% and not parity. 
However, the one area where Germany wanted to press for parity was submarines. 
The Naval Staff concluded that failing an international agreement on 
abolition, Germany would eventually acquire a right to build submarines. 
The Germans had already made it clear that if the other naval Powers 
achieved parity with Britain, in the submarine category, under any future 
agreement, then Germany would expect similar rights. However, this was not 
to be taken to mean that they would build up to this level but with 
sections for twelve submarines, at least, already available, then clearly 
Germany was unlikely to maintain a low submarine strength. Admiralty 
calculations were that a force of 50-60 boats could result if Germany 
were allowed parity. Despite these figures, faith in the efficiency of 
A, sdio was such that the attitude adopted to so potentially dangerous a 
situation was only that it 'must arouse some misgiving. '42 Attitudes 
continued to be based on the belief that attempts to prevent German naval 
rearmament would result in unilateral action by Germany, whereas attempts 
41. Ibid. 
42. D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 369. (See Note 40. ) 
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to reach a moderating agreement might be successful. Thus, despite the 
evidence of extensive preparations for submarine construction it was still 
accepted, with some conviction, that the Germans did not have any 'desire 
to acquire a large Submarine fleet. ' 
43 
German proposals for an increase in submarine tonnage from 35 to 
parity were answered only by the qualification that the increase should be 
drawn from other categories and therefore, 'that the additional submarine 
tonnage would have to be reckoned as part of the total tonnage. '44 This 
view by a former Head of the Submarine Service is symptomatic of the casual 
approach to the issue of German re-acquisition of the submarine. Although 
developments in Asdic were continuing, only a couple of years had passed 
since Admiral Field had proclaimed that even with Asdic equipped escorts 
a convoy could not be considered as completely safe from the submarine. 
Further, naval officers holding senior rank were only too aware, from 
personal experience, how serious were the effects of an intensive submarine 
campaign. 
Meanwhile, on 17 June the German representatives had presented prop- 
osals that included an overall tonnage limit for their Navy not exceeding 
3 of the British. Within this total Germany was to be allowed eventual 
parity on submarine tonnage, but in the immediate future however the Germans 
were satisfied with a limit of 45%. 
45 
Over the long term, it was stressed, 
parity would be desirable to sweet Germany's requircments in coast defence 
in the Baltic, especially vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. In the interests of 
43. D. B_F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 369. (See Note 40. ) 
44. Admiral Little, 6 June 1935, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 378,. 
'Notes of the 4th Meeting Between Representatives of the 
United Kingdom and Germany. ' 
M 
45. British Representatives, 15 June 1935, D. B. F. P., 
2 ser., XIII, 417, 'Draft Agreement Discussed at 6th 
Meeting of United Kingdom and German Representatives. ' 
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securing an overall agreement the British were prepared to concede the 
principle of parity, especially as they did not regard the role of the 
submarine as primarily A/S. The result was that German submarine building 
was not considered as likely to necessitate an automatic increase in the 
British force. Therefore, on 18 June the British Government formally 
accepted the German right to parity in the submarine category, although 
initially the German Navy was to be limited to 45%. Significantly the only 
real controls were in the hands of the Germans. They could decide when to 
increase their submarine force to the level of parity, While the British 
were restricted to merely, 'a friendly discussion, 
" 
before Germany exer- 
cised her right to increase construction. There were no objections from 
the Germans as the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed the same day 
with the 45% allowance equalling 24,000 tons. The German decision to build 
small submarines was mainly dictated by the limited tonnage available to 
them even if they invoked the 'escape' clause allowing parity. The result 
by September 1939 was a force of 58 U-boats; one more than the Royal Navy 
had but still well below the 200-300 boat force that Doenitz considered 
necessary for an effective submarine campaign against Britain. 
Ar lo-German Naval Agreement - Reasons 
On the importance of the Agreement to Germany, Doenitz held that: 
'Britain's acquiescence in the possession by Germany of 45% and in certain 
given circumstances of 100% of British submarine tonnage instead of the 
g laid down for the other categories did not ... amount to anything very 
much in the way of concession. '47 Among several reasons he proposed for 
Britain's acceptance of the German re-acquisition of the submarine was the 
assessment of the secondary role this weapon was accorded by British naval 
46, Simon to Herr Von Ribbentrop, 18 June 1955, 
D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 431. 
47. Doenitz, op. cit., 11. 
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planners. - 
Britain's dependence on seaborne imports of raw materials and 
the need to defend the large merchant fleet this necessitated was recog- 
nised as well as the vulnerability of the lengthy Imperial sea communications. 
'Such protection, however, can only be provided 
by surface vessels and not by submarines ... Then 
again, as Britain had no potential adversary upon 
whose sea lines of communication she would in war 
be compelled to launch large scale submarine 
attacks, she obviously did not feel the need 
of a strong submarine arm. ' `8 
Nevertheless, these statements were erroneous as an assessment of the 
Admiralty's reasons for allowing German re-acquisition of the submarine 
which were based on the importance attached to voluntary restriction of 
German naval rearmament and an exaggerated belief in the power of Asdic to 
counter the Submarine. In addition, the Germans had agreed to abide by 
Part IV of the London Naval Treaty, governing the actions of submarines 
against merchant ships, 
49 
and: 'The U-boat is vulnerable when surfaced - 
when exposed for example, to gunfire. '50 
Meanwhile, the British Government came under pressure not only 
domestically but also from the French, who were incensed over what they 
considered to be unilateral action on the part of the British. Primarily, 
the French were concerned about the abrogation of the naval clauses of the 
Versailles Treaty as well as the technical aspects of the Agreement, 
including the provisions on submarine construction. 
51 
The British Govern- 
nient's eagerness to reach an agreement with Germany on naval arms limitation 
48. Doenitz, op. cit., 10. 
49. Admiralty, June 1935, ADM 116/3377, 'Anglo-German Naval 
Conversations, 1935: Summary of Discussions Between the 
British and German Naval Representatives. ' 
50. Doenitz, op. cit., 10. 
51. Sir G. Clarke (Paris) to Sir S. Hoare (Foreign Secretary), 
19 June 1935, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 437. 
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was evident in the answers to the French charges. 
'We had always been nervous of letting the 
Germans go back to Berlin, because we had 
good grounds for believing that Herr Hitler 
had overruled the German Naval Staff, ' who 
had objected to the 3 limit, land we feared 
that, if the delegation returned, they would 
come back to London with fresh demands. '52 
The British went to great lengths to minimise the importance of-the parity 
concession. The reasons given included such differing admissions as that 
it was a concession the British did not want to make but which did not 
greatly alter the situation; that if Britain retained her existing subma- 
rine strength, the Germans would be unlikely to want to go up to the 45% 
limit; and finally that if a future naval treaty awarded parity to all the 
major naval Powers then Germany's claim to equal treatment would also have 
entitled her to parity. This ignored German repudiation of the Versailles 
Treaty and the fact that the Anglo-German Naval Agreement amounted to 
official British approval of this act. Whether the French considered these 
explanations to be satisfactory or not, relations between London and Paris 
deteriorated for several months. Certainly, the French had shown little 
inclination to engage in discussions with the Germans or advance alter- 
native methods of dealing with the obvious spectre of German rearmament. 
A combined approach would possibly have led to a different agreement 
including land armaments. However, Hitler's acceptance of an inferior 
position for the German Navy could have been determined by the greater 
priority accorded to the Army and Air'Force. Thus, without affecting 
overall planning he had been able to placate British naval fears and divide 
two allies at the same time. 
52. Sir R. Craigie (Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office) 
to Clarke, 1 July 1935, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 497. 
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The reasons of the British Government for seeking the, Agreement had 
been stated at Geneva in 1932 and remained largely unchanged. On the 
specific issue of submarines, the central factor was the Admiralty's 
belief that counter-measures had been developed to nullify the submarine 
threat to British shipping. This point was, emphasised in discussions with 
the United States Naval Staff. 'The Admiralty is not so seriously appre- 
hensive of submarines as they believe that they can successfully deal with 
them. '53 Further, it was erroneously calculated that resources allowed to 
submarine construction would not enable the German Navy to pass their 
agreed quota until 1942. In 1939 the Germans were still within the limits 
but this was largely due to the priority given to the Army and Air Force. 
Information forwarded by the Germans in 1935 had showed plans for a force 
of 80 submarines to be built by 1939.54 This meant that within four years 
the Royal Navy might expect to have to counter a submarine force twice the 
size that pre-Agreement predictions had indicated. 
However, - both the Government and Admiralty viewed the negotiations 
with Germany as part of the general preparations for the 1935 London Naval 
Conference. The hope was that a new long-term treaty on naval arms limit- 
ation would emerge to replace the Washington and London naval treaties. 
The Government considered it essential to hold a Conference during 1935 
as the existing treaties expired during 1936. The Admiralty also needed 
to know the limits on warship displacement and gun calibres by the end of 
1935. Otherwise it would be, 'impossible to make the necessary technical 
preparations in time or to frame the financial estimates with any degree 
53. L. Pratt, 'Anglo-American Conversations on the Par East, ' 
International Affairs, XLVII, (1971), 760-63. 
54. D. N. I., 16 Nov. 1935, ADM 116/3368, 'Official 
Particulars of German Submarines. ' 
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of accuracy. '55 The signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was 
seen as adding Germany to the understanding with the United States as a 
basis for future naval relationships. However, the French refused to send 
a delegation to London to continue the preparatory discussions on the 1935 
Conference. Italy was expected to follow France's lead and the Japanese 
position appeared unaltered from December 1934. The British were careful 
not to provoke a complete French withdrawal and thought it wiser not to 
include Germany in the Conference, which would be restricted to the 
Washington Powers, although Russia and Germany would be considered for a 
later Conference. 
56 
Messages to this effect were filtered through to the 
French via the Americans. 
On 29 July the French Ambassador forwarded the suggestion that, 'a 
delegate from the Admiralty should go to Paris shortly in order to break 
the ice which has formed since the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and to set 
in motion preliminary discussions on naval limitations. ' 
57 In agreeing, 
the British emphasised that these conversations were not to be replace- 
ments for the existing series of preliminary discussions on the Naval 
Conference. During the Anglo-French talks, held in Paris on 6 and 7 
August, 
58 the French emphasised their continued opposition to abolition 
but agreed with the British proposal for a qualitative limit of 2,000 
tons. 
59 A certain amount of alarm was created by the French demand for an 
55. Foreign Office & Admiralty, 18 July 1935, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., 
XIII, 526, 'Memorandum on the Future Course of Naval 
Negotiations. ' 
56. Hoare to Sir R. Lindsay (Washington), 29 July 1935, 
D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 565-66. 
57. Vansittart to Chatfield, 29 July 1935, D. B. F. P., 
2 ser., XIII, 566-67. 
58. Captain Dankwerts, Aug. 1935, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 
589-94, 'Record of Anglo-French Naval Discussions. ' 
59. Hoare to Clarke, 7 Aug. 1935, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 588. 
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escalator clause to counter any rapid increases in the German submarine 
force. However, British fears of another round of tonnage increases were 
calmed by French assurances that any additional construction would not 
be claimed in the submarine category. Finally, the French agreed to 
accept Part IV of the London Naval Treaty provided that this was treated 
not as a naval matter but rather one for international law and therefore 
would be excluded from any agreement on naval arms limitation. 
On submarine construction the Admiralty remained satisfied to be 
bound by the provisions of the London Naval Treaty. Approximately 10,500 
tons were available for the 1934-56 programmes and only 6,000 tons had 
been allocated to the 1934 and. 1935 programmes which left a larger amount 
of tonnage than had been previously assigned to an annual programme. 
proposals for the 1935 Naval Conference now set the total force at 47 boats 
comprised of six minelayers, three 'G', twenty 'T', twelve 'S', and six 
'U' class. Provision had been made for the majority in existing programmes 
and the most urgent need was to further the construction of the 'U' class 
since the 'H' class boats could not be retained in a safe and seaworthy 
condition for much longer. However, submarines continued to be allocated 
a low priority in construction. 'This programme is based on 
(1) main- 
taining the Fleet at approximately the same strength as hag been aimed at 
in recent years, (II) commencing as rapid replacement of the Battlefleet 
is practicable. '60 Clearly no extra resources were considered necessary 
or would be available for additional submarine construction and the 4,000 
tons available for :. 936 under the London Naval Treaty were considered 
sufficient. However, the Admiralty decided to include one 'T' class61 
60. Chatfield to Board, 16 Nov. 1935, ADM 19057, 
11936 Naval Construction Programme. ' 
61. Board Minute No. 3315,28 Nov. 1935, ADP( 1/9057, 
11936 New Construction Programme. ' 
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since, 'this class will be the standard patrol submarine for some years 
to come, and the technical departments feel confident that the construction 
of the "T" type can safely be continued without waiting for experience of 
the first vessel. 162 
Meanwhile, the Government were sufficiently satisfied with the 
results of the discussions with the major naval Powers to issue invitations 
for the Naval Conference, scheduled to open during early December 1935. 
The Naval Ministerial Committee met on Trafalgar Day and recommended to the 
Cabinet that in the final proposals, quantitative submarine limitation 
should be downgraded and emphasis placed on securing agreement on qualit- 
ative limitations. 
The Admiralty was privately relieved over the rejection of any 
abolition proposals since growing Japanese military power and belligerency, 
allied to the potential threat from a rearmed Germany aroused concern over 
the Navy's deficiencies in quantity and age of material and the need to 
rectify this in the face of continued Government opposition. Moreover, 
despite improvements to Asdic, the possibility of possible German 
re-acquisition of the submarine could not be entirely ignored. Yet at 
this moment the Admiralty had chosen to support the conclusion of naval 
agreement with Germany under which the latter were allowed to build up to 
45% of British submarine tonnage and then to 100% with no real British 
control over the escalation. This may appear to have been a strange 
decision to make at a time when it was being stated that the convoy system, 
even supported by A/S escort forces was no guarantee of safety against the 
submarine. However, the Admiralty considered that there was a greater 
need for an overall naval agreement with Germany. The recommendation was 
62. Monsell, Jan. 1936, ADIM 116/3394p '1936 New 
Construction Progrannme: Section E- Submarines. ' 
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that Germany be brought into an international agreement which would allow 
the Germans the right to build large surface warships and free them from 
the prohibition on submarine construction: it involved the gamble that 
Germany would continue to adhere to and not contravene such an agreement. 
Recognising that the inevitable increase in pressure from the Germans for 
release from the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty might lead 
to unilateral action, especially if the other Powers adopted a negative 
view, the best solution had been considered to be to persuade the Germans 
to an agreement with limitations on tonnage rather than risk no agreement 
at all. The alternative was the possible collapse of the Washington and 
London Naval Treaties, under the pressure of a naval building race. Such 
a development would have spelt the failure of a decade of continuous 
activity on disarmament by successive British governments. 
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CHAPTER 12 
1935 - 1939 
1955 LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 
AND RE-ARMAMENT 
In many ways, the second London Naval Conference, which opened on 
9 December 1955, was a disappointment. Despite months of tortuous negot- 
cations the net result was an increase in the overall tonnage demands of 
all the invited Powers. Proposals for abolition or tonnage restriction 
in the submarine category proved abortive. 
1 
The British allied their 
submarine proposals with destroyer and other 1A/S tonnage demands. In 
contrast to the 1930 London Conference an extra 50,000 tons, taking the 
total to 200,000 tons was being asked for in the destroyer category. The 
1930 figure had been based on the assumption that Japan would allow her 
submarine tonnage to fall to 52,700 tons by 31 December 1936. In fact the 
Japanese had increased their submarine force and in 1935 were claiming a 
further increase over the London Treaty figures. Attempts to persuade 
the French and Italians to adhere to the Treaty had also proved unsucc- 
essful. Therefore, the Admiralty considered itself justified in asking 
for increased destroyer tonnage. 
'At the present time France has 83 submarines 
of total tonnage 78,118 tons. Seventy four of 
these vessels are under-age. During the period 
of the London Naval Treaty there have been no 
indications of a substantial reduction in her 
submarine tonnage, and reports from Japan show 
1. Foreign Office, 19 May 1936, ADM 116/3376, 
A4241/4/45, London Naval Conference, 1936, 
'Memorandum on the Proceedings and Results 
of the Naval Conference: Section 2,1-10. ' 
(Henceforth quoted as 'London History'. ) 
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'that the latter is likely to increase her 
submarine threat considerably as soon as 
she is free to do so. Italy has 67 submarines 
(49,242 tons) built and a further 12 vessels 
(7,830 tons) building. '2 
Moreover, the Admiralty had allowed the Germans 40,000 tons of submarines 
and 150,000 tons of destroyers was now only considered satisfactory if the 
French, Italians and Japanese accepted submarine forces of 40,000 tons. 
This was clearly unlikely and therefore irrespective of any Conference 
decision a large increase was necessary in the Royal Navy's destroyer 
tonnage. 
Despite the standard British plea that, 'submarines should be abol- 
fished, the foreign Powers represented, as was only to be expected, have 
been unable to accept this point of view. '5 The net result was an increase 
in the submarine tonnage demands of all the invited Powers. In spite of 
the early withdrawal of the Japanese delegation, over the British and 
. American 
refusal to grant them parity in all categories, 
4 
a treaty was 
concluded on 25 March 1936. It contributed no new limitations or reduc- 
tions in the submarine category, although all the participating Powers, 
plus Japan, did agree to sign a separate agreement covering submarine 
operations against merchant ships. The Germans also agreed to sign the 
document, known as the London Submarine Agreement which was a continuation 
of the Root Resolutions and Part IV of the London Naval Treaty and if 
adhered to gave the Admiralty a powerful weapon against the submarine. 
2. Admiralty, 4 Dec. 1935, Documents on British Foreign 
Policy, 2 ser., XIII, 719, 'Memorandum on the Retention 
of Cruisers and Destroyers in Excess of the London Naval 
Treaty. ' 
5. 'London History', 4. 
4. British Delegation, 14 Jan. 1936, D. B. F. P., 2 ser., XIII, 
771, 'Record of Meeting Between United. Kingdom and United 
States Delegations. ' 
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'Under this treaty, a submarine, when stopping 
or sinking a merchantman, was required to act 
in the same manner as a surface ship. The 
fact that the merchantman carried guns mounted 
"for the sole purpose of self-defence" did not 
absolve the submarine from this obligation, and 
the vessel in question was regarded as still 
retaining its full character, under international 
law, as a merchant ship and as being therefore 
entitled to the appropriate degrees of immunity. 
In practice, this meant that the submarine, acting 
in accordance with the Prize Ordinance, would have 
to remain surfaced while stopping and searching 
any merchantman. If then it was to be justified, 
according to the conditions laid down in the 
Prize Ordinance, in sinking the vessel, the 
submarine was first required to take measures to 
ensure the safety of the ship's company. As the 
lifeboats carried by merchantmen were not regarded 
as adequate for this purpose on the high seas, the 
submarine was required to take the crew aboard or, 
since this would generally prove to be impracticable, 
to refrain from sinking the ship. i5 
The important factor was whether such an agreement would be adhered to. 
However, Germany's adherence to the London Agreement depended on the worth 
of Hitler's word. This could not be openly doubted, for political reasons, 
and to publicly declare support for the convoy system would indicate that 
the belief was that the Agreement would be deliberately broken. Profes- 
sional opinion firmly believed that: 'Although Germany has adhered to the 
rules of submarine warfare contained in part IV of the London Naval Treaty, 
1930, we cannot rely for our security on her observance of these rules. '6 
However, if the Agreement were adhered to then valuable time would be 
provided to augment existing 4/S forces. For that reason many continued 
to cling to the belief that, because unrestricted submarine warfare in 
1917 had brought the U. S. A. into the War and led to the defeat of the 
Kaiser's Germany, then such a tactic was unlikely to be repeated a second 
5. Doenitz, op. cit., 11-12. 
6. Admiralty to Defence Plans Sub-Committee of C. I. D., 
29 Apr. 1937, CAB 27/648, D. P. (P) 3, 'A New-Standard 
of Naval Strength, t 16. 
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time, and certainly not in the opening stages of a war in which the United 
States remained a neutral. 
In. many ways the London Naval Conference proved to be' not the laät of 
the naval disarmament conferences but the official starting point of world 
naval rearmament. The long period of military neglect and belief in disarm- 
ament precluded any sudden reversal from the policy of retrenchment but the 
Conference provided a focus for a gradual realisation, in the face of the 
policies of Germany, Japan and Italy, of the need to restore British 
military strength. After the failure of the London Conference it became 
clear that there would be a further decline in the proportionate strength 
of the entire Royal Navy unless Britain followed the other naval Powers 
and undertook extensive new construction. Despite the provisions of the 
1936 Treaty, 'political conditions had so greatly changed by the end of 
1936 that the-three parties concerned agreed to waive to some extent the 
provisions of the Treaty for a reduction in the total tonnage of Cruisers, 
Destroyers and Submarines. 
7 
One of the changes in political conditions 
occurred on 7 March 1936 when the Germans, taking advantage of the crisis 
over Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, reoccupied the Rhineland. Although 
Britain and France denounced this action on 12 March there was no likeli- 
hood of military action. The Rhineland Crisis had highlighted the vulner- 
able position of the Royal Navy 
in the event of war with Germany since so 
much of its strength was committed to the Mediterranean. In addition, the 
crises exposed the 
impossibility of fighting a simultaneous naval war in 
Europe and the Far East. The message that naval rearmament needed to be 
speeded up was now unmistakeable. As well as new construction, stocks of 
stores, especially ammunition and fuel oil, needed to be replenished after 
being severely run down over a period of years. Once the 1930 London Naval 
7. Admiralty, 1936, ADM 116/3596, 'Naval Disarmament since 
the War. ' 
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Treaty expired on 51 December 1936, the Admiralty wanted to be ready to 
initiate new construction, principally battleships and cruisers. As a 
result the Navy Estimates, introduced on 4 March 1936, totalled nearly 
X64 million, approximately £10 million above those of the previous year. 
In April the total was raised to X80 million as a result of a Supplem- 
entary Estimate and illustrated, in comparison with previous Estimates, 
8 
just how low British naval strength had been driven by the economic policies 
of successive Governments. 
The A, /S Position 
To help counter the submarine threat, four flotillas of old destroyers 
had been converted but these vessels could not be considered as anything 
but a temporary palliative. The conclusion that the decision was forced 
by the financial stringency of the Government must be tempered by the First 
Lord's statement that minimum destroyer requirements were 22 flotillas for 
all theatres, which differed little from the figure given in 1934. This 
ignored the deterioration in the international situation in the inter- 
vening period and the Naval Staff's new assessment that over 100 A/S 
escort vessels would be needed for European waters alone. The Admiralty's 
attitude on the submarine threat to merchant shipping remained one of 
blithe confidence, 'that the anti-submarine measures which have been 
developed since the war would ... greatly lessen the effectiveness of the 
submarine as a weapon against shipping. '9 However, differences existed 
over how best to use the $/S forces. In addition to the role of convoy 
escorts a revival of support for the 'hunting-group' system, discredited 
in the First World War, was bolstered by the signing of the London Submarine 
Agreement: 
8. See Appendix: C. 
9. Admiralty, 26 Feb. , 1937, ADM 1163596, 'Notes for 
the 1937 Naval Estimates. ' 
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'Should the enemy conduct his operations 
strictly in accordance with International 
`Law the menace to our trade in Home Waters 
cannot be considered severe and our shipping 
will be allowed to move independently ... 
We hope from the outset to be able to under- 
take a heavy offensive against enemy subma- 
rines at sea and this will be conducted by 
groups of anti-submarine striking forces. '10 
Even'if the "enemy submarines were to attack obligingly on the surface, 
the 'hunting-group' system could only work where naval forces were close 
to the position of any merchantman under attack. This was feasible in 
coastal areas but not in mid-ocean. However, the hope was that this very 
remoteness would protect merchant shipping when outside the range of 
existing-A/S'escorts. In the event of an enemy adopting unrestricted 
submarine' warfare from the start of a war, the Admiralty plans called for 
'the immediate adoption of convoy and escort as an antidote. ' 
11 
If unres- 
tricted warfare was adhered to, then A, /S tactics were to be based on the 
'hunting-group' and merchant shipping would sail independently. 
12 
This 
ignored one lesson of 1917 that convoys were not subject to delays unlike 
independent sailings by a route being declared dangerous. The sinking of 
the 'Athenia' (against Hitler's orders) on 5 September 1939 removed any 
indecision and forced the adoption of convoys, albeit with insufficient 
escorts. At the same time another echo of concern was voiced over the 
shortage of"A/S escorts. 'In the opening stages of the war the naval 
forces available are hardly adequate to provide fully effective numbers for 
escorting our convoys. '13 Nevertheless, because of the priority awarded 
10. Admiralty, 1937, ADMM 116/3379, 'Memorandum on 
Trade Protection. ' 
11. Ibid. 
12. D. D. of P., 26 Nov. 1939, ADM 1/10084. 
13. ADM 1163379, 'Trade Protection. ' (See Note 10. ) 
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to screening the fleet, proposals were made for reducing the number of 
4/S escorts to one per convoy. Justification for this dangerous policy 
rested on the dubious-grounds that, (ships in an inadequately escorted 
convoy are safer fron submarine attack than if sailing singly., 
14 
More- 
over, the belief in the superiority of Asdic remained strong, allowing the 
erroneous contention that fewer escorts would be needed than in 1917-18. 
This neatly solved the nagging problem of insufficient numbers but left 
the risk that if the theory proved erroneous in wartime, then little or no 
time would be available to rectify the situation. Evidence of Asdic 
fallibility was to be provided by the last Combined Fleet Exercise in 
peacetime, when attacks by submarines on the fleet resulted in only one of 
them being detected. 
25 
Condemnation was swift and accurate, 'to collect 
a large number of valuable ships into a small space without adequate prot- 
ection was making a gift to a submarine. '16 Moreover, such concentration 
of shipping provoked views on the possibility of heavier losses from air 
attack. The Admiralty's answer was to point to A/A gunfire as an adequate 
deterrent. Events during 1939-40 were to shatter rudely any belief in 
the impotency of anti-shipping air attacks. 
The basis for the dilemma over the use of A, /3 forces stemmed from the 
fact that British $/S training and the assessment of the tactics likely 
to be adopted by an enemy were based on British submarine training and 
tactics. German 'wolf-pack' tactics were to make nonsense of the British 
belief that submarines would be forced by A, /S escorts to attack from long- 
range (over 3,000 yards) thus reducing the danger of fatal hits. Moreover, 
14. ADM 116/3873, Mar. 1939, 'Combined Fleet Exercise "XZQ". ' 
15. ADM 116/5379, 'Trade Protection. ' (See Note 10. ) 
16. D. C. N. S., Vice-Admiral William M. James, 3 Mar. 1938, 
ADM 1/9501, 'Convoy Policy: Comments on Memorandum 
Submitted by D. of P. ' 
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British tactics were based on the perceived operational use to which 
their submarines would be put and with only 40-50 submarines the emphasis 
was on solitary attacks, especially enemy warships and not large, slow 
merchant convoys. Exercises were tried with submarines attacking in 
groups but only in terms of operating as one and not independently once a 
target had been found. The object remained purely that of increasing the 
number of hits and the idea was dropped because salvoes could not be fired 
simultaneously by all submarines of the group. 
17 
However, efforts were 
made to test the system of placing a line of submarines ahead of a convoy, 
which was restricted to 10 knots. Submarines were allowed to manoeuvre 
on the surface but had to attack submerged and the boats were not allowed 
to communicate by wireless. 
18 
Naval exercises seemed to have been designed 
more for the air and sea escort forces and the submarine results, not 
unnaturally, were disappointing. German submarine attacks on the surface 
at night also came as a surprise to the British since, 'night encounters 
have been carried out on a few occasions only, particularly with the 
Fleet and Commanding Officers have as yet little experience of this side 
of submarine operations. ' 
19 
However, the Admiralty remained mainly concerned about the surface- 
raider threat to convoys and the submarine menace was considered less 
serious. 'The Admiralty are satisfied that the greatest potential danger 
comes from the surface raider and it is a danger which can only be met by 
17. Tactical Division, July 1931, M& 186/481, 'Progress in 
Torpedoes, Mining and Anti-Submarine Warfare. ' (P. T. M. A. S. ), 
C. B. 3002/30,22. 
18. Tactical Division, 1938, ADM 186/159, Exercises and 
Operations, C. B. 1769/58, 'Exercise Z. P., 14-15 March 1938.1 
19. Tactical Division, Apr. 1937, ADM 186/540,, P. T. M. A. S., 
1936s 35-57. 
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'having sufficient cruiser strength. '20 Initial policy was to press for 
a return to the minimum figure of 70 cruisers, reduced to 50 at the " 
1930 London Naval Conference, and the increase was to be achieved in the 
short-term by the retention of over-age tonnage. Admiralty plans also 
called for large numbers of merchant ships to be taken over and converted 
to the armed-cruiser role. However, this deprived the country of the 
fastest and most modern merchant vessels and went some way towards hampering 
the supply position in war. 
Increases in Submarine Construction 
The signing of the London Naval Treaty of 1936 opened up a period of 
naval rivalry accentuated by the developing international situation. The 
Defence Requirements Committee (D. R. C. ) had called for a 'New Standard' of 
naval strength, initially to rectify 'deficiencies' in equipment. In the 
submarine category this led to a Supplementary Estimate in July 1936 by 
which the number of boats in the 1936 and future construction programmes 
were increased. 
21 
The First Sea Lord supported the decisions of the Minis- 
terial committee on Defence Policy and Requirements under which it was 
prepared to increase the 1938 and 1939 submarine programmes to seven boats 
per year, in addition to the eighteen boats on order up to the 1937 prog- 
ramme. This was, 'a rate of building larger than would be explicable on 
the score of replacement. ' 
22 Despite this admission of the growing 
seriousness of the situation in Europe and the Far East, the new orders 
20. Admiralty, 26 Feb. 1937, ADM 116/3596, 'Notes for the 
1937 Naval Estimates. ' 
21. Board Minute No. 3380,24 June 1936, ADM 19037, M. F. 13113, 
'1936 Supplementary Naval Estimate. ' 
See also: Appendix: G(13). 
22. Chatfield., 20 Oct. 1936, ADP 16795, '1937-39 Naval 
Construction Programmes. ' 
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only equalled the number of submarines either over-age or due to become 
over-age by 1939. Nevertheless, the new requirement showed how unreal- 
istic the pre-London Conference figure of 40 submarines had been. 
The D. R. C. report had not referred to the question of submarine 
strength since it had been hoped to secure a limitation of such tonnage 
at-the London Naval Conference. The failure of the Conference to produce 
a tonnage limitation agreement led to a reassessment of British require- 
ments under the proposed 'New Standard'. The result was a return to the 
figures of the late 1920's and a target of 82 submarines. It was proposed 
at the same time that the building programme should be seven vessels"per 
annum, and that priority should be given to the construction of general 
-service patrol submarines. '25 Despite the desire to expand the Navy, a 
limit existed on the rate of new construction, because of limited ship- 
building capacity. The restrictions on naval building imposed by succes- 
siveýarms limitation treaties and Government retrenchment policies had 
resulted in extensive deterioration, and even destruction, of construction 
facilities, plus the dispersion of skilled manpower. Therefore, before 
any new orders could be laid down these firms needed financial aid from 
the Government to expand facilities. Nevertheless, the 1936 submarine 
construction programme had been doubled to eight boats, and additions made 
to future programmes. The Submarine Service found that the submarine 
continued to be placed low in the order of building priority. Apart from 
the naval dockyards only three firms, in 1936, were engaged inýsubmarine 
construction. Of these, only Vickers-Armstrong and Cammell-Laird had 
facilities for large scale expansion. Moreover, these firms had orders 
for other categories of warship which further-hampered any proposed increase 
in submarine strength. Despite these handicaps, these two firms plus 
23. Ibid, Section E- Submarines, 10. 
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Scotts of Greenock were to provide the majority of British submarines 
between 1939-45, with the emphasis placed on existing designs, to speed 
production. Meanwhile, pending experience with the first three 'U' class, 
submarine construction was to be concentrated on the 'T' class until 
1938.24 Revised figures set the estimated total of submarines at 62 by 
April 1939 and 70 twelve months later, assuming one year of war and in 
the unlikely event that there would be no war losses. 
The Admiralty remained at pains to point out that although the increase 
in submarine numbers might be considered substantial, 'it is small in 
comparison with the strength of France, Italy and Japan, and trifling 
compared with that reported to belong to Russia. ' 
25 
The climate of opinion 
both in the country and in Parliament still favoured no major increase in 
armaments. Therefore, although faced with evidence of expanding foreign 
naval forces the Admiralty had to adopt a cautious approach in the request 
for further naval construction. Despite the demise of quantitative tonnage 
limitation the view remained that although the submarine could be consid- 
ered a possible danger, 'the Admiralty are confident that the anti-submarine 
measures which have been developed since the War would in any case greatly 
lessen the effectiveness of the submarine as a weapon against shipping. '26 
'Greatly lessen' was no substitute for destroy and the weakness in numbers 
of A/S escorts was now painfully realised, as was the inability to provide 
a rapid increase in new construction. Nevertheless, despite the poss- 
ibility of opposition on financial grounds in Parliament it was declared 
officially that the naval construction programme had been drawn up in 
24. Board Minute No. 3421,16 Nov. 1936, ADM 167/94, 
'1937 New Construction Programme. ' 
25. ADM 116/3596, '1937 Naval Estimates. ' (See Note 20. ) 
26. ADM 116/3596, '1937 Naval Estimates. ' (See Note 20. ) 
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order, 'to achieve as early as practicable a modern Fleet of the strength 
called for by the political formula upon which the Government decided in 
1932, '27 namely the 'New Standard'. The Admiralty considered that approval 
of this would clearly signal the end of retrenchment and a total of 148 
warships was proposed under the 1936 and 1937 programmes. 
28 
The problem 
of interference by Government policies was not yet entirely eradicated and 
in December it was-announced that the projected force total of 80 subma- 
rines was to be cut by seven, 'in order to effect some economy on the 
future cost of the Navy. '29 This decision was taken despite the later 
assurance that the initial figure had been arrived at after: 'Taking 
into account both money and the German Treaty. '3° As a means of further 
economy, submarines were also to be retained for sixteen years before 
being classified as over-age, despite long opposition from the Submarine 
Service on the grounds that such an extension would be dangerous. Even 
a reduced force total of 73 was not certain, since this could only be 
achieved by 1943 if 22 submarines were included in the 1938-1941 prog- 
rammes. This necessitated the proposal to order seven boats in 1938 and 
five in each of the succeeding years. 
British Naval Policy in the Far East, 1937-38 
Meanwhile, the increasing danger of a simultaneous war in Europe and 
the Far East posed grave problems for naval planners. Ever since the First 
27. Admiralty, 12 Feb. 1937, ADM 167/99.. C. P. 61(37), 
'1937 New Construction Programme. ' 
28. Admiralty to D. P. R. Sub-Committee of the C. I. D., 
29 Apr. 1937, ADM 116/3631, 'Memorandum on the 
Proposed New Standard of Naval Strength. ' 
29. Chatfield to Board, 9 Dec. 1937, ADM 16797, 
Board Minute No. 3503. 
O. D. of P. to First Lord, 21 Dec. 1938, ADM 1/9728, 
P. D. 07545/38, 'British Future Submarine Strength 
in the Light of German Submarine Building. ' 
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world War the Royal Navy had retained a slim superiority, despite the 
demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, over both the Japanese Navy and 
the strongest European navy. This calculation presumed a neutral and 
friendly United States. However, successive naval disarmament conferences 
had reduced the margin of superiority and the building programmes of Japan 
and Germany threatened to destroy it. The British response had been two- 
fold, leading to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and a call for a 'New 
Standard' of naval strength, 'maintaining the naval "status-quo". ' 
31 The 
latter, if achieved, was considered to allow a strong fleet to be trans- 
ferred to the Far East in the event of conflict, while retaining sufficient 
naval strength in European waters to deter an aggressor. 
The situation was considered to be sufficiently serious for the 
Admiralty to authorise a series of meetings with representatives of the 
United States Navy on the possibility of naval co-operation in the event 
of a serious deterioration in the Far East. The conversations were des- 
igned to lead only to an understanding and no firm treaty of alliance 
was envisaged. American proposals included the despatch of all their 
available capital ships to Honolulu. Admiralty policy remained based on 
sending a strong enough naval force to engage the Japanese Fleet. The 
main body was to consist of eight or nine battleships and one or two 
battlecruisers and included 25 submarines. However, the exact composition 
was subject to alteration, depending on the situation in European waters, 
and the quoted figures were only to serve as a general guide. Italy, as 
well as Germany, was now included in the Naval Staff's calculations of 
potential enemies in European waters. The Abyssinian crisis and then 
German and Italian support for the Spanish Nationalists had indicated the 
31. Admiralty, 19 July 1937, ADM 116/3631, 'A New 
Standard of Naval Strength, ' Notes for 3rd D. P. 
Meeting, D. P. (P) 3. 
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vulnerability of British naval forces, especially in the Mediterranean, 
in the event of a simultaneous conflict in the Far East. Although subse- 
quent events were to show the fears on the Italian threat to the Mediter- 
ranean to be exaggerated, nevertheless the Admiralty considered that it 
might have to rely-, entirely on the alternative route to-the East via the 
Cape of Good Hope. 
French Co-operation in the Mediterranean 
In the event of a European conflict, the Royal Navy attached prime 
importance to protecting the vulnerable trade-routes which converged in 
Home Waters. Loss of control of these areas, even temporarily, threatened 
grave consequences and possible total defeat. The Mediterranean also 
posed severe problems, especially if Italy were hostile since her geog- 
raphical position threatened the passage of warships and merchant shipping 
through the central Mediterranean. Control of the western basin of the 
Mediterranean was eased, however, by the presence of the bulk of the 
French Navy and its strategically placed bases in southern France and 
North Africa. Therefore, agreement was reached with the French that in 
the event of war with Germany, they should assume responsibility for the 
western-basin. This allowed the British to concentrate, existing naval 
forces in the Mediterranean in the eastern basin without having to 
seriously drain naval forces from Home Waters. Merchant shipping was to 
be routed round the Cape of Good Hope to further reduce the strain on the 
Mediterranean Fleet. 
Keeping open the sea route to the east remained an essential priority 
but clearly British naval strength was insufficient for this task in the 
event of a simultaneous conflict in the Far East and Europe. Sufficient 
forces did not exist to allow the stationing of strong fleets in Home 
'Waters, the Mediterranean and the Far East. An adequate fleet to counter 
Japan could only be provided by the transfer of the majority of the 
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Mediterranean Fleet to the Far East. This move, in turn, depended on the 
French Navy assuming control of the whole of the Mediterranean. 
Use of Submarines in Par East 
The low strength of the British submarine force and the-'need for 
submarines to be stationed in Home Waters and the Mediterranean precluded 
sending the requisite numbers of submarines to the Far East, either for a 
'holding' action until the arrival of the Main Fleet or for the reconnais- 
sance and local defence roles. The latter included defence of Singapore: 
'Operating in the South of the China Seas in 
conjunction with the shore based aircraft from 
Singapore, submarines should contribute materially 
to the security of the fortress. It is unfortunate 
that all the submarines at present stationed in 
China are by their design more suited for long 
oversea patrols than for patrol duties in rest- 
ricted waters. '32 
It had been intended that these submarines would be used in reconnaissance 
patrols or long-range interception of troop convoys. The latter role was 
now considered unlikely to produce substantial results because of the vast 
area to be covered and the limited number of submarines available. Never- 
theless, the employment of at least one submarine in Japanese waters was 
hopefully expected to result in the Japanese mounting a full scale $/S 
operation indefinitely. Even these proposals assumed the survival of 
Singapore and a minimum of aggressive moves by the Japanese Navy pending 
the arrival of the British Fleet. Despite the realisation that in the 
event of simultaneous conflict with Germany and Japan it would be difficult, 
if not impossible to despatch a major fleet to the Far East, these 
proposals were approved. 
53 
52. C. in C. China Station, 10 July 1937, ADM 1163863, 
'Appreciation of the Eastern Forces During the Period 
Before Relief, ' 99-100. 
See also: Remarks by D. of P., Captain T. S. V. Phillips. 
33. Plans Division, Oct. 1938, MAI 116/3673, 'Naval War 
Memorandum' (Eastern), Section X(D), Amendment No. 6. 
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Following the Japanese denunciation of the Washington Treaty, the 
Admiralty had been forced to reconsider, 'the important role which subma- 
rines will be called upon to play in "holding the fort" in the Far East ... 
and the inadequacy of the existing provisions in that respect. '54 Despite 
the clear need for an immediate increase in submarine strength in that 
area, the new contingency plans called for the despatch of only ten 
submarines, to augment the fifteen boats of the China flotilla. The 
limited numbers available to cover both Europe and the Par East meant that 
Admiralty freedom of action was severely restricted. Even this limited 
35 
proposal left only 27 submarines in Home Waters. The immediate role 
remained: 'The security of the Singapore Base and its facilities. ' 
56 
No 
alteration was envisaged in other operational roles although greater 
emphasis was given to the possibility for attacks on Japanese invasion 
convoys en-route to Singapore and not just in the vicinity of the base. 
Further possibility of offensive operations, however, was largely precluded 
both by the shortage of numbers and the fact that, despite the tactical 
views of C. in C. China Station, only the three 'G' class submarines of 
the existing British boats possessed the range to conduct effective 
Singapore-Japan patrols. Plans to operate the 'G' class with the Fleet 
had to be abandoned since even these boats could not maintain station. 
The hope was that if the eventual British Fleet in the Far East 
proved either equal or inferior to the Japanese Fleet in capital ships 
34. D. of P., 12 Feb. 1934, ADM 116/5862, M. U. 0570/55, 
'Disposition of Naval Forces: Phase 1- War in the Far East. ' 
55. Plans Division, Oct. 1938, ADM 116/3673, 'Naval Plan - 
Dispositions: Phases I and II - Forces to be Despatched 
to Far East and Retained in European Waters, 50.9.38. - 
30.1.39. ' 
36. D. of P., 1934, ADM 116/3862, 'Eastern War: Appreciation 
of the Situation of the Eastern Forces During the Period 
before Relief. ' 
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then these submarines, 'might be able to influence the enemy'stactics ... 
by the threat of their presence. '57 A weakness lay in this constant 
reliance on fighting a war by threat rather than physical contact but 
it was a solution largely imposed by shortage of numbers. Thus for plan- 
ning purposes it was assumed that if Japan moved first against Hong Kong 
then British surface forces would be unable to counter with operations 
against Japanese sea communications. Nor were British submarines to be 
allowed to resort to unrestricted warfare. Instead the intention was to 
resort to economic pressure against Japan. Such assumptions precluded 
any possibility of a vigorous Japanese offensive, even if Britain became 
involved in a simultaneous conflict in Europe. Calculations indicated 
that to operate a continuous submarine reconniassance"patrol off Japan 
from Singapore required a minimum of six boats as against only three if 
the patrol was based on Hong Kong. However, Hong Kong by its geographical 
position was likely to be one of Japan's initial targets. 'Therefore, 
submarines could not be certain of operating from there for more than a 
limited period. Moreover, the vulnerability of-this base, precluded the 
use of the 'S' class in the Far East because of their limited endurance. 
Nevertheless, existing plans called for six of these submarines to move 
with the Fleet to reinforce British forces in that area, despite their 
being considered more suitable for the confined waters of the Mediterranean 
and the Baltic. As such it was a reflection of the exigencies which had 
to be resorted to because of the limited numbers available. Official 
justification was that the 'S' class, 'would be suitable for employment 
on offensive patrols off Formosa and the Pescadores or against Japanese 
advanced bases on the China coast. ' 
58 
Once again, these roleswere dependent 
37. Plans Division, March 1938, ADM 116/5673p 
'Submarine Operations. ' 
58. Ibid. 
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on the ability to operate from Hong Kong but only if, 'the facilities at 
that port, ' are, 'sufficiently intact to enable them to do so. ' 
59 
Existing plans also called for the use of at least three 'Porpoise' 
class minelayers in the Far East despite the stated belief that: 
'Conditions in the Western Pacific are not 
generally favourable for effective mining 
action against the Japanese. With the excep- 
tion of the Resoardes area suitable objectives 
for offensive minelaying are so far from British 
bases as to preclude the continuous inter- 
ference of enemy minesweeping forces in these 
areas. Moreover, tides are generally strong 
and the waters deep off the Japanese coast. '40 
Nevertheless, the hope was that along with reconnaissance patrols, even 
minimal minelaying would require the Japanese to commit considerable naval 
resources. Again, this was simply a question of using every possible 
weapon. However, it is difficult to accept that the Japanese would have 
found one minelaying/reconnaissance patrol per month a serious inconvenience. 
The method of employment of British submarines in wartime was now dependent 
on whether the naval initiative was retained or conceded to the enemy. 
In the Far East, 'submarines would have to be employed in furtherance of 
the counter measures to possible or probably enemy movements and/or for 
reconnaissance., ' 
41 
and this was a defensive posture leaving the initiative 
with the Japanese. 
In terms of the effect of air power on naval operations, the Admiralty 
could not have been unaware of the growth of Japanese naval air power. 
39. ADM 116/3673, 'Submarine Operations. ' (See Note 37. ) 
40. ADM 116/3673, 'Submarine Operations. ' (See Note 37. ) 
41. Rear-Admiral (S), R. H. T. Raikes to C. in C. Home Fleet, 
Admiral Sir Roger R. C. Backhouse, 23 Feb. 1938, 
ADM 1/9540,0.5, 'War Memorandum: Enclosure No. 1- 
General Remarks Affecting the Employment of Submarines 
in War. ' 
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Along with the United States, Japan had pursued a vigorous policy of 
developing an independent naval air policy whose equipment and tactics 
were specifically designed for the maritime environment. The'Royal Navy 
had possessed no such opportunity following the incorporation in 1918 
of the Fleet Air Arm into the Royal Air Force. The latter had therefore 
been responsible for the control, administration and operation of British 
naval air policy since 1924, a position which proved unsatisfactory for 
the Admiralty. However, within the Navy the prevailing view into the 
1930's was one of using aircraft solely as an aid to naval actions decided 
by gun power. Gradual awareness of the developments of the Japanese and 
American navies led to a more positive belief in the capabilities of naval 
air power. Thus following a lengthy campaign the Admiralty regained 
control of the Fleet Air Aram in 1937 and under the 1936-1939 programmes 
six fleet carriers were ordered. More importantly the-roles allocated to 
naval aircraft had altered towards acceptance of aimore. decisive part in 
naval tactics. 
The use of aircraft against submarines had its origins during 1914- 
1918 but the difference in 1939 lay in the far greater range, speed and 
armament possessed by maritime aircraft. Unfortunately due to the hiatus 
in naval aircraft development which had persisted for so long in Britain 
effective mat6riel was not available in-1939. Nevertheless, this did not 
affect the theoretical development of tactics. The problem with using 
aircraft in the Als role remained essentially that of detection. Clearly 
it was a physical impossibility to equip aircraft with Asdio and there- 
fore the aeroplane was most dangerous when the submarine was surfaced. 
Initial roles logically centred on protection of the fleet, reducing the 
submarine's effectiveness by keeping it submerged. Although a submarine's 
range and speed could be reduced in this manner, submergence still 
conferred the cloak of invisibility and limited the aircraft's effectiveness. 
- 594 - 
In areas such as the Mediterranean the clarity of the water restored some 
of the aircraft's effectiveness since submarines could be seen, in the 
right conditions, down to 90 feet. This was not the case in the Atlantic 
and Pacific, except in coastal areas. Thus in considering reconnaissance 
or minelaying patrols in the Far East or the Baltic, the Admiralty needed 
only to restrict itself to expressing caution, as to the effects of air- 
craft in the AIS role, in coastal or shallow water areas. In these areas 
intense A/S activity of all kinds would be expected as a matter of course. 
British Submarine Dispositions in European Waters 
Submarine dispositions for a war with Germany proved less easy to 
define but the conclusion was that if the same strategy was employed as 
. during the First World War then the dispositions should be similar with, 
, concentration for short periods in particular areas, ' being, 'preferable 
to dispersion over wide areas continuously. ' 
42 
Proposed submarine bases 
were Rosyth (twenty boats), Blyth and Middlesborough (ten each). 
43 
However, Rosyth was needed for surface units 
44 
and the Submarine Service 
had to finally settle for the alternative proposal of Blyth as the main 
base and Hartlepool replacing Rosyth. 
45 
On the question of the operational role of the British submarines in 
European waters, the Admiralty laid emphasis on the need for reconnaissance 
patrols to obtain early intelligence of enemy movements. This role 
involved surveillance of attempts by German surface units to break out 
against the Atlantic convoys and possibly the English East coast ports, 
42. Ibid. 
43. See Appendix: I(1). 
44. C. in C. Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Charles M. Forbes to 
Admiralty, 27 May 1938, ADM 1/9540,962/H. F. 00/200. 
45. Raikes to Backhouse, 23 Feb. 1938, ADM 1/9540,0.5, 
Enclosure No. 2,3. 
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reflecting the Admiralty's continued concern with the surface-raider. 
Maintaining a watch on the exits from the North Sea was also the main role 
assigned to the aircraft of Coastal Command. Depending on whether the 
enemy engaged in unrestricted warfare, anti-submarine co-operation was 
assigned the next priority on Coastal Commands. Overall, the use of 
British submarines was based on the tactics employed by the German Fleet 
during the First World War, except that the German battle fleet was expec- 
ted to be small by comparison. In the absence of new tactics by the 
Germans and any advances in submarine technology this was a logical policy 
to follow. It was also clear that the reconnaissance role in areas such 
as the Heligoland Bight would again fall heavily on the submarine forces 
and that once more the reporting of sightings of outward bound ships would 
take precedence over attacks on these vessels. The same problems would 
exist as in 1914-18, with up to seventeen hours of darkness in winter and 
with submarines at least fifteen to twenty miles apart even under ideal 
conditions. This meant that the possibility of enemy forces escaping 
detection would be high. 'In view of these factors it is questionable 
whether reconnaissance off the enemy coast in the winter would be worth 
the effort. '46 Nevertheless, it was accepted that the first phase of 
employment of submarines against Germany would have to involve reconnais- 
sance patrols in the Heligoland Bight. The placing of submarines close 
inshore was ruled out because of the expected heavy "enemy 4/S measures 
and minefields. The remaining submarines, minus the minelayers, were to 
be stationed in the Skaggerak. One major alteration from the previous 
conflict was to be the use of aircraft in the maritime reconnaissance role 
in place of certain submarine patrol lines. However, certain factors 
46. lbid, Enclosure No. 2,4. 
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reduced their effectiveness including bad weather, especially prolonged 
in winter, and the inadequate range of existing aircraft. The Anson, with 
a range of only 500 miles could not even reach the Norwegian coast. There- 
fore these areas had to be covered by submarine patrol until the arrival 
of more effective aircraft purchased from America. The disposition of 
all British submarine patrol lines, bedevilled by shortage of numbers, 
were to be dictated by two assumptions. These were that the Dover Straits 
would be mined, restricting German surface and submarine raiders to the 
passage between the Shetlands and Norway, and that the Germans would use 
their surface ship and submarines to attack British trade outside aircraft 
range, leaving the air force to deal with British bases and coastal trade. 
47 
Despite this assumption, Rear-Admiral (S) remained in favour of retaining 
some submarines in the coast defence role; this ignored their failure in 
this role in the First World War. If there had been a surfeit of submarines 
it is possible that such a proposal could have been viewed as a safety 
factor in terms of covering all potential threats. 
In reality, only 27 submarines were expected to be available by early 
1939 with another six months before any reinforcements became available. 
Therefore only eight to ten boats could be maintained on patrol in the 
Heligoland Bight. 
48 
To consider using submarines in a coast-defence role 
could only have a-detrimental effect on other patrol-areas, especially with 
only sixteen submarines ready for war in Home Waters in March 1938,49 plus 
three refitting and eight in Reserve. Omitting the minelaying submarines 
47. ADM 1/9540, Forbes to Admiralty. (See Note 44. ) 
48. Raikes to Backhouse, 23 Feb. 1938, ADM 1/9540, 'Enclosure 
No. 3, Factors Affecting the Organisation of Submarine 
Patrols, ' 1. 
49. Admiralty, 31 May 1938, ADM 1/9379, 'State of the 
Fleets: Part 1. ' 
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reduced the total available for patrol duties to fourteen. In August, 
because of the worsening situation with Germany, Rear-Admiral (S) decided 
to allocate all available suitable submarines to patrol duties and carry 
out training with boats from the Reserve. Even by making reductions in 
the number of submarines available for the Heligoland patrol there were 
still insufficient boats for other North Sea patrols. Further complic- 
ations were added by a lack of clarity in portions of the Admiralty's 
operational orders. Thus, submarines on the Norwegian patrol were to be 
allowed to attack any warships sighted but only if, 'no undue delay in 
reporting the enemy will be caused. '50 It was only after a definite 
request by Rear-Admiral (S) that the time period was clarified as being 
one hour. 
It was expected that submarine numbers would improve slightly by 
June 1939, assuming no war before then, to a total of 25 boats plus eight 
'H' class with the training flotillas. Moreover, the expeotition was that 
by the spring of 1939 there would no longer be a need to maintain the 
Norwegian patrol, thus freeing boats for other patrol duties. Nevertheless, 
the situation on numbers clearly remained far from satisfactory. Definite 
dispositions, based on the numbers available, were approved by the Admiralty 
on 28 September. Aberdeen now replaced Middlesborough in the list of 
bases. 
51 This ensured that some boats were as far north as possible so as 
to reduce time spent travelling to and from patrol areas. The new 'T' 
class were to be based at Blyth as they became available and the 2nd and 
3rd Submarine Flotillas were under the direct command of Rear-Admiral (S) 
who was to move from Portsmouth to Rosyth in wartime. 
50. Raffkes to Forbes, 18 Aug. 1938, AM 1/9540p 0.5, 
'War Memorandum. ' 
51. Raikes to Aaniralty, 11 Sept. 1938, AUrd 1/9537, F. A. 1. , 
'Submarine War Orders - Germany. ' 
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Weakness of 0 Forces - Crews 
The Munich crisis, in the autumn of 1938, served to highlight several 
aspects of the inadequate level of British naval strength, including, in 
addition to the shortage of hulls both in the submarine and A/S categories, 
a shortage of specialist manpower in the Submarine Detector Branch. In 
this instance a major reason was the failure to provide enough submarines 
in the A/S training role. The Admiralty remained confident about the 
efficiency of Asdic. However such confidence depended on the existence of 
several factors, including the need for the submarine target to remain 
submerged and provided sufficient qualified Asdic operators were available 
for all the vessels that needed them. This was, in itself, a reflection 
of the attitudes and atmosphere of the period in which naval defence 
establishments had been allowed to decline to the level where more and more 
categories of men and ships tended to be regarded as specialised and there- 
fore superfluous in the interests of economy. Thus, in the early 1920's 
the need for submarines for training A/S flotillas had been advanced as 
a major reason for British retention of the submarine. In the autumn of 
1938 it was belatedly recognised officially that not only could the extra 
Asdic operators not be provided from Reservists (due to it being a special- 
ised function) but that there was little likelihood of providing the 
necessary training submarines in the immediate future. 'The shortage of 
submarines for AIS "instruction" at Portland and for subsequent AIS 
"training" all over the world has been frequently stressed. ' 
52 
Now the 
inability to provide sufficient training submarines was defined as shortage 
of crews and it was proposed that at least two submarines from Reserve 
52. D. of T. D., 24 Nov. 1938, Al 1/10092, T. D. 586/38, 
' A, /S Training. ' 
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should. be used for A/S instruction. 
53 Other than this there was little 
hope of an early improvement in numbers. 'Unfortunately the continued 
failure of the "T" class submarines to come up to their completion dates 
has upset the forecast for the various submarine flotillas for March 
1939. '54 In addition, the proposal for the 'T' class to relieve submarines 
from the 5th Submarine Flotilla at Portsmouth and increase the number of 
boats at Portland was therefore unlikely to be fulfilled until after March. 
The proposition to bring forward the necessary two submarines from Reserve, 
for use in 1, /S training, was also considered impractical since the officers 
and crew would have had to be taken from submarines in full commission at 
Portsmouth or with the Home Fleet. This would merely have compounded the 
problems for the Fleet which was already short itself of submarines for 
A/S training. Ten 'T' class were expected to be completed during 1939, 
allowing the older submarines to be placed in Reserve. However, this was 
not expected to lead to an immediate increase in numbers available for 
A/S training, since submariners had to be retained to train for the new 
boats. Nevertheless, it was still hoped to provide the two submarines for 
AIS training before March 1940. 
Naval Rearmament - General 
Meanwhile, the Admiralty was once again engaged in a prolonged 
struggle with the Treasury for resources. Initial plans for rearmament 
in the early 1930's had been to replace the Fleet on a One-Power Standard, 
although the Admiralty proposed a 'New Standard' of naval strength taking 
into account problems posed by developments in the Far East as well as 
Europe. Based on the recommendations of the D. R. C. the submarine require- 
ment was set at 55. In November 1935 the 3rd report of the D. R. C. had 
55. D. of P. to D. O. D., 16 Dec.. 1938, ADM 1/10092. 
54. D. O. D. to D. of P., 21 Dec. 1938, ADid 1/10092. 
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proposed a 'New Standard' equivalent to a Two-Power Standard and taking 
into account the possibility of a simultaneous war with Germany and Japan. 
On 20 January 1936 the D. P. R. Sub-Committee had directed the Admiralty to 
prepare a naval programme to give effect to the 'New Standard' as soon as 
possible and the 1936 and 1937 programmes approximated to the level necessary 
to achieve this target. The Admiralty's proposals were considered on 
11 May 1937 and the D. P. R. decided, despite the gravity of the international 
situation, to postpone any definite recommendations to the Cabinet. 
Admiralty pressure had brought little change in the situation with the 
Treasury by early 1938. 
On submarines, the Treasury calculated that this section of the D. R. C. 
programme, originally planned to be spread over seven years, would be 
exceeded in three. Moreover, Admiralty proposals to build up the Fleet 
to the D. R. C. standard at an accelerated rate were regarded as being equiv- 
alent to the almost complete cessation of naval building during the last 
four years of the seven year programme. The size of the 1938 programme was 
also objected to on the grounds, 'that to lay down a very large programme 
in 1938 following two very large programmes in 1936 and 1937 would lead 
to the bunching of a vast programme of expenditure into a relatively short 
space of time. '55 Therefore, the Treasury suggested that the Admiralty 
should consider a smaller programme which would not incur expenditure for 
a Fleet beyond the D. R. C. standard. The Admiralty's original programme 
for 1938 was £70 million and a reduction was expected of £34 million. 
Meanwhile, the Government continued to favour enonomy in the Estimates and 
the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence had indicated that it might be 
necessary to ration the three Services. Therefore, the Board agreed to 
55. Board Minute No. 3518,5 Feb. 1938, ADM 167/102, 
'Neer Construction Prograr, me 1938.1 
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the First Lord's proposals that because of existing reductions, in the 
1938 Estimates these should be reduced but only to X45 million. Under 
these measures the 1938 submarine programme was to consist of only three 
'T' class. 
56 
The First Lord emphasised, however, that he and the Board viewed such 
a move with misgiving. If the D. R. C. 's recommendations remained accurate 
and there were no reductions in the German and Japanese Fleets then it was 
dangerous even to consider a reduction in the Admiralty's estimate of the 
forces necessary to counter any potential threat to the nation and the 
Empire. Further, 'it must be borne in mind that since the D. R. C. gave the 
directions on which the Admiralty have acted the international situation 
has not improved but deteriorated. Germany has grown more powerful and 
Japan less friendly. '57 This point had been emphasised to the D. R. t. 
Sub-Committee on 29 April 1937. Failure to implement the 'New Standard' 
was stated to have serious consequences for Imperial defence. 
'When the capital ships now building in 
Europe are completed, it would not be poss- 
ible on our existing standard of naval strength 
to safeguard the Empire in the Far East if 
already engaged in war in Europe; even with 
Germany limited to 35ö of our own strength, we 
could never take the risk of despatching to 
the Far East a sufficient fleet to act as a 
deterrent to Japanese aggression. '58 
Nevertheless, even if the gravity of the situation had been accepted, 
increasing the Fleet up to the 'New Standard' could not be completed before 
1942 and even this time scale was not possible under the existing financial 
56. Board Minute No. 3530,25 Feb. 1938, ADM 167/102. 
(Three 'T' and four 'U' class had been approved 
under Minute No. 3503 on 9 Dec. 1937. ) 
57. First Lord of the Admiralty, Alfred. Duff Cooper to 
Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
27 May 1938, ADM 167/102. 
58. Admiralty to D. P. R. Sub-Committee of C. I. D., 
29 Apr. 1937, CAB 16/82, D. P. (P) 3, 'Memorandum 
on New Standard of Naval Strength. ' 
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limits of £1,600 million to the three Services over five years. More- 
over, given the weakened shipbuilding capacity, during the period up to 
March 1942 a construction programme equivalent to the 'New Standard' was 
the maximum effort which could be accommodated. It had to be accepted 
that, 'even the so-called New Standard programme will not provide by 
31 March 1942 a Fleet adequate to meet the strategic requirements of the 
situation. The smaller Fleet produced by the so-called D. R. C. programme 
would be quite hopelessly inadequate. ' 
59 
In practical terms the earliest time by which an adequate construction 
programme could be completed was 1946. The dangers in allowing the 
disparity to increase were emphasised during July since, 'the delay in 
our attainment of the New Standard of naval strength may well place us at 
an ultimate disadvantage as compared with potential enemies since our prop- 
osals for the New Standard and the rate of achieving it were based upon 
known or expected developments. ' 
60 
The uncertainty that pervaded naval 
planning stemmed from the failure to take a political decision on the long- 
term naval standard required. The Treasury considered the D. R. C. Fleet 
remained the official policy on this issue while the increases in the 
1936-38 Navy Estimates had only been intended to increase the rate at 
which this Fleet level was achieved. However, the Admiralty maintained 
that it was a misapprehension to believe, 
, that the D. R. C. fleet is something which 
has the approval of the Cabinet whereas the 
New Standard fleet is an unauthorised project. 
As a matter of fact the D. R. C. fleet has had 
no substantial foundation since the death of 
quantitative limitation and neither can be 
59. . ADM 167102, Board Minute No. 3550. 
(See Note 56. ) 
60. Duff Cooper to Sir Thomas Inskip, 21 July 1938, 
ADM 1/9672, 'Naval Expenditure, 1937-41.1 
- 403 - 
'said to have the approval of the Cabinet. 
We have, however, since 1936 been working 
on a hand to mouth policy without a decision 
as to the ultimate strength of the Fleet. '61 
The result of this uncertainty wäs to increase the difficulty of preparing 
war plans, strategic dispositions and even such general items as organis- 
ation and training. This was seen as reducing the Navy's ability to 
fulfil its role in the nation's foreign policy. However, the Cabinet 
accepted that demands by the other Services would make it impossible to 
attain the 'New Standard' and the actual level of strength would have to 
fit the financial resources available. 
62 
This decision carried a consid- 
erable risk with it, that emphasised how much time, as well as money, had 
become an important political factor. 
German Claim to Build up to 100% of British Submarine Strength 
On 10 December 1938, the German Government announced its intention to 
exercise its rights under Article 2 (f) of the 1935 Anglo-German Naval 
Agreement and increase German submarine tonnage to parity with the British 
force. In reply the British Government proposed a series of discussions 
as provided for under the 1935 Agreement. The German decision was expected 
to have an adverse effect on British public opinion which was considered 
as possibly useful in any attempt to dissuade the Germans from their deci- 
sion. The Government were apprehensive over the German reason, given as 
Soviet naval expansion, since theoretically if their object was merely to 
increase the security of communications then only coastal submarines were 
necessary. However, indications were that a large number of ocean-going 
boats were to be included. If construction was restricted to the smaller 
submarine then the British Government had little objection. Nevertheless, 
61. Ibid. 
62. Cabinet, 20 July 1938, CAB 55/38, 'Memorandum on 
New Standard of Naval Strength. ' 
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it was not expected that, 'the German representatives will be in a position 
to return a favourable reply to the above suggestions as regards the 
submarines. 163 Therefore, the British naval representatives were not 
empowered to make any decisions without reference to London. The discus- 
sions were not expected to go well since it was assumed that the Germans 
would use the discussions to place responsibility for increases in naval 
armaments on British naval mobilisation during the Munich crisis and a 
supposedly anti-German basis to British rearmament policy. 
Therefore, expecting a difficult set of discussions the naval deleg- 
ation arrived in Berlin on 30 December 1938 to present the British proposals. 
The Germans had already allowed for the effect on British public opinion 
of the increase in submarine tonnage when signing the 1935 Agreement since 
this publicly gave them the right to achieve parity with the British subma- 
rine force. 
64 
The British representatives argued in vain that the only 
circumstances under which it had been agreed that an increase over 45% could 
be contemplated involved international agreement on submarine parity and 
a decrease in British tonnage below 52,700 tons. No parity agreement 
existed and the total British tonnage was now 70,000 tons, so there was 
no reason for any increase by the Germans. Information reaching the 
Admiralty had made it clear that Germany's total projected submarine ton- 
nage by December 1938 was to be 32,000 tons. Prior to the discussions with 
the German Naval Staff it had been stated that: 
'The latest submarine figure we announced to 
Germany was one of 70,000 tons which gives 
Germany the right to 31,580 tons if she uses 
her 45% quota. This figure ought to suffice 
63. Foreign office to British Delegation (Berlin), 
28 Dec. 1938, ADM 116/3765. 
64. British Delegation, 30 Dec. 1938, ADM 116/5765, 
'Records of a Meeting Held at the German Marineleitung. ' 
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'to meet her "absolute" requirements for 
the defence of her coasts which have not 
increased since 1935.165 
However, the Germans were committed to claiming the increase up to 100% 
despite evidence that resources allocated to naval building would not 
allow more than 40,000 tons to be laid down prior to 1940. Attempts to 
persuade the Germans to accept a maximum limit of 60% were also unsucces- 
sful and the talks ended in total failure. Moreover, any possibility of 
renewing these discussions was quashed when on 28 April Germany abrogated 
the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, claiming anti-German policies by the 
British Government, following the British guarantee to Poland. 
66 
By 
September 1939 the Germans had completed only 30,000 tons, amounting to 
55 submarines, of which only 26 were ocean-going models. In order to 
have exceeded this total legally the Germans had to both invoke Article 
2 (f) and later abrogate the Agreement. Although political requirements 
prevented this move at an earlier date an additional major factor in 
ensuring the survival of the Agreement for four years was a preference 
among senior German naval officers for a surface fleet rather than a 
large submarine force. Certainly, as Germany had demonstrated, the 
submarine could be easily mass-produced and pre-fabricated using both 
waterside and inland shipyards. 
The German actions generated intense discussion on ways of increasing 
future British submarine strength. A variety of proposals were produced, 
all centring on the retention of over-age tonnage, since the issuing of 
65. D. of P., 23 Dec. 1938, ADM 116/3369, 'Discussions 
with the German Naval Staff. ' 
66. Viscount Halifax to Sir M. Henderson (Berlin), 
28 Apr. and 23 June 1939, ADM 116/3369, A. 3092/1/45 
and A. 4372/1/45, 'Documents Relating to the Abrogation 
of the Anglo-German Naval Agreements. ' 
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new construction orders could not be immediately acted upon by firths 
already overloaded with orders for all categories of warships, most of 
which had a higher priority than the submarine. A force of 60 boats was 
already scheduled to be completed by 1943 and alterations in the 1939 
programme'increased this total to 67, allowing for six over-age submarines 
being retained. The 'ideal' force total was now calculated to be as high 
as 127 boats, which was approximately twice the total actually possessed 
by the Royal Navy in September 1939. 
Despite this, while British naval strength was curtailed by financial 
considerations, limiting the submarine force was considered profitable, 
assuming the Anglo-German Naval Agreement remained in force. If the 'New 
Standard' programme had been accepted the resulting submarine total would 
have been 82, 'taking into account both money and the German Treaty. '67 
However, as a result of Treasury pressure during early 1938 the Admiralty 
had accepted a reduction to 73 boats. The conclusion remained that: 
'Taking all considerations - strategical, 
financial and political into account, it 
seems best to adhere to our present fore- 
cast of tonnage of 70,000; submarine 
construction after the 1939 programme to 
be in replacement of over-age tonnage and 
not additional. i68 
This was a conclusion which found favour with several members of the Board 
of Admiralty including the First Lord, First Sea Lord, and the Deputy Chief 
of the Naval Staff. Confirmation was given to a maximum force total of 
71 submarines by 1943 but studies completed in February 1959 concluded 
that at least twenty extra submarines would be required in the first year 
of war. 
69 
Further deterioration of the political situation in Europe, 
67. D. of P. to Duff Cooper, 21 Dec. 1938, MA 1/9728, 
P. D. 02345/38. 
68. Ibid. 
69. Admiralty, 17 Feb. 1939, ADM 3.16/3747t M. 0753.1/38t 
'Enclosure B. ' 
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however, quickly left the Admiralty with no choice but to revise the 
proposed submarine force total and to introduce an Emergency war Programme, 
doubling the 1939 programme from eighteen to 37 boats. 
70 
Nevertheless, 
these figures could do little to alleviate the immediate shortage prior 
to the outbreak of war and this was reflected in the British submarine 
dispositions, altered frequently over the next few months, 
71 including 
such anomalies as 'Porpoise' class minelayers being transferred to the 
Mediterranean to act in the patrol role. The war was to prove the unsuit- 
ability of these and other large submarines for patrol work in this area, 
where the shallow and clear waters allied to intensive air and sea A, /S 
patrols worked against them. 
Unrestricted Submarine Warfare - British Attitudes 
to Attacks on Convoy 
A major problem, apart from numbers, concerned the application and 
adherence to the London Submarine Agreement and the resulting effects of 
this and other Treaties. The standard operational roles of British subma- 
rines in wartime, whether these were attacks on enemy warships or reconnais- 
sance patrols, were clearly understood. However, international agreements 
affecting unrestricted submarine warfare left some doubt, within the 
Submarine Service, over the position of British submarines in attacking 
enemy convoys, particularly those containing neutral shipping. Initial 
discussions had already taken place within the Admiralty when the issue 
was highlighted by proposals forwarded by Rear-Admiral (S). These 
70. Emergency War Programme Committee, 
,l 
Apr. 1939, 
ADM 116/3747, G. 02708/39. 
See also: Controller, 7 Feb. 1939, ADM 116/3747,11.0960/39, 
'Naval Hypothesis for Supply Board Work. ' 
71. Rear-Admiral (S), B. C. Watson to Admiralty, 2 Feb. 1939, 
ADM 1/9867,75/05, 'Enclosure: War Organisation of Submarines 
in Home Waters. ' 
See also: Watson to Forbes, 3 Mar. 1939, AIi 1/9867,0.5. 
See also: Appendix: 1(2). 
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emphasised the vulnerable position of British bases and possessions in the 
Mediterranean and the Far East. The C. I. D. had already concluded that aid 
for these areas from surface forces could no longer be regarded as certain 
in the event of war simultaneously with Germany and Japan. A more vigorous 
use of submarines in an attempt to rectify this situation was suggested, 
including surprise attacks on enemy convoys. One possible result was the 
alienation of neutral opinion which necessitated that such a policy should 
be clearly defined and announced as defensive. 
Attacks on enemy trade were not included in these proposals since 
such a move, 'would be a retaliatory measure to be taken shortly after the 
outbreak of war in answer to the enemy's use of unrestricted warfare which 
was universally expected. ' 
72 
Moreover, attacks on trade were considered 
to have little direct connection with protection of bases and possessions. 
'Hostile' shipping in the vicinity of such areas was seen as a different 
case. Unlike the unrestricted U-boat campaigns during 1917-18 similar 
British submarine operations, if necessary, would be carried out, 'in a 
limited area for strictly defensive purposes against "hostile shipping" 
i. e. shipping which is being used to invade territory or to maintain 
invading armies. ' 
75 
The 'limited areas' were to be created by declaring 
zones in the vicinity of bases such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malta as 
'dangerous areas'. The area around Malta was to be extended to cover the 
sea communications between Italy and. Libya in the event of war with the 
former. Submarines were to be instructed that convoys found in these areas 
and believed steering towards the British bases were, 'to be presumed 
72. Watson to Admiralty, 5 Aug. 1939, ADM 1'10360,645/942 
'Remarks on the Use of Submarines in Defence of 
Territory. ' 
73. Ibid. 
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'hostile and ... to be attacked without warning. '74 On the question of 
such action being used as an excuse by the enemy to begin unrestricted 
warfare the view was that: 
'If there were the least hope that our 
enemies would refrain from attacking our 
trade with submarines, then perhaps it 
would be wise to await events even at the 
risk of losing our territory. But ... 
there is no hope of this and any delay on 
our part might have fatal losses without 
any corresponding gain ... our proposed 
action is strictly defensive and compared 
to unrestricted warfare is nearly if not 
entirely legal. It is therefore most unlikely 
that it could ever lead to the general recog- 
nition of unrestricted warfare. ' Therefore, 
'enemy convoys containing enemy or neutral 
ships known to be carrying troops or weapons 
such as tanks or aeroplanes; or containing 
vessels known to belong to the fighting 
services and carrying supplies may be sunk 
without warning. Ordinary merchant vessels 
in the convoy would have to take their chance 
of being hit. t75 
One objection was that submarines could not know the contents of a convoy 
and therefore could not be certain their attack was justified, even under 
the above conditions. This was an erroneous view since submarines could 
be given the same information on shipping movements as surface warships. 
Existing Admiralty policy laid down that, 
'in enemy convoy only the escorting ships, 
troopships, auxiliary vessels belonging to 
the enemy fighting forces, or merchant ships 
known to be acting as auxiliaries in direct 
attendance on the enemy fleet, could be attacked 
without warning, although any ordinary merchant 
ship in the convoy would have to accept the 
risk of incidental damage. t76 
74. ADM 110360, 'Submarines in Defence of Territory. ' 
(See Note 72. ) 
75. ADM 1/10360, 'Submarines in Defence of Territory. ' 
(See Note 72. ) 
76. Head of M., 21 Aug. 1939, ADAM 1/10360, M. 07295/39, 
'Attacks on Enemy Convoys. ' 
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This policy differed from Rear-Admiral (S)'s suggestions in that any 
convoy vessel could be attacked, without transgressing the rules of rest- 
ricted submarine warfare, so long as it was known that there was at least 
one vessel which could be justifiably sunk without warning. The expect- 
ation was that there would be no legal problem or difficulty with neutrals, 
if such an attitude were announced on the outbreak of war. Clearly, the 
danger existed of justifying the introduction of unrestricted submarine 
warfare by an enemy. The longer any nation could be induced by example or 
international pressure to confine submarine operations to agreed inter- 
national rules the more time would be available to strengthen British 
AIS forces and the convoy system. 
The likelihood of facing not only Germany or Japan but also Italy 
increased during the summer of 1939 and meant that the strength of British 
naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean would be at a very low level. 
Loss of the Suez Canal route would clearly pose a severe threat to commun- 
ications between Britain and the Far East, especially India. The position 
of Malta, provided it could be defended from invasion, was invaluable if 
it proved necessary to prevent Italian supplies reaching Libya. However, 
it was assumed that such convoys would be heavily escorted and the short- 
age of submarines was so severe that boats employed against such convoys 
would probably be fully occupied in attacking the escorts. This was a 
pessimistic view but one based on the 'worst case' philosophy and which 
recognised the extent to which the British submarine force would be stret- 
ched in the opening months of war. Nevertheless, 'with such a convoy the 
presumption that every vessel in it was of the categories that may be 
attacked without warning would be so strong that there would, in fact, 
appear to be no real objection to attacking it indiscriminately from either 
the legal or political standpoint. ' 
77 
77. Ibid. 
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Such a situation would not require an elaborate scheme of announced 
danger areas and it was accepted that: 'If it it decided to adhere to the 
policy hitherto adopted, the question of declaring dangerous areas is of 
no great intrinsic importance-' 
78 
Certainly, existing policy allowed 
virtually indiscriminate attack on convoys if known to be proceeding to 
invade British territory. On other enemy convoys the view was that neutral 
shipping within them would have to run the risk of destruction as a result 
of an attack on the entire convoy. However, Admiralty policy seemed more 
concerned with, 'the necessity of initiating a policy of reprisal with 
clean hands, '79 than with the practicality of the situation. 'Innocent 
ships in belligerent convoy may not be sunk without warning, ' however, 
'they incur the risk of being hit by gun or torpedo directed against the 
escort or guilty merchant vessel. '80 Clearly no submarine would be able 
to surface in the face of an armed convoy escort to give a warning to 
individual ships in that convoy any more than it would be possible for a 
submarine commander to isolate one vessel in such a confused situation, 
both senior and operational officers being aware of these facts. In 
addition, existing legislation banning unrestricted submarine warfare 
allied to plans for the 'defensive' arming of British merchant ships were 
designed to nullify the power of the submarine by forcing it to operate in 
a vulnerable position on the surface. The final decision was to shelve the 
problem for the immediate future since, 'with regard to the proposal to 
notify dangerous areas, this can legally only be done by means of mines. '81 
78. ADM 1/10360, 'Attacks on Enemy Convoys. ' (See Note 76. ) 
79. D. of P., 26 Aug. 1939, ADM 1/'10360, 'Remarks on 
R. A. (S)'s Memorandum of 3 Aug. ' 
80. Ibid. 
81. ADM 1/10360, D. of P. (See Note 79. ) 
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Largely as a reaction to the failure of the 1935 London Conference 
attempts had been made to improve submarine numbers under the 1936 and 
1937 programmes. However, the Admiralty yielded to Treasury pressure over 
the 1938 programme, resulting in a cutback to a replacement level. 
political developments in Europe out short any permanent reduction and 
intensive efforts were made to augment existing numbers. Irrespective of 
military or political requirements, however, there was a limit to the 
measures which could be taken quickly to rectify any shortage of matriel. 
These steps were hampered by a much reduced national shipbuilding capacity 
which directly resulted from the long years of retrenchment and neglect. 
In addition, there was the problem of construction time, for even with the 
most vigorous of armaments industries there existed a limit to the speed 
with which the end product could be produced - and the British armaments 
industry was not in vigorous shape. Thus, in 1935 while it had been 
calculated that there was a military requirement for a submarine force of 
70,000 tons, the political, economic and constructional factors dictated 
an effective limit of 40,000 tons for the immediate future. Although 
additions were made to the later programmes, clearly no short term improve- 
ment was likely in numbers. Thus, submarines ordered in early 1939 could 
not be expected to enter service until late 1940. Therefore, for the 
first year of the war the Royal Navy would be faced with the prospect of 
relying on its existing submarine force, which would obviously be reduced 
by war losses, and the advent of the few boats ordered under the 1937 and 
1938 programmes. Shortage of submarines proved so severe that during the 
early months of the war, until the 'T', 
their way into service, 
82 that the old 
IS' and 'U' war orders could find 
'H' and 'L' class submarines had 
82. Admiralty, 28 Sept. 1939, ADII 167/105, 
'War New Construction Programme - Submarines. ' 
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to be brought into operational use. In addition several old 'R' and 'S' 
class boats were borrowed from the United States Navy to augment the 
training forces. 
The deficiency in numbers proved an admission of the failure to react 
adequately to the steady deterioration of the political situation in both 
Europe and the Far East. Despite this, orders prior to the war still only 
equalled the exact number of over-age submarines up to 1939. Nevertheless, 
even such a limited response illustrated how unrealistic had been the 
Government's pre-1935 London Conference proposal for a submarine force of 
only 40 boats. Although factors such as shipbuilding capacity and const- 
ruction time played an important part in ensuring a slow response to the 
international political situation after 1935, the problem of Government 
aversion to rearmament proved difficult to eradicate. Elsewhere the real- 
isation was dominant that existing naval forces were inadequate in numbers 
and sometimes quality for the roles and commitments they would be expected 
to undertake. Shortage of numbers contributed again to the clear but 
belated realisation of the inadequacy of post-war British Government policies 
and the fatal acquiescence of the Admiralty at crucial periods. 
Therefore, in the submarine category, although confirmation was given 
to a force total of approximately 70 boats, evidence accumulating in the 
final months of peace indicated that at least a further twenty submarines 
would be needed to accommodate initial war losses. Moreover, in ideal terms 
a force of twice the earlier figure was considered essential. Overall, the 
weakness in numbers of the British submarine force was also a reflection 
of the belief, based on investment in the battlefleet, that the submarine 
fulfilled only an auxiliary role in naval tactics. Similarly, certain 
aspects of naval thought rated the influence of maritime air power, real 
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and potential, far too low, until it was almost too late. Clearly, as 
long as control of the air and the undersea remained inadequate then 
Britain faced the danger of losing command of essential sea communications 
and trade routes. 
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis has been to describe and account for the 
development of British naval policy in relation to the submarine. The 
invention of the submarine in a practical form at the turn of the century 
presented naval designers with a difficult new technology to master and 
operators with a quandary. Official reluctance to adopt and then develop 
the new weapon meant that progress in producing reliable designs was slow. 
partly because of the adoption of a policy which favoured the development 
of short-range coastal submarines the Royal Navy lagged behind Germany 
before 1914. Senior naval commanders still regarded the submarine as a 
slow, unreliable and vulnerable vessel which had to be accompanied by a 
surface warship on cruises outside coastal waters. Therefore, the ways in 
which submarines came to be operated during the war were an unsettling 
surprise and a challenge to traditional naval thinking and tactics. By 
1918 research and development had pushed submarine surface speeds up to 
24 knots (on steam turbines) and provided increased size, armament and 
endurance. The result was that the submarine had been developed to a 
high level of efficiency in a much shorter period absolutely as well as 
relatively than any other type of naval weapons-system. No similar claim 
could really be made in respect of the Naval Air Arm; the potential of 
maritime air power lay largely in the future and the development of naval 
aircraft proved slower than their land based counterparts. Effective naval 
air power was recognised as requiring the replacement of seaplanesby 
aeroplanes and the provision of efficient aircraft carriers able to 
maintain station with the Fleet. In the case of the submarine a wide 
range of advances had already been made; in addition to the coastal and 
overseas patrol submarines, several other models had been produced 
including fleet, monitor and minelayer submarines. These were the result, 
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not only of the perceived needs of war, but of the general naval attitude 
towards the role of the submarine within the Royal Navy: to support the 
Fleet. 
The public also expected fleet actions and overwhelming victories, 
which reflected the traditional presentation of naval history. The effect 
on naval training and tradition resulted in an emphasis on fleet battles 
to the detriment of control of sea communications and protection of 
merchant shipping. The former was vital to Imperial cohesion and the latter 
to national survival. Loss of control in either area created the spectre 
of defeat. Despite the evidence of history and of Jutland, that there was 
no such thing as a decisive fleet action which would end a war, the belief 
persisted. The Navy's strategy and tactics were reflected in the preoccup- 
ation with preparing for the next Jutland, even though technical develop- 
ments increasingly precluded such an event. In addition, after 1918 the 
British were unlikely to be faced by any enemy fleet comparable with the 
German High Seas Fleet. If it was not yet fully clear how the submarine 
might revolutionise naval warfare it was obvious that it added to its 
uncertainty. But the result was a reinforcement of the belief that a 
decisive battle was necessary. Many senior officers refused to accept 
that any warship which could not take a place in surface fleet actions 
could be considered as anything other than an auxiliary: for many, the 
capital ship remained dominant because it was the only vessel which could 
force a decision in the fleet action which continued to be held as the 
ultimate reason for the Navy's existence. The Submarine Service reacted 
to this belief by attempting to adapt the submarine to a range of quasi- 
surface roles. The element of surprise given by submergence was recognised 
and encouraged; but, it was also nullified by the Navy's emphasis on 
surface engagement. This emphasis cannot be fully explained, but undoubt- 
edly had something to do, in pre-Asdic days, with the sense of helplessness 
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on the part of surface warship captains as long as the submarine remained 
an undetectable threat: the same sense of disquiet that led to continuing 
hopes, after the war, that the submarine could be abolished. 
Yet, conversely, British submarine development had flourished in the 
wartime period. The elan of many submarine commanders and their successes 
stimulated a general desire to match the German efforts to develop this new 
weapon and produced, by the end of the war, a large submarine force, with 
a wide range of capabilities, and skills in operations and mat'riel which 
gave a sizeable lead over States which, unlike Germany, retained submarines 
in their navies. It also produced a body of skilful, but frequently very 
young submarine officers who, for all their enthusiasm, were not senior 
enough to influence doctrinal thinking about the new weapon in the post- 
war international system. Demobilisation and retrenchment reduced the 
submarine force, and made the survivors subject to the results of disarm- 
ament negotiations. Failure to secure agreement either on the total 
abolition of the submarine or a limited possession of the submarine by 
the other major naval Powers ensured its retention in the Royal Navy even 
though, intrinsically, it represented more of a threat to British maritime 
interests than any other recent developments. 
In terms of technical advance so much had been done by 1918 that the 
main lines of submarine development had already been fixed. Therefore 
from 1918 to 1939 materiel advances were incremental and there were no 
startling developments which would have forced the Royal Navy to pay 
particular attention to the submarine. Nothing took place on a scale 
comparable to the development of marine nuclear technology in the 1950's 
which so altered submarine capability. Moreover, many of the ideas which 
had emerged by 1918 which had been thought to be interesting or promising 
turned out to be neither. Patrol submarines had demonstrated their utility 
and therefore the limited submarine construction resources available were 
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concentrated primarily on this model; so were the roles that were allocated 
to the Submarine Service. The most successful of these had been reconnais- 
sance, and little priority was attached to commerce attacks, because of 
the absence of any potential enemy with a large merchant fleet, and 
because the cruiser force was considered capable of dealing more success- 
fully with enemy merchant shipping, by engagement during'the opening stages 
of a war and then by distant blockade. 
The steady decrease in submarine construction resulted in an increa- 
singly limited number of submarines and no possibility of extensive prog- 
ress in producing improvements. Moreover, despite the relative priority 
accorded to the patrol model it was not until November 1923 that the first 
post-war design was ordered. The future development of fleet and cruiser 
submarines was subject to technical and tactical as well as political and 
economic conditions. Nevertheless, there continued to exista strong 
belief in the necessity for fleet submarines as an adjunct to the battle- 
fleet. In this scenario, engendered partly by the "sunk cost" investment 
in capital ships, the submarine continued to be regarded as fulfilling an 
auxiliary role. Even the critical views expressed by the Naval Staff that 
the fleet submarine was not an essential unit of the Fleet were not occas- 
ioned by the desire to develop more promising roles for the submarine but 
rather to prevent expenditure. If any emphasis had been placed on prom- 
oting the submarine in roles more suited to the existing level of tech- 
nological development it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it 
would have led to a more rapid appreciation within the Navy of the 
distinctive contribution the submarine could make to naval warfare, which 
had to be based upon its invisibility when submerged. 
Many of the experiments with specialist types of submarine in the 
Royal Navy stemmed from the belief or knowledge that similar work was 
being undertaken by other navies, sometimes on flimsy evidence. Although 
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there was a basic determination among the naval construction and design 
teams to stay abreast of the latest submarine developments, these were 
always subject to the limitations of finance and the greater priority 
awarded to other categories of warships. Thus, submarine weapons develop- 
ment, for example, was squeezed: even marginal improvements in'torpedoes 
took up to a decade and very little was achieved. Moreover, -the bulk of 
the cost of research and development, including Asdic and W/T for subma- 
rines was borne by other sectors of the Royal Navy. Submarines in this 
regard tended to be the same sort of Cinderella that the Naval Air Arm 
was in aircraft development. Nevertheless, development of hull design and 
propulsion systems did take place, resulting in submarines which although 
only marginally faster than boats of 1914-1918, possessed-greater endurance, 
larger torpedo armament, a deeper diving'ability, and greater overall 
reliability. However, the submarine remained primarily a submersible vessel 
operating most of the time on the surface and submerging only to evade an 
attacking warship or aircraft, or to launch a torpedo attack. The dual 
propulsion system of diesels on the'surface and electric motors submerged 
remained unchanged throughout the period. The limitations of existing 
diesel propulsion resulted in a gradual acceptance that increases in 
surface speed could only be gained by increasing the size of the engines 
which in turn required an increase in the size of the submarine; but the 
greater displacement ensured only a minor gain in speed, and the larger 
the submarine became, the more unstable and unmanoeuvrable it was under- 
water. By the late 1920's development came to concentrate on increased 
endurance and reliability. An obvious solution was to increase the amount 
of fuel oil carried but the restricted space available within the pressure 
hull required the use of part of the ballast tanks for storage. These 
were constructed from weaker materials than the pressure-hull and until 
the advent of advanced welding techniques during the Second World War, 
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British submarines suffered from leakages of fuel oil while submerged. 
This required a partial reversion to fuel oil storage within the pressure 
hull but international tonnage limitation agreements in force by the 
1930's meant that new designs were severely limited in the amount of extra 
fuel which could be stored. Continuous development and improvement in hull 
construction techniques, largely based on the desire to increase diving 
depth, resulted in some improvement to the leakage problem. 
In terms of naval policy, retention of the British submarine led to 
the decision that the numbers required would not be based on the total of 
submarines possessed by other nations but rather on the potential threat 
posed by the strongest possible opponent in European waters (France) and 
in the Far East (Japan). The existing and projected strength of the British 
battlefleet precluded the basing of sufficiently powerful naval forces 
simultaneously in Europe and the Far East, and to move the main Fleet to 
the Far East would take at least several weeks. The Naval Staff, despite 
the evidence of the First World War, considered that submarines might be 
useful in local defence in the Far East and for rear-guard actions until 
major surface units could arrive in the area. This reasoning was based 
partly on the relatively low cost of submarines but more decisively on the 
probable shortfall in more suitable surface warships, such as the cruiser, 
as these were also subjected to limitation agreements. Nevertheless, 
although lacking adaptability for peacetime diplomacy and public relations 
duties, the submarine was accepted as possessing a credible wartime capab- 
ility. Moreover, the official attitude for over two decades had been that 
the submarine was the ideal weapon for the Power in the weaker position cr 
on the defensive; in support, the Naval Staff could point to the French 
acquisition of large numbers of submarines. British policy was therefore 
always to station in the Far East the largest patrol submarines available: 
but these boats were usually inadequate in size and endurance for the roles 
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assigned to them. By the time designs for the next generation of patrol 
models were finalised in the early 1930's the effects of further disarm- 
ament conferences and tonnage limitation agreements resulted in boats with 
size and endurance more suitable for European waters, and the Far East rem- 
ained an area for which no role-designed submarines were provided until 1944. 
Overall, by the 1930's, the Admiralty considered warships the main 
target for British submarines, although some attention was given to 
surface shadowing of enemy troop convoys, and reconnaissance remained one 
of the most firmly advocated duties. The surface shadowing role reflected 
a continuing preoccupation with attempts to use the submarine as a substi- 
tute surface warship. The need to use the limited tonnage available in 
the submerged roles of reconnaissance in enemy waters and warship attacks 
resulted eventually in the deletion of 'substitute' roles. However, the 
question of submarines roles had a minimal effect in the early 1930's on 
the Admiralty's assessment of numbers and tonnage limitation agreements. 
Not until 1936 did the annual submarine construction rate even match the 
number of boats annually reaching the over-age limit or being scrapped; 
yearly the Admiralty had to prune its construction requirements, in which 
the submarine continued to have a low priority. Throughout the period 
between the two World wars, while the battleship was limited by a building 
'holiday', the cruiser and the destroyer were considered of prime import- 
ance and the official attitude remained that the submarine was retained 
principally because other powers could not be persuaded to renounce it. 
The deterioration of the international situation only very gradually 
altered this policy. 
Requirements for submarine types had already changed but to a certain 
extent the developments had cancelled each other out. Increases in the 
size of new submarines caused a rise in the cost of individual boats and, 
in the atmosphere created by shortage of hulls and continuing financial 
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restrictions, the emphasis was diverted to meeting the overall tonnage 
quota with a greater number of smaller submarines. Even then the low 
level of proposed submarine strength necessitated a highly optimistic 
view being taken of the potential wartime strain that the British subma- 
rine force was likely to undergo. The calculations involved the assump- 
tion that, for planning purposes, war would occur only in one area (Europe 
or the Far East) at any time. Even then the projected force level could 
only be considered sufficient by ignoring the effect of early war losses. 
Circumstances eventually dispersed these erroneous proposals. The 
Admiralty gradually recognised that there would be a irreversible decline 
in the proportionate strength of the Royal Navy unless Britain made a 
major effort to match the building programmes of the other naval Powers. 
The case had been set out during 1934 in the 'New Standard of Naval 
Strength' and the failure of the 1935 London Conference forced the Govern- 
ment to concede that there was now an urgent need to rectify the deficien- 
cies in the Navy's strength. However, major short term problems now 
included not only money, but the limited capacity of British shipbuilding. 
only three firms remained capable of constructing submarines and all of 
them needed financial assistance and time to improve their facilities 
before any new orders could be laid down. 
Meanwhile, the increasing possibility of a simultaneous war in 
Europe and the Far East posed insoluble problems for naval planners. The 
low strength of the British submarine force and the need for submarines to 
be stationed in Home waters and the Mediterranean now meant that the requ- 
isite number of submarines could not be sent to the Far East, either for 
a 'holding' action until the arrival of the main Fleet or for reconnaissance 
and local defence roles. No thought appears to have been given to using 
submarines in an anti-commerce role once it was accepted that Hong Kong 
was likely to be an initial and vulnerable target. The distance from 
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Singapore to Japanese waters, the shortage of submarines, and the greater 
importance attached to defensive roles, combined to ensure that any concept 
of attacking the Japanese merchant marine was not followed up. The Amer- 
icans were to prove the value of such a campaign during the Second World 
, Tar and during the early years of that conflict proved that distance was 
no permanent obstacle by operating from Australia and Hawaii. However, 
the Americans possessed the advantage of having pursued a consistent policy 
of developing long-range submarines, since an ocean-war with Japan was 
always a prime contingency in their Exercises and War Plans. For the 
British, the disposition of submarines for a war with Germany proved more 
difficult to define since there was no High Seas Fleet upon which to focus 
and the utility of the French as a surrogate-adversary fell quickly away 
in tactical planning; but the final decision was to repeat the dispositions 
and roles of the First World War. 
Overall, the failure to maintain a realistic level'of naval strength 
in the inter-war period in all categories, had become alarmingly clear in 
1938 and, for submarines, the new 'ideal' force total was calculated in 
that year to be as high as 127 boats. This was twice the total the Royal 
Navy had on the outbreak of war in September 1939. The weakness of the 
submarine force at that time lay principally in the numbers of hulls avail- 
able in relation to what was required of them: the materiel proved, in 
general, to be sufficiently good to get by. ' 
Throughout the inter-war period, while substantive naval doctrine 
still regarded the battlefleet and the surface warship in general as the 
principal arbiters of naval warfare, the threat and potential of the'subma- 
rine was underplayed. During the 1920's the Navy generally suffered a 
period of tactical sterility, stemming from a preoccupation with the past 
rather than an awareness of future needs, and from a requirement to save 
on fuel and ammunition. How far financial stringency was an excuse rather 
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than an explanation is not clear. The shortage of submarine hulls was to 
be a critical tactical issue, but in strategic terms the neglect to provide 
adequate numbers of major warships was to prove a far more serious conse- 
quence of the attitude to defence procurement during the inter-war period. 
A persistent desire for disarmament even when it was shown to be inter- 
nationally unattainable marked the political climate of the period. 
Government policy favoured arms reduction for financial as well as moral 
reasons but the dependent trust put up on international agreements was not 
followed up by any consistent policy towards either the international 
requirements of the 'collective security' which had been hoped for from the 
League of Nations nor effective internal economic allocation of resources. 
The 'Ten Year Rule' was a self-denying ordinance that reflected a set of 
domestic aspirations more than it did a cohesive determination to ensure 
that home and overseas policies marched in step. Thus, Government policy 
in the 1920's, on international disarmament had continued to press for 
submarine abolition: the official climate, despite Beatty's objections, 
remained unfavourable towards both development and expansion of submarine 
numbers. The Admiralty rightly became sceptical on the possibility of 
achieving abolition in the face of increasing foreign opposition, but 
hoped that tonnage reductions might be secured which would allow financial 
savings by reducing the need for future A, /S forces. Meanwhile, until 
submarine abolition or limitation became a fact, the Admiralty had still 
to wrestle with the problem of inadequate numbers. Reductions in existing 
flotillas, curtailment of new construction and continuation of the 
existing scrapping proposals meant that the Admiralty was forced oumul- 
atively to revise its submarine policy downward to conform with the 
Government's financial views. 
Financial pressures were important in the Depression but political 
pressure was dominant, as was indicated by the decision to suspend the 
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1929 and 1930 submarine programmes pending the results of the 1930 London 
Naval Conference. During the late twenties and early thirties the Admiralty 
seems to have been dominated by a lethargy towards the disarmament policies 
of the Government of the day which it found difficult to overcome in the 
period when Beattyts dominant hand had been removed. The acquiescence of 
the Board in the reductions and deferments of the period can be mostly 
explained by the constant pressure for economy to which they were subjected 
by successive Governments. The familiar pattern from the early years of 
the 1920's centred on the Board of Admiralty's main efforts being engaged 
in the yearly battle over the Navy Estimates. In addition, long periods 
of tradition and success were logically breeders of conservatism and 
suspicion of fundamental change. Liddell Hart said that the only thing 
more difficult than getting a new idea into a soldier's head was getting 
an old one out; but he, or Sir Herbert Richmond, might have said it of 
sailors, too. Clearly, what would have been required was a reversal of 
the economic and structural factors, as well as a quite exceptional bid 
for extra Governmental political support to maintain a higher level of 
investment in the Fleet; this would not only have been difficult to achieve 
in the absence of any external threat as pressing as Tirpitz's Navy had 
been in 1908, but it would probably have called for Army and Air Force 
concurrence, if not active support. The prospects for this were low, and 
the general political atmosphere unfavourable. Public attitudes towards 
the Navy were not what they used to be, especially after Invergordon. 
Only the collapse of the disarmament policies in the ruins of the 1935 
London Naval Conference ensured political acceptance, if not recognition, 
of the need for extensive new construction to repair the deficiencies in 
the Fleet. 
In 1936, for the first time, annual submarine construction rate rose 
above three boats. However, by that stage the final shortage - time - had 
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been added. Between 1936 and 1938 the Admiralty also ordered five battle- 
ships, four aircraft carriers and 21 cruisers but only nine AIS or escort 
vessels. A freedom to build beyond the prior treaty limitations and the 
belief in the continuing dominance of the Fleet action were the basis of 
this decision. Yet, although the Admiralty knew that the Germans were 
building a few technically advanced capital ships they could not but also 
be aware that they had officially sanctioned the resurgence of the U-boat 
arm under the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement. 
The threat posed by foreign Powers' possession of the submarine had 
been illustrated by the effect on the unrestricted submarine campaign of 
1917 against British and allied merchant shipping. Submarines had also had 
such a restrictive influence on the battlefleet that a large number of 
destroyers to screen the fleet had been considered necessary before it 
was safe for the capital ships to put to sea. During most of the First 
World War destroyers had not possessed any detection devices, which rest- 
ricted their effectiveness against the U-boats, but nevertheless, destroyers 
often forced the submarine to launch its torpedoes at sufficient distance 
to allow the attacked vessel to take avoiding action. In addition, the 
presence of destroyers resulted in submarines being forced to dive and 
abandon an attack. Nevertheless, the protection afforded to the Grand 
Fleet was bought by force of numbers that resulted often in an inadequate 
level of defence for the merchant convoys. 
In 1917 successful experiments had resulted in the first crude Asdio 
devices. The initial successes achieved with this equipment led to the 
belief that this device would provide the answer to any future submarine 
threat. Further developments of this locating device had been kept secret 
even from Britain's wartime allies. Evidence suggests that the secret was 
well kept and that in 1939 Britain held a definite lead in Asdic develop- 
ment. Not only did other nations lack equipment of sufficient quality to 
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pose a serious threat to British submarines but rumours concerning the 
effectiveness of Asdic magnified its actual effectiveness. Nevertheless, 
the prime motive behind the development of Asdic continued to be that of 
providing a means for surface vessels to defeat the submarine. Despite 
intense and relatively expensive development undertaken throughout the 
inter-war period, the effectiveness of Asdic continued to be limited by 
weather, and the wide range of sea conditions inherent in open waters. 
Advances in detection range, although limited, were made and the speed at 
which A/S vessels could operate was raised. In 1939 British A/S forces 
possessed a far more effective weapon than in 1918; but it was still no 
full answer to submarine operations. The principal deficiency was in the 
ftilure to provide an adequate number of A/S vessels to carry the equipment, 
despite the warnings given by Naval Staff studies and naval spokesmen from 
the early 1930's onwards. Faced with the continuous problem of procuring 
resources to produce the number of A/S vessels which might be needed, many 
senior naval officers tended to find comfort in an exaggerated and ration- 
alised belief that Asdic would provide a total solution to any threat posed 
by foreign submarine forces. Allied to this was an attitude of indifference 
towards convoy during much of the inter-war period. Many senior commanders 
had an antipathy towards convoy, regarding it as a defensive measure and 
therefore anathema to a service whose greatness was believed to lie in its 
readiness to assume the offensive. There was, at the very least, little 
recognition of the immensity of the problem that would be occasioned by a 
general introduction of the convoy system. Existing numbers of AIS 
vessels might be adequate for defence of the Fleet but the additional need 
to cover merchant convoys presented an impossible task. The collapse in 
1936 of the disarmament policies which had been pursued for over a decade, 
and the growing belligerence of Germany and Japan, finally persuaded the 
political and naval authorities to grapple with this problem. However, by, 
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then time was too short for even great amounts of money to provide a 
solution until well into the Second World War, and expedients of various 
kinds had to be resorted to. 
In addition to the twin problems of finance and international arms 
agreements affecting the amount of resources allocated to the submarine, 
there was a third factor - the position of the Submarine Service within 
the Navy. The proponents of the submarine realised that with the return 
of peace the Government and Admiralty no longer felt such a concern for 
the submarine as an element in the Navy that they would see any major 
objection to disposing of submarines in an international agreement. In 
that sense the Submarine Service was in a weak and defensive position in 
the Navy. There was nothing in the functions of the Submarine Service as 
far as the Royal Navy was concerned which could enable it to-bring strong 
pressure on the Admiralty for a larger and unfairly generous share'of 
resources. Their needs were not considered serious enough to bring subma- 
rines to the centre of naval policy and there was no major problem over the 
allocation of resources to submarines, in contrast to the question of money 
for battleships or aircraft carriers that arose in the late 1930's. 
Although the Submarine Service could reasonably point to the submarine's 
potential it was badly placed to make-its voice heard, especially in terms 
of its strength as a sub-group of the naval officer corps. Most of the 
officers on submarines were of junior rank and few senior commands existed. 
To become successful meant leaving the submarine world. This contrasted 
with the other specialist arm created as a result of technological develop- 
ment - the Fleet Air Arm, which not only offered more senior posts for 
captains and commanders but was a constant preoccupation to the Board until 
the struggle to regain total control from the R. A. F. had been won. more- 
over, officers who joined either the Submarine Service or the Fleet Air 
Arm tended to be regarded as deviant enthusiasts. What was beyond doubt 
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was that the most formative period of an officer's career was as a ship's 
officer: his ideas were formed then rather than as a senior commander. The 
majority of posts being surface ship appointments, the consequence was a 
senior officer corps which knew about cruisers, for example, but was relat- 
ively ignorant of submarines. Opinions were therefore unreceptive to such 
Submarine Service pressure as existed and personal views based on operational 
experience were self-reinforcing. Chatfield who, as the heir of Beatty, 
saw his role as restoring the confidence of the Navy in Whitehall after a 
number of difficult transitional years is an example. Although his papers 
contain extensive reference to surface ships in general and especially 
cruisers, including the necessity of maintaining an adequate number and 
avoiding a shortfall in construction programmes, no evidence exists of an 
interest in the submarine. In the 1920's and 1930's there were many 
officers in senior positions who still did not really understand the subm- 
arine. In operational terms the Submarine Service was again in a similar 
position to the Fleet Air Arm, new and thus in some ways exciting; but 
different and therefore in other ways difficult to come to grips with. 
Thus, in 1939 much criticism could be, and was, fairly directed at the 
unskilful and uninformed use of both'submarines and aircraft carriers. 
That there was some justification in such criticism could be seen in the 
fate of H. M. S. 'Courageous', torpedoed while on . 4/S patrol. 
From a First Sea Lord's viewpoint, submarines had a limited utility 
in peacetime. Unlike cruisers or capital ships they could not easily be 
used for either 'cold war' or 'gunboat diplomacy'. These had more evident 
utility in wartime operations and it made military sense to send submarines 
to the Far East, even though it was primarily a defensive gesture. In 
terms of priority for constructional resources the submarine possessed some 
advantages in military capabilities per pound spent but not sufficient 
marginal utility to justify constructional preference over other categories, 
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especially in peace as well as war. Under the effects of the 'Ten Year 
Rule' the Admiralty had to consider not only military functions but also 
a vessel's capabilities in peacetime activities. In this either or situ- 
ation the decision tended to favour the surface vessel, such as the 
destroyer, over the submarine. 
Two other major problems had had to be faced and overcome by the 
Submarine Service's persistence. For a long time the international political 
environment favoured attempts to reach agreement on arms limitation. The 
strong thread that ran through this expectation was that some at least of 
the weapons of the First World War could be abolished. Submarines and 
poison gas were two particular types of weapon which had a special concern 
for the British - gas for its horror and submarines because of their part- 
icular threat. In this context, Government aspirations were in some sense 
a reflection of a sector at least of public opinion, which, together with 
the effect of direct economic pressure, affected Government policy towards 
providing resources for the Services. In economic terms this was not only 
a period of chronic instability, culminating in the worst slump in British 
economic history, but also the era of pre-Keynesian economics. Deficit 
budgeting was anathema; balancing of the budget must be done on a year to 
year basis, and cuts were arbitrary and based on political expediency 
rather than on any relationship to investment rationale. Not only was 
there a general Service worry about the continuing decline in the defence 
budget but also a primary point of concern, the share that each of the 
Services received.. Whatever the individual problems, Governments' overall 
policy remained firm for a long time in the belief that it was not econom- 
ically orthodox to use public expenditure to stimulate armaments or 
engineering production to maintain employment or indeed to use public works 
of any kind in this way. Certainly, as far as the Services were concerned, 
the Government felt committed for a very long time to retain something of 
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the aspiration that had been prevalent in 1918 - that the Great War had 
been the war to end wars. 
However, despite overcoming many of the problems which faced it, or 
perhaps because of those which it failed to solve, the Submarine Service 
could feel in the final assessment, that it had achieved neither the 
prestige nor the influence in the inter-war period, which were commen- 
surate with any sympathetic view of the importance of its functions. In 
1939 the other new branch, the Fleet Air Arm, was represented on the Board 
of Admiralty by the Fifth Sea Lord while the Submarine Service had no rep- 
resentative on the Naval Staff at anything like the same level. There is 
little evidence however that this particular disability worried the Flag 
Officers, Submarines; the Submarine Service tended to regard itself as a 
, private navy' and inevitably was treated as such by the other specialist 
branches. Flag Officer Submarines was king in 'Dolphin', and this gave 
cohesion to the Branch even if it did not spread the submarine gospel very 
fast or far. It produced, amongst other benefits, a host of able submarine 
commanders in the Second World War, but it delayed the integration of the 
Submarine Service into the mainstream of naval doctrine. It was perhaps 
only the ultimate paradox that the first Submarine specialist to become 
First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff resigned because aircraft carriers 
could no longer be afforded in the Fleet. 
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APPENDIX: A OFFICE HOLDERS 
AM HEADS OF THE SUBMARIITE SERVICE 
COMMODORE(S) 9TD REAR ADIIIRRAL(3). 
Feb. 1915 - 24 Aug. 1919 .. .... Commodore S. S. Hall 
25 Aug. 1919 - 24 Aug. 1921 .. .... Rear-Admiral D. L. Dent 
25 Aug. 1921 - 31 Aug. 1923 .. .... Rear-Admiral H. F. P. Sinclair 
1 Sep. 1923 - 31 Aug. 1925 .. as .. Rear-Admiral VT. S. Nicholson 
1 Sep. 1925 - 31 Aug. 1927 .. .... Rear-Admiral V. H. S. Haggard 
1 Sep. 1927 - 1 Sep. 1929 .. .... Rear-Admiral H. E. Grace 
2 Sep. 1929 - 1 Sep. 1931 .. .... Rear-Admiral 
U. E. Dunbar-Nasniith, V. C. 
2 Sep. 1931 - 9 Dec. 1932 .. .... Rear-Admiral C. J. C. Little 
10 Dec. 1932 - 9 Dec. 1934 .. .... Rear-Admiral 
N. F. Lawrence, D. S. O. 
10 Dec. 1934 - 9 Dec. 1936 .. .... Rear-Admiral 
C. P. Talbot, D. S. O. 
10 Dec. 1936 - 14 Dec. 1938 .. .... Rear-Admiral 
R. H. T. Raffkes, D. S. 0. 
15 Dec. 1938 - 3 Jan. 1940 .. .... Rear-Admiral R. C. Matson 
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A(2) FIRST LORDS OF THE ADMIRALTY 
20 Jul. 1917 - 16 Jan. 1919 .. .... Sir Eric C. Geddes 
16 Jan. 1919 - 18 Feb. 1921 .. .... Walter H. Long 
(Viscount Long, 1921) 
18 Feb. 1921 - 31 Oct. 1922 .. .... Arthur Hamilton, Baron Lee 
31 Oct. 1922 - 28 Jan. 1924 .. .... Leopold C. M. S. Amery 
28 Jan. 1924 - 7 Nov. 1924 .. .... Frederick J. N. Thesigcr 
(Viscount Chelmsford) 
7 Nov. 1924 - 10 June 1929 .. .... William C. Bridgeman 
(Viscount 33ridgeman, 1929) 
10 June 1929 - 27 Aug. 1931 .. .... Albert V. Alexander 
(Viscount, 1950; Earl, 1963) 
27 Aug. 1931 -9 Nov. 1931 .. .... Sir Joseph A. Chamberlain 
9 Nov. 1931 -6 June 1936 .. .... Sir Bolton M. Eyres-ldonsell 
(Viscount Monsell, 1935) 
6 June 1936 - 28 May 1937 .. .... Sir Samuel J. G. Hoare 
(Viscount Templevtood, 1944) 
28 May 1937 - 27 Oct. 1938 .. .... Alfred Duff Cooper 
(Viscount Norwich, 1952) 
27 Oct. 1958 -3 Sep. 1939 .. .... Earl Stanhope 
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A(1 3 FIRST SEA L 
AND C. N. S. 
27 Dec. 1917 -1 Nov. 1919 .... 
1 Nov. 1919 - 30 Jul. 1927 .... 
30 Jul. 1927 - 50 Jul. 1930 .... 
ORDS 
." Acting-Admiral Sir Rosslyn 
E. ä7eryss 
.. Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty 
.. Admiral of the Fleet 
Sir Charles E. Madden 
30 Jul. 1930 - 21 Jan. 1933 .. .... Admiral Sir Frederick L. Field 
21 Jan. 1933 - 17 Nov. 1938 .. .... Admiral Sir A. Ernte Chatfield 
17 Nov. 1938 - 15 June 1939 .. .... Admiral Sir Roger R. C. Backhouse 
1.5 June 1939 - 15 Oct. 1943 .. .... Admiral Sir A. Dudley P. R. Pound. 
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A4 SECOND SEA LORDS 
27 Sep. 1917 - 31 ?, Iar. 1919 
31 ?, Jar. 1919 - 30 Sep. 1920 00 
30 Sep. 1920 - 15 Aug. 1924 .. 
15 Aug. 1924 - 2 Apr. 1925(Died).. 
22 Apr. 1925 - 15 Aug. 1927 .. 
15 Au ;. 1927 - 2G May 1930 .. 
26 May 1930 - 31 Aug. 1932 
31 Aug. 1932 - 30 Sep. 1935 
30 Sep. 1935 - 30 Sep. 1938 




Vice-Admiral Sir Herbert L. Heath 
Vice-Admiral dir Montague 
E. Browning 
Vice-Admiral Sir Henry F. Oliver 
Vice-Admiral. Sir Michael 
Culme-Seymour, `zart. 
Vice-Admiral the Hon. 
Sir Hubert G. 1Iran& 
Vice-Admiral Sir 1.4ichael H. Hodges 
Admiral Sir Cyril T. M. Fuller 
Vice-Admiral A. Dudley P. R. Pound 
.. Vice-Admiral 
Sir Martin Dunbar-Nasmith 
Admiral Sir Charles J. C. Little 
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AW THIRD SEA LORDS 
AND CONTROLLERS 
17 June 1918 - 2 July 1919 .... 
2 July 1919 - 15 Apr. 1920 .... 
15 Apr. 1920 - 15 may 1925 .... 
15 May 1923 - 50 Apr. 1925 .... 
50 Apr. 1925 -1 Nov. 1928 .... 
1 Nov. 1928 -1 Mar. 1932 .... 
1 Mar. 1932 - 23 Apr. 1934 .... 
25 Apr. 1934 "- 1 Mar. 1939 .... 
1 Mar. 1939 - 22 May 1942 .... 
as Captain Charles P. S. do Bartolome. 
.. Rear-Admiral 
Sir William C. M. Nicholson 
.. Rear-Admiral Frederick L. Field 
.. Rear-Admiral Cyril T. M. Fuller 
.. Rear-Admiral 
Sir A. Ernie Chatfield 
s. Rear-Admiral 
Roger R. C. Backhouse 
.. Rear--Admiral Charles M. Forbes 
.. Vice-Admiral 
Reginald G. H. Henderson 
.. Rear-Ainitral Bruce A. Frazer 
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A(6) DEPUTY CHIEFS OF NAVAL STAFF 
10 Jan. 1918 -1 May 1919 .. 
1 May 1919 -4 Aug. 1919 
4 Aug. 1919 -1 Nov. 1921 
1-Nov. 1921 - 15 May 1925 
15 may 1925 -1 May 1928 
1 May 1928 - 30 June 1930 
30 June 1930 - 9 Jan. 1933 
9 Jan. 1933 - 29 Oct. 1935 
29 Oct. 1935 - 14 Nov. 1938 
14 Nov. 1938 -1 June 1939 
1 June 1939 - 21 Oct. 1941 .. 
.... Vice-Admiral 
Sir Sydney R. Fremantle 
.... Rear-Admiral James A. Ferguson 
.... Vice-Admiral Sir 0smond de B. Brook 
.... Vice-Admiral Sir Roger J. B. Keyes 
.... 
Vice-Admiral 
Sir Frederick L. Field 
.. Vice-Admiral William VI. Fisher 
.... Vice-Admiral Frederic C. Dreyer 
.. Vice-Admiral Charles J. C. Little 
.... Vice-Admiral William M. James 
.... Rear-Admiral 
Andrew B. Cunningham 
..., Rear-Admiral T. S. V. Phillips 
PERMkTh2'TT SECRETARIES OF THE ADMIRALTY 
(Became a full member of Board of Admiralty 31 Oct. 1921) 
1911 -7 Aug. 1917 .... .. Sir V1. Graham Greene 
7 Aug. 1917 - 10 July 1936 .... .. Sir Osivyn A. R. Murray 
10 July 1936 -5 Dec. 1940 .. "" "" Sir R. H. Archibald Carter 
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A(I COMMANDERS IN CHIT? GRAND, ATLAUNTIC . 
A? 1D HOnl FL =. S 
29 Nov. 1916 -7 Apr. 1919 
(Grand Fleet) 
8 Apr. 1919 - 14 Aug. 1922 
(Atlantic Fleet - Dec. 1919) 
15 Aug-. 1922 - 14 Aug. 1924 . '. 
15 Aug. 1924 - 14 Aug. 1927 . '. 
15 Aug. 1927 - 16 Apr. 1929 .. 
17 Apr. 1929 - 25 May 1930 
26 May 1930 - 5 Oct. 1931 
6 Oct. 1931 - 13 Sep. 1933 
(Home Fleet - March 1932) 
14 Sep. 1933 - 19 Aug. 1935 
20 Aug. 1935 - 11 Apr. 1938 
12 Agr. 1938 -1 Dec. 1940 .. 
.... Admiral Sir David Beatty 
(Earl, 1919) 
.... Admiral Sir Charles E. Madden 
.... Admiral Sir John M. de Robcck 
.... Admiral Sir Henry P. Oliver 
.... Admiral the Hon. 
Sir Hubert G. Brand 
.... Admiral Sir A. Ernie Chatfield 
.... Admiral Sir Michael H. Hod,; es 
.... Admiral Sir John D. Kelly 
.... Admiral Sir William H. D. Boyle 
(Earl of Cork °. Orrey, 1934) 
.... Admiral Sir Roger R. C. 
Backhous e 
.... Admiral Sir Charles I. I. Forbes 
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A(s) CO MiANDERS Irr CHIEF rr2EDITERRANFWIr FLEET 
26 Aug. 1917 - 25 July 1919 .. 
26 July 1919 - 14 May 1922 .. 
15 May 1922 -7 June 1925 
-8 June 1925 -7 June 1928 
8 June 1928 - 26 May 1930 .. 
27 May 1930 - 30 Oct. 1932 
51 Oct. 1952 - 19 Mar. 1936 
20 Mar. 1936 - 5 June 1939 
6 June 1959 . - 
1 Apr. 1942 
.... Admiral Hon. 
Sir Somerset A. Gough-Calthorpe 
.... Admiral Sir John M. de Robeck 
.... Admiral Sir Osmond de B. Brock 
.... Admiral Sir Roger J. B. Keyes, 
Bart 
.... Admiral Sir Frederick L. Field 
.... Admiral Sir A. Ernte Chatfield 
.... Admiral Sir William W. Fisher 
.... Admiral Sir A. Dudley P. R. Pound. 
.... Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham 
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APPENDIX B: 
B(1) BRITISH SuBM BrrE BUILDING PROGRA t'! ES 1920 - 59 
1921 Estimates: 'X. 1'. 
1923 Estimates: '0.1' ('Oberon'). + 
1926 Estimates: Six '0' Class. 
1927 Estimates: Six 'P' Class. 
1928 Estimates: Four 'R' Class. x 
1929 Estimates: One 'River' ('G') Class, two 'S' Class. 
1930 Estimates: One 'Porpoise' Class, two 'S' Class. i 
1931 Estimates: One 
1932 Estimates: One 
1933 Estimates: Two 
1934 Estimates: One 
1935 Estimates: One 
1936 Estimates: One 
1937 Estimates: Sevi 
'River' Class, two 'S' Class. 
'River' -Class, two t St Class. ii 
'Porpoise' Classf two 'S' Class. 
'Porpoise' Class, two 'S' Class. 
'Porpoise' Class, one 'S' Class, one 'T' Class. 
'Porpoise' Class, four 'T' Class, three 'U' Class. 
an 'T' Class. 
1938 Estimates: Three 'T' Class. 
1939 Estimates & Supplementary Estimates: Seven 'T' Class, five 'S' Class, 
twelve 'U' Class. iii 
+ Plus 'A. O. l' & 'A. 0.2' for the Royal Australian Navy. 
x Two 'R' Class were cancelled. 
Three 'G' Class were deleted from the Estimates. 
i One 'G' Class postponed until 1931 Estimates, one 'Porpoise' Class 
included. 
ii One 'Porpoise' Class deferred for a year and one 'S' Class brought 
forward. 
iii Plus four ex-Turkish acquired. 
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B(s) BRITISH SUBAR] E BUILDITZG 1920 - 1939* 
DETAILS OF SUBM;: ARINE CLASSES 
TITLE DESCRIPTION TONNAGE 
'Y. 1' Experimental Cruiser submarine 2,425 
10.1' Patrol submarine 1,311 
'0' Class Patrol submarines 1,475 
'P' Class Patrol submarines 1,475 
'R' Class Patrol submarines 1,475 
'RIVER' Class Fleet submarines 1,850 
'PORPOISE' Class Minelayer submarines 1,520 
'S' Class Small Patrol submarines 640 
'T' Class Patrol submarines 1,090 
'U' Class Small Patrol submarines 540 
Six 'L' Class were transferred to H. M. Dockyards for 
delayed completion between 1923-26. 
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APPENDIX C: 
BRITISH NAVY ESTDI TES . AND 
ACTUAL EXP +l TDITURE 
1919 - 1939 
YEAR NET ESTD. IATES IM EXPE''DITURE 
(in thousand pounds) (in thousand pounds) 
1918-19 149,200 554,091 
1919-20 157,529 154,084 
1920-21 84,372 92,505 
1921-22 `82,479 75,896 
1922-23 64,884 57,492 
1925-24 58,000 54,064 
1924-25 55,800 55,694 
1925-26 60,500 60,005 
1926-27 58,100 57,145 
1927-28 58,000 58,123 
1928-29 57,500 57,139 
1929-30 55,865 55,988 
1930-31 51,739 52,274 
1931-32 51,605 51,015 
1932-33 50,476 50,164 
1953-34 53,570 53,444 
1934-35, 56,550 56,616,,. 
1935-36 60,050 64,888 
1936-37 69,930 80,976 
1937-38 78,065 78,259 
1938-39 93,707 96,396 
1939-40 63,399 99,429 
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APPENDIX D: BRITISH SUBMATRIPTE CLASSES 1900 - 1918 
() 'Holland' to 'U' Class l 
No. Builder Launched Completed 
1 Vickers Oct. 1901 Feb. 1903 
2 Feb. 1902 Aug. 1902 
3 May 1902 Aug. 1902 
4 May 1902 Feb. 1903 
5 June 1902 Feb. 1903 
(All were ordered in Dec. 1900 and built at Barrow-in-Furness) 
Length 65* feet 
Beam 114 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 105 tons 




Surface 250 B. H. P. 82 knots (No. 1 - 160 B. H. P. ) 
Submerged 74 S. H. P. 7 knots 
Hull Single 
Armament One 18 inch Bow T. T. 
Complement Two Officers, seven ratings. 
(These boats were originally designed without a periscope). 
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D2 
'A' Class. (All built at Barrow-in-Furness) 
No. Builder Ordered Launched Completed 
1 Vickers Dec. 1900 July 1902 July 1905 
2 Oct. 1902 Apr. 1905 July 1904 
5 May 1905. ' " 
4 June 1905 
5 Aug. 1905 Mar. 1904 Feb. 1905 
6 it Mar. 1905 
7 Jan. 1905 Apr. 1905 
8 n n " may 1905 
9 Feb. 1905 " 
10 June 1905 
11 Mar. 1905 July 1905 
12 Sep. 1905 
13 Apr. 1905 June 1905 
Length 105 feet (A. 5-18 - 99 feet) 
Bean 112 feet (A. 5-13 - 122 feet) 
Displacement 
Surface 165 tons (A. 5-13 - 190 tons) 
Submerged 180 tons (A. 5-13 - 205 tons) 
Engine Petrol 12 Cylinder (A. 5-15 - 16 cylinder) 
Screw 1 
Performance 
Surface 450 B. H. P. 10 knots (A. 5-13 - 550 B. H. P. 11- knots) 
Submerged 80 S. H. P. 42 knots (A. 5-13 - 150 S. H. P. 7 knots) 
Endurance 320 miles at 10 knots 
Hull Single 
Armament Two 18 inch Bow T. T. 
Complement Two Officers, nine Ratings. 
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D8 
'B' Class (All built at Barrow by Vickers) 
No. Ordered Launched Completed 
1 Mar. 1904 Oct. 1904 Apr. 1905 
2 Jan. 1905 Aug. 1905 Dec. 1905 
3 Sep. 1905 
4 Oct. 1905 Jan. 1906 
5 Nov. 1905 Feb. 1906 
6 " Mar. 1906 
7 
8 Jan. 1906 Apr. 1906 
9 
10 Mar. 1906 May 1906 
11 Feb. 1906 July 1906 
Length 143 feet 
Beam 152 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 285 tons 










(First British subs 
600 B. H. P. 12 knots 
190 S. H. P. 7 knots 
1,000 miles at 84 knots 
Single 
Two 18 inch T. T. s 
Two Officers, eleven Ratings 
marines to be fitted with fore hydroplanes. ) 
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D(4) 
'C' Class (All built by Vickers except 'C. 17-18') 
No. Completed No. Completed 
1 1906 10 1907 
2u it 
5 1907 12 1908 
4" 15 
5 1906 14 " 
6 1907 15 " 
7 16 
8 17 " Chatham Dockyard 
9" 18 
Length 143 feet 
Beam 152 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 290 tons 
Submerged 520 tons 
Engine Petrol - 
Screw 1 
Performance 
Surface 600 B. H. P. 12 knots 
Submerged 200 S. H. P. 7 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 1,000 miles at 81 knots 
Submerged 40 miles 
Hull Single 
Armament Two 18 inch Bow T. T. s 
Complement Two Officers, fourteen Ratings 
(Fitted with two periscopes) 
(C19-58 Built 1908-9: Submerged Speed 8 knots: Endurance 1500 miles) 
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D5 
'D' Class 
No. Builder Completed 
1 Vickers 1910 
2 " 
3 " 1911 
4 
5 1912 
6 n " 
7 Chatham Dockyard 1911 
8 1912 
Length 165 feet 
Beam 202 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 494 tons 
Submerged 620 tons (D. 1 - 595 tons) 
Engines Vickers Diesel 
Screws TWO 
Performance 
Surface 1,750'B. H. P. 16 knots (D. 1 - 1200 B. H. P. 142 knots) 
Submerged 550 S. H. P. 10 knots (D. 1 -9 knots) 
Endurance 
Surface 2,500 miles at 10 knots 
Submerged 60 miles 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Two 18 inch Bow 
One 18 inch Stern 
Guns Two 12 Pounders 
Complement Three Officers, 24 Ratings. 
(tp. 41 was the first British submarine to mount a deck gun. First class 
to be equipped with W/T in design - recognition of value in reconnaissance 
role. 













Vickers (Built for Royal 
Australian Navy) 
7-8 1918 Chatham Dockyard 
9 1915 Vickers 
(orders placed 10 Aug. 1914 Vickers 
in 1912-13) 11 Sep. 1914 Vickers 
12 Oct. 1914 Chatham Dockyard 
13 Dec. 1914 Chatham Dockyard 
14 Dec. 1914 Vickers 
15 Oct. 1914 Vickers 
16 Feb. 1915 Viokers 
17 Apr. 1915 Vickers 
*18 June 1915 Vickers 
(Orders placed 19 July 1915 Vickers 
in Nov. 1914) 20 Aug. 1915 Vickers 
E. 21 Type 
21 Oct. 1915 Vickers 
22 Nov. 1915 Vickers 
23 Dec. 1915 Vickers 
24 Jan. 1916 Vickers 
25 Oct. 1915 Beardmore (Clyde) 
26 Dec. 1915 Beardmore 
('E. 10-18' took from 20 to 50 months to complete from date of order. 
Of the subsequent 'E' class submarines, several were completed in eight 
to ten months. ) 
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D(6) 
'E' Class (continued) 
No. Completed Builder 
27 Aug. 1917 Yarrow (Clyde) 
28 ' (cancelled) 
29 Oct. 1915 Armstrong Whitworth (Tyne) 
50 Deo. - 1915 Armstrong1whitworth 
51 Dec. 1915 Scotts (Greenock) 
52 Oct. 1916 White (Cowes) 
35 Nov. 1916 Thorneycroft (Southampton) 
54 Mar. 1917 Thorneyoroft 
35 July 1916 John Brown (Clyde) 
56. Nov. 1916 Sohn Brown 
57 Mar. 1916 Fairfield (Clyde) 
58 July 1916 Fairfield 
59 Oct. 1916' Palmers (Tyne)/Armstrong Whitworth 
40 May 1917 Palmerz/Armstrong Whitworth 
41 Feb. 1916 Cammell Laird (Birkenhead) 
42 June 1916 Camme3l Laird 
45 Mar. 1916 Swan Hunter (Tyne). 
44 July 1916 Swan Hunter 
45 Aug. 1916 Cammell Laird 
46 Oct. 1916 Cammell Laird 
47 Oct. 1916 Fairfield/Beardmore , ý. 
48 Mar. 1917 Fairfield/Beardmore,,. 
49 Dec. 1916 Swan Hunter 
50 Jan. 1917 John Brown 
51 Jan. 1917 Scotts 
52 Mar. 1917 Denny (Dumbarton) 
55 Mar. 1916 Beardmore 
54 May 1916 Beardmore 
55 Mar. 1916 Denny 
56 Aug. 1916 Denny 
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D(6) 
'E' Class (continued) 
Length 181 feet 
Beam 222 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 660 tons 
Submerged 800 tons 
Engines Vickers-Admiralty diesel 
Screws Two 
Performance 
Surface 1,600 B. H. P. 152 knots 
Submerged 840 S. H. P. 10 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 3,000 miles at 10 knots; 2,600 miles at 10 knots (2nd 
group) 
Submerged 99 miles at 5 knots 
Hull Saddle Tank 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Two 18 inch Bow 
Two 18 inch Beam: One 18 inch Stern 
(Minelayer one 18 inch Bow) 
Guns One 12 Pounder or 4 inch 
Complement Three Officers, 28 Ratings 
('E. 24', 1341, t41', 145-46', 1511 were all fitted as minelayers. They 
had no beam tubes but had minetubes and carried twenty mines. ) 
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D(7) 
'S'-Class 
No. Builder Ordered "Completed 
1 Scotts Aug. 1914 
2") 1912-15 May 1914 
5") Sep. 1915 
Length 148 feet 
Beam 14 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 252 tons 




Surface 650 B. H. P. 154 knots 
Submerged 400 S. H. P. 8-2 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 1,600 miles at 8 knots 
Submerged 75 miles at 4-5 knots 
Hull Double 
Armament Two 18 inch Bow T. T. s 
Complement Two Officers, sixteen Ratings. 
(Transferred to Italian Government in 1916) 
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D(8) 
'W' Class (All built by Armstrong Whitworth) 
No. Ordered Completed 
1) Jan. 1915 
2 1912-15 May 1915 
S) Feb. 1916 
4 June 1916 
Length 150 feet ('W. 1-2' 1711 feet) 
Beam 17 feet ('W. 1-2' 15 feet) 
Displacement 
" Surface 520 tons ('W. 1-2' - 331 tons) 
Submerged 490 tons ('W. 1-2' - 510 tons) 
Engines Schneider Lambert diesel 
Screws Two 
Performance 
Surface 760 B. H. P. 15 knots ('W. i' - 710 B. H. P. ) 
Submerged 480 S. H. P. 82 knots 
Endurance 2,500 miles at 9 knots 
Hull Double 
Armament 
Torpedo Tub es Two 18 inch Bow 
Gun One 2 Pounder 
Complement Two Officers, sixteen Ratings 
(Transferred to Italian Government in 1916) 
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.D9 
'Nautilus' 
No. Builder Ordered Completed` 
N. l Vickers 1912-13 Oct. ' 1917 
Length 240 feet 
Beam 26 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 1,270 tons 
Submerged 1,694 tons 
Engines Vickers diesel 
Screws TWO 
Performance 
Surface 3,700 B. H. P. -17 knots 
Submerged 1,000 S. H. P. '10 knots 
Endurance 5,300 miles at 11 knots 
Hull Double 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes One 21 inch Bow 
Four 18 inch Beam 
One 21 inch Stern 
Gun One 12 Pounder 
Complement Four Officers, 58 Ratings 
(Eäperimental diesel-powered, ocean-going sub ririe - failed to reach 
operational status. ) 
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D(1O) 
Swordfish' 
No. Completed Builder 
(Ordered 1912-13) S. 1 July 1916 Scotts 
Length 231 feet 
Beam 23 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 904 tons 
Submerged 1,384 tons 
Engines Laurenti steam turbines 
Screws Two 
Performance 
Surface 3,750 B. H. P. 18 knots 
Submerged 1,500 S. H. P. 10 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 3,000 miles at 8 knots 
Hull Double 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Two 21 inch Bow 
Four 18 inch Beam 
Guns Two 12 Pounders 
Complement Four Officers, 38 Ratings 
(Experimental steam-driven, ocean-going submarine which was finally 
converted to a 
'surface 
patrol boat. ) 
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D(U) 
'V' Class- (A11 built by Vickers) 
No. Ordered Completed 
1) May 1915 
2 1912-15 Nov. 1915 
5) Jan. 1916 
4) Mar. 1916 
Length 148 feet 
Beam 16'* feet 
Displacement, 
Surface 564 tons 
Submerged 486 tons 
Engines Vickers diesel 
Screws Two 
Performance 
Surface 900 B. H. P. 14 knots 
Submerged 380 S. H. P. 9 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 1,200 miles at 14 knots; 3,000 miles at 9 knots 
Submerged 74 miles at 5 knots 
Hull Double 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Two 18 inch Bow 
Gun One 2 Pounder 
Complement Two Officers, sixteen Ratings 
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D(]. 2) 
'F' Class 
No. Ordered Completed Builder 
1) Aug. 1915 Chatham Dockyard 
2) 1912-15 Aug. 1917 Whites 
5) July 1916 Thorneycroft 
Length 151 feet 
Beam 16 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 555 tons 
Submerged 525 tons 
Engines M. A. N. diesels 
Screws Two 
Performance 
Surface 900 B. H. P. 142 knots 
Submerged 400 S. H. P. 9 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 1,000 miles at 14 knots; 8,000 miles at 9 knots 
Submerged 90 miles at 3 knots 
Hull Double 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Two 18 inch Bow 
One 18 inch Stern 
Gun One 2 Pounder 
Complement Two Officers, sixteen Ratings 


















Length 186 feet 
Beam 221 feet 
Completed Builder 
Nov. 1915 
Mar. 1916 Chatham 
Apr. 1916 Dockyard 
Jan. 1916 
Feb. 1916 








Aug. 1917 Scott 
Displacement 
Surface 693 tons 
Submerged 964 tons 
Engines Vickers diesels 
Screws Two 
Performance 
Surface 1,600 B. H. P. 152 knots (design) 14 knots (actual) 
Submerged 840 S. H. P. 10 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 1,900 miles at 14 knots; 2,400 miles at 12j knots 
Submerged 95 miles at 5 knots 
Hull Double 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Two 18 inch Bow 
Two 18 inch Beam 
One 21 inch Stern 
Guns one 5 inch H, /A or one 12 Pounder H/A 
Complement Three Officers, 28 Ratings, 




























480 B. H. P. 
320 S. H. P. 
13 knots 
11 knots (620 S. H. P. for 1 hour. ) 
Endurance 
Surface 2,000 miles at 13 knots; 1,600 miles at 10 knots 
Submerged 30 miles at 5 knots 
Hull Single 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Four 18 inch Bow 
Gun One 6 Pounder 
Complement Three Officers, twenty Ratings. 
(All boats of this class 'H. 1 - 20' were based on designs by the 
Electric Boat Co. of America. 'H. 1 - 20 were constructed in the United 
States and were to be delivered unarmed to Canadian Vickers. However, 
the latter boats were interned by the U. S. Government and not released 
until after America's entry into the war in 1917. Only 'H. ll' and 'H. 12' 
served with the Royal Navy since 'H. 14 - 15' were transferred to the 
Royal Canadian Navy and 'H. 13' and 'H. 16 - 20' to the Chilean Navy. ) 
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D 15 
'H. 21' Class 
No. Ordered Completed 
21-22 Jan. 1918 
23-25 Jan. - Apr. 1918 
26-27 Feb. 1917 Mar. 1918 (27-1919) 
28-32 June 1918 (51/52-1919) 
33-34 1919 
39-40 June - 1919 




























480 B. H. P. 13 knots 








1,400 miles at 11 knots; 2,200 miles at 82 knots 
80 hours at 2 knots; 1.6 hours at 74 knots. 
Single (Pressure hull divided into 7 watertight 
compartments. ) 
Four 21 inch bow 
Three Officers, twenty Ratings 
(The original 'H' class design was slightly modified by the Admiralty 
to include a 21 inch torpedo armament instead of an 18 inch. Nine of the 
second series remained in service at the outbreak of World War II. ) 
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D 16 
'J' Class 
No. Ordered Completed Builder 
1 Apr. 1916 Portsmouth Dockyard 
2) July 1916 to It 
5 Jan. 1915 June 1916 Pembroke Dockyard 
4) July 1916 to of 
5 June 1916 Devonport Dockyard 
6) Aug. 1916 It 
Length 275 feet 
Beam 23 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 1,210 tons 
Submerged 1,820 tons ('J. 7' - 1,760 tons) 
Engines Vickers diesel 
Screws TWO 
Performance 
Surface 3,600 B. H. P. 192 knots 
Submerged 1,550 S. H. P. 92 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 2,600 miles at 192 knots; 5,000 miles at l2- knots 
Submerged 60 miles at S knots 
Hull Double 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Four 18 inch Bow 
Two 18 inch Beam 
Gun One 3 inch H/A or One 4 inch 
Complement Five Officers, 39 Ratings 
('J. 7' (modified 'J' class) ordered May 1916, completed Sept. 1917 at 
Devonport Dockyard. ) 
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D(17) 
'K' Class 
No: Ordered Completed Builder 
1 Aug. 1915 Apr. 1917 Portsmouth Dockyard 
2 Feb. 1917 
5 June 1915 Sep. 1916 Vickers 
4 Jan. 1917 
5 May 1917 Portsmouth Dockyard 
6 June 1917 Devonport ^ 
7' ' July 1916 
8 Aug. 1915 Mar. 1917 Vickers 





11 Feb. 1917 Armstrong 
12 Aug. 1917- _p 
22(ex 13) Oct. 1917 Fairfield 
14". May 1917 ." 
15 Mar. 1918 Scott 
16 Feb. 1916 Mar. 1918 Beardmore 
17 Mar. 1917 Vickers 
Length 338 feet 
Beam 262 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 1,883 tons 
Submerged ;, 2; 560 tons 
Engines Parsons & Brown Curtiss steam turbines 
Screws Two 
Performance 
Surface 10,000 B. H. P. 24 knots (Aux. diesel generator 800 B. H. P. ) 
Submerged 1,400 S. H. P. 9 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 3,000 miles at 132 knots 
Submerged 85 miles at 14 knots 
Hull Double 
- 464 - 
D(17)_ 
'K' Class (continued) 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Four 18 inch Bow 
Four 18 inch Beam 
Two 18 inch External Mountings (Upper Deck) 
Guns One 3 inch H/A 
Two 4 inch 
Complement Five Officers, 45 Ratings 
Lost: - 'K. 1' (1917); 'K. 4' (1918); 'K. 13' (salved - renumbered 'K. 22'); 
'K. 5' (1921). 
(The 'K' class submarines were the only steam driven submarines in British 
Service. Steam was adopted in order to obtain greater speed than offered 
by existing diesel engines so that these boats could accompany the Fleet. 
In addition to steam turbines a diesel oil engine was fitted for 
(1) driving the dynamo charging the batteries (2) supplying propulsive 
power during the interval of changing from steam to motor propulsion or 
vice-versa. ) 
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D(181 





Laid Down Launched 
June 1918 Aug. 1919 
Completed Builder 







551 feet (o. a. ), 547 feet (p. p. ) 
28 feet 
17 feet 10 inches (full load) 
Surface 2,140 tons (2,500 tons +) full load 
1,710 tons (1,890 tons +) Standard 
Submerged 2,770 tons (2,800+) 
Engines Geared Steam Turbines 
Screws Two 
Performance 
Surface 10,000 B. H. P. 24 knots (221+) 
Submerged 1,400 S. H. P. 9 knots (8+) 
Endurance 
Surface 2,240 miles at 8 knots 
Submerged 1 hour at 8 knots; 11 hours at 5 knots 
Hull Double 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Six 21 inch Bow 
Four 21 inch Beam '(Four 18 inch Beam+) 
Two 21 inch Stern 
Guns Three 4 inch 
Two Lewis M. G. 
Complement Six Officers, 59 Ratings 
('K. 23-25,27-281 were cancelled) 
(Alterations were made to the forward topside buoyancy tanks to give more 
forward buoyancy in a seaway. ) 




(Orders placed 1 
Feb. 1916) 2 
(Orders placed 3 

































































H. M. Dockyard 
Vickers 
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D(19) 
IL' Class (continued) 
Length 258j feet ('L. 1-8' - 251 feet) 
Beam 25z feet 
Displacement 
Surface 890 tons (full load); 760 tons (Standard) 




Surface 2,400 B. H. P. 172 knots ('L. 1-8' - 17.2) 
Submerged 1,600 S. H. P. 10- knots 
Endurance 
Surface 2,850 at 17.6 knots (A) ('L. 1-8' - 2,950 at 17.2 (A) ) 
5,800 at 10 knots (LE) & (L) 
Submerged 200 miles at 2 knots 
Hull Saddle Tank 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Four 21 inch Bow ('L. 1-8' - Four 18 inch Bow) 
Two 18 inch Beam 
Gun one 4 inch ('L. 1-8' -3 inch) 
Complement Three Officers, 36 Ratings (A) 
(5 + 52 (L) & (LE) ) 
(A): Admiralty; (L): Lipscomb; (LE): Lenton. 
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D( 20 
'L. 50'. C1ass 
No. Ordered Laid Down Completed Builder 
50-51 ? Cammell Laird 
52 Feb. 1917 1921 Armstrong 
55* 1917 1925 
54* 1924 Denny 
55-58 Apr. 1917 (55)1918 (56)1919 Fairfield 
59 ? Beardmore 
60-61 ? CA=ell Laird 
62 Apr. 1918 1918 ? Fairfield 
65-64 ? Scott 
65-66 ? Swan Hunter 
67-68 ? Armstrong 
69-70 Apr. 1917 1917 *(69)1925 Beardmore 
71-72 (71)1920 Scott 
75 ? Denny 
74 Apr. 1918 1918 ? 
* Completed H. M. Dockyards 1923-26. 
Length 235 feet 
Beam 232 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 960 tons (full load); 845 tons (Standard) 
Submerged . 




Surface 2,400 B. H. P. 171 knots 
Submerged 1,600 S. H. P. 102 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 5$, 000 miles at 174 knots; 4,500 miles at 8 knots 
Submerged 80 miles at 5 knots 
Hull Saddle Tank 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Six 21 inch Bow 
Guns Two 4 inch 
Complement Four Officers, 58 Ratings 
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D(2]-) 
'b4' Class 
No. Ordered Completed Builder 
1 (ex K. 18) Feb. 1916 1918 Vickers 
2 (ex K. 19) May 1916 1920 
3 (ex K. 20) Aug. 1916 1920 Armstrong-Whitworth 





















1,600 tons (full load); 1,450 tons (Standard) 
1,950 tons (Standard) 
Diesel '' 
Two 
2,400 B. H. P. 152 knots 
1,600 S. H. P. 92 knots 
4,000 miles at 11 knots; 5,840 miles at 10 knots 
80 miles at 2 knots 
Double 
Four 18 inch Bow ('M. 5' - Four 21 inch Bow) 
One 12 inch (MK 9) 
One 5 inch H/A 
Six Officers, 59 Ratings (61) 
('M. 2' converted to experimental seaplane-carrier - foundered 1932) 
('M. 3' converted to experimental minelayer - sold. 1932) 
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D(22) 
'R' Class 
No. Ordered Laid Down Completed Builder 
1-4) 1917 (4) 1919 Chatham Dockyard 
5-6 Cancelled 
7) Oct. June 1918 Vickers 
8) 1917 July 1918 
9-10) Armstrong-, Whitworth 
11-12) July 1918 Cammell Laird 
Length 163 feet 
Beam 1513 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 420 tons (full load); 385 tons (Standard) 




Surface 240 B. H. P. 92 knots 
Submerged 1,200 S. H. P. 15 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 2,200 miles at 92 knots 
Submerged 15 miles at 15 knots; 240 miles at 4 knots 
Hull Single 
Armament 
Torpedo Tub es Six 18 inch Bow 
Guns One 4 inch 
Complement Two Officers, twenty Ratings 
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D(23) 
ox. l1., I 
Ordered No. Launched- Completed Builder 
Aug. 1921 '%. 1' June 1923 Sep. 1925 Chatham Dockyard 
Length 561 feet 10 inches (o. a. ); 350 feet (p. p. ) 
Beam 29 feet 10 inches 
Draught 15 feet 9 inches 
Displacement 
Surface 3,050 tons (full load); 2,425 tons (Standard) 
2,280 tons (N. M. M. ) 




Surface 6,000 B. H. P. 191 knots 
Submerged 2,600 S. H. P. (2,400 designed) 9 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 12,40 miles at 12 knots 
Hiill Double 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Six 21 inch Bow 
Guns Four 5.2 inch (Twin turrets -- Director firing - 
9 feet range finder - horizontal base, worked from 
within each turret. ) 
Complement Six Officers, 104 Ratings 
(Designed to fight as much on the surface as submerged. Twin gun. 
mountings carried forward and aft of the conning tower, well clear of 
the waterline on., a high.. casing built on top of a double hull. At time 
of completion '%. 1' was the largest submarine in the world. ) 
N. M. M.: National Maritime Museum. 
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D(24) 
'Oberon' (ex '0.1') 
Name Laid Down Launched Completed Builder , 
Oberon 1924 Sep. 1926 1927 Chatham, Dockyard- 
Length 275 feet (o. a. ); 2664 feet (p. p. ) 
Beam 28 feet 
Draught 151 feet (full load) 
Displacement 
Surface 1,490 tons (full load); 1,511 tons (Standard) 
Submerged 1,805 tons (Standard) 
Engines Vickers diesel (6 cylinder) 
Screws Two 
Performance 
Surface 5,000 B. H. P. 15 knots 
Submerged 1,350 S. H. P. 9 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 6,500 miles at 10 knots 
Hull Saddle Tank 
Amament 
Torpedo Tubes Six 21 inch Bow 
Two 21 inch Stern 
Gun One 4 inch 
Complement Five Officers, 51 Ratings 
(With only two exceptions - 'Swordfish' and 'Nautilus' - all previous 
British submarines had been numbered. '0.1', renamed 'Oberon' before 
launching, and all subsequent British submarines were named from the 
beginning. Shortly after the outbreak of World War II, the practice of 
numbering only was restored. Consequently only the 'T' and 'U' class 
submarines of the 1959 Programme received names. However, despite official 
ruling to the contrary, most submarines crews adopted unofficial names 
with the initial letter S, T, or U as applicable. In early 1945 the 
Admiralty., in deference to the Submarine Service, returned to the policy 
of naming submarines and existing unofficial names were allowed to stand. ) 
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D(25 
101 Class (Improved 'Oberon$) 
Name Laid Down Launched Completed Builder 
Odin May 1928 'Chatham Dockyard 
Olympus Dec. 1928 Beardmore 
Orpheus 1927 Feb. 1929 1929 
Osiris ) May 1928 ) Viokers-Armatrongs 
Oswald-) June 1928 n 
Otus ) Aug. 1928 ) 
Length: 265 feet (o. a. ); 265 feet (p. p. ) 
Beam 50 feet 
Draught 152 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 1,750 tons (full load); 1,475 tons (Standard) 
Submerged 2,035 tons (Standard) 
Engines Admiralty diesel 
Screws Two 
Performance 
surface 4,400 B. H. P. 172 knots 
Submerged 1,520 S. H. P. 9 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 8,500 miles at 10 knots; 10,000 miles at 8'knots 
Hull Saddle Tank 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Six 21 inch Bow 
Two 21 inch Stem 
Gun one 4 inch 
Complement Five Officers, 51 Ratings 
('Oberon' had been fitted with the forward hydroplanes at the bottom of 
the pressure hull. In the '0' class and la ter submarines these 'planes 
were moved to the top of the pressure hull and, although resulting in a 
slower dive, this move allowed the 'planes to be turned-in when not in 
use, thereby making them less liable to damage and allowing greater ease 
of access for maintenance. ) 




parthian July 1929 
Perseus May 1929 
Phoenix Oct. 1929 
Poseidon June 1929 
Proteus July 1929 
Pandora Aug. 1929 
Completed Builder 
1930 Chatham Dockyard 
of Vickers -Amstrongs 




Length 289 feet 2 inches (o. a. ); 271 feet (p. p. ) 
Beam 29 feet 94 inches 
Draught 15 feet 3A)1-2 inches (full load) 
Displacement 
Surface 1,760 tons (full load); 1,559 tons (Standard) 




Surface 4,640 B. H. P. 17-fl knots. 
Submerged 1,520 S. H. P. 9 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 8,400 miles at 10 knots; 10,000 miles at 8 knots 
Hull Saddle Tank 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Six 21 inch Bow 
Two 21 inch Stern 
Gun One 4 inch 
Complement Five Officers, 51 Ratings 
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D(27) 
'R' Class 
Name Launched Completed Builder 
Rainbow May 1950 1931 Chatham Dockyard 
Regent June 1930 Vickers-Armstrong 
Regulus 
Rover """ 
Length 289 feet 2 inches (o. a. ); 275 feet (p. p. ) 
Beam 29 feet 94 inches 
Draught 15 feet 1O inches (full load) 
Displacement 
Surface 1,762 tons (full load); 1,574 tons (Standard) 




Surface 4,400 B. H. P. 172 knots 
Submerged 1,520 S. H. P. 9 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 8,000 miles at 10 knots; 10,000 miles at 8 knots 
Submerged 1 hour at 9 knots; 50 hours at S knots 
Hull Saddle Tank: diving depth 500 feet 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Six 21 inch Bow 
Two 21 inch Stern 
Gun one 4. &7 inch 
Complement Five officers, 51 Ratings 
(The 10', 'P', and 'R' classes suffered 75% losses when transferred to 
the Mediterranean during World War II0emphasising the unsuitability of 
large submarines in coastal or shallow waters. ) 
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D(281 
'Riyer'Class (ex 'G' Class) 
Name Launched Completed Builder 
Thames Jan. 1932 1932 Vickers Ärmstrongs 
Clyde Mar. 1934 it 
Severn -Jan. 1934 
Length 345 feet (o. a. ) 325 feet (p. p. ) 
Beam 28 feet 














2,200 tons; 1835 tons (Standard) 
('Thames': 2,165 tons; 1,810 tons (Standard). ) 
2,710 tons ('Thames': 2,680 tons) 
Admiralty Diesels 
Two 
10,000 B. H. P. 212 knots 
('Thames': 7,500-10,000: 202-214 knots) 
2,500 S. H. P. 10 knots 
10,000 miles at 8 knots; 2,800 miles at 21 knots 
('Thames': 10,000 miles at 10 knots)' 
90 miles at 3 knots; 10 miles at 10 knots 
30 hours at 3 knots; 1 hour at 10 knots 
Double 
Torpedo Tubes Six 21 inch Bow 
Gun . One 
4 inch (or 4.7 inch) 
Complement Five Officers, 56 Ratings 
(These submarines were the final British attempt to produce a fleet 
model. A speed of 212 knots was obtained using diesel engines but contem- 
porary capital ships were approaching 30 knots speed and therefore interest 
in fleet submarines declined. More so as submarine tonnage was limited 
ender the 1930 London Naval Treaty and two patrol submarines ('T' class) were 
possible for the approximate tonnage of 1 'River' class submarine. ) 
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D 29 
'Porpoise' Class 
Name Launched Completed Builder 
Porpoise Aug. 1932 1953 Vickers Armstrong 
Grampus Feb. 1936 1936 Chatham Dockyard 
Narwhal Aug. 1955 Vickers-Armstrong 
Rorqual July 1956 1937 
Cachalot Dec. 1937 1938 Scotts 
Seal Sep. 1938 1939 Chatham Dockyard 
Length 2922 feet (o. a. ); 2712 feet (p. p. ); 
(Porpoise 288 feet (o. a. ); 267 feet (p. p. ) ) 
Beam 252 feet (Porpoise 294 feet) 
Draught 17 feet (full load) (Porpoise 15 feet) 
Displacement 
Surface 1,805 tons (full load; )l, 555 tons (Standard) 
(Porpoise 1,770 tons (full load); 1500 tons (Standard) ) 
Submerged 2,115 tons (Porpoise 2,060 tons) 
Engines Admiralty diesel 
Screws Two 
Performance 
Surface 5,300 B. H. P. 16 knots (with mines) (15 knots design speed) 
Submerged 1,630 S. H. P. 84 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 7,400 miles at 10 knots 
Hull Double 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Six 21 inch Bow 
Gun one 4 inch 
Mines Fifty 
Complement Five Officers, 54 Ratings 
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D 30 
IS' Class (1932) 
Name Launched Builder 
(Swordfish Nov. 1931 Chatham Dockyard 
Ist (Sturgeon Jan. 1952 
Group (Seahorse Nov. 1952 
(1G) (Starfish Mar. 1935 
(Sealion Mar. 1954 : Cammell Laird. 
(Shark Mahr 1954 Chatham Dockyard 
2nd (Salmon Apr. 1934 Cammell Laird 
Group (snapper Nov. 1934 Chatham Dockyard 
(2G) (Seawolf Nov. 1955 Scotts 
(Spearfish Apr. 1936 Cammell Laird 
(Sunfish Sep. 1936 Chatham Dockyard 
(Sterlet Sep. 1957 it 
(Another 50 units comprising a 3rd Group were built between 1941-45. ) 
Length 2021 feet (o. a. ) (1G); 208 feet (o. a. ) (2G); 
187 feet (p. p. ) (1G); 193 feet (p. p. ) (2G) 
Beam 24 feet 
Draught (mean) 12 feet (1G); 13 feet (2G) 
Displacement 
Surface 735 tons; 640 tons (Standard) (1G) 
765 tons; 670 tons (Standard) (2G) 
Submerged 935 tons (1G); 960 tons (2G) 
Engines Admiralty diesel 
Screws. Two 
Performance 
Surface 1,550 B. H. P. 14.3 knots 
Submerged 1,500 S. H. P. 9.6 knots (1 hour) 
Endurance 
Surface 5,600 miles at 10 knots 
Submerged 36 hours at 2 knots and 1 hour at 10 knots (1G) 
45 hours at 3 knots (2G) 
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D(O) 
IS' Class (continued) 
Hull Saddle Tank 
Diving Depth 300 feet 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Six 21 inch Bow 
Gun One 3 inch H/A 
Complement Four Officers, 52 Ratings: 34 Ratings (2G) 
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D(31) 
'T' Class 
Name Launched Builder 
Triton Oct. 1937 Vickers Armstrongs 
*Thetis June 1938 Cammell Laird 
Tribune Dec. 1938 Scotts 
Trident Dec. 1938 Cainnmell Laird 
Triumph Feb. 1938 Vickers Armstrongs 
Taku May 1938 Camaell Laird 
Thistle Oct. 1938 Vickers Armstrongs 
Triad May 1939 it 
Truant May 1939 of " 
Foundered Liverpool Bay 1 June 1939. Salved April 1940 and renamed 





















275 feet (o. a. ), 245 feet 3 inches (p. p. ) 
('Triton' 277 feet (o. a. ), 265 feet (p. p. ). ) 
262 feet ('Triton' 26 feet) 
14 feet 7 inches 
1,325 tons ('Triton' 1,330 tons; 1,095 tons (Standard)) 
1,573 tons ('Triton' 1,595 tons) 
Admiralty Diesels (6 cylinder) (also Vickers, Sulzer, 
" and M. A. N. ) 
Two 
2,500 B. H. P. 154 knots 
1,450 S. H. P. 9 knots 
8,000 miles at 10 knots, 4,500 miles at 11 (foul bottom) 
55 hours at 24 knots 
Saddle Tank 
300 feet 
Eight 21 inch Bow (6 internal; 2 external) 
Two 21 inch Beam (later turned aft plus one external 
stern tube. ) 
One 4 inch 
Five Officers, 51 Ratings 
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D(52)_ 
'U' Class 
Name Launched Builder 
Undine Oct. 1957 Vickers Armstrongs 
Unity Feb. 1938 it 
Ursula Feb. 1958 ". " 
(Further 46 units built between 1940-45. ) 
Length 191 feet (o. a. ); 1714 feet (p. p. ) 
Beam 16 feet 5 inches 
Draught (mean). 14 feet 
Displacement 
Surface 630 tons; 540 tons (Standard) 
Submerged 730 -tons ' 
Engines Admiralty Diesels (6 cylinder) 
Screws Two 
Performance 
Surface 625 B. H. P. 114 knots 
Submerged 825 S. H. P. 9 knots 
Endurance 
Surface 4,050 miles at 10 knots 
Submerged 60 hours at 2 knots; 2 hours at 9 knots. 
Hull Single 
Diving Depth 200 feet 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes Six 21 inch Bow (4 internal; 2 external) 
Gun One 12 Pounder or 3 inch A/A (2G) 
Complement Three Officers, 54 Ratings (L): 33 Ursula (LG): 
27 Unity and Undine (LG) 
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APPENDIX E: PRELIMINARY DESIGN PROPOSALS FOR 
CERTAIN SUBMARINE MODELS AND CLASSES 
E1 PROPOSED DESIGN OF STEAM POWERED FLEET SUBMARINE 
D. N. C. to Third Sea Lord, 21 Nov. 1915, N. M. M., Tennyson-d'Eyncourt 
papers. 
(Some papers contain reference to pre-war Tactical Exercises 
at War College. ) 
Length .... .. 558 feet (oa) 
Beam .... .. 29 feet 
Displacement: 
Surface . .... 1660 tons 
Submerged .... 2660 tons 
Engines: Steam driven geared turbines 
Speed: 
Surface . .... 24 knots 
Submerged .... 10 knots 
Endurance: 1,100 n. miles at 24 knots 
2,500 n. miles at cruising speed 
Armament: 
Torpedo tubes .. 2 bow 
4-21 inch beam 
2 stern 
Guns .... .. 2-3 inch A. A. 
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E2 
r, . ~.., . 
SMALL TYPE -' SUBMARINES 
Financial 'L' or 'L. 50' class Proposed new construction Resulting no. s 
Year under 12 yrs of age to be completed under 12 years 
at end of year (Programme year in brackets) at and of year 
1951-52 10 (& 11H') 2 (1929) 15 
1952-55 72 (1950) 11 
as _ý 
1955-54 62 (1951) 12 
1954-55 60 12 
1955-56 52 (1955)+ 151J 
1956-57 22 (1954)+ 12 
1957-58 12 (1955)+ 15 
1958-59 00 12 
+ Provisional only 
In addition to the submarines shown in the table it was intended 
that there would be the following additional boats at the end of the 
financial year 1951-32, according to the existing approved scrapping 
programme: - 
Five 'L' or 'L. 50' class, five 'H' class, 'R. 4'. All under 
thirteen years of age. 
täß iP 
Six 'L' class under fourteen years. 
One 'L' class under fifteen years. 




ALTERNATIVE 'S' CLASS DESIGNS PREPARED BY D. N. C. 
'5.1' 'S. 2' 
Length overall 177 feet 6 inches 196 feet 
Diam. of P. H. 15 15 
Displacements: Geneva 604 tons 703 tons 
Surface 690 tons 800 tons 
Submerged about 800 tons about 920 tons 
B. H. P.. main engines 1450 1650 
Speed, Surface 14 knots 14, knots 
B. H. P. motors 840 1000- 
Speed. Submerged. 9 knots 9 knots 
&idurance (Surface),, 3250 miles at 9 knots 5250 miles-at 9 knots 
(Submerged) 50 miles at 4. knots 75 miles at 4 knots 
Armament 3 inch H. A. gun 3 inch H. A. gun 
=2 Lewis guns 2 Lewis guns 
4-21 inch T. T. 6-21 inoh, T. T. 
8 Torpedoes 12 Torpedoes, 
Diving 
. 
Depth. 300 feet 500 feet 
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E(4) 
SKETCH DESIGNS PREPARED BY D. N. C., 19 APRIL 1954 
FOR 1000 TONS SUBMARINE 
Design A Design B 
Length overall 260 feet 250,; feet 
Beam 22 feet . 22-feet 
Mean Surface Draught 15 feet 6 inches 15 feet 7 inches 
Surface Displacement 1260 tons 1195 tons 
Standard 1065 tons 990 tons 
Submerged " 1540 tons 1455 tons 
B. H. P. of Engines. 2500 tons 2500 tons 
Speed at Surface Displacement 14.8 knots 15 knots 
Endurance at 8 knots 9,500 miles 11,000 miles 
Endurance at. 11 knots 6,000 miles 7,200 miles 
H. P. of Motors 1500 1500 
Submerged Speed 9 knots 9 knots 
Submerged Endurance, at 9 knots 2 hours 1 hour 
n" at 12 knots, 80, hours 55 hours 
at 2 knots 64 hours 42 hours 
Bow Torpedo Tubes 6 6 
External Torpedo Tubes 4 4 
Spare Torpedoes 6 6 
Guns S inoh/2 Lewis 5 inch/2 Lewis 
Complement 50 48 
Diving Depth 500 feet 300 feet 
(Submarine intended for use in the Far East to replace 'Odin', 'Parthian' 
and 'Rainbow' Classes. ) 
- 486 - 
E(5) 
SKETCH DESIGN PREPARED BY D. N. C., 19- APRIL 1934 
FOR 400 TONS SUBMARINE 
Length, overall .... .. .... 166 feet 6 inches 
Beam, .... .... .. .... '15 feet 9 inches 
Mean Draught in diving trim .... 13 feet 8 inches 
Surface Displacement . .. .... -, 460 tons. 
Standard Displacement ... .... 420 tons 
Submerged Displacement .. .... 535 tons 
B. H. P. of Engines .. .. .... 525 
Surface Speed .... .. .... 11. knots 
Endurance at 10 blots .. .... 2000 miles 
H. P. of Main Motors .. .. .... 450 
Submerged Speed . .. .. .... 9 knots 
Submerged Endurance at 9 knots . .. 1 hour 
at 2 knots . .. 40 hours 
21 inch Bow Torpedo Tubes .... 4 
Reserve Torpedoes .. .. .... 2 
Guns 
.... .... .. .... 1- 
2 Lewis 
Complement . .... .. .... 24 Officers 8 Men 
Diving Depth .. 00 .. .... 150 feet 
(Submarine intended to replace 'H' class, primarily for use in AIS 
training in addition'to war purposes. ) 
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E6 
R. A. (S)'s PROPOSALS FOR SMALL SUBMARINE FOR A/S TRAINING 
Standard Displacement . .. 410 tons (approx. ) 
Hull .... .. .... Single 
Diving Depth .. .... 150 feet (min. ) 
Torpedo Armament . .... 4-21 inch bow tubes 
4 Torpedoes in tubes plus: 
'Two Spares if possible for war 
only, in which condition crew space 
will. be sacrificed if necessary. ' 
Gun Armament .. .... 2 Lewis guns 
Main Engines .. .... Twin Screws 
480 H. P. (240 H. P. per shaft) 
575 R. P. M. 
Surface Speed .. .... 11- knots 
Cruising Speed .. .... 10 knots 
Surface Endurance .... 2,000 miles at 10 knots 
Submerged Speed .. .... 9 knots 
Submerged Endurance .... 1 hour at full speed; Not less 
than 40 hours at slowest speed. 
Complement .... .... (war) 5 Officers (1 R. N. R. ) 21 Ratings 
(peace) 2 Officers. 21 Ratings 
(27 feet periscopes were also specified and escape hatches rather than 
air locks. Asdic was considered essential for instructing classes of 
submarine personnel in the uses of submarine asdio - one of the functions 
of this type of submarine. Also useful in wartime. ) 
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E7 
COMPARISON OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SUBMARINE 
MINELAYER DESIGNS 1930 
EXTERNAL INTERNAL INTERNAL 
DESIGN DESIGN DESIGN 
(c) (D) (E ) 
Length (overall) 288 feet 296 feet 296 feet 
Displacement (Standard) 1490 tons 1500 tons 1500 tons 
Mines (No. ) 50 40 40 
Engines (B. H. P. ) 5300 1550 2700 
Speed (surface) 15 knots 11' knots 14 knots 
Battery Cells (No. ) 336 536 224 
Motors (B. H. P. ) - 1520 1500 1500 
Speed (Submerged for 1 hour) 8j knots 8 knots 71 knots 
Endurance (2 knots) 40 hours 40 hours 25 hours 
Accommodation Space 1 .9 .5 
Diving Depth 500 feet 500 feet 500 feet 
Cost £580,000 £550,000 £350,000 
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8 Ei 
TABLE SHOWING ACTUAL CAPACITIES OF FREE FLOODING SPACES 
ABOVE SURFACE WATER LINE IN VARIOUS SUBMARINES, TOGETHER WIM 
THEIR PERCENTAGE OF SURFACE DISPLACEMENT. 
A 
Gross free flooding 






'%. 1' .... .... .. 680 2780 24.4 
'K. 26' . .... .... 480 2300 21 
'M. 5' (Pre-conversion) .. 160 1722 9.5 
'M. 5' (Post-converaion) .. 770 1745 44 
'Rainbow' ('R' class) . .. 240 1740 13.6 
New Minelayer (external type) 480 1745 27.5 
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E(g) 
PROPOSED PATROL AND MINELAYING SUBMARINE' 
OF THE 1939 PROGRAMME 




. .. 1.. .. 




H. P. of'Engines:. 
Surface Speed .... 
Surface Endurance 
H. P. of Main Motors 
Submerged Speed for 1 hou 
" Endurance at 5 knot 
Torpedo Tubes .... 
Reserve Torpedoes 
Gun 
.... .. 00 
Mines . .... .. 
Diving Depth .... 
Complement . .... 
218 feet 
.. 185 feet 
25 feet 
15 feet 6 inches (including water around mines) 
815 tons (excluding water around mines) 
.. 727 tons 
.. 1025 tons 
. 1600 
14 knots 
4,000 miles at 10 knots 
1300 
it 9 knots 
,s 36 hours 
.. 6-21 inch bow 
.. 6 
.. 1--5 inch 
.. 12 
.. 300 feet 
60 58 
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APPENDIX F: VARIOUS PROPOSALS ON SUBMARINE TYPES 
F(l) SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS TO AND REPLIES FROM 
C. IN C .'s -ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN FLEETS 
QUESTIONS ATLANTIC MEDITERRANEAN NOTE' 
1) Are you in favour Does not No. The C. in C., 
of a new term . consider a Med., encloses 'Battle Submarine' Battle replies from his 
Submarine commands. They 
of value. do not differ 
2) Does a'Battle in essentials 
Submarine need a speed from his 
of 5 to 6 knots in covering reply. 
excess. 'G' type are 
needed for Fleet 
Submarines. They 
5) Are the advantages may sometimes be 
of a Fleet Submarine Yes _,, able to cooperate 
sufficient to tactically in the 
justify 'G' type'. battle. 
4) Should Patrol 
Submarine be Yee Yes 
'G' class. ' 
5) Are you in favour 
of a small Yes Yes 
submarine. ý_.. 
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p(2) 
OPINIONS SOUGHT ON FIVE MAJOR POINTS CONCERNING 
SEAPLANE-CARRYING SUBMARINES 
1) The need for aircraft . in submarines and the uses to which they 
could be put in war. 
2) The type(s) of submarine(s) in which they should be carried. 
5) If required for patrol submarines, whether all patrol. submarines 
should be so equipped. If not all, what proportion. 
4) whether one (or more) submarines should be specially constructed 
for carrying aircraft, other requirements being reduced in order 
to obtain an aircraft with a better performance than is otherwise 
possible. 
5) The requirements of the aircraft as regards: - endurance, speed, 
ceiling, W/T equipment, armament, etc. 
Admiralty to C. in C. Mediterranean Fleet 
C. in C. Atlantic Fleet 
R. A. (S) 
D. of T. S. 
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APPENDIX G: TABLES OF FLEET STRENGTHS, 
WARTIME LOSSES AND FUTURE CONSTRUCTION 
G(l) PRE- AND POST-WAR BRITISH FLEETS COMPARED 
A B C A B C 
Classes Full Commission Reduced Crews Reserve F. C. R. C. R. 
1920 - 21 1914 
Battleships 16 3 12 50 15 14 
Battle Cruisers 4 - 5 8 - - 
Cruisers - 4 2 18 7 17 
Light Cruisers 57 2 1S 29 19 15 
T. B. D. 's & T. B. 's 90 45 59 107 110 6 
Submarines 53 - 38 66 - - 
Monitors - 5 1 - - - 
Totals 180 55 128 258 151 50 
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G2 








T. B. D. 's 




Axmed Merchant Cruisers 
Armed Boarding Steamers 
Auxiliary Vessels employed in R. N. 
5 Hospital Ship 1 
5 Frozen'Meat Ship 1 
5 Mine carriers 2 
1 Minesweepers 1 
1 Fleet Messengers 6 
11 Commissioned research ships 5 
1 Miscellaneous 2 
7 Colliers 195 
2 Oilers- 55 
4 Special Service Ships 22 
1 Tugs 1 
1 Yachts 2 
11 Admiralty Trawlers S 
9 Hired Trawlers 14 
Hired 'Drifters 5 
62 289 
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c(2) 










U. S. A. 
Greece 
Brazil 






















Total, Neutral Tonnage 
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C. 3 
NAVAL STAFF CALCULATIONS OF UNITED STATES PROPOSALS: 
TOTALS TO BE RECEIVED BY THE THREE NATIONS INVOLVED 
r' 
Submarines Built Building Submerged Surface 
Tonnage Tonnage 
British Empire 93 7 101,261 80,476 
United States 105 57(a) 66,058 53,457 
40,550 50,068 
106,588 83,525 
, Tap an 20 26(b) 14,516 10,959 
28,276 21,260 
42,592 32,219 
(a) Ten projected boats are not included. 
(b) About 60 projected boats are not included. 
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G. (4) 
TEN YEAR BUILDING PROGRAMME (ORIGINAL PROPOSALS) 
SUBMARINES BUILT AND BUILDING 
Submarines Submarines completed Total (Classes) Grand Total 
over-age in preceding during preceding H&R L, M&O JR 7C Year No. ) 
financial year financial year 
Nil L. 69, K. 26 25 29 16- 61 
K. 2, K. 6 L. 23, L. 25, L. 27,25 34 141 1925 65 
L. 55-54. 
K. 14 
H. 21, L. 1-3, L. 7, 
J. 7, K. 12, K. 22. 
H. 25-26, H. 28, L. 5-6, 
L. 8-9, L. 11-12, L. 15-16, 
M. l. 
H. 14-15, H. 22, H. 27, 
H. 29-31, L. 14, L. 17, 
L. 20, R. 10. 
H. 52-54, H. 45-44, H. 47- 
50, H. 52, R. 4, L. 18-19, 
L. 85, L. 56, L. 71. 
L. 21, L. 25, L. 52, M. 2-5. 
L. 22. 
L. 69, K. 26 
L. 25, L. 26-27, L. 55-54, X. l 
- 25 34 151 1926 64 
0.1 24 51 -11 1927 57 
- 19 21 -11 1928 42 
- 11 18 -11 1929 51 
-- 15 -11 1930 15 
--8 -11 1931 10 
--7 -11 1932 9 
--7 -11 1935 9 
--6 --1 1934 7 
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c. ( 5 
ORIGINAL PROPOSALS FOR ANNUAL SUBMARINE 
CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME 1925 - 31 
Programme Year Patrol Submarine Fleet Submarine Cruiser Submarine 
1925-26 8- - 
1926-27 7- 1 
1927-28 44 - 
1928-29 6- 2 
1929-50 6- 2 
1930-51 7- 1 
Total Number of Submarines - 48. 
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c. (6) 
EFFECTIVE SUBMARINE STRENGTH OF BRITISH EMPIRE 
1 APRIL 1928 
GRAPH A 
Assumptions 
1) The effective life of all submarines is twelve years. 
2) Australia maintains two submarines. 
5) Scrapping as approved by the Board till 1April 1950. 
4) Scrapping on reaching twelve years of age after 1 April 1950. 
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Gf6 GRAPH C U. S_. A. 
oa 
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G7 
GOVERNMENT APPROVED SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION 







10' Class Fleet Type Depot Ship 
6 - 1 
6 - - 
6 - 1 
5 1 - 
25 1 2 
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a(8) 
POSITION OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL POWERS ON SUBMARINES 
OVER 600 TONS STANDARD DISPLACEMENT 
BRITISH EMPIRE 
(a) Including 6 'P' class of 1927 Programme 53,576 by 1950 




6 of ? tons (1929) 9p240 
(o) Total 72,056 by 1952 
UNITED STATES 
(a) 580588 by t 1929 
''5 repeat IV' class 8,466 
(b) 
-- - -i, Total 67,054 by 1951 
l 'Neff' of ? tons 2,000? 
(c) Total 69,054? by. 1932?, 
JAPAN 
(a) 71,577 by 1950 





Total 78,497 by 1932? 
FRANCE (Omitting 6 submarines just 12 years old = 4,848 tons) 
(a) and 58,524 by 1930 
(Omitting 12 submarines of 620 tons each) 
1 boat of 747 tons 747 
(b) Total 59,271 by 1931? 
14 boats of various types 21,579 approx. 
(c) Total 80,650 by 1953? 





(b) Believed nil 
4 boats of 837? tons 
25,757 by 1930? 
3,348 
(c) Total 29,085 by 1951? 
The 'standards displacements of French and Italian submarines were 
not known and opinion was that they were probably smaller than figures 
given. The British, American and Japanese figures were as stated at 
the 1927 Geneva (Coolidge) and Conference. 
(a) Denotes tonnage built and building 
(b) Denotes tonnage appropriated for but probably not yet commenced 
(c) Denotes tonnage projeoted only and probably not commenced. 
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G(9) 
SUBMARINE FLEETS OF THE 1950 LONDON 
CONFERENCE POWERS 
Aug. 1914 11 Nov. 1918 Building Dec. 1929 
British Empire 74 157 10 55 
U. S. A. 51 77 2 122 (108) 
Japan 15 16 7 64 
France 54 65 52 59 
Italy 19 78 18 59 
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G9 SUBMARINE FORCES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 
ON 31 DEC. 1929 
Submarines under 13 years of age 
Tonnage Date 
Name (Tons of of 
2,240 lbs. ) Armament 
H. 23 .. 
H. 24 .... 
H. 27 .... 
H. 28 .... 
H. 30 .-.. 
L. 3 .... 
L. 4 .... 
L. 5 .... 
L. 11 .... 
L. 12 .... 
L. 14 .... 
L. 15 ... .. 
L. 16 .... 
L. 17 .... 
H. 31 .... 
H. 32 .... 
H. 33 .... 
H. 34 .... 
H. 43 .... 
H. 48 .... 
H. 49 .... 
R. 4 .... 
L. 18 .... 
L. 19 .... 
L. 20 .... 
L. 33 .... 
L. 56 .... 
H. 44 .... 
H. 50 .... 
L. 21 .... 
L. 25 .... 
L. 71 .... 
M. 2 .... 
M. 3 .... 
L. 22 .... 
L. 52 .... 
L. 69 .. 
K. 26 .. 
L. 23 .. 
L. 54 .. 
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c. (9) Submarines under 13 years of age - continued 
------ 
Guns 
Tonnage Date Calibr Name (Tons f f e o o 
2,240 lbs. ) Armament No. Inches Milli- 
metres 
L. 26 .... 760 1926 1 4" 102 
L. 27 .... 1 4" 102 
Oxley . .. 1,354 1 4" 102 
Otway . .. 1,349 1927 1 4" 102 
Oberon . .. 1,311 1 4" 102 
Odin .... 1 41, 102 
Otus .., .. 1 4" 102 
Orpheus .. 1,475 1929 1 4" 102 
Olympus.. 1 4" 102 
Oswald .. 1 4" 102 
Osiris .. 1 4" 102 
Submarines Building 
Parthian .. 1930 1 4" 102 
Perseus .. 1930 1 4.7" 120 
Poseidon .. 1930 1 4" 102 
Proteus .. "° 1930 1 4" 102 
Pandora .. 1930 1 4" 102 
Phoenix .. 1,475 1930 1 4" 102 
Rainbow- .. 1931 1 4.7" 120 
Regent .. 1931 1 4.7" 120 
Regulus .. 1931 1 4.7" 120 
Rover .... 1931 1 4.7" 120 
is 
Submarines Authorised 
1 vessel .. 1,760 
1 vessel .. 640 
1 vessel .. 640 
Submarines over 13 years of age - NIL. 
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G 10 
CLASSES OF SUBMARINES IN ROYAL NAVY 1932 
Class and Names of Vessels Programme Dis lacement H. P. Speed 
Year (Tons) (Knots) 











Oberon, Otway, Oxley 
WAR 410 2,400 15 
WAR 760 2,400 17 
WAR 845 2,400 172 
WAR 585 240 4 
1921-22 2,425 - 192 
1923-24 1311-1354 2950-5000 15-15j 
'Odin' Class 
Odin, Otus 
Osiris, Olympus 1926 1,475 4,400 17-17'k 
Oswald, Orpheus 
'Parthian' Class - £445,000 at 1930 prices. 
Parthian, Pandora 
Perseus, Phoenix 1927 1,475 4,400 17-171 
Proteus 
tRainbowl Class 
Rainbow, Regent 1928 1,475 4,400 17-172 
Regulus, Rover 
'Swordfish' Class - £270,000 at 1930 prices. 
Swordfish 1929 640 1,550 13A 
Sturgeon (Building) ) 1929 640 1,550 13 
Starfish Building 1930 640 1,550 1ý 
Seahorse (Building 1930 640 1,550 13 
Sealion (Building 1951 670 
6 
1,550 15- 
Shark (Building 1951 70 1,550 14 
Salmon (Building) 1932 640 1,550 134 
'Thames' Class ('G') - 2525,000 at 1950 prices. 










y e C n Bu 1932 , 0 0,000 21 
'Porpoise' Class (Minelayer) - £294,000 at 1930 prices. 
Porpoise Building) 1930 1,500 3,300 15 
Grampus (Building) 1932 1,500 5,300 15 
- 511 - 
G 11 
COMPARISON OF CLASSES ANDr SUITABILITY OF 
C't' °ý9y3i" 
BRITISH SUBMARINES FOR SERVICE IN FAR EAST 
_ 
' L' Class 'Rover' Class 'S' Class 'Thames' Class 
Surface Tonnage 760 1475 650 1775 
Endurance (Miles) 4,000 at 10,000 at 5,600 at 10,000 at 8 knots 
8 knots 8 knots 10 knots 
Speed,,, 17 18 14 21, 
(surface) (13.7) (21.7) 
W/T Range (Miles) 500 800 450 800-1000 
Armament 
Torpedo Tubes 4-21"(Bow) 6-21"(Bow) 6-21"(Bow) 6-21"(Bow) 
2-21"(Stern) 
Torpedoes 8 14 12 12 
Gun... 1-4" 1-4" 1-5" 1-4.7" 
Habitability 
IL' Class: Not good in tropics. 
'Rover' Class: Very good and suitable for tropics. Cooling plant is 
fitted. 
'S''Clässi Will not be good due to lack of space and not being 
fitted with cooling plant; are not very suitable for 
work in the tropics. 
'Thames' Class: Good in tropics. Cooling plant fitted but not battery 
cooling. 
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c. (]. 2) 
PROPOSED BRITISH SUBMARINE FLEET 1939 
(ON COMPLETION OF CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 1ES UP ' 1936) 
3 'G' (River) Class -1 at 1,805 tons; 2 at 1,850 
6 'Porpoise' Class -1 at 1,500; 5 at 1,565 
15 101, TO, and 'R' Class - at 1,475 
5 early '0' Class -1 at 1,311; 1 at 1,349; 1 at 1,554 
15 'S''Class -3 at 640; 12 at 670 







* 1,771 tons short of London Treaty figure for under-age tonnage and 
tonnage replacing boats over-age before December 1959. Assuming no 
further reduction in overall tonnage at proposed 1955 Conference. 
PROPOSED BRITISH SUBMARINE FLEET 1945 
(ASSUMING ANNUAL RATE OF THREE SUBMARINES LAID DOWN) 
3 'G' Class 5,505 
6 'Porpoise' Class 9,525 
+Proposed 20 'P' Type of approximately 1200 tons 24,000 
+ 20 'S' Type of approximately 670 tons 13,440 
49 52,230 
+ The numbers of these dependent on the individual tonnage decided on 
and number of IS' class found necessary. 
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c( 13 
FORECAST OF THE 1936 - 39 SUBMARINE 
CONSTRUCTION PROGRP2XES 
Year IT' Class 'Porpoise' Class 'U' Class 
(Minelayer) 





1939 2-. 2 
* Original Programme in brackets. 
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H1 
APPENDIX H: RESOLUTIONS, DEFINITIONS, 
AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES 
ROOT RESOLUTIONS 
FINAL TREATY FORM 
I 
The Signatory Powers desiring to make more ef'f'ective the rules 
adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals 
and non-combatants at sea in time of war, declare that among those rules 
the following are to be deemed an established part of international law: 
1. A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search 
to determine its character before it can be seized. 
A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuses to 
submit to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed 
after seizure. 
A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and 
,, - passengers have been first placed in safety. 
2. Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt 
from the universal rules above stated; and if a submarine can not 
=- capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules the existing 
law-of nations requires it to desist from attack and from seizure and 
to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested. 
M 
II 
The Signatory Powers invite all other civilized Powers to express 
their assent to the foregoing statement of established law so that there 
may be a clear public understanding throughout the world of the standards 
of conduct by which the public opinion of the world is to pass judgement 
upon future belligerents. 
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H1 
III 
The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating the require- 
ments universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of 
the lives of neutrals and non-combatants, and td the end that the 
prohibition of such use shall be universally accepted as a part of the 
law of nations they declare their assent to such prohibition and invite 
all other nations to adhere thereto. 
Iv 
The Signatory Powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the 
humane rules declared by them with respect to the prohibition of the 
use of submarines in warfare, further declare that any person in the 
service of any of the Powers adopting these rules who shall violate any 
of the rules thus adopted, whether or not such person is under orders 
of a governmental superior shall be deemed to have violated the laws 
of war, and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if on an act of 
piracy, and may be brought to trial before the civil or military 
authorities of any such Powers within the jurisdiction of which he may 
be found. 
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H(2) 
RESOLUTIONS OF 1925 IMPERIAL CONFERENCE 
Submarines 
1. Minimum number required for Empire Defence 78 
2. Present strength (planned up to 1926) 55 
5. Vessels building or to be laid down in 1926 10 
4. Strength on 1 April 1930 57 
(Line 2 plus Line 3 minus submarines reaching 
12 years age limit. ) 
5. Numbers of vessels reaching age limit between 
1 April 1950 and 1 April 1936 42 
6. Strength on 1 April 1936 allowing for no further 
building 15 
(Line 4 minus Line 5. ) 
7. Numbers that should be laid down between 1 April 
1927'and 1 April 1933 to provide on 1 April 1936 
the numbers specified in Line 1.65 
(Line 1 minus Line 6. ) 
8. Projected British programme from 1 April 1927 to 
1 April 1930 18 
9. Deficiency to be made good by additional 
construction commenced before 1 April 1933 45 
(Line 7 minus Line 8. ) 
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H(3) 
ADMIRALTY DEFINITION OF MAJOR -- 
SUBMARINE TYPES, 1930 
1. PATROL SUBMARINE: - Large submarines, of great endurance, for 
patrol and reconnaissance work at considerable distances from their 
base. This work may be combined with attack on enemy 'ssels met with. 
2. --SMALL-TYPE SUBMARINE: - For use in generally similar ways to the 
larger patrol type, but, at shorter distances from. its, base; capable, 
however, of operating in restricted waters, where. the larger type would--- 
be unsuitable. 
3. FLEET SUBMARINE: - Large submarines, of high speed, designed for 
acting in conjunction with their own fleet in shadowing and attacking 
the enemy fleet. 
4. 'CRUISER SUBMARINE: - : Very large submarines, of specially great 
endurance, designed primarily for work on the trade routes ' similarly -` 
to surface-cruising vessels. 
4 
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H4 
THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY, APRIL 22,1950 
INTERNATIONAL TREATY FOR THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION 
OF NAVAL ARMAMENT 
PART Ir 
Article 6 
1. The rules for determining standard displacement prescribed in 
Chapter II,, Part 4 of the Washington Treaty shall apply to all surface 
vessels of war. of each of the High Contracting Parties. 
2. The standard displacement of a submarine is the surface displace- 
went of the vessel complete (exclusive of the water in non-watertight 
structure) fully manned, engined, and equipped ready for sea, including 
all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions for crew, 
miscellaneous stores, and implements of every description that are intended 
to be carried in war, but without fuel, lubricating oil, fresh water or 
ballast water of any kind on board. 
3. Each naval combatant vessel shall be rated at its displacement 
tonnage when in the standard condition. The word 'ton', except in the 
expression 'metric tons', shall be understood to be the ton of 2,240 
pounds (1,016 kilos). 
Article 7 
1. No submarine the standard displacement-'of which exceeds 2,000 tons 
(2,082 metric tons) or with a gun above 5.1 inch (130 mm. ) calibre shall 
be acquired by or constructed by or for any of the High Contracting 
Parties. 
2. Each of the High Contracting Parties may, however, retain, build. 
or acquire a maximum number of three submarines of a standard displacement 
not exceeding 2,800 tons (2,845 metric tons); these submarines may carry 
guns not above 6.1 inch (155 mm. ) calibre. Within this number, France 
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H(41 
may retain one unit, already launched., of 2,880 tons (2,926 metric tons). 
with guns the calibre of which is 8 inches (203 mm. ). 
3. The High Contracting Parties may retain the submarines which they 
possessed on the 1st April, 1950, having a standard displacement not in 
excess of 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) and armed with guns above 
5.1 inch (150 mm. ) calibre. 
4. As from the coming into force of the present Treaty in respect 
of all the High Contracting Parties, no submarine the standard displacement 
of which exceeds 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) or with a gun above 
5.1 inch (130 mm. ) calibre shall be constructed within the jurisdiction 
of any of the High Contracting Parties, except as provided in paragraph 2 
of this Article. 
PART IV 
Article 22 
The following are accepted as established rules of International Law. 
1. In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must 
conform to the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are 
subject. 
2. In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to atop 
on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a 
warship, whether surface vessels or submarine, may not sink or render 
incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed 
passengers, crew and ships papers in a place of safety. For this purpose 
the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety 
of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather 
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H(4) 
conditions, by the proximity ofland, or the presence of another vessel 
which is in a position to take them on board. 
The High Contracting Parties invite all other Powers to express their 
assent to the above rules. 
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H'8 
BASES OF AGREEMENT 
MARCH 1,1931 
PART B VESSELS WHOSE TONNAGE IS REGULATED BY THE TREATY OF LONDON 
France and Italy will conform to the following rules in preparing their 
programmes for construction to be completed before the 51st December, 1936: - 
(e) Submarines 
No further construction other than for completion of the 1930 
programme and for the replacement of tonnage becoming over-age after the 
51st December 1931. Over-age vessels shall be scrapped, except where 
scrapping would result in the total submarine tonnage figure falling 
below the submarine figure mentioned in article 16 of the Treaty of London. 
Subject to a general revision of the naval question in the course of 
the Disarmament Conference of 1952, the tonnage of French, submarines in 
oommission. Rill not exceed, up to the 31st December, 1936, the figure of 
81,989 tons, representing at the present moment the under-age tonnage of 
vessels built or building. The Members of the British Commonwealth Of 
Nations maintain that this figure of 81,989 tons is too high in relation 
to their destroyer tonnage of 150,000 tons under the London Naval Treaty, 
but they agree to notify the other signatories of part III of the Treaty 
of London that they will not have recourse to article 21 of the London 
Treaty pending the general revision of the naval question mentioned above. 
Should it not be possible at the 1932 conference to arrive at a satis- 
factory equilibrium between French submarine tonnage and British Common- 
wealth destroyer tonnage, the Members of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations will retain their right to make such an increase as they may 
judge necessary in their destroyer figure of 150,000 tons. 
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APPENDIX I: BRITISH SUBMARINE DISPOSITIONS 1938 - 1939 
I1 PROPOSED BRITISH SUBMARINE DISPOSITIONS 
JULY 1959 
Base No. of Boats Class 
Portland & Portsmouth 14 9 'H' 
3 'Lt 
2 '0' 
Blyth 9 g'S' 
S '0' 
Middlesborough 9 6 IS, 
3 'U' 
Rosyth (Port Edgar) 14 5 'River' 
8 'T' 
5 'Porpoise' 
(Four 'T' Class due for completion in July 1939) 
Rear Admiral (S) Raikes to Admiral Backhouse, 23 Feb. 1938, 'Review 
of the factors affecting the employment and disposition of submarines in 
a War with Germany. ' 
Revisd& List 




Hartlepool 20 8 'T' 
12 'S' 
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1(2) 
WAR MEMORANDUM 
REA R ADMIRAL(S) No. 05 18 AUG. 1938 
ENCLOSURE No. 2 
PATROL SUBMARINES LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE FOR 
OPERATIONS AND TRAINING IN HOME WATERS 
DURING THE PERIOD AUGUST 1958 TO JUNE 1939 
Submarines Available Submarines Available 
For War Duties For Training 
AUGUST 1938 
6 'S', 3 'L', 5 'H' TOTAL 14 5 '0' ,3 'H' 
SEPTEMBER 1938 
6 'S', 5 'L', 5 '0', 1 'U' TOTAL 15 8 'H' 
OCTOBER 1938 
6 'S', 5 'L', 5 '0', 1'U' TOTAL 15 8 'H' 
NOVEMBER 1958 
6 'S', 5 'L', 5 '0', 2 'U', 1 'T' TOTAL 17 8 'H' 
DECEMBER 1938 
6 'S', 5 'L', 5 '0', 5 'U', 1 'T' TOTAL 18 8 'H' 
JANUARY 1959 
6 'S', 3 'L', 5 '0', 5 'U', 1 'T' TOTAL 18 8 'H' 
FEBRUARY 1939 
6 'S', 5 'L', 5 '0', 5 'U', 2 'T' TOTAL 19 8 'H' 
MARCH 1939 
6 'S', 3 'L', 5 '0', S 'U', 5 'T' TOTAL 22 8 'H' 
APRIL 1939 
6 'S', 5 'L', 5 '0', 5 'U', 7 'T' TOTAL 24 8 'H' 
MAY 1939 
6 'S', 5 'L', 5 '0', 5 'U', 7 IT, TOTAL 24 8 'H' 
JUNE 1959 
6 'S', 5 'L', 5 '0', 5 'U', 8 'T' TOTAL 25 8 'H' 
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I2 
gUBMARINES HOMEWATERS - DISPOSITIONS AUG. 1938 - SEPT. 1939 
WAR ORGANISATION AND DISPOSITIONS OF SUBMARINES 
11 Sept. 25 Sept. 
. Au R. 
1938 1938 11938 
- 5'0' 
Under R. A. (S) who 3'S' 8'S' 8'S' 
in turn under 2'Porpoise - - 
CinC Home Fleets 1'H' 4'H' 
TOTAL 5 14 12 
2'Porpoise 2'Porpoise' 
Amalgamated with 5'L' 3'L' 
6th S. F. under 
Feb. 39 2'H' 
reorganisation 
TOTAL 5 7 
6th S_F_ Mines for SIM 
(Blyth) Minelayer to be 
Details as for 
kept at Blyth and 





5th S. F. 3'S' 
2'L' 
Training Command 
by Captain 5th 
S. F. Admin. by 
R. A. (S) 
(Portsmouth 
and Portland) 
). 1939 Ma. 1939 
2'0' 2'0' 








8'H' 5'H' 2'H' 
i'U' Z'U' 
1' Porpoise', 11T1 
5'0' 3'0' 
+N. C. +N. C. 
TOTAL 158 10+ 8+ 
RESERVE 5' H' 6' H' 
5'0' 
TOTAL 86 
GRAND TOTAL 25 27 29 31 
S. F.: Submarine Flotilla 
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I (2 
SUBMARINE DISPOSITIONS AUG. 1938 - SEPT. 1939 
H014E WATERS AND MEDITERRANE N 
April 1939 July 1939 August 1939 




6 'S' (2 from 2nd SF) 4 'S' 
C. in C. lied- 4 
'T' (3 from I3 to, 
iterranean. 2nd S. F. 
) 
Total 8+5 10 
Atlantic S. F. j2 'River' 
(Temporarily under 
R. A. Gibraltar 
Total 2 
i 
2nd S. E. 'O'(Reserve) 2 'O'(Reserve) 2 10' 
7'S' 7'S' +1'S' 7'S' (Dundee) 3 'Porpoise' in Sept. R. A. (S) under 
C. in C. Home 
1 'River' 1 'River' 
Fleets. 
1'T'+2'T' 1'T' 
in Aug. & Sep. 
Total 12 14 11 
6th S. F. 3 'U' 3 'U' 3 'U' 
(as above) 
3 'L' (or 2 'L' 3 'L' 3 'L' 
+1I HI) 
Total 6 6 6 
5th . F. 8 'H' 
(6 in 9 'H'(Reserve) 9 'H' 
(Training) Reserve) + N. C. 1 'S' (to 2nd SF) 4 'p'(Reserve 2 'T' Portsmouth then to 1st SF) 
and 2 'T' (until 
Portland 
service 
2' S' (+' 
+ N. C. 
Total 16+ 9+ 12 
GRAND TOTAL 1 54 37 39 
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I2 
SUBMARINE DISPOSITIONS IN HOLE WATERS, 
MEDITERRANEAN AND FAR EAST - SEPTD. MER 1939 




Depot Ship - 'M. AIDSTONE' Under Command of 
3 'Porpoise' C. in C. Mediter- 
14 'S' ranean. 
3 '0' 
-- --- -- ---- 
j10 
Depot Ship - 'FORTH' Under R. A. (S) and in 
3 'T' turn under C. in C. 




4th S. F. Depot Ship - '1MEDW ' Under Command of 
(China) 14 10' ' ' 
C. in C. China 




6th S. F.. 
ýDepot 
Ship - 'TITANIA' (as 2nd S. F. ) 
(Blyth) j3 +UI 
' ' ' 2 L +1 H' 
Total 1 6 
ý_____--------- 
5th S. F. Depot Ship - 'ALECTO' Commanded by Capt. (S) 
(Training) 7 'H' +2 'H' 5th S. F. 
Portsmouth 
(Refitting) Admin. by R. A. (3). 
and 
1 'River' 
Portland 1 '0' 
Total 
GIBRALTAR 12 'River' (on passage to 
Freetown) 





GRAND TOTAL 57 
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--APPENDIX J: BIBLIOGRAPHY 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
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specific subjects. 
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ADM: 167: - Files containing the Minutes and Memoranda of the meetings 
of the Board of Admiralty. 
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and tactics, principally asdic, torpedoes and gunnery. In addition there 
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within the Admiralty files. 
CAB: 21,27: - Several files on miscellaneous aspects of naval policy 
all with some connection to submarine policy or construction. 
C. : 29: - These files contain material on the London Naval Conferences, 
much of which is duplication of the information contained in the ADM: l and 
ADM: 116 series. However, there is a limited amount of additional material. 
CAB: 50: - Papers on the 1922 Washington Conference. Once again 
duplication with the ADM: 1 and ADM: 116 series but also some unique material. 
CAB: 33,53,55: - General naval policy during 1930's. 
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H. M. S. 'Dolphin' Archives, Gosport 
Extensive collection of miscellaneous papers on the Submarine 
Service and submarine development, in various stages of being re-cata- 
logued. Therefore the numbers listed may have been altered as the 
documents were examined by the Curator and his staff. Useful material 
on submarine trials, tactics, design modifications, scrapping and } 
construction programmes, weapons development, asdio, as well as quarterly 
and half-yearly Reports. 
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